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Abstract 
 
The  concept  of  journalism  as  a  profession  has  arguably  been  fraught  and  contested 
throughout  its  existence.  Ideologically,  it  is  founded  on  a  claim  to  norms  and  a  code  of  ethics, 
but  in  the  past,  news  media  also  held  material  control  over  mass  communication  through 
broadcast  and  print  which  were  largely  inaccessible  to  most  citizens. 
 
The  Internet  and  social  media  has  created  a  news  environment  where  professional  journalists 
and  their  work  exist  side-by-side  with  non-journalists.  In  this  space,  acts  of  journalism  also 
can  be  and  are  carried  out  by  non-journalists.  Through  the  new  news  distribution  channels 
offered  by  social  media,  non-journalists  are  potentially  able  to  disseminate  their  texts  to  wide 
audiences.  In  practice  this  means  that  journalism  is  no  longer  exclusively  the  domain  of  the 
journalist,  and  has  led  to  the  adoption  of  collaboration  as  a  journalistic  convention  that 
presents  opportunities  but  also  serious  challenges  and  risks  for  the  professional  community. 
 
My  research  aims  to  contribute  to  the  news  discourse  concerning  emerging  professional 
practices  in  networked  journalism  with  a  focus  on  how  journalistic  authority  is  reasserted 
within  a  collaborative  news  environment.  Rather  than  looking  at  networked  journalism  as 
primarily  participatory,  this  research  explores  collaborative  newswork  as  a  means  to  carry  out 
professional  boundary  work  and  to  articulate  this  to  audiences.  I  argue  that  the  act  of 
collaboration  in  newswork  at  times  becomes  a  quasi-ideological  project  to  protect  journalism 
as  a  profession  that  lays  claim  to  ethics,  norms  and  routines. 
 
The  research  comprises  three  case  studies  of  news  stories  covered  by  the  BBC  World  Service 
and  the  English-language  services  of  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera.  Using  quantitative  and 
qualitative  analysis  methods,  they  explore  how  social  media  was  mobilised  in  the  newswork. 
The  aim  was  to  explore  how  sourcing  practices  affected  the  power  relationships  between 
primary  and  secondary  definers,  and  how  journalists  create  and  articulate  professional 
boundaries  in  collaborative  newswork.  These  research  findings  were  triangulated  with 
interviews  with  social  media  editors  at  the  three  news  organisations.  
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1.  Introduction 
The  Internet  has  arguably  thrown  professional  journalism  into  crisis  not  only  by  undermining 
its  commercial  business  model,  with  dwindling  revenue  plaguing  much  of  the  industry,  but  by 
creating  an  environment  that  contests  the  notion  of  professionalism  in  journalism.  Journalists 
as  a  professional  community  have  had  their  exclusivity  as  news  producers  challenged  in  ways 
that  have  not  only  opened  a  space  for  non-professionals  in  newswork  but  that  also  in  some 
ways  come  to  rely  on  them.  Collaborating  with  non-journalists  has  become  an  important  part 
of  almost  all  facets  of  journalism  be  it  on  breaking  news,  societal  issues,  or  human  rights 
abuses.  A  set  of  social  newsgathering  guidelines  adopted  by  the  members  of  the  European 
Broadcasting  Union  illustrate  the  extent  to  which  news  organisations  acknowledge  the  need 
to  adapt  to  this  deprofessionalisation  of  newswork.  
 
[It]  is  recognised  that  in  order  to  provide  a  news  service  that  is  universal,  relevant,  and 
trusted  the  news  content  cannot  just  be  restricted  to  that  which  is  provided  by 
professional  news  organisations  and  must  include  content  from  individuals,  groups 
and  entities  who  are  witnessing  and  filming  news  events  of  interest.  (EBU  2018) 
 
 
With  the  new  interdependence  with  non-journalists  in  the  production  of  newswork,  journalists 
have  had  to  find  new  ways  to  assert  and  demonstrate  their  authority.  This  authority  may  be 
asserted  in  the  form  that  interaction  and  collaboration  take  or  in  the  news  texts  produced  from 
interactive  newswork.  Therefore,  network  journalism  can  arguably  be  viewed  not  only  as  a 
relatively  new  approach  to  newswork  with  the  aim  to  include  non-journalists  in  the  process  of 
news  production,  but,  paradoxically,  as  a  means  by  which  journalists  conduct  professional 
boundary  work.  This  research  seeks  to  investigate  how  three  elite  mainstream  news 
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organisations  --  BBC  World  Service,  France  24  English,  and  Al  Jazeera  English  --  mobilise 
collaboration  through  social  media,  and  the  role  that  boundary  work  plays  in  collaborative 
newswork.  
 
In  the  early  noughties,  there  was  optimism  about  the  democratic  potential  of  what  Jenkins 
dubbed  “convergence  culture”  (2006,  p.  2).  Jenkins  argues  that  barriers  would  be  broken 
down  between  professionalism  and  amateurism  in  newswork,  wresting  control  from  power 
elites  about  who  got  to  speak  to  a  mass  audience.  An  interconnected  digital  world  was  seen  as 
blurring  the  lines  between  media  production  and  consumption.  As  individuals  participated  in 
an  electronic  agora,  they  become  “produsers”  (Bruns  2006,  p.  276)  of  news  content  of  their 
own.  Much  was  made  of  the  supposed  empowerment  of  news  consumers,  who  were 
described  by  Jay  Rosen  (2006)  as  “the  people  formerly  known  as  the  audience”  and  Dan 
Gillmor  (2004)  simply  as  the  “former  audience”.  As  interconnectedness  of  news  consumers 
became  a  prerequisite  for  the  distribution  of  news  products,  news  consumers  were  no  longer 
reduced  to  the  silent  passive  masses  on  the  receiving  end  of  a  predominantly  one-way  mass 
media.  Exploring  how  the  professional  identity  of  journalists  fits  with  convergence  culture, 
Deuze  (2008)  advocated  for  the  opportunities  that  interactivity  and  hybridity  could  present  in 
fostering  participation,  inclusion,  and  higher  standards  in  journalism.  And  yet,  already  then 
he  cautioned  about  “the  tendency  of  institutions  to  adapt  to  innovation  and  change  in  ways  to 
primarily  reproduce  that  what  came  before”  (ibid.,  p.  112).  At  the  end  of  his  paper  he 
concluded  that  journalists  were  “likely  to  respond  nostalgically  and  defensively  to  disruptive 
change”  while  “media  management  tend  to  interpret  such  changes  primarily  in  terms  of  their 
potential  to  ‘depopulate’  the  profession”  (ibid.,  p.  118).  It  is  fair  to  say  that  the  early  euphoria 
from  a  section  of  academics,  who  predicted  a  democratising  effect  on  the  news  media,  has 
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since  been  tempered.  Research  explored  in  the  following  chapter  has  pointed  towards 
professionals  normalising  the  way  in  which  they  mobilise  social  media  for  newsgathering  and 
reporting.  But  perhaps  more  poignantly,  as  concepts  such  as  ‘convergence’  and  ‘hybridity’ 
have  faded  into  the  past,  they  have  been  replaced  with  an  intense  focus  on  what  journalism  is 
and  how  it  sets  itself  apart.  
 
As  I  will  discuss  in  the  literature  review,  challenges  to  the  notion  of  professionalism  in  the 
context  of  journalism  have  been  present  throughout  its  existence,  and  journalists  have  tried  in 
a  number  of  ways  to  claim  the  right  to  authority  through  their  own  interpretive  community. 
From  an  industry  perspective,  the  need  to  define  journalism  as  the  occupation  of  a 
professional  community  is  today  more  pressing  than  ever.  As  a  result,  recent  years  have  seen 
academia  return  to  issues  of  professional  journalism,  such  as  in  Carlson  and  Lewis’s  seminal 
work  Boundaries  of  Journalism  (2015).  Boundary  work  has  assumed  an  important  role  in 
professional  newswork,  given  the  need  to  defend  journalism  as  a  profession  at  a  time  when 
many  acts  of  journalism  can  and  are  carried  out  by  ordinary  members  of  the  public.  My  own 
research  will  argue  that  at  times  boundary  work  is  the  core  meaning  and  pursuit  of 
collaborative  newswork,  making  news  production  a  sort  of  discursive,  quasi-ideological 
project  to  protect  journalism  as  a  profession. 
 
At  the  same  time  as  news  organisations  are  formalising  the  integration  of  interactivity  and 
collaboration  in  professional  routines  and  practices  of  the  mainstream  news  media,  the  value 
of  the  information  shared  by  non-professionals,  and  the  digital  spaces  in  which  they  do  this, 
have  come  under  intense  scrutiny.  The  alternative  news  environment  of  social  media 
platforms,  where  audiences  are  concerned,  have  been  heavily  criticised  both  in  the 
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mainstream  news  media  as  well  as  in  academia.  A  technological  determinism  argues  that  the 
algorithms  of  social  media  platforms  and  search  engines  have  led  to  ‘echo  chambers’  and 
‘filter  bubbles’  that  encase  audiences  in  their  own  prejudices.  This  alleged  balkanization  in 
public  opinion  is  perceived  as  anti-democratic  (Piore  2018;  Wells  2018)  because,  in  the  main, 
democracy  is  understood  as  striving  for  consensus.  Moreover,  the  ability  for  anyone  to 
publish  has  allegedly  led  to  an  epidemic  of  ‘fake  news’  and  ‘misinformation’  published  by 
malignant  actors  and  spurred  on  by  algorithms.  Therefore,  the  alternative  news  environment 
is  perceived  as  a  threat  to  deliberative  democracy  (Zuiderveen  Borgesius  et  al.  2016),  which 
(it  is  implied)  must  be  upheld  by  the  values  of  professional  journalism.  However,  to  what 
extent  these  fears  are  justified  is  debated.  Evidence  on  ‘filter  bubbles’  and  ‘echo  chambers’  is 
not  clear  cut.  For  one,  the  phenomenon  is  difficult  to  measure  empirically  (Knight  2017; 
Zuiderveen  Borgesius  et  al.  2016).  Where  attempts  have  been  made,  the  automated 
personalisation  of  news  content  by  algorithms  has  not  been  found  to  be  the  main  driver  in 
creating  ‘information  cocoons’.  Rather,  self-selection  is  that  driver  (Bakshy  et  al.  2015).  This 
poses  a  much  greater  question  about  how  much  the  human  factor  is  undermining  the 
deliberative  democracy  that  news  media  strives  to  facilitate,  or  how  news  organisations  can 
remedy  this.  But  even  the  extent  to  which  deliberate  selection  by  individuals  achieves  filter 
bubbles  is  disputed  (Hazard  Owen  2018;  Zuiderveen  Borgesius  et  al.  2016).  Nevertheless,  the 
extent  to  which  filter  bubbles  and  misinformation  are  considered  a  threat  to  public  discourse 
was  made  clear  in  a  keynote  address  by  Emily  Bell  (2018)  at  the  ‘News  Assembly’  of  the 
European  Broadcasting  Union.  Bell  called  for  public  service  media  to  engage  in  “collective 
bargaining”  with  social  media  companies,  that  would  see  them  threaten  to  leave  these 
platforms  if  they  did  not  address  these  issues.  There  is  no  doubt  that  Bell  believed  in  the 
moral  impetus  for  such  a  call  to  arms,  but  as  she  was  speaking  in  front  of  an  audience  of  more 
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than  100  editors  from  legacy  news  media,  it  was  evident  that  what  was  also  at  stake  was 
professional  authority  to  define  what  is  acceptable  public  discourse,  and  how  such  discourse 
should  be  conducted. 
 
The  widespread  access  to  the  Internet  has  dramatically  lowered  barriers  to  publishing  and 
broadcasting,  and  social  media  have  had  a  prominent  role  to  play  in  this.  Designed  as 
conduits  for  information  among  the  networks,  or  communities,  of  users  these  platforms  host, 
they  are  a  powerful  tool  for  news  distribution.  More  importantly  though,  they  are  a  tool  that 
has  become  decoupled  from  professional  journalism.  For  better  or  worse,  social  media  create 
a  news  environment  that  is  outside  the  control  of  professional  news  media  and  can  never  be 
fully  shaped  by  them.  As  audiences  increasingly  seek  out  information  and  upload  their  own 
original  news  content  in  this  alternative  new  environment,  professional  news  media  must 
participate  in  it  or  risk  becoming  irrelevant.  Unlike  in  the  past,  the  media  industry  no  longer 
controls  the  distribution  channels,  leaving  journalists  and  non-journalists  to  both  exist  side  by 
side  in  the  same  space.  Non-journalists  also  report,  comment,  adapt  and  edit  a  stream  of 
information  that  is  constantly  transformed  by  each  new  addition  and  alteration.  In  doing  so 
they  often  seek  to  influence,  debate  or  respond  to  the  news  coverage  of  professional 
mainstream  journalism,  which  in  most  cases  still  informs  the  majority  of  this  information 
stream. 
 
As  a  practitioner  specialised  in  social  media  newsgathering,  my  main  area  of  interest  is  in 
how  news  organisations  and  my  colleagues  grapple  with  the  collaborative  nature  of 
newswork  today.  Having  joined  social  media  news  agency  Storyful  in  2011,  I  was  involved  in 
a  small  startup  in  Dublin  that  went  on  to  be  at  the  forefront  of  defining  interactive 
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newsgathering  as  a  professional  practice.  Over  the  subsequent  seven  years,  I  witnessed  this 
new  practice  transform  newsgathering  in  the  industry.  More  importantly  though,  news  media 
over  time  mobilised  to  define  how  collaboration  with  non-journalists  takes  place.  In  2018,  I 
took  on  a  role  as  editor  for  the  EVN  Social  Newswire  at  the  European  Broadcasting  Union, 
where  I  have  been  involved  in  building  a  similar  newsgathering  service  for  public  service 
media.  The  large  volume  of  scholarly  work  that  exists  on  networked  journalism  gives  the 
impression  that  today’s  news  media  is  plugged  into  social  media  and  online  communities  in  a 
sophisticated  and  well-established  way.  Yet,  at  industry  level  my  experience  is  that  for  most 
journalists  social  media  is  still  far  more  unfamiliar  terrain  than  one  might  imagine.  Although 
the  idea  of  collaborative  newswork  is  largely  accepted  –  albeit  sometimes  grudgingly  –  the 
opportunities  that  this  presents  in  newswork  require  journalists  to  rethink  their  role  in  a  way 
that  can  appear  paradoxical.  This  is  especially  true  for  those  who  have  worked  in  this  industry 
for  more  than  half  a  decade.  
 
The  expertise  that  I  gathered  in  my  work  were  based  around  applying  journalistic  practices 
such  as  discovering  and  sourcing  social  media  material  that  was  of  importance  to  news 
audiences,  setting  professional  best  practice  for  verification  of  this  type  of  material,  and 
contextualising  it.  Therefore,  my  professional  work  involves  a   strong  gatekeeping 
component  with  regard  to  sourcing,  selecting  and  framing  social  media  texts  based  on  a 
journalistic  logic.  I  have  been  in  the  role  of  the  journalist  that  manages  collaborative 
newswork,  and,  therefore,  also  have  first-hand  experience  of  its  limitations  within  the 
professional  news  environment.  Throughout  my  career,  I  have  witnessed  (and  participated  in) 
what  I  perceive  as  a  normalisation  of  collaboration  and  a  rhetoric  concerning  the 
professionalisation  of  the  practices  around  it.  
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 Journalists’  claim  to  an  exclusive  professional  community  has  arguably  always  relied  on  their 
role  as  experts  in  relaying  information  to  non-experts  (Carlson  2015,  pp.  8-9).  They  translate 
information  from  elites,  and  probe  them  on  behalf  of  their  audiences  but  also  act  as  stand-in 
citizens  under  the  guise  of  being  the  everyman.  They  consider  it  their  role  to  uncover  and 
report  news  and  opinions  from  one  group  of  citizens  for  another.  In  the  past,  there  was  limited 
scope  for  non-journalists  to  publish  outside  the  mainstream  news  media,  but  as  this  limitation 
crumbles  away,  journalists  are  forced  “to  confront  how  it  is  they  differ  from  other  social 
actors  –  if  at  all”  (ibid.,  p.  9).  Where  Deuze  (2008)  urged  news  media  to  embrace 
collaboration,  journalists  remain  resistant,  which,  I  argue,  is  down  to  the  lack  of  a  shared 
discursive  language  and  conception  about  their  place  in  today’s  news  environment.  As  the 
mechanisms  by  which  the  professional  community  previously  functioned  –   that  is,  almost 
exclusive  access  to  mass  media  –  have  become  less  ubiquitous,  it  has  become  apparent  that 
the  ideological  discourse  around  the  profession  that  was  taken  for  granted  is  in  fact  weak  and 
easily  contested.  Unable  to  return  to  a  time  where  the  technology  for  mass  communication  is 
in  the  hand  of  the  media  industry  alone,  it  can  be  argued  that  professional  journalism  now 
relies  more  than  ever  on  a  robust  ideological  raison  d’etre.  
 
Hujanen  (2016)  explores  the  radical  transition  that  journalists  have  been  asked  to  make  from 
a  discursive  perspective.  On  the  one  hand,  the  discourse  of  professional  journalism  creates 
clear  boundaries  that  grant  journalists  the  exclusive  right  to  produce  journalism.  Based  on  the 
premise  of  autonomy,  the  journalist  is  “represented  as  gatekeeper  towards  economic  and 
political  spheres  of  influence  and  citizens”  (ibid.,  p.  878).  Today,  this  role  of  authority  is 
being  challenged  not  just  by  practical  realities  but,  arguably,  also  ideologically.  Meanwhile, 
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the  discourse  of  citizen  debate  gives  a  physical  expression  of  democracy,  and  acts  as  a 
sub-discourse  to  professional  journalism.  The  term  ‘Fourth  estate’  is  characterised  as  a  pillar 
of  democracy,  and  deemed  essential  to  inform  and  facilitate  public  discourse.  As  social  media 
created  an  alternate  news  environment,  a  news  discourse  centred  around  interactivity  between 
journalists  and  non-journalists  emerged,  where  audiences  “provided  an  additional  workforce 
to  pursue  better  journalism”  (ibid.,  p.  876).  Accepting  the  interdependence  on  non-journalists 
in  newswork,  journalists  share  their  professional  knowledge  with  amateurs  and  incorporate 
them  into  their  logic  of  professional  journalism.  However,  I  believe,  traditional  journalistic 
conventions  are  central  to  shaping  this  interactivity  as  journalists  ‘initiate’  the  amateurs  in 
order  to  integrate  them  into  their  work.  In  fact,  as  collaboration  is  adopted  as  a  new 
convention,  it  can  be  mobilised  and  managed  to  offset  the  risks  that  non-journalists  pose  to 
the  notion  of  professionalism.  By  problematising  the  inclusion  of  non-journalists  and  then 
integrating  them  into  professionalism,  existing  conventions  are  made  visible  in  a  way  that 
was  previously  not  explicit.  Therefore  collaborative  newswork  should  not  necessarily  be 
explored  as  a  means  to  fostering  greater  inclusion  or  better  journalism,  but  perhaps  as  a  way 
to  carry  out  professional  boundary  work. 
 
The  Guardian’s  editor-in-chief  Katharine  Viner  offered  an  illustration  of  the  ambiguous 
relationship  professional  journalism  has  with  the  opportunities  and  challenges  posed  by 
extra-media  voices  and  non-journalists  to  publish  and  broadcast.  Giving  the  A.N.  Smith 
Lecture  in  Journalism  at  the  University  of  Melbourne  in  2013,  Viner  made  a  strong  case  for  a 
mutual  and  reciprocal  relationship  between  professional  journalists  and  news  audiences  that 
appears  to  be  underpinned  by  the  ideology  of  convergence  culture.  Quoting  a  Tow  Center  for 
Digital  Journalism  essay  on  post-industrial  journalism,  she  framed  mainstream  media’s  new 
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role  as  bringing  together  professional  journalists  and  citizens  as  equals.  While  stressing  that 
“there  is  more  a  need  than  ever  for  the  journalist  as  a  ‘truth-teller,  sense-maker,  explainer’” 
(Viner  2013)  she  argued  for  a  much  more  fluid  and  reciprocal  relationship  with  news 
audiences.  For  example,  she  criticised  those  journalists  on  Twitter  who  choose  to  set 
themselves  apart  from  others  with  the  blue  tick  of  personal  verification,  to  lend  their  words  a 
greater  air  of  authority.  With  the  two-way  flow  of  information,  she  argued,  journalists  have  to 
be  prepared  to  climb  into  the  pit  with  everyone  else. 
 
What  if  we  were  to  embrace  the  ecosystem  of  the  web  and  combined  established 
journalistic  techniques  with  new  ways  of  finding,  telling  and  communicating  stories? 
Opened  ourselves  up?  Put  the  people  formerly  known  as  the  audience  at  the  heart  of 
everything?  Combined  the  elite  and  the  street…  and  the  tweet? 
Not  gut  instinct  or  data:  both. 
Not  the  phone  or  Twitter:  both. 
Not  neutral  journalists  or  politicised  journalists:  both. 
Not  original  reporting  or  verification, 
journalists  or  bloggers, 
journalists  or  activists, 
journalists  or  readers. 
The  future  of  journalism,  with  humility,  is  all  of  the  above.  (ibid.) 
 
A  few  years  later  and,  while  still  stressing  the  importance  of  working  with  citizens  in  a 
mutual  and  reciprocal  manner  through  technology,  Viner  shifted  emphasis  on  the  need  to 
fight  for  a  “strong  journalistic  culture”  (Viner,  2016)  and  traditional  news  values.  She 
described  the  open  forum  of  the  Internet  where  all  information  is  seen  as  of  equal  value,  as 
having  created  a  struggle  that  involves  the  “diminishing  status  of  truth”.  At  the  centre  of  her 
argument  lies  the  assertion  that  shared  norms  for  finding  truth  have  been  lost  but  are  essential 
for  an  environment  where  public  consensus  can  be  built.  In  her  view  professional  journalism 
must  be  preserved  and  reinvigorated  in  order  for  it  to  deliver  a  public  service.  This  shift  took 
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place  in  the  space  of  just  three  years  and  coincided  with  other  evidence  of  an  ideological 
shift  from  the  idea  of  convergence  during  this  period  with  the  publication  of  Carlson  and 
Lewis’  (2015)  work  on  professional  boundary-formation  in  journalism.  
 
In  Viner’s  2016  ‘Long  Read’  feature,  journalism  is  seen  to  serve  a  deliberative  democracy 
that  must  facilitate  debate  that  strives  for  consensus,  and  the  only  way  to  achieve  this  is 
through  a  shared  way  of  looking  at  the  world.  It  is  a  view  that  is  common  to  mainstream  news 
media  and  is  underpinned  by  the  idea  of  the  Habermasian  public  sphere  (Habermas  2003), 
where  citizens  engage  in  a  rational  debate  to  seek  the  truth.  In  journalistic  terms  this 
translates  into  news  routines  that  follow  established  methods  that  are  presented  as  natural  and 
which  audiences  have  been  trained  to  read  in  certain  ways.  It  can  be  argued  that  as  it  became 
apparent  that  non-journalists  published  without  deferring  to  these  same  rules,  the  journalistic 
profession  recognised  their  threat.  So  within  a  few  short  years,  the  rhetorical  embrace  of  the 
levelling  of  hierarchies  turned  into  a  stark  warning  about  the  alleged  dangers  this  posed  to 
democracy  and   audiences  were  called  on  to  accept  the  authoritativeness  of  journalists.  But  if 
professional  journalism  sees  it  as  its  role  to  build  consensus  through  a  shared  way  of  seeing, 
then  journalists  are  not  likely  to  deviate  significantly  from  how  they  construct  news  as  a 
community. 
 
The  research  presented  here  deals  with  how  news  organisations  have  adapted  their  routines 
and  processes  to  integrate  social  media  news  content,  and  how  their  journalists  position 
themselves  in  this  interaction.  It  investigates  the  use  of  interactive  newsgathering  and 
collaborative  newswork  by  journalists  across  three  elite  international  news  organisations  that 
are  on  the  one  hand  similar  in  their  global  reach,  and  on  the  other  emerged  from  different 
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media  cultures.  These  are  the  BBC  World  Service,  and  the  English-language  services  of 
France  24  and  Al  Jazeera.  I  examine  the  sourcing  and  gatekeeping  routines  exclusively  with 
regard  to  information  sought  through  social  media,  with  the  aim  to  explore  how  these  affect 
power  relationships  between  sources  and  journalists.  The  research  was  conducted  through  the 
analysis  of  three  separate  case  studies  between  summer  2015  and  the  end  of  2016.  All  of 
them  comprised  news  events  that  had  a  strong  social  media  component  and  were  headline 
news  across  all  three  news  organisations.  These  were  the  Greek  referendum  during  the 
economic  crisis,  coverage  of  the  EU  migrant  crisis,  and  coverage  of  the  final  battle  for 
Aleppo.  All  three  stories  were  at  or  near  the  top  of  the  news  agenda  across  the  three  news 
organisations  during  the  period  examined,  generating  numerous  news  texts,  which  relied  on 
social  media-sourced  content.  Both  quantitative  and  qualitative  analysis  of  these  texts  was 
conducted  to  investigate  what  social  media-sourced  content  was  used  and  how  it  was 
presented.  In  addition,  I  interviewed  social  media  editors  at  the  organisations  to  triangulate 
some  of  the  findings  and  test  them  against  the  editors’  own  rationale  for  collaborative 
newswork.  These  are  presented  in  a  chapter  broken  down  by  themes  addressed  in  the 
interviews,  including  the  outlet’s  formalised  approach  to  the  use  of  social  media, 
agenda-setting,  differences  among  social  media  platforms,  verification  processes,  and  the 
editors’  attitude  towards  professional  guidelines  for  collaborative  newswork. 
 
When  I  set  out  to  do  this  research,  it  was  not  my  intention  to  explore  boundary  work  in 
networked  journalism,  but  rather  to  explore  citizen  participation  in  mainstream  news  media. 
However,  as  the  findings  began  to  present  themselves,  it  soon  became  apparent  that  the  issue 
at  stake  for  the  news  organisations  was  their  justification  and  continued  relevance  in  this 
drastically  changed  news  environment.  Professional  boundary  work  became  the  common 
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thread  that  tied  the  data  together  and,  therefore,  presented  itself  as  the  inevitable  theoretical 
framework  to  underpin  the  discussion  of  my  research.  Firstly,  the  data  from  the  case  studies 
was  examined  with  consideration  to  each  news  organisation’s  own  cultural  logic.  This  meant 
considering  if  and  how  the  norms  of  that  media  culture  were  applied  to  collaborative 
newswork.  Secondly,  the  spread  of  news  organisations  had  the  effect  of  revealing  a  range  of 
evidence  about  the  consequences  of  collaborative  newswork  with  regards  to  whether  it  was 
binding  the  global  professional  community  together  or  diffusing  it.  I  hope  the  findings 
presented  here  will  contribute  to  understanding  of  journalists  have  been  adapting  their 
routines,  practices  and  professional  discourse  to  offset  the  challenges  posed  by 
non-journalists’  ability  to  carry  out  own  journalistic  work.  Specifically,  it  approaches  the 
collaborative  newswork  not  necessarily  as  a  means  to  foster  participation  but  to  carry  out 
professional  boundary  work. 
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2.  Literature  Review 
 
This  chapter  provides  an  overview  of  some  of  the  key  ideas  that  have  evolved  in 
understanding  news  production,  dissemination  and  consumption  in  a  networked  news 
environment.  It  aims  to  explore  two  often  separately  treated  areas  of  media  research:  the 
news  environment  of  social  media  platforms,  and  the  news  environment  and  rationale  of 
legacy  news  media.  A  separation  of  these  two  areas  –  both  in  research  and  theory  –  can  have 
the  effect  of  downplaying  the  journalist’s  participation  in  the  first  as  well  as  the  second.  It  is 
my  aim  to  bridge  this  gap  by  bringing  two  different  logics  together;  that  of  the  professional 
news  environment  on  the  one  hand,  and  that  of  the  user-driven,  collaborative  news 
environment  of  social  networks  on  the  other.  By  combining  different  methodological 
approaches,  I  aim  to  investigating  how  traditional  news  media  and  journalists  deal  with  the 
disruption  caused  by  the  demands  for  interactivity  with  users. 
 
The  need  to  assert  authority  in  order  to  preserve  the  idea  of  professionalism  in  journalism  is 
discussed  through  boundary  work,  which  forms  the  theoretical  framework  of  this  research. 
This  section  discusses  journalists’  claim  to  their  own  interpretive  community  and  the 
mechanisms  by  which  they  define  their  boundaries,  before  further  delving  into  the  evolution 
of  the  role  of  the  journalist,  and  different  conceptions  of  what  a  journalist’s  responsibility  to 
the  public  are.   In  Chapter  3,  I  explore  the  media  models  relevant  to  the  news  organisations 
investigated  in  this  research  and  examine   the  online  news  strategies  defined  by  each  of  the 
organisations  in  order  to  help  contextualise  the  research.  The  specific  media  culture  of  a  news 
organisation  can  be  assumed  to  be  a  contributing  factor  in  how  journalists  at  each 
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organisation  might  define  professionalism.  Therefore,  they  might  affect  the  way  that 
journalists  perform  boundary  work. 
 
Much  of  networked  journalism  among  mainstream  news  media  is  based  on  a  heavy  reliance 
on  Twitter  as  a  newsgathering  tool.  Therefore,  the  following  literature  review  also  entails  a 
discussion  of  how  the  microblog  functions  as  a  social  network.  It  investigates  how 
information  is  shared  by  users;  how  networks  of  users  interact  with  each  other;  and  how 
communication  differs  from  the  one-to-many  broadcasting  style  of  traditional  news  outlets.  It 
then  goes  on  to  discuss  some  of  the  factors  contributing  to  the  emergence  of  elite  users  in  the 
blogosphere  and  how  this  can  be  applied  to  social  media  platforms  relied  on  for 
newsgathering  in  the  research.  An  overview  of  historical  media  traditions  seeks  to  explain  the 
roles  of  news  organisations  in  the  research  and  the  considerations,  responsibilities  and 
obligations  of  their  journalists  in  that  context.  The  following  sections  discuss  the  discourse 
surrounding  ‘ambient  journalism’  and  ‘affective  news  streams’,  which  envisioned  the 
journalist  in  the  role  of  ‘gatewatcher’  rather  than  gatekeeper.  I  aim  to  show  how  greater 
egalitarianism  and  plurality  in  newswork,  which  often  accompanied  these  concepts  in  the 
early  2000s,  is  balanced  with  the  reality  of  a  saturated  news  environment  and  attention 
scarcity  among  audiences.  The  difficulties  faced  by  non-journalists  in  achieving  visibility 
through  social  media,  are  covered  by  the  literature  review  to  return  to  mainstream  news 
media  as  playing  an  enduring  role  in  providing  a  public  sphere.  It  is  this  continued  reliance 
on  mainstream  news  media  in  shaping  news  discourse  that  prompted  me  to  focus  the  research 
on  the  interactive  and  collaborative  nature  of  today’s  professional  newswork.  
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Drawing  boundaries  around  journalism 
 
As  journalists  face  huge  challenges  through  the  widespread  availability  of  technology  that 
enables  almost  anyone  to  record,  publish  and  broadcast,  boundary  work  has  become  integral 
to  protecting  it  as  a  profession.  Ascribing  professionalism  to  journalism  in  the  classic  sense  is 
fraught,  however,  given  that  there  is  no  definitive  path  of  entry  into  the  profession  –  such  as 
through  a  particular  education  or  license  to  practice.  Nevertheless,  journalists  have  long 
sought  to  build  their  own  “interpretive  communities”  that  strive  for  “internal  cohesion  and  the 
right  to  enforce  its  own  exclusivity”  (Carlson  2015,  p.  8) .  Journalistic  professionalism, 
articulated  through  a  set  of  norms  and  routines  is  the  mechanism  that  legitimises   journalists 
as  exclusive  providers  of  knowledge  and  meaning.  (Carlson  2017)  Integral  to  this  is  the 
understanding  that  the  activities  of  journalists  are  a  public  service,  typically  couched  in  the 
belief  that  journalism  is  essential  to  democracy.  
 
Online  news  production  must  perhaps  be  studied  separately  to  other  types  of  news  production 
as  it  comes  with  its  own  culture  as  Deuze  (2009)  has  argued.  In  it  the  journalist  has  taken  on  a 
greater  role  as  “individual  meaning  makers”  and  the  hierarchical  structures  of  more 
traditional  news  formats  gives  “way  to  new  practices  and  ways  of  working  under  the 
influence  of  current  social  and  technological  trends”  (p.  84).  However,  as  this  text  is  already 
10  years  old,  and  online  news  has  become  ubiquitous,  I  argue  that  these  practices  and  routines 
now  form  a  core  part  of  the  newswork  overall.  While  Deuze  discusses  the  “individualization 
of  labour”  (p.  90)  --  meaning  the  precariousness  of  journalism  through  individualised 
contracts  and  multi-skilling,  where  workers  are  expected  to  act  as  entrepreneurs  --  he  argues 
that  these  types  of  journalists  are  no  longer  initiated  into  the  profession  in  the  conventional 
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apprentice  model  but  rather  form  their  understanding  of  a  professional  community  in  a  way 
that  is  more  removed  from  the  traditional  newsroom.  This  is  an  important  argument  to  this 
research  in  that  it  acknowledges  the  precarity  of  the  journalist  as  a  wage  labourer  amid  the 
break-down  of  traditional  ways  of  socializing  young  journalists,  and  the  emergence  of  new 
ways  of  forming  and  articulating  boundary  work  in  order  to  lay  claim  to  an  interpretive 
community.  Therefore,  I  argue  that  precarity  in  a  collaborative  news  environment  and  new 
articulations  of  boundary  work  may  be  interlinked,  and  may  lead  journalists  to  perform 
boundary  work  as  a  type  of  self-promotion.  Moreover,  the  fear  of  loss  of  livelihood  feeds 
directly  into  how  boundary  work  is  performed,  perhaps  putting  survival  of  the  profession 
above  the  more  esoteric  norms  and  conventions  of  journalism.  As  such  boundary  work  may 
be  taking  place,  particularly  in  relation  to  factors  that  are  seen  as  a  threat  to  the  exclusivity 
and  authority  of  professional  journalists  rather  than  all  aspects  of  practices  such  as  sourcing 
and  agenda-setting  equally.  
 
Perhaps  provocatively,  Hanitzsch  and  Vos  say  journalism  has  “no  ‘true’  essence”  (Hanitzsch 
&  Vos  2017 ,  p.  127).  They  argue  it  is  an  institution  that  is  shaped  by  the  discourse  of  internal 
and  external  actors,  and  that  defines  normative  roles  and  ideas  which  evolve  and  drastically 
change  over  time.  Moreover,  norms  differ  according  to  location  and  context.  For  example, 
research  on  climate  change  journalism  showed  Philippine  news  media  to  deviate  from  norms 
embodied  in  Western  news  media  (Evans  2016) .  Therefore,  professional  ideals  of  journalism 
are  a  site  of  struggle  for  authority  in  shaping  this  discourse  while  the  community  is  primarily 
held  together  by  its  functioning  as  an  institution.  However,  a  growing  trend  of 
universalisation  of  norms  was  observed  in  the  early  2000s  (Hafez  2002) .  And  many  Western 
normative  ideas  about  journalism  have  resonated  with  professional  communities  in  other 
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societies,  especially  in  regards  to  truth-telling,  objectivity  and  independence  (Pintak  & 
Ginges  2009) .  In  fact,  I  believe,  the  nature  of  networked  journalism  has  contributed  to  a 
transnational  journalism  culture  that  is  yet  to  be  fully  understood.  It  has  prompted  new 
analytical  models  to  study  how  norms  are  shared  or  not  in  this  culture  (Hellmueller  et  al. 
2017) .  This  research  analyses  news  texts  from  organisations  from  different  media  systems  or 
cultures  (discussed  in  Chapter  3),  attempting  to  explore  differences  and  similarities  in  the 
news  output  of  networked  journalism  through  empirical  and  textual  analysis.   Deuze  and 
Witschge  (2017)  argue  that  to  understand  present-day  journalism  requires  looking  “beyond 
boundaries”  (p.  177).  Journalists  often  carry  out  newswork  away  from  the  newsroom  (the 
former  locus  of  professional  journalism)  which,  nevertheless,  continues  to  define  the 
perception  of  what  journalism  looks  like.  Journalists  today  are  often  entrepreneurs  without 
the  security  of  permanence  at  an  organisation,  collaborating  with  non-journalists  in 
newswork,  and  are  required  to  constantly  adapt  their  skills  in  a  permanently  evolving  and 
changing  news  environment.  Despite  the  extreme  precarity  they  face,  journalists  continue  to 
adapt  in  what  may  only  be  described  as  dogged  devotion  to  a  set  of  ideals  and  values  they 
attach  to  their  work.  It  is  argued  here  that  this  normative  ideology  fostered  in  journalism  is 
perhaps  the  most  persistent  form  of  boundary  work  there  is.  It  is  consistently  underpinned 
with  public  discourse  about  a  range  of  professional  norms  and  routines  that  takes  place  not 
only  inside  the  professional  community  but  is  increasingly  expressed  outwards  by  journalists. 
This  makes  a  case  for  further  exploring  boundary  work  not  only  as  a  set  of  pseudo-norms, 
which  only  have  the  appearance  of  normative  behaviour  and  ideas,  but  as  a  persistent 
coherence  to  professional  journalism.  However,  it  appears  that  what  those  norms  and 
practices  are  remains  difficult  to  pin  down  in  any  definitive  way.  The  hybrid  nature  of 
networked  journalism  (Bruns  2006;  Bruns  &  Highfield,  2012;  Chadwick  2011a;  Hermida 
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2010a;  Papacharissi  2015)  has  undermined  the  very  concept  of  newswork  as  a  professional 
occupation  in  academia.  With  so  many  actors  involved  in  newswork,  the  questions,  ‘What  is 
journalism?’  and  ‘Who  is  a  journalist?’  seem  to  become  increasingly  impossible  to  answer. 
Yet  Witschge  et  al.  (2018)  argue  “the  norms  that  govern  journalism  practices  and  theories 
transcend  the  interactions  between  actors  in  a  way  that  deserves  more  scholarly  attention: 
they  are  powerful  in  structuring  relationships  because  they  are  shared  references  that  connect 
present,  current  practices  with  ideals,  old  and  new”  (p.  5).  However,  today’s  news 
environment  has  also  arguably  given  rise  to  new  normative  behaviour  and  ideas,  perhaps 
belying  the  notion  of  norms  that  remain  constant  and  transcendental.  For  example,  the 
long-standing  norm  of  objectivity  has  been  contested  through  the  emergence  of  transparency 
as  a  “discursively  constructed”  journalistic  norm  (Vos  &  Craft  2017,  p.  1514).  The  authors 
argue  that  transparency  has  not  been  presented  as  an  additional  norm  but  is  inherently  placed 
in  opposition  to  objectivity.  This  arguably  suggests  a  fundamental  shift  in  normative  ideas 
taking  place  and  suggests  boundary  work  can  be  explored  as  a  set  of  shifting  and  maleable 
norms  and  practices. 
 
At  a  time  where  the  news  media  no  longer  holds  the  monopoly  on  speaking  to  a  mass 
audience  “[t]he  survival  of  journalism  as  an  occupation  depends  on  its  credibility,  which  is 
gained  through  the  collective  behavior  of  its  practitioners”  (Singer  2015,  p.  22) .  Certainly, 
among  the  major  news  organisations  studied  here  a  significant  crossover  in  norms  can  be 
reasonably  assumed  due  to  the  arguably  disproportional  influence  of  Western  news  media  on 
the  global  news  flow.  However,  the  extent  to  which  boundary  work  is  performed  in  a 
monolithic  way  is  debatable  as  different  logics  are  coming  up  against  each  other.  Earlier,  I 
referred  to  how  journalists  themselves  have  begun  to  play  a  greater  role  in  defining  practices 
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away  from  the  newsroom.  However,  this  is  not  to  say  that  control  over  what  is  published  and 
how  does  not  still  often  rest  with  news  organisations  and  therefore  with  the  institutions  of 
journalism.  And  Deuze  also  maintains  that  institutions  continue  to  play  a  central  role.  For 
example,  Palmer  (2015)  describes  how  two  freelance  war  correspondents  were  delegitimized 
by  American  news  networks,  when  their  reports  did  not  match  the  dominant  narrative  on  the 
conflicts  they  reported.  The  cases  described  by  her  describe  a  conflict  between  the  boundary 
work  of  the  reporters,  which  was  found  in  practices  and  values  such  as  to  bear  witness  and 
speak  truth  to  power,  while  the  networks  ultimately  distanced  themselves  from  the  journalists, 
describing  them  as  freelancers  (in  other  words,  outside  the  trusted  circle  of  professional  staff), 
and  even  framed  them  as  potential  activists  (falling  foul  of  the  journalistic  norm  of 
impartiality).  So  the  boundary  work  of  specific  journalists  was  not  paramount  but  secondary 
to  what  was  admissible  as  news  reporting  for  the  news  organisations.  However,  I  believe  that 
Singer’s  argument  that  journalism  is  increasingly  dependent  on  collective  behaviour  warrants 
exploration,  specifically  in  how  this  ties  in  with  journalists  interdependence  with  news 
organisations.  My  point  is  that  between  the  claim  by  the  institutions  of  journalism  to  be  able 
to  define  the  parametres  of  boundary  work  in  order  to  maintain  their  dominance  in  a  much 
more  diversified  news  environment,  and  the  more  self-directed  approach  to  defining  practices 
and  routines  by  a  workforce  in  precarious  employment,  a  space  may  be  opened  up  where 
boundary  work  is  driven  by  survival  rather  than  ideals.  Pivotally,  I  suggest  that  survival  and 
ideals  may  not  necessarily  be  as  interlinked  as  Singer  suggests.  
 
Carlson  (2015)  draws  on  Gieryn  (1983)  to  describe  the  three  types  of  boundary  work 
journalists  collectively  carry  out  –  expansion,  expulsion,  and  protection  of  autonomy  –  and 
the  three  areas  that  these  are  enacted  upon  –  participants,  practices,  and  professionalism 
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(2015,  p.  9).  For  example,  expansion  can  mean  widening  access  to  journalism  to 
non-journalists,  incorporating  new  news  production  routines,  and  extending  journalism  to 
new  types  of  media.  Expulsion  may  mean  expelling  actors,  practices  or  values  that  are 
considered  deviant.  Protection  of  autonomy  refers  to  the  ability  to  keep  out  actors  that  may 
conflict  with  the  values  and  practices  of  the  profession,  such  as  public  relations  professionals, 
management,  and  to  define  the  accepted  practices  of  the  profession.  Since  digital  media 
assumed  a  prominent  role  in  news  in  the  early  2000s,  journalists  have  been  increasingly 
expressing  the  importance  of  their  work  through  professional  norms.  One  of  the 
characteristics  of  this  discourse  is  an  ‘us  versus  them’  dichotomy,  that  seeks  to  discredit  the 
authoritativeness  of  the  non-journalist  information  producers  through  these  norms  (Singer 
2015).  However,  what  shape  this  dichotomy  takes  and  to  what  extent  it  excludes 
non-journalists  from  newswork  sanctioned  by  professionals  is  continually  changing  as 
journalists  try  to  find  ways  to  include  information  produced  by  non-professionals.  Networked 
journalism,  that  is  the  collaboration  between  journalists  and  citizens  (Jarvis  2006),  is  still 
governed  by  a  hierarchy  of  influence,  as  Reese  and  Shoemaker  (2016)  argue.  In  the  context  of 
this  research,  networked  journalism  may  be  better  understood  as  collaboration  between 
journalists  and  extra-media  actors.  Van  der  Haak  et  al.  (2012)  describes  it  as  “networks  of 
various  professionals  and  citizens  collaborating,  corroborating,  correcting,  and  ultimately 
distilling  the  essence  of  the  story  that  will  be  told”  (p.  2927).  
 
Although  the  news  environment  has  been  restructured,  hierarchical  power  is  in  many  places 
reasserting  itself  through  the  relationships  formed  between  actors  in  these  networks  (Reese  & 
Shoemaker  2016).  Therefore,  networks  do  not  necessarily  undermine  hierarchy  as 
“relationships  are  still  conditioned  by  larger  systemic  factors”  (ibid.,  p.  406).  For  example, 
25 
while  journalists  are  joining  networks  that  collaborate  on  news  production,  their  participation 
in  these  relationships  is  shaped  by  their  understanding  of  their  role  as  journalists.  As 
journalists  are  resorting  to  employing  non-journalists  in  news  production,  their 
“‘second-order’  newswork  still  maintains  a  professional  ethos,  distant  from  the  eyewitness 
field-reporting  professionals  have  always  valorized,  yet  still  holding  that  ethos  as  an 
aspiration”  (ibid.,  p.  400).  Their  networks  are  shaped  by  the  relationships  they  seek  out  and 
nurture,  but  also  how  they  interact  with  different  actors  in  it  and  what  position  they  take.  One 
study  found  journalists  would  apply  their  professional  norms  and  roles,  as  providers  of 
information,  and  agenda-setters  and  gatekeepers  of  public  discourse,  to  their  use  of  Twitter 
hashtags  (Enli  &  Simonsen  2018) .  Journalists  were  found  to  take  considerable  initiative  in 
producing  original  content  for  Twitter  and  took  a  lead  in  shaping  discourse  in  their  own 
networks.  Their  use  of  hashtags  was  mainly  designed  to  propel  their  original  newswork  to 
audiences  beyond  their  immediate  follower  network.  
 
Although  impartiality  (if  understood  in  terms  of  not  opining)  has  in  many  places  lost 
importance  as  a  professional  norm,  as  a  value  it  continues  to  be  of  utmost  relevance  in  almost 
all  journalistic  work  that  incorporates  social  media  news  content  and  is  most  evident  in  the 
practice  of  verification.  Verification  of  social  media-sourced  material,  especially  videos  or 
photos,  is  often  presented  as  only  relaying  the  hard  facts  about  this  type  of  material.  It 
involves  determining  bias  of  a  source,  verifying  claims  made  by  the  producer  and 
determining  authenticity  (Middleton  2016),  all  suggesting  a  strong  emphasis  on  impartiality. 
To  a  great  extent  journalists  continue  to  lay  claim  to  exclusivity  as  news  providers  through 
promising  reliability,  accuracy  and  authenticity  (Hermida  2015) .  In  a  real-time  24/7  news 
environment  this  can  present  huge  challenges.  Therefore,  routines  are  being  adapted  to 
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networked  journalism  that  can  withstand  inaccuracies.  Verification  becomes  a  quest  for 
reliable  information,  with  accuracy  as  its  end  goal.  Trust  in  the  journalist  is  primarily  fostered 
through  transparency.  The  journalist  is  a  “trusted  professional  who  is  transparent  about  how  a 
news  story  comes  together,  with  accounts  and  rumors  contested,  denied  or  verified  in 
collaboration  with  the  public”  (ibid.,  p.  47).The  hot  button  issue  of  what  was  first  referred  to 
as  ‘fake  news’  --  and  more  recently  ‘misinformation,  or  ‘disinformation’  --  has  been  used 
extensively  for  boundary  work  as  mainstream  news  media  has  problematised  misinformation 
through  deviant  practices  in  news  production  by  non-journalists,  framing  it  as  a  threat  to  the 
proper  functioning  of  democratic  societies .  Misinformation  has  dominated  industry 1
conferences  and  been  used  to  leverage  the  emergence  of  new  specialist  journalistic  roles 
focused  on  sourcing  and  verifying  social  media  news  content .  Tech  giants  such  as  Facebook 2
and  Google  have  come  under  heavy  criticism  for  enabling  the  spread  of  so-called 
‘misinformation’  and  research  has  looked  at  how  news  outlets  have  tried  to  label  Facebook  as 
a  news  organisation,  drawing  it  into  the  boundaries  of  journalism,  in  order  to  then  criticise  it 
as  deviant  (Johnson  &  Kelling  2017) . 
 
Despite  the  disruption  that  social  media  as  publishing  platforms  have  caused,  journalists’ 
persisting  ability  to  define  professional  boundaries  is  shown  in  the  way  that  sources’  continue 
1  In  Western  societies,  almost  all  journalistic  roles  are  typically  framed  by  the  normative  ideology  that 
journalism  facilitates  democracy  (Carlson  2017;  Christians  et  al.  2010;  Haak  et  al.  2012)  though  this 
has  been  argued  to  be  too  limiting  to  understanding  journalism  in  the  21st  century  (Josephi  2013). 
2  Three  examples  of  companies  or  news  departments  specialised  in  sourcing  and  authenticating  social 
media  content  are  social  media  news  agency  Storyful,  the  BBC’s  UGC  Hub,  and  the  European 
Broadcasting  Union’s  Eurovision  Social  Newswire. 
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to  struggle  for  the  attention  of  journalists.  They  do  this  through  long-established  means,  such 
as  press  releases,  press  conferences,  easily  appropriated  multimedia  material  and  availability 
to  answer  questions  for  journalists  (Domingo  &  Le  Cam  2015) .  In  other  words,  actors 
looking  for  publicity  continue  to  speak  to  journalists  in  the  ‘language’  most  likely  to  grant 
them  access  to  their  institutions,  and  deem  representation  in  the  mainstream  news  media  as 
important.  This  can  be  argued  to  show  that  professional  journalism  continues  to  be  seen  as  a 
vital  medium  to  reach  the  wider  public,  while  other  channels  are  considered  less  influential. 
Nevertheless,  these  practices  have  also  come  to  be  coupled  with  news  production  that  takes 
place  outside  the  mainstream  news  media  such  as  on  social  networking  sites.  In  addition  to 
this  alternative  news  production,  popularity  on  social  media  can  feed  back  into  the 
mainstream  news  narrative. 
 
While  boundary  work  is  core  to  ring-fencing  journalism  as  an  occupation,  journalists  also 
engage  in  straightforward  self-promotion  by  cultivating  their  social  media  personas.  Research 
shows  that  journalists’  Twitter  activity  mixes  private  and  professional  information,  which 
means  boundaries  between  what  are  deemed  sanctioned  professional  practices  and 
non-professional  practices  blur  (Molyneux  et  al.  2018) .  And  this  too,  I  argue,  can  be 
understood  as  evidence  of  a  kind  of  boundary  work,  albeit  one  that  is  not  based  on 
professional  norms  per  se,  but  on  celebrity  status.  Journalists  perceive  themselves  as 
professionals  engaging  in  public  relations  activity  with  their  audience,  where  they  create  a 
more  personal  feel  and  look  to  engage  audiences,  while  at  the  same  time  their  occupation 
plays  an  important  role  in  their  image-building.  This  is  to  say  that  the  act  of  branding  shows 
they  understand  themselves  as  members  of  an  exclusive  professional  community  and  engage 
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in  some  form  of  self-promotion  that  always  implicitly  has  their  professional  work  at  the 
centre  of  their  social  media  persona. 
 
This  section  has  attempted  to  provide  an  overview  of  the  concept  of  professionalism  in 
journalism  and  how  this  may  be  defined.  I  argue  that  the  norms  and  routines  that  govern  the 
professional  community  are  very  fluid.  However,  this  does  not  prevent  the  use  of  a  range  of 
practices  by  which  boundary  work  is  conducted  to  produce  an  ‘othering’  of  non-journalists. 
Perhaps  the  most  enduring  form  of  boundary  work  is  the  ideology  of  journalists  as  an 
autonomous  interpretive  communities  that  defines  its  own  standards.  This  community  is  in 
part  centred  around  the  idea  of  the  newsroom  although  for  many  journalists  it  is  arguably 
more  of  a  nostalgic  concept  than  a  lived  reality,  perhaps  contributing  to  the  formation  of  a 
type  of  imagined  community. 
 
The  journalist 
 
To  explore  some  contrasting  perceptions  of  an  ideal  of  the  journalist,  theorist  Geraldine 
Muhlmann  (2010)  has  referenced  Charles  Baudelaire  and  Walter  Benjamin  to  offer  differing 
views  of  the  personas  that  embody  the  journalist.  I  want  to  describe  these  as  they  reveal  some 
of  the  discursive  and  ideological  conflicts  at  the  heart  of  journalism,  and  also  add  to  the 
historical  context  that  runs  through  the  profession.  This  section  is  attempting  to  contextualise 
the  boundaries,  norms  and  values  that  journalism  claims  to  give  it  authority  and  legitimacy. 
 
First,  the  notion  of  the  impartial  observer,  typically  conceived  of  as  a  cornerstone  of  good 
journalism  (Kovach  &  Rosenstiel  2007),  is  eloquently  described,  as  Muhlmann  suggests,  in 
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Baudelaire’s  1864  essay  ‘The  Painter  of  Modern  Life’.  In  describing  the  ‘perfect  flâneur’, 
Baudelaire  seeks  to  sketch  out  the  characteristics  of  an  artist  who  is  able  to  distill  the  essence 
of  contemporary  life  in  their  work. 
 
For  the  perfect  flâneur,  for  the  passionate  spectator,  it  is  an  immense  joy  to  set  up 
house  in  the  heart  of  the  multitude,  amid  the  ebb  and  flow  of  movement,  in  the  midst 
of  the  fugitive  and  the  infinite.  To  be  away  from  home  and  yet  to  feel  oneself 
everywhere  at  home;  to  see  the  world,  to  be  at  the  centre  of  the  world,  and  yet  to 
remain  hidden  from  the  world  –  such  are  a  few  of  the  slightest  pleasures  of  these 
independent,  passionate,  impartial  natures  which  the  tongue  can  but  clumsily  define. 
(Baudelaire  1995,  p.  9) 
 
Applied  to  the  journalist,  Baudelaire  describes  a  person,  who  both  actively  participates  in  the 
world,  but  through  a  lense  of  disinterest.  Far  from  being  ‘blasé’  though,  he  has  an  enthusiasm 
for  what  he  observes  and  is  driven  by  the  desire  to  condense  it  to  its  most  essential 
characteristic  and  elements. 
 
He  is  looking  for  the  quality  that  you  must  allow  me  to  call  ‘modernity’  for  I  have  no 
better  word  to  express  the  idea  I  have  in  mind.  He  makes  it  his  business  to  extract 
from  fashion  whatever  element  it  may  contain  of  poetry  within  history,  to  distill  the 
eternal  from  the  transitory.  (ibid.,  p.  12) 
 
Once  applied  to  social  media,  the  designation  of  the  journalist  as  a  disinterested  observer 
might  envisage  them  as  seeking  to  “separate  the  noise  from  the  news  of  social  conversations ” 
(Little  2015),  as  the  founder  of  social  media  news  agency  worded  it.  The  aim  is  not  to 
represent  the  full  array  of  voices  in  all  their  conversations,  but  to  capture  that  which  is 
considered  newsworthy  by  the  journalist.  Through  monitoring  and  engaging  with  users  on 
social  media  platforms,  the  networked  journalist  filters  information  from  the  multitude  of 
voices  competing  for  attention  and  seeks  to  make  sense  of  them.  This  suggests  that  if  done  in 
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the  vein  of  the  ‘perfect  flâneur’,  they  participate  in  this  space  by  being  at  the  centre  of  it 
while  also  acting  as  a  spectator.  In  short,  there  is  an  independence  of  spirit.  This  kind  of 
sense-making  can  be  seen  in  action  on  many  journalist’s  Twitter  streams,  as  they  pick  out 
information,  contextualise  and  comment  on  it.  At  the  same  time,  there  is  also  a  collaborative 
sensemaking  taking  place  between  journalists,  laying  bare  an  interdependence  between  them 
to  share  knowledge  and  sources  in  order  to  arrive  at  a  version  of  the  truth.  Journalists  are 
bound  together  in  a  way  that  runs  counter  to  the  independence  and  remove  that  Baudelaire 
describes. 
 
Baudelaire  makes  it  clear  that  the  character  he  describes  is  not  indifferent  but  a  ‘moral’ 
person ;  someone  who  seeks  to  reveal  a  fundamental  truth.  His  essay  reveals  an  idealised 3
view  of  what  an  observer  of  the  world  should  be.  Therefore,  he  preempted  an  important 
quality  found  in  the  professionalisation  of  journalism  in  the  first  half  of  the  20th  century  that 
elevated  the  quest  for  objectivity.  This  professionalization  created  prestige  for  journalists  as 
reporting  began  to  be  seen  as  a  quasi  scientific  pursuit  with  well-defined  techniques  and 
methods,  deemed  to  arrive  at  a  truthful  and  comprehensive  version  of  events.  The  claim  to 
objective  reporting,  for  example,  illustrates  the  desire  to  legitimize  journalism  in  a  scientific 
manner.  It  was  not  the  journalist  who  was  required  to  be  objective  in  their  view  but  rather  the 
aim  was  for  him  or  her  to  apply  objective  methods  to  reporting  (Kovach  &  Rosenstiel  2007, 
p.  88). 
 
3  “The  dandy  is  blasé  or  pretends  to  be  so,  for  reasons  of  policy  and  caste.  Monsieur  G.  has  a  horror  of 
blasé  people”  (ibid.,  p.  9).  Baudelaire  goes  on  to  compare  this  idealised  character  to  a  philosopher, 
hampered  by  his  distaste  for  the  abstract. 
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German  critic  Walter  Benjamin  argued  that  this  aim  for  disinterest  and  remove  is  precisely 
what  prevents  the  press  from  challenging  power  relations  in  society.  As  a  Marxist,  he  argued 
that  the  intellectual  bourgeois  writer  at  best  only  feigns  allegiance  with  the  working  class. 
Unless  he  is  prepared  to  convert  his  words  into  actions,  the  writer  is  described  as  parasitic, 
benefiting  from  the  hegemonic  order  that  sustains  existing  conditions. 
 
For  we  are  confronted  with  the  fact  […]  that  the  bourgeois  apparatus  of  production 
and  publication  is  capable  of  assimilating,  indeed  of  propagating,  an  astonishing 
amount  of  revolutionary  themes  without  ever  seriously  putting  into  question  its  own 
continued  existence  or  that  of  the  class  which  owns  it.  (Benjamin  1998,  p.  94) 
 
Benjamin  outlines  an  alternative  to  this  in  his  description  of  the  ‘operative  writer’,  who, 
through  his  work,  actively  counters  the  conditions  he  denounces.  “His  mission  is  not  to 
report,  but  to  struggle;  he  does  not  play  the  role  of  spectator,  but  actively  intervenes.  He 
defines  his  task  through  the  statement  he  makes  about  his  activity”  (ibid.,  p.  88). 
Unsurprisingly  then,  Benjamin  disagrees  with  the  professionalisation  of  journalism  that  he 
argues  turns  it  into  an  exclusive  club.  Instead,  he  lauds  the  press  that  breaks  down  the  “the 
distinction  between  author  and  public”  and  where  “authority  to  write  is  no  longer  founded  in 
the  specialist  training  but  in  a  polytechnical  one,  and  so  becomes  common  property”  (ibid.  p. 
90).  More  than  60  years  after  Benjamin’s  death,  the  Internet  has  finally  produced  the  means 
by  which  this  deprofessionalisation  in  mass  communication  is  a  genuine  possibility. 
Professionalism  today  is  the  dividing  line  drawn  between  journalists  and  non-journalists, 
designed  to  elevate  the  journalists’  voice  above  others,  giving  it  a  claim  to  authority  in  and  of 
itself,  rather  than  those  who  previously  laid  claim  to  this  status.  Therefore,  the  journalist  is 
also  engaged  in  a  struggle  that  is  mainly  focused  on  the  interests  of  his  own  group; 
professional  journalists.  
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 Reverting  back  to  the  claims  of  impartiality  and  objectivity,  Glasser  and  Marken  (2005) 
elaborate  on  the  way  by  which  professonalisation  of  journalism  has  structurally  limited 
diversity  in  the  news  media,  without  denying  access  to  any  particular  group.  They  write  that 
“professionalisation  means  standardization,  it  accounts  not  for  differences  among  individuals 
but  for  what  individuals  have  in  common”  (ibid.,  p.  270).  Therefore,  a  byproduct  of  common 
professional  codes,  norms  and  routines  is  the  reinforcement  of  a  universal  process  to  arrive  at 
the  Truth  that  tends  to  underscore  rather  than  challenge  the  status  quo.   With  journalists 
required  to  remove  themselves  from  their  reporting  and  apply  standardized  norms  they  are 
limited  in  how  they  can  account  for  differences  and  alternative  views,  undermining  efforts  to 
diversify  the  voices  that  are  heard.  
 
The  recent  and  long  overdue  move  to  diversify  American  newsrooms  [...]  rests  on  the 
premise  that  different  kinds  of  people,  experiencing  the  world,  in  different  ways,  will 
bring  to  the  newsroom  new  and  different  interests.  But  this  runs  foul  of  the  premise  of 
professionalism,  which  in  the  United  States  posits  a  disinterested  newsroom  whose 
staffers  must  steer  clear  of  even  the  appearance  of  partiality.  (ibid.,  p.  271)  
 
Stuart  Hall  et  al.  (1978)  discuss  how  professional  routines  structurally  allow  power  elites  to 
maintain  their  hold  on  how  news  is  framed.  It  provides  a  reference  point  for  exploring  how 
these  practices  have  changed  or  stayed  the  same  in  networked  journalism.  Hall  et  al.  argue 
that  professional  ideology  and  routines  “give  rise  to  the  practice  of  ensuring  that  media 
statements  are,  wherever  possible,  grounded  in  'objective'  and  'authoritative'  statements  from 
'accredited'  sources.  This  means  constantly  turning  to  accredited  representatives  of  major 
social  institutions  “  (ibid.,  p.  58)  While  some  of  these  sources  are  called  upon  for  their 
representativeness,  others  –  specifically  the  ‘expert’  –   are  granted  an  elevated  accredited 
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status  precisely  because  they  represents  noone  and,  it  is  assumed,  have  a  total  disinterested  in 
the  information  and  views  they  provide. 
 
These  two  aspects  of  news  production  –  the  practical  pressures  of  constantly  working 
against  the  clock  and  the  professional  demands  of  impartiality  and  objectivity  – 
combine  to  produce  a  systematically  structured  over-accessing  to  the  media  of  those 
in  powerful  and  privileged  institutional  positions.  The  media  thus  tend,  faithfully  and 
impartially,  to  reproduce  symbolically  the  existing  structure  of  power  in  society's 
institutional  order.  (ibid.,  p.  58) 
 
These  are  the  sources  that  Hall  et  al,  describe  as  ‘primary  definers’  of  news  events.  Rather 
than  journalists  defining  the  news  agenda,  it  is  these  voices  that  are  given  the  opportunity  to 
frame  news.  Therefore,  the  news  media  is  in  fact  the  ‘secondary  definer’,  mainly  facilitating 
such  sources’  access  to  a  mass  audience. 
 
The  media,  then,  do  not  simply  'create'  the  news;  nor  do  they  simply  transmit  the 
ideology  of  the  'ruling  class'  in  a  conspiratorial  fashion.  Indeed,  we  have  suggested 
that,  in  a  critical  sense,  the  media  are  frequently  not  the  'primary  definers'  of  news 
events  at  all;  but  their  structured  relationship  to  power  has  the  effect  of  making  them 
play  a  crucial  but  secondary  role  in  reproducing  the  definitions  of  those  who  have 
privileged  access,  as  of  right,  to  the  media  as  'accredited  sources'.  From  this  point  of 
view,  in  the  moment  of  news  production,  the  media  stand  in  a  position  of  structured 
subordination  to  the  primary  definers.  (ibid.,  p.  59) 
 
This  crucial  distinction  between  secondary  and  primary  definers  is  what  this  research 
attempts  to  explore  by  analysing  whether  these  roles  have  shifted  through  the  engagement 
and  reliance  on  social  media  by  mainstream  news  media.  As  elites  and  major  institutions 
arguably  no  longer  rely  on  the  media  to  proliferate  their  message  how  is  professional 
journalism  adapting  to  a  news  environment  where  their  exclusive  right  to  mediate  these 
messages  and  its  position,  even  as  a  secondary  definer,  is  threatened?  Moreover,  has  the 
ability  to  becoming  a  ‘primary  definer’  by  unaccredited  extra-media  voices  been  broadened 
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through  the  use  of  social  media  in  the  case  studies  under  investigation  in  this  research?  Some 
research  (Reich  2015)  has  shown  no  substantial  increase  in  the  use  of  ordinary  citizen  sources 
in  news  coverage  over  the  last  decade  overall.  One  question  posed  by  this  research  asks 
whether  social  media  sources  reflect  a  departure  from  the  norm  that  may  indicate  an 
increased  share  of  ordinary  citizens  in  journalistic  sources  with  an  increased  reliance  social 
media,  as  was  anticipated  by  some  theorists  (Allan  2013;  Bruns  2010;  Gillmor  2004;  Rosen 
2006) .  As  eyewitnesses  to  news  events,  and  citizen  journalists  or  activists  are  able  to  share 
their  own  texts  on  social  media,  have  these  types  of  sources  also  been  able  to  set  and  frame 
the  news  agenda?  Whereas,  primary  source,  such  as  eyewitnesses,  were  called  upon  to  give 
accounts  of  what  they  saw  when  a  news  event  unfolded,  they  were  less  likely  to  define  how 
this  news  event  was  framed.  Allan  (2013)  has  argued  this  power  imbalance  has  changed  with 
the  autonomy  of  non-elites  to  publish  and  share  their  own  material.  Therefore,  what  evidence 
is  there  that  ordinary  citizen  voices  have  been  able  to  assume  the  role  of  primary  definer  in 
the  coverage  of  the  news  events  studied  here? 
 
First,  though,  it  is  important  to  define  who  might  constitute  sources  who  are  not  typical 
primary  and  secondary  definers  as  Hall  et  al.  defined  them  —  meaning  accredited  routine 
sources  and  the  media.  For  the  purpose  of  this  study,  these  are  ordinary  citizen  sources, 
though  this  is  not  an  entirely  unproblematic  term.  Afterall,  journalists  are  also  ordinary 
citizens,  as  are  many  individuals  that  for  the  purpose  of  news  coverage  could  be  deemed 
authoritative  and  accredited.  One  study  of  journalistic  sources  (Reich  2015),  defined  these  as 
typically  ‘non-elite’  and  comprising  private  people  without  any  “organizational  affiliation,  or 
[...]  regardless  of  such  affiliation”  (p.  2413).  This  suggests  that  anyone  speaking  in  a  private 
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capacity,  rather  than  as  a  representative  or  professional,  may  be  deemed  an  ordinary  citizen 
source. 
 
While  this  may  be  a  starting  point  for  a  definition  it  is  not  truly  fit  for  purpose  for  the  hybrid 
nature  of  how  many  interact  on  social  media,  often  mixing  the  private  with  the  professional 
and  public.  Firstly,  journalists  as  well  as  some  accredited  sources  are  often  careful  to  state 
that  their  social  media  activity  reflects  their  own  views  and  not  those  of  their  organisation. 
Moreover,  journalists  and  news  organisations  are  often  ambiguous  about  whether  they  view 
their  or  their  employees’  social  media  activity,  respectively,  as  professional  or  private  conduct 
(Plunkett  2012;  Posetti  2009).  This  could  then  mean  that  such  users  are  expressing 
themselves  within  a  personal  capacity  and  as  private  people.  However,  their  identity  as 
journalists,  experts,  spokesperson,  etc,  and  their  professional  affiliation,  also  frequently 
means  that  they  are  acting  at  least  partly  in  a  professional  context,  which  is  implicitly 
understood  and  taken  for  granted  by  their  followers.  
 
Since  all  social  media  activity  involves  some  kind  of  publishing  or  broadcasting  to  a  public, 
ordinary  citizen  sources  involve  an  element  of  the  amateur  that  should  be  incorporated  in  the 
definition  of  citizen  sources  for  the  purpose  of  this  research.  Bowman  and  Willis  (2003,  p.  9) 
describe  citizen  journalism  as  “the   act  of  a  citizen,  or  group  of  citizens,  playing  an  active  role 
in  the  process  of  collecting,  reporting,  analyzing  and  disseminating  news  and  information.” 
Therefore,  their  social  media  activity  is  not  only  performed  in  a  private  capacity  but  at  times 
resulting  from  a  personal  or  collective  cause  rather  than  a  professional  interest.  Amateurism 
is  often  mentioned  alongside  citizen  journalism  (Allan  2013;  Johnson  &  John  III  2017; 
Schmieder  2015)  as  a  defining  characteristic.  Stebbins  (1977)  seminal  work  The  Amateur: 
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Two  Sociological  Definitions  ties  the  amateur  into  a  professional-amateur-public  system. 
Here,  the  amateur  is  guided  by  professional  norms,  skills  and  techniques,  that  he  tries  to 
acquire  without  necessarily  aiming  to  become  a  professional.  “[As]  a  special  member  of  the 
public,  [he]  knows  better  than  the  run-of-the-mill  member  what  constitutes  a  creditable 
performance  or  product”  (ibid.,  p.  587).   However,  unlike  the  professional,  he  does  not 
receive  the  majority  of  his  income  from  this  pursuit.  As  does  the  professional,  though,  the 
amateur  also  aims  to  serve  the  public  rather  than  just  himself. 
 
Where  Reich’s  definition  is  very  broad,  Stibbens’  definition  would  clearly  only  account  for  a 
very  small  fraction  of  social  media  users,  who  publish  and  broadcast  as  dedicated  amateur  or 
citizen-journalists.  Ordinary  citizen  sources  incorporate  both  of  these  definitions  to  varying 
degrees.  In  one  study  discussing  amateur  photographs  in  news  coverage  (Schmieder  2015), 
an  interviewee  working  in  the  professional  news  media,  argued  that  there  needs  to  be 
“intentionality  around  the  notion  of  photojournalism”  (p.  589).  Many  ordinary  citizens  using 
social  media  clearly  do  not  intend  to  produce  journalism  with  their  social  media  activity. 
Rather,  they  may  unintentionally,  spontaneously  or  sporadically  perform  “acts  of  journalism”, 
as  Allan  (2013)  describes  it.  Others  show  an  ongoing  commitment  to  producing  journalistic 
work  as  non-professionals,  therefore  echoing  Stibbens’  idea  of  amateurs.  Therefore,  there  are 
different  types  of  ordinary  citizen  sources  with  varying  perceptions  of  themselves  in  relation 
to  professionals.  This  is  important  to  bear  in  mind  when  analysing  ordinary  citizen  sources. 
For  example,  it  poses  questions  around  the  relationships  professionals  build  with 
citizen-journalists  and  other  ordinary  citizen  sources.  Do  they  treat  them  differently;  concede 
more  authority  to  the  output  of  the  one  or  the  other?  Schmieder  (2015)  argues  that  amateur 
photographs  are  ‘visual  quotes’,  much  in  the  same  way  that  eyewitnesses  to  news  events 
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would  provide  quotes.  Those  who  produce  them  are  treated  primarily  as  sources,  creating  a 
hierarchy  that  casts  professionals  in  a  more  authoritative  role.  
 
What  is  Twitter  and  how  does  it  work? 
 
The  quality  of  offline  social  networks  is  often  measured  in  terms  of  how  reciprocal 
relationships  are  between  its  members.  For  example,  in  social  networks  in  organisations,  trust 
and  collaboration  is  characterised  by  high  levels  of  reciprocity  (Kilduff  and  Tsai  2003) 
Reciprocity  has  also  been  a  popular  subject  of  research  in  online  social  networks.  While 
power  law  distribution,  meaning  the  tendency  to  follow  popular  users,  was  applied  to  the 
blogosphere  in  Shirky’s  seminal  work  ( 2003 )  Power  Laws,  Weblogs,  and  Inequality ,  
complementary,  and  at  times  contradicting,  research  made  the  case  for  applying  social 
exchange  theory  to  online  social  networks  (Faraj  and  Johnson  2010;  Surma  2016) .  In  this 
conception,  networks  gain  sustainability  not  through  preferential  attachment  to  popular  users 
but  when  users  enter  reciprocal  relationships  with  one  another  based  on  two-way 
communication.  
 
Although  Twitter  has  changed  substantially  over  time  towards  a  personalised 
algorithm-driven  feed  that  grants  different  levels  of  exposure  to  different  users,  this  was  not 
always  the  case.  Today,  not  just  popular  users’  original  tweets  are  given  greater  prominence, 
but  also  their  retweets  and  likes  as  the  Twitter  algorithm  edits  one’s  feed.  But  at  the  time  of 
writing  the  flow  of  tweets  by  the  users  one  was  following  was  still  displayed  only 
38 
chronologically.   In  the  present  version  of  Twitter,  the  development  of  networks  that  is  based 4
purely  on  self-driven  social  exchange  is  undermined  by  focusing  users’  attention  on  a 
selection  of  popular  users  they  are  following.  It  also  prompts  users  to  follow  accounts  that 
other  users  they  are  connected  with  follow.  Therefore,  it  is  arguably  trying  to  engineer  a 
cohesive  social  network  based  on  a)  reciprocity,  and  b)  transitivity.  High  reciprocity  is  where 
“two  people  tend  to  be  symmetric”,  while  high  transitivity  is  where  “ties  between  three 
people  tend  to  be  complete”  (Kilduff  and  Tsai  2003,  p.  32) .  For  example,  when  Twitter  user  A 
follows  Twitter  user  B  and  vice  versa  the  relationship  can  be  described  as  reciprocal,  while 
transitivity  means  that  Twitter  user  A  will  follow  Twitter  user  C  because  C  is  followed  by  B. 
This  forms  a  network  of  Twitter  users  that  is  shaped  by  each  others  relationships.  While  these 
structural  changes  on  Twitter  are  recent,  the  literature  discussed  here  shows  how  algorithms 
may  be  contributing  to  the  formation  of  specific  networks  but  are  at  best  only  accelerating  the 
way  that  networks  already  formed  previously. 
 
The  definition  of  Twitter  as  a  social  network  rather  than  a  new  iteration  of  one-way 
communication  mimicking  mass  media  was  explored  in  a  relatively  early  study  (Kwak  et  al. 
2010)  examining  the  microblog’s  structures  and  most  popular  users.  A  research  question 
posed  was  whether  Twitter  could  be  defined  as  a  social  network  if  reciprocity  was  a  required 
core  characteristic.  By  crawling  the  entire  microblog  with  its  41.7  millions  users  at  the  time, 
the  study  found  a  notably  low  level  of  reciprocity.  77.9%  of  user  pairs  with  any  link  between 
them  were  connected  one-way,  while  just  over  a  fifth  (  22.1%)  of  users  had  a  reciprocal 
relationship.  The  authors  argued  that  Twitter  retains  some  of  the  core  characteristics  of 
4  However,  ‘promoted  tweets’,  meaning  advertising,  had  already  become  a  feature  of  Twitter 
timelines.  
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traditional  mass  communication,  allowing  for  its  most  popular  users  –  mass  media  and 
celebrities  –  to  adapt  it  to  their  needs  for  a  distribution  platform.  A  Twitter  user  may  gather 
followers  without  ever  following  any  of  them  back,  and  many  of  the  most  popular  users 
rarely  responded  to  comments  directed  at  them,  leading  the  authors  to  argue  that  the  ability  to 
speak  to  a  wide  audience,  without  necessarily  engaging  in  a  reciprocal  relationship,  favours 
Twitter  as  a  one-to-many  platform.  A  user  can  choose  to  follow  particular  accounts,  like 
channels,  to  received  their  content  but  has  no  guarantee  of  being  listened  to  or  seen  by  those 
behind  those  accounts. 
 
Nevertheless,  the  nature  of  how  content  is  spread  on  Twitter  suggests  a  deeper  engagement 
than  the  passive  consumption  of  a  TV  programme.  An  important  feature  of  the  microblog  is 
its  retweet  function  that  encourages  sharing  content  from  other  users,  while  the  @  mentions 
are  an  open  invitation  to  comment  and  engage  in  conversations.  The  ability  to  retweet  set 
Twitter  apart  from  traditional  news  media  in  a  very  fundamental  way  as  it  is  the  function  that 
allows  tweets  to  be  spread  far  beyond  the  followers  of  the  original  author.  The  so-called 
‘million  follower  fallacy’  (Avnit  2009)  illustrates  that  up  to  a  point  there  is  no  straight 
correlation  between  the  popularity  of  a  Twitter  user,  measured  in  follower  count,  and  their 
influence.  
 
Up  to  about  1,000  followers,  the  average  number  of  additional  recipients  is  not 
affected  by  the  number  of  followers  of  the  tweet  source.  That  is,  no  matter  how  many 
followers  a  user  has,  the  tweet  is  likely  to  reach  a  certain  number  of  audience,  once 
the  user’s  tweet  starts  spreading  via  retweets.  This  illustrates  the  power  of  retweeting. 
That  is,  the  mechanism  of  retweet  has  given  every  user  the  power  to  spread 
information  broadly.  (Kwak  et  al.  2010,  p.  598) 
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While  the  study  found  that  the  potential  overall  audience  a  tweet  reaches  once  it  is  retweeted 
is  not  influenced  by  the  number  of  followers  the  tweet’s  source  has,  this  was  only  true  for 
sources  with  fewer  than  1,000  followers.  Nevertheless,  the  study  also  compiles  a  ranking  of 
the  most  popular  accounts  in  terms  of  followers  and  the  most  retweeted  accounts  and  found 
relatively  little  overlap.  This  finding  was  echoed  by  another  contemporary  study  (Cha  et  al. 
2010) ,  indicating  factors  other  than  popularity  affecting  retweets.  In  this  research,  the  number 
of  followers  of  the  users  most  highly  retweeted  is  still  far  larger  than  that  of  the  average  user. 
So,  while  the  size  of  the  following  of  an  account  may  not  be  the  sole  indicator  of  the 
likelihood  of  being  retweeted,  it  does  still  play  a  significant  role  in  increasing  the  chances  of 
amplification  through  retweets.  One  conclusion  drawn  by  Kwak  et  al  (2010)  is  that  users’ 
behaviour  around  what  to  amplify  and  spread  “shows  the  rise  of  alternative  media  in  Twitter” 
  -  meaning  that  media  we  may  consider  ‘alternative’  have  a  tendency  to  do  well  on  the 5
platform.  These  types  of  Twitter  accounts  achieved  considerable  reach  by  rallying  audiences 
to  participate  in  the  distribution  of  their  content.  However,  a  closer  look  at  these  accounts  also 
shows  that  they  are  not  necessarily  ordinary  voices  but  appear  to  represent  an  ‘elite’  among 
Twitter  users,  who  in  everyday  terms  are  often  described  as  ‘influencers’. 
 
5  A  look  at  the  top  20  ranking  of  most  retweeted  accounts  show  10  of  them  were  classified  as  news 
sources  or  journalists  that  constitute  professional  journalism.  The  most  popular  Twitter  user  was  a 
journalist  for  social  media  news  site  Mashable.  Others  included  the  Huffington  Post  and  TechCrunch, 
perhaps  indicating  a  greater  engagement  with  online,  technology  and  social  media-related  news  sites. 
In  addition,  four  sources  were  four  Iranian  bloggers.  The  study  was  conducted  in  2009  coinciding 
with  the  so-called  Green  Revolution  in  Iran  and  where  social  media  played  a  large  role  in  generating 
international  publicity. 
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Influence  on  Twitter  has  been  defined  “as  the  ability  of  a  user  to  spread  information  in  a 
network”  (Pezzoni  et  al.  2013,  p.  362) .  Considering  that  retweets  are  the  main  mechanism  by 
which  information  spreads,  several  studies  have  tried  to  identify  what  factors,  aside  from 
popularity,  affect  retweeting.  Two   of  these  have  been  described  as  visibility  (Hodas  & 6
Lerman  2012;  Pezzoni  et  al.  2013) ,  as  well  as  “name  value”  (Cha  et  al.  2010)  or  “user 
standing”  (Pezzoni  et  al  2013).  Visibility  was  measured  by  analysing  the  position  a  tweet  had 
in  a  user’s  timeline  and  found  that  tweets  further  to  the  top  were  more  likely  to  be  retweeted. 
As  already  mentioned,  today,  visibility  is  no  longer  determined  by  the  timing  that  a  user  logs 
onto  their  Twitter  timeline  but  by  an  algorithm  that  pushes  specific  tweets  to  the  top,  hence 
reducing  the  equality  among  users  in  achieving  visibility.  Previously,  including  during  the 
periods  covered  by  case-studies  in  this  thesis,  visibility  involved  a  greater  element  of  chance 
whereas  today  it  is  more  deliberately  engineered.  However,  even  in  2011/2012  visibility  was 
influenced  by  retweets  within  a  specific  network.  The  more  a  tweet  was  retweeted  among  the 
Twitter  users  one  followed,  the  greater  the  likelihood  that  it  would  be  seen.  ‘Name  value’  or 
‘user  standing’  was  linked  to  more  subjective  qualities  such  as  celebrity,  expertise,  or 
credibility.  Given  that  publicity  is  in  the  nature  of  journalism  and  access  to  the  public  is 
ensured  through  a  whole  array  of  media  (broadcast,  print,  online)  it  is  reasonable  to  assume 
that  a  Twitter  users’  perceived  news  value  and  reputation  as  a  news  source  is  likely  to  elevate 
their  user  standing  among  those  interested  in  news  content.  Twitter  communities  themselves 
have  a  tendency  to  form  around  common  interests  (Java  et  al.  2007)  and  visibility  and  name 
value  allow  specific  users  to  become  influencers  in  these  communities. 
  
6  Additional  factors  affecting  retweeting  behaviour  were  the  use  of  hashtags  and  links  in  tweets.  (Suh 
et  al.  2010) 
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Murthy  (2013)  also  discussed  how  Twitter  brings  social  networks  and  one-way  broadcasting 
together  to  “maximizing  audience  reach”  (ibid.,  p.  9).  He  provides  a  useful  distinction  in 
differentiating  social  media  and  social  networks  to  help  understand  Twitter.  Social  media,  he 
argues,  “is  mainly  conceived  of  as  a  medium  wherein  ‘ordinary’  people  in  ordinary  social 
networks  [as  opposed  to  professional  journalists]  can  publish  user  generated 
‘news’/’updates’”  (ibid.,  p.  8).  Social  media,  therefore,  is  a  medium  to  broadcast  similarly  to 
mass  media,  except  it  provides  ordinary  people  with  the  tools  to  reach  a  wide  audience. 
  
For  a  contrasting  definition  of  social  networks,  Murthy  draws  on  Boyd  and  Ellison  (2007): 
   
We  define  social  network  sites  as  web-based  services  that  allow  individuals  to  (1) 
construct  a  public  or  semi-public  profile  within  a  bounded  system,  (2)  articulate  a  list 
of  other  users  with  whom  they  share  a  connection,  and  (3)  view  and  traverse  their  list 
of  connections  and  those  made  by  others  within  the  system.  The  nature  and 
nomenclature  of  these  connections  may  vary  from  site  to  site.  (2007,  p.  211) 
 
This  definition  was  created  with  social  networks  such  as  Facebook,  Bebo  and  MySpace  in 
mind.  By  applying  both  of  these  definitions,  an  overlap  becomes  clear  between  social  media 
and  social  network  that  is  inherent  in  Twitter.  Murthy  uses  the  term  ‘interactive  multicasting’ 
to  capture  how  tweets  spread  through  social  networks: 
 
[A]  key  difference  here  between  social  media  and  social  network  sites  is  the  design  of 
the  former  to  be  explicitly  public  and  geared  towards  interactive  multicasting. 
Combine  the  two  –  as  Twitter  does  –  and  you  have  real-time  public,  many-to-many 
broadcasting  to  as  wide  a  network  as  the  content  is  propagated  by  its  users.  (Murthy 
2013,  p.  11) 
 
It  can  therefore  be  argued  that  the  central  function  of  the  microblog’s  social  networks  is  to  act 
as  conduits  for  the  spread  of  information. 
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Huberman  et  al.  (2009)  makes  the  assertion  that  there  were  two  co-existing  types  of  social 
networks  on  Twitter:  the  first  is  the  ‘following’  of  a  user,  the  second  is  the  interaction 
between  users  through  @  mentions.  Unsurprisingly,  the  latter  networks  were  significantly 
sparser  than  the  former.  In  this  latter  network  a  user  is  highly  selective  about  who  they 
interact  with.  However,  it  is  this  network  that  also  most  affects  tweeting  behaviour.  The  larger 
the  network  that  is  centred  around  interactions,  the  more  a  user  will  tweet.  By  contrast,  the 
size  of  a  following  only  boosts  the  frequency  of  tweets  to  a  point.  In  addition,  the  number  of 
@  mentions  directed  at  a  user  are  also  is  considered  one  measure  that  contributes  to  the  level 
of  influence  a  user  yields  (Cha  et  al.  2010).  
 
This  section  has  shown  that  Twitter  is  a  social  media  platform  that  provides  any  of  its  users 
with  the  ability  to  distribute  information  publicly.  On  an  individual  user  basis,  it  operates  as  a 
one-to-many  broadcasting  medium  that  can  be  transformed  into  many-to-many  broadcasting 
through  the  social  networks  it  hosts.  On  the  one  hand  there  are  loose  social  networks,  and  on 
the  other  a  whole  range  of  more  tightly  knit  networks  and  communities,  that  thrive  and 
sustain  themselves  through  the  reciprocity  of  social  exchange,  and  that  can  be  an  effective 
tool  to  create  influencers.  Each  user  who  retweets  is  a  node  that  distributes  a  tweet  to  their 
social  network,  but  the  followings  congregated  around  users  vary  in  size  depending  on  the 
popularity  of  that  user.  They  are  also  able  to  overlap  as  each  user  has  the  ability  to  follow  an 
unlimited  number  of  other  users  and  communities  are  likely  to  form  around  particular  topics. 
Influencers  are  not  determined  through  popularity  -–  meaning  the  size  of  their  following  – 
alone,  but  also  affected  by  other  factors  such  as  visibility,  user  standing  and  @  mentions. 
However,  these  three  factors  have  the  potential  to  reinforce  each  other.  The  higher  the  user 
standing,  the  greater  the  visibility;  the  greater  the  visibility  the  more  likely  the  @  mentions, 
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etc.  Influencers,  both  have  the  ability  to  spread  their  own  original  tweets  further,  and  it  is 
logical  to  assume  that  their  retweets  also  have  greater  resonance.  This  would  lead  to  the 
conclusion  that  influencers  are  not  necessarily  formed  primarily  by  a  wide  loose  social 
network  but  can  be  formed  by  a  much  smaller  but  influential  social  network. 
 
Power  law  and  Elite  users 
 
Having  discussed  the  existence  of  influencers  on  Twitter,  what  characterises  these  users  in 
relation  to  news  content  and  the  power  dynamics  within  which  they  operate  warrants  further 
discussion.  Shirky’s  ( 2003)  analysis  of  power  law  distribution  in  the  blogosphere  offers  a 
starting  point  and  puts  forward  the  argument  that  “[d]iversity  plus  freedom  of  choice  creates 
inequality,  and  the  greater  the  diversity,  the  more  extreme  the  inequality”.  Shirky’s  paper 
predates  Twitter,  and  emerged  when  news  media  outlets’  online  presence  was  still  in  its 
infancy,  but  it  does  offer  some  explanation  for  the  unequal  power  distribution  found  online 
with  regards  to  social  media  users.  He  sought  to  demonstrate  how  some  blogs  attract  more 
attention  than  others  by  arguing  that  individuals’  choices  naturally  affect  each  other.  
 
While  the  first  person  to  link  to  a  blog  does  so  without  any  outside  influence,  the  probability 
of  the  blog  being  linked  to  by  the  second  blogger  is  slightly  increased,  and  the  chances  of  a 
third  link  is  again  a  little  greater,  and  so  on.  Therefore,  older  blogs  with  large  readerships  gain 
readers  more  easily,  provided  the  blogger  remains  active.  “The  system  assumes  that  later 
users  come  into  an  environment  shaped  by  earlier  users;  the  thousand-and-first  user  will  not 
be  selecting  blogs  at  random,  but  will  rather  be  affected,  even  if  unconsciously,  by  the 
preference  premiums  built  up  in  the  system  previously”  (ibid.).  As  a  starting  point,  Shirky’s 
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theory  assumes  total  equality  as  it  is  based  around  the  assumption  that  every  blogger  had  an 
equal  opportunity  to  become  influential  at  the  start  but  that  over  time  a  dwindling  percentage 
of  bloggers  reach  a  mass  audience.  Shirky  explicitly  discounts  any  influence  of  qualities  or 
characteristics  of  a  blog  on  its  appeal  and  likelihood  to  be  linked  to.  “What  matters  is  that  any 
tendency  towards  agreement  in  diverse  and  free  systems,  however  small  and  for  whatever 
reason,  can  create  power  law  distributions”  (ibid.).  This  leads  him  to  argue  that  though  the 
blogosphere  is  an  unequal  terrain,  the  inequality  seen  is  mostly  fair,  and  not  the  result  of  a 
cliquish  preference  for  any  particular  group  of  bloggers. 
  
Shirky  also  argued  that  equality  in  the  blogosphere  existed  on  four  grounds.  Firstly,  the 
barriers  to  blogging  are  not  much  greater  than  the  barriers  to  getting  on  to  the  Internet  in  the 
first  place,  suggesting  that  there  are  no  significant  hurdles  to  becoming  a  blogger  beyond 
getting  online.  Secondly,  blogs  require  constant  activity  to  maintain  audiences.  Thirdly, 
popularity  depends  on  the  preference  of  a  large  number  of  other  bloggers  that  cannot  be 
simulated.  And  finally,  there  is  no  reason  to  assume  a  qualitative  difference  between  a 
popular  and  less  popular  blogger.  He  made  this  final  point  most  forcefully,  rejecting 
arguments  about  the  concentration  of  readership  on  a  small  number  of  blogs.  
 
The  largest  step  function  in  a  power  law  is  between  the  #1  and  #2  positions,  by 
definition.  There  is  no  A-list  that  is  qualitatively  different  from  their  nearest 
neighbors,  so  any  line  separating  more  and  less  trafficked  blogs  is  arbitrary.  (ibid.)  
 
However,  in  2003,  the  internet  was  a  different  place  to  what  it  is  today.  The  blogosphere  that 
Shirky  describes  was  not  the  terrain  of  professional  communicators  to  the  same  extent  it  is 
today.  News  organisations  were  still  coming  to  grips  with  new  media  as  a  means  of  reaching 
mass  audiences.  Still,  the  four  claims  made  to  illustrate  the  ‘fairness’  of  the  inequality  are 
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clearly  contentious  and  several  arguments  critiquing  them  have  been  put  forward  that  will  be 
explored  at  a  later  point  in  this  chapter.  
 
First  though,  how  can  Shirky’s  theory  about  power  laws  in  the  blogosphere  be  applied  to 
Twitter?  To  start  with  there  are  parallels  between  hyperlinking  and  retweeting.  Similarly  to 
the  number  of  hyperlinks  determining  the  ranking  of  a  blog,  the  rate  a  Twitter  user  is 
retweeted  determines  his  level  of  influence.  As  already  discussed  this  is  broadly  accepted  in 
literature  and  used  as  a  main  measure  in  Twitter  analytics  tools  to  determine  the  ‘social 
authority’  of  users  (Bray  2013) .  Shirky  identifies  visibility,  facilitated  by  bloggers’ 
hyperlinking,  as  the  key  factor  in  driving  audiences  to  the  top  bloggers.  This  also  corresponds 
with  findings  on  the  correlation  between  visibility  and  retweets. 
 
Power  law  distribution  also  characterised  the  Twittersphere,  with  studies  (Bakshy  et  al.  2011; 
Kwak  et  al.  2010;  Wu  et  al.  2011)  showing  a  similar  concentration  of  attention  on  a  small 
number  of  Twitter  users.  For  example,  Wu  et  al  (2011)  found  20,000  accounts  (less  than 
0.05%  at  the  time)  “attract  almost  50%  of  all  attention  within  Twitter”  (p.  709).  These  elite 
users  typically  fit  into  one  of  four  categories;  celebrities,  media,  organisations  and  blogs .  7
 
Within  this  population  of  elite  users,  moreover,  we  find  that  attention  is  highly 
homophilous,  with  celebrities  following  celebrities,  media  following  media,  and 
bloggers  following  bloggers.  Second,  we  find  considerable  support  for  the  two-step 
flow  of  information  –  almost  half  the  information  that  originates  from  the  media 
passes  to  the  masses  indirectly  via  a  diffuse  intermediate  layer  of  opinion  leaders,  who 
7  The  methodology  by  which  elite  users  were  defined  involved  crawling  user  profiles  on  relevant 
Twitter  lists  for  keywords.  For  the  media  category,  only  the  terms  ‘news’,  ‘media’,  and  ‘news-media’ 
were  searched  leading  to  the  potential  omission  of  individual  journalists  from  these  elite  users  who 
might  identify  themselves  with  the  terms  journalist,  correspondent,  reporter,  editor. 
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although  classified  as  ordinary  users,  are  more  connected  and  more  exposed  to  the 
media  than  their  followers.  (ibid.,  pp.  713-714)  
 
The  two-step  flow  of  information,  or  word-of-mouth,  showed  that  nearly  half  a  million  users 
acted  as  nodes  that  were  better  placed  to  facilitate  the  spread  of  information  from  elite  users 
to  other  users.  In  regards  to  media  content,  the  research  makes  no  real  distinctions  between 
the  ordinary  users  who  best  facilitated  such  information  cascades  from  elite  media  users,  thus 
offering  little  insight  into  how  this  group  is  broken  down.  However,  it  demonstrates  that  not 
every  retweet  is  equal  and  that  certain  individuals  have  a  greater  ability  to  spread 
information.  In  a  study  on  viral  marketing,  Bakshy  et  al  (2011)  showed  that  information 
cascades  on  Twitter,  often  referred  to  as  ‘going  viral’,  are  more  likely  to  be  sparked  by 
Twitter  users  with  many  followers  and  that  have  been  influential  in  the  past.  However,  the 
virality  of  a  particular  tweet  is  difficult  to  predict  when  retweeted  by  exceptionally  influential 
users  alone.  Rather,  retweets  by  a  larger  number  of  reasonably  influential  users  was  more 
likely  to  start  information  cascades,  so  where  a  particular  piece  of  content  piqued  the  interest 
of  several  influencers  it  was  likely  to  spread  further. 
 
There  is  a  strong  argument  for   homophily  among  social  networks  on  Twitter  (Barberá  2015; 
Conover  et  al.  2011;  Wu  et  al.  2011) .  Numerous  studies  into  engagement  and  behaviour 
among  journalists  and  news  media  on  Twitter  have  shown  this  same  preference  to  largely 
limit  interactions  to  other  reporters  of  similar  status  (Lasorsa  et  al.  2012;  Nuernbergk  2016) 
and  Twitter  users  that  conform  to  traditional  journalistic  norms  of  authoritative  voices 
(Almgren  &  Olsson  2015) .  Although  many  journalists  on  Twitter  are  not  among  the  most 
influential  but  nevertheless  often  possess  above  average  influence,  it  is  reasonable  to 
hypothesise  that  where  enough  come  together  to  amplify  a  particular  tweet  or  hashtag  they 
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are  well  placed  to  trigger  information  cascades.  Given  the  high  degree  of  homophily  in  elite 
journalists’  interactions  on  Twitter,  a  piece  of  content  may  ‘go  viral’  among  journalists  first, 
before  spreading  to  news  audiences  sympathetic  to  their  outlets. 
 
Shirky  separates  the  blogosphere  from  the  mainstream  media,  the  latter  of  which  he  defines 
as  broadcasting  instead  of  conversing.  He  emphasises  the  reciprocity  that  bloggers  show  each 
other  through  engaging  with  comments  and  hyperlinking  to  each  others’  blogs.  Once  a 
blogger  becomes  too  popular  to  engage  with  all  the  comments  and  hyperlinking,  he  argues 
they  no  longer  fit  that  definition  and  instead  become  a  broadcast  outlet.  Having  said  this, 
Shirky’s  separation  between  broadcasting  and  conversing  does  not  address  how  bloggers  are 
able  to  alternate  between  the  two  communication  styles  and  assumes  a  willingness  to  engage 
wherever  possible. 
 
Moreover,  by  reducing  choices  to  mathematical  equations,  Shirky’s  analysis  ignores  other 
factors  that  drive  the  concentration  of  influence  into  the  hands  of  a  few  elite  bloggers-  this 
also  helps  to  illustrate  hierarchies  on  Twitter.  McChesney  (2013)  argues  that  subjective 
human  decision-making  and  economic  factors  have  been  key  to  elevating  some  online  news 
sources  over  others.  Although  focused  on  how  the  Internet  has  driven  the  concentration  of 
media  ownership,  some  of  his  core  arguments  are  relevant  to  user  behaviour  on  Twitter. 
Firstly,  the  largest  mainstream  media  organisations  have  benefited  in  influence  from  the 
Internet  as  news  audiences  congregate  around  familiar  news  sources.  The  apparent  abundance 
of  choice  has  contributed  to  the  shrinking  number  of  news  sources  available,  with 
overwhelmed  news  consumers  seeking  out  trusted  household  names.  Secondly,  the 
unresolved  dilemma  of  how  commercial  news  media  can  survive  online  has  led  to  further 
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media  concentration  with  large  media  conglomerates  better  financially  cushioned  to  survive, 
while  medium-sized  news  organisations  are  forced  into  bankruptcy.  
 
There  is  a  ‘long  tail’  of  millions  of  websites  that  exist  but  get  little  or  no  traffic,  and 
only  a  small  number  of  people  have  any  idea  that  they  exist.  Most  of  them  wither,  as 
their  producers  have  little  incentive  and  resources  to  maintain  them.  There  is  also  no 
effective  “middle  class”  of  robust,  moderate-sized  websites;  that  segment  of  the  news 
media  has  been  wiped  out  online,  leading  Hindman  to  conclude  that  the  online  news 
media  are  more  concentrated  than  in  the  old  news  media  world.  (McChesney  2013, 
pp.  190-191) 
 
In  as  far  as  Twitter  can  be  considered  a  news  source,  these  factors  play  into  what  Twitter 
users  rise  above  the  rest  in  influence,  with  professional  journalists,  and  especially  elite 
journalists,  naturally  attracting  followers  through  their  trusted  and  reliable  reputation,  which 
elevates  their  ‘user  standing’.  In  the  blogosphere,  Shirky  and  others  (Cha  et  al.  2010;  Goode 
2010)  highlight  the  need  for  bloggers  to  remain  active  to  maintain  their  ranking.  This  in  itself 
plays  into  the  hands  of  media  and  communication  professionals  as  they  have  the  skills  and 
are  often  encouraged,  if  not  expected,  by  their  employers  to  engage  on  social  media 
platforms.  Goode  writes  that  “one  of  the  major  factors  often  overlooked  [...]  is  the  divide 
between  the  time-rich  and  the  time-poor.  An  abundance  of  news  sources  to  navigate  and 
opportunities  to  ‘join  the  conversation’  [...]  scarcely  ‘democratizes’  news  for  the  many 
citizens  who  work  double  shifts  or  have  round-the-clock  care  responsibilities”  (2010). 
Research  findings  into  the  most  influential  American  bloggers  (Hindman,  2009)  substantiate 
this  point.  Less  diversity  in  terms  of  education  level,  gender,  and  ethnicity,  were  found  among 
the  bloggers  than  staff  in  traditional  newsrooms. 
 
Moreover,  neither  a  dichotomy  between  broadcasting  and  conversation,  nor  Shirky’s  early 
assumption  of  blogger’s  willingness  to  reciprocate,  is  found  in  the  behaviour  of  journalists  on 
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Twitter.  This  might  be  because  journalists  cannot  be  considered  bloggers  only  because  they 
also  occupy  the  same  space.  However,  there  are  also  limitations  to  applying  Shirky’s  power 
law  theory  with  regard  to  the  blogosphere  to  Twitter,  as  the  microblog  is  structured  differently 
and  indexing  of  users  and  their  tweets  are  not  as  opaque  as  the  blogosphere  in  2003. 
Therefore,  visibility  and  user  standing  are  affected  differently.  Yet,  there  has  also  been  a 
normalising  effect  observed  in  how  the  microblog  is  used  to  maintain  professional  routines, 
especially  with  regard  to  elite  professional  journalists.  Deuze  (2008)  anticipated  that 
mainstream  journalists  would  adopt  an  ‘us  vs  them’  mindset  towards  the  apparent  opening  up 
of  their  professional  field  to  amateurs  through  social  media.  While  convergence  culture 
potentially  offered  opportunities  for  collaboration,  he  predicted  that  journalists  would  react 
nostalgically,  while  media  management  would  take  it  as  an  opportunity  to  lay  off  staff,  and 
audiences  would  see  it  as  a  way  to  bypass  journalism  rather  than  foster  closer  ties.  This 
analysis  essentially  predicted  a  fragmenting  effect  that  social  media  would  have  on 
professionals  and  news  audiences.  
 
Indeed,  the  perceived  emergence  of  a  social  media  echo  chamber  has  been  supported  by  a 
number  of  studies  of  journalists’  behaviour  on  Twitter.  Lasorsa  et  al  (2012)  found  that  elite 
journalist  were  less  likely  to  relinquish  their  gatekeeping  role  on  Twitter  than  their  less  elite 
peers,  meaning  that  those  working  for  national  news  organisations  did  not  link,  retweet  or 
engage  in  conversations  with  non-professionals  as  much  as  journalists  at  smaller  news 
outlets.  They  were  also  significantly  less  likely  to  express  opinions.  Professional  norms  were 
therefore  more  strictly  observed  by  those  with  a  greater  vested  interest  in  them.  Since, 
research  into  interactions  by  journalists  and  mainstream  media  has  shed  more  light  on  how 
professionals  have  adjusted  to  norms  and  practices  particular  to  Twitter  while  safeguarding 
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their  authority  as  gatekeepers.  Analysis  of  German  political  correspondents  showed  that  this 
cohort  of  journalists  was  likely  to  “remain  in  a  journalism-centered  bubble  and  to  mostly 
interact  with  one  another”  (Nuernbergk  2016,  p.  877).  Moreover,  they  also  largely  steered 
clear  of  retweeting  political  actors,  perhaps  for  fear  of  being  perceived  as  endorsing  them. 
The  findings  indicate  that  journalists  often  operate  in  an  echo  chamber  that  largely  consists  of 
their  peers.  An  investigation  into  Twitter  use  by  Norwegian  and  Swedish  public  service 
broadcasters  revealed  a  similar  tendency  towards  elite  interactions  in  their  national  election 
coverage  (Larsson  et  al.  2016) .  The  findings  showed  that  news  organisations  were  more 
likely  to  be  @  mentioned  by  non-elite  users,  but  more  likely  to  respond  to  elite  users,  such  as 
journalists  and  politicians.  This  was  the  case  despite  a  stated  desire  by  staff  to  use  social 
media  for  greater  engagement  with  the  general  public. 
 
Nevertheless,  it  would  be  disingenuous  to  argue  that  mainstream  journalism  has  been  able  to 
simply  shut  out  non-professionals  by  closing  rank  (although  it  may  have  created  a  mechanism 
to  minimize  their  impact  on  professional  news  production).  While  Deuze  (2008)  predicted 
that  professional  journalists  would  begin  to  compete  with  those  Bruns  (2006)  dubbed 
“produsers”,  professional  journalism  has  also  undoubtedly  been   adopting  and  appropriating 
amateur-produced  content.  The  term  “produsers”  was  used  to  describe  the  blurring  of 
boundaries  between  the  consumption  and  production  of  content  online,  with  individuals 
distributing  content  that  they  altered,  added  to,  or  commented  on  in  some  way. 
 
Describing  the  distribution  of  news  about  the  Arab  Spring  in  Cairo,  Murthy  (2013)  wrote  that 
the  Twitter  conversation  was  dominated  by  a  relatively  small  group  of  activists  in  Egypt,  and 
the  platform’s  biggest  strength  was  in  reaching  international  audiences,  including 
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international  journalists.  By  framing  the  role  Twitter  played  within  the  context  of  activism,  he 
separated  Twitter  ‘activists’  from  journalists,  though  both  participated  in  the  same  medium, 
carrying  out  at  least  some  of  the  same  activities.  He  acknowledged  that  Twitter  had  relatively 
little  impact  in  mobilising  protesters  in  Egypt  but  rather  showed  its  strength  in  raising  global 
awareness,  writing  that  “much  of  Twitter’s  prominence  [...]  arose  from  individuals  in  the 
West  tweeting  and  retweeting”  (ibid.  p.  112).  Therefore,  western  Twitter  users’  participation 
in  raising  global  awareness  and,  by  extension,  action  by  the  international  community  can  be 
understood  as  a  form  of  activism.  
 
The  idea  of  information  being  widely  shared  and  retweeted  as  being  activism  is  an  interesting 
one,  because  much  of  the  same  information  was  being  shared  both  by  activists  and 
journalists.  So  what  distinguishes  a  journalist  on  Twitter  retweeting  information  from  any 
other  member  of  the  public  doing  the  same?  A  main  difference  is  possibly  intention.  It  is 
argued  that  a  journalist  is  expected  to  adhere  to  professional  journalistic  practices  and  an 
ethical  framework  that  set  both  impartiality  and  accuracy  as  important  values  (Kovach  & 
Rosenstiel  2007).  In  a  time  where  everyone  can  potentially  publish,  this  ideological  emphasis 
on  professional  norms  and  practices  to  set  themselves  apart  has  perhaps  become  increasingly 
important  to  professional  journalists.  As  I  will  discuss  in  more  detail  later  in  this  chapter,  a 
form  of  activism  or  implied  advocacy  arguably  and  ironically  also  becomes  part  of  the  role  of 
the  journalist.  This  activism  is  not  primarily  focused  on  a  cause  such  as  toppling  an 
authoritarian  regime  but  rather  on  promoting  the  value  and  routines  of  professional 
journalism.  Mainstream  media  is  no  longer  simply  engaged  in  reporting  the  news  while 
taking  the  practices  it  adheres  to  for  granted,  but  involved  in  an  ongoing  process  of 
self-validation.  This  comes  at  a  time  when  the  overlap  between  the  activities  of  amateurs  and 
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mainstream  journalists  is  growing,  complicating  efforts  to  set  professional  journalism  apart  in 
the  eyes  of  news  audiences.  McNair  (2005)  argued  that  “as  the  information  marketplace  has 
become  more  competitive  in  recent  years,  the  commercial  value  of  reliable  accurate 
information  increases,  not  decreases,  and  old  fashioned  objectivity  remains  a  key  marketing 
tool  for  global  news  brands  like  the  BBC  and  CNN”  (p.  34).  Given  the  radical  shift  from 
information  scarcity  in  the  past  to  a  news  environment  characterised  by  information  overload, 
“[t]he  sense-making,  interpretative  functions  of  journalism  are  enhanced,  not  made  redundant 
in  the  era  of  real-time  and  online  news”  (McNair  2005,  p.  40).  Yet,  interpretation  of  news 
events  is  also  a  main  feature  of  citizen  commentary  (Bruns  2010).  Therefore,  it  may  be  that 
professional  journalists  seek  out  reciprocal  validation  from  peers  to  raise  their  profile  and 
thus  potentially  create  a  filter  bubble  or  echo  chamber  among  themselves. 
 
By  exploring  power  law,  I  have  sought  to  explore  some  of  the  early  assumptions  around 
equality  in  the  blogosphere  and  dispute  that  these  can  be  translated  or  applied  to  Twitter. 
Influence  on  Twitter  can  be  affected  by  a  number  of  factors  that  can  work  in  favour  of 
communication  professionals,  including  their  reputation  and   skills  in  speaking  to  large 
audiences,  their  networks  of  other  journalists  and  their  ability  to  amplify  their  voices 
collectively.  As  a  community  they  are  arguably  able  to  increase  their  visibility  to  their  wider 
networks  (or  audiences)  but  also  inside  their  networks  of  peers. 
 
‘Ambient’  journalism  and  ‘gatewatching’ 
 
An  analysis  of  the  nature  of  news  production  and  distribution  on  Twitter  may  be  found  in 
Hermida’s  (2010b)  description  of  “ambient  journalism”.  He  argues  that  social  media  has 
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created  an  environment  that  “enable[s]  the  former  audience  to  become  part  of  the  news 
environment  as  it  has  the  means  to  gather,  select,  produce  and  distribute  news  and 
information”  (Hermida  2010a) .  He  describes  ‘ambience’  as  an  awareness-system  that  is 
always  switched  on  but  shifts  between  background  and  foreground  in  news  audience’s 
consciousness.  The  ambient  news  environment  in  the  TV  era  was  all-pervasive,  with 
audiences  dipping  in  and  out  of  focusing  their  attention  on  news  products  as  consumers. 
Within  an  environment  of  ambient  journalism,  there  is  the  option  to  contribute  to  the  news 
environment  as  producers  and  distributors.  Hermida  argues  that  the  collage  of  fragments,  or 
tweets,  is  a  form  of  journalism  in  its  own  right.  Instead  of  applying  norms  of  professional 
journalism,  Twitter  creates  its  own  journalistic  environment  with  its  own  logic  that  empowers 
non-professionals  to  engage  in  news  production.  He  writes:  “Micro-blogging  can  be  seen  as  a 
form  of  participatory  or  citizen  journalism,  where  citizens  report  without  recourse  to 
institutional  journalism”  (Hermida  2010b,  p.  300).  
 
Citizen  journalism  emerged  in  the  1970s  and  was  characterised  by  small,  hyper-local  and 
alternative  media,  conceptualizing  public  communication  as  an  intersubjective  discourse, 
where  meaning  is  created  in  the  interaction  of  subjective  social  beings.  Through  it  “[d]ialogue 
has  emerged  as  a  centrepiece  of  contemporary  communication  theory”  that  is  now  a 
significant  contribution  to  the  media  landscape  (Christian  et  al.  2009,  p.  60).  Citizen 
journalism  may  be  considered  a  dated,  and  somewhat  narrow  term,  to  describe  collaboration 
in  newswork  by  non-elites.  Especially  in  a  globalised  world,  the  normative  concept  of 
citizenship  is  challenged  as  it  is  tied  to  the  nation-state’s  ability  to  confer  rights  (Siapera 
2017) .  Citizens’  rights  and  responsibilities  are  understood  within  territorial  boundaries.  This 
is  problematic  with  regards  to  networked  journalism  because  participation  in  newswork  can 
55 
come  from  individuals  who  are  citizens  of  geographically  remote  locations  and  without  an 
obvious  stake  in  a  news  event,  or  are  outside  of  the  definition  of  citizen  but  with  a  substantial 
stake  in  a  news  event  (ie.  refugees  and  migrants).  This  is  not  to  say  that  this  definition  of 
citizenry,  if  applied  to  citizen  journalism,  is  always  without  merit  but  that  it  is  not  broad 
enough  to  capture  the  full  range  of  participants  or  type  of  participation  in  this  research. 
Therefore,  I  will  apply  Siapera’s  idea  of  digital  citizenship  to  non-elite  users  participating  in 
newswork.  In  this  conception,  the  citizen  can  be  outside  the  boundaries  of  the  nation-state 
while  trying  to  achieve  change  within  it. 
 
Hermida’s  analysis  neatly  separates  Twitter  users  between  mass  media  and  citizens  and  feeds 
into  the  early  hypothesis  that  the  Internet  is  leading  towards  the  democratization  of  mass 
communication  (Benkler  2007;  Jenkins  2006;  Shirky  2008a) .  It  also  fed  into  the  prediction 
that  professional  journalism,  embodied  by  the  press,  would  become  increasingly  displaced  by 
the  activities  of  amateurs  thanks  to  diminishing  revenue  in  a  commercial  news  environment. 
However,  the  democratization  of  news  was  envisioned  to  offset  the  negative  implications  of 
this  trend  (Shirky  2008b) .  Yet,  the  rise  of  Twitter  as  a  tool  and  publishing  platform  for 
journalists  shows  that  the  line  between  citizen  and  mass  media  is  much  more  difficult  to 
identify.  The  activities  Hermida  identifies  as  carried  out  by  citizen  journalists  are  also  the 
activities  of  professional  journalists  participating  on  Twitter  and  vice  versa.  
 
Bruns  (2010)  responded  to  Hermida  criticizing  the  theoretical  binary  between 
’para-journalism’  and  journalism  that  casts  the  former  in  a  communitarian  ethic  and  the  latter 
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as  a  ‘gatewatcher’   in  the  interest  of  corporate  media.  Much  of  what  was  described  as  citizen 8
journalism,  he  renamed  ‘citizen  commentary’,  in  which  “news  curation  is  the  core  practice” 
(Bruns  &  Highfield  2012) .  As  Bruns  pointed  out,  news  curation  relies  heavily  on  the 
abundance  of  available  information,  including  mainstream  media  reporting.  “[T]he 
politicization  of  mainstream  journalism  and  the  relatively  low  cost  of  producing 
commentary”  (ibid.,  p.  8),  Bruns  argued,  had  led  to  the  increase  of  op-eds  in  the  mainstream 
news,  which  in  turn  fuelled  efforts  by  alternative  media  to  source  their  own  independent 
information.  In  short,  the  internet  produced  a  news  environment  where  the  practices  of 
mainstream  and  alternative  media  increasingly  overlap,  to  the  point  of  a  cross-pollination  of 
contributors,  leading  to  a  more  heterogeneous  news  environment.  Bruns  and  Highfield  saw 
the  uptake  of  Twitter  as  having  ‘turbo-charged’  gatewatching  and  collaboration  between 
professional  journalists  and  non-professionals.  He  described  it  as  a  “flat  and  open  network 
structure”  (ibid.,  p.  10),  where  news  production  and  curation  becomes  malleable  and  fluid. 
News  curation  is  shaped  by  a  multitude  of  voices  as  they  congregate  around  specific 
hashtags.  “[T]he  process  of  news  curation  [...]  is  further  decentralized  and  shared;  no  one 
individual  Twitter  user  is  now  responsible  for  compiling,  collating,  and  curating  the  available 
information  on  any  given  topic.  Instead,  it  becomes  a  thoroughly  collaborative  exercise.” 
 
However,  the  news  collage  produced  on  Twitter,  as  Bruns  described  it,  can  only  be  apparent 
to  anyone  who  follows  all  of  the  information  emerging  around  a  particular  news  event.  While 
it  might  be  feasible  for  the  news  pastiche  to  be  appreciated  in  its  entirety  for  less  prominent 
events,  it  becomes  a  practical  impossibility  for  events  that  generate  widespread  interest. 
8  Given  the  information  abundance,  ‘gatewatchers’  would  replace  gatekeepers,  organising  and 
ordering  valuable  information.  
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Given  the  abundance  of  information,  hierarchies  become  necessary,  if  not  inevitable  and  at 
the  time  of  the  research  in  2015  and  2016  Twitter  automatically  ordered  tweets  searched  by 
‘keywords’  according  to  popularity  rather  than  chronology.  Therefore,  a  discussion  of  power 
dynamics  on  the  Internet  provides  further  insight  into  how  hierarchies  emerge  and  are  shaped. 
More  recently,  Hermida  (2017)  looked  at  how  professional  norms  can  be  adapted  whereby 
the  journalist  “acts  as  a  forum  organizer  guided  by  both  traditional  journalistic  principles  and 
emerging  values  of  collaboration  and  co-creation,”  securing  the  “role  of  the  social  media 
reporter  as  a  key  node  in  a  networked  and  hybrid  media  environment”  (p.  189).  Bringing 
professional  norms  to  the  ambient  journalism  environment  means  that  the  journalist  then  also 
participates  in  it  but  inspires  trust  and  authority. 
 
Chadwick  (2011a;  2011b;  2013)  also  echoed  this  emergence  of  a  collaborative  approach  to 
news  production  that  he  called  the  ‘hybrid  media  system’.  Analysing  the  political  news  cycle 
in  Britain,  he  argued,  political  news  production  as  “a  tightly-controlled,  even  cozy  game 
involving  the  interactions  and  interventions  of  a  small  number  of  elites:  politicians,  officials, 
communications  staff,  journalists,  and,  in  a  small  number  of  recent  studies,  elite  bloggers”  is 
being  contested.  “While  these  elite-driven  aspects  of  political  communication  are  still  much 
in  evidence,  the  hybridization  of  old  and  new  media  requires  a  rejuvenated  understanding  of 
the  power  relations  shaping  news  production”  (2011b,  p.  7).  A  main  characteristic  of 
Chadwick’s  model  is  ‘interdependence’,  as  old  media  look  to  exploit  the  viral  nature  of 
online  news,  while  new  media  news  outlets  still  operate  in  an  environment  where  traditional 
news  media  are  able  to  outperform  their  newer  rivals  in  terms  of  financial  and  organisational 
resources  (2011a,  p.  5).  Much  of  new  media  continues  to  rely  on  the  scoops  and  reporting  of 
traditional  news  media.  Chadwick  argued  this  hybridization  between  new  technologies  and 
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traditional  news  media  would  lead  towards  the  empowerment  of  non-elites  to  contest  the 
mainstream  media’s  monopoly  on  framing  and  reporting  of  news.  “The  more  that 
professional  broadcast  and  press  media  use  digital  services  like  Twitter  and  Facebook,  the 
more  likely  it  is  that  media  will  become  open  to  influence  by  activists  who  use  those  same 
tools.”  (Chadwick  2011b,  p.  15) . 
 
This  news  environment  describes  a  rich  tapestry  of  actors  able  to  participate  in  a  news 
production  cycle  that  is  in  essence  more  collaborative  and  diverse  than  the  linear 
one-to-many  model  of  broadcasting.  Nevertheless,  Chadwick,  like  Bruns,  also  recognises 
how  professional  journalists  are  competing  on  new  media  to  outperform  other  actors  and 
assert  their  dominance  in  this  space.  “[Journalists]  have  also  selectively  integrated  digital 
practices  and  online  sources  into  their  own  coverage,  as  they  seek  to  outperform  new  media 
actors  in  an  incessant,  micro-level,  and  often  real-  time  power  struggle  characterized  by 
competition  and  conflict,  but  also  negotiation  and  interdependence.”  (ibid.,  p.  8)  It  is  through 
competition  on  the  one  hand  and  interdependence  on  the  other  that  diversity  is  deemed  to  be 
fostered.  With  new  players  contesting  the  right  to  draft  and  determine  news,  journalists  lose 
their  privilege  to  decide  who  gets  to  speak.  Instead,  not  only  must  they  compete  but  also  take 
heed  of  new  emerging  voices  not  to  run  the  risk  of  rendering  themselves  irrelevant.  “[O]nline 
activists  and  news  professionals  alike  are  now  routinely  engaged  in  loosely  coupled 
assemblages  characterized  by  conflict,  competition,  partisanship,  and  mutual  dependency,  in 
the  pursuit  of  new  information  that  will  propel  a  news  story  forward  and  increase  its 
newsworthiness”  (2011b,  p.  19).  In  more  recent  work,  Chadwick  (Chadwick  et  al.  2016) 
returns  to  the  issue  of  unequal  power  distribution  in  the  hybrid  media  system,  and  how  news 
media  are  adapting  to  newer  media.  But  he  insists  that  greater  opportunities  remain  for 
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non-elites  to  disrupt  information  flows  than  at  any  other  point  in  the  last  60  years.  Critically, 
Chadwick  notes  that  as  professional  journalists  adapt  their  practices  to  digital  media  “this 
process  also  works  in  the  opposite  direction:  amateur  journalists  and  bloggers  increasingly 
integrate  the  logics  of  professional  journalists”  (2016,  p.  14)  to  the  point  that  some  of  them 
are  partly  accepted  into  the  professional  community.  I  argue  that  what  this  suggests  is  an 
ongoing  struggle  over  what  constitutes  legitimate  forms  of  mass  communication  and  that  it  is 
by  no  means  clear  that  the  give  and  take  in  this  struggle  is  equal. 
 
A  similar  collaborative  spirit  between  citizens  and  journalists  is  echoed  in  Papacharissi’s 
(2016)  definition  of  “affective  news  streams”  where  “news  [is]  collaboratively  constructed 
out  of  subjective  experience,  opinion,  and  emotion,  all  sustained  by  and  sustaining  ambient 
news  environments.”  (p.  34)  Everyone  is  invited  to  contribute  and  established  norms  in 
professional  newswork,  such  as  neutrality,  are  called  into  question.  Essentially,  it  is  the  ability 
to  talk  back  and  for  subjectivity  to  shape  part  of  the  news  stream,  that  Papacharissi  argues, 
reconnects  journalist  with  a  disaffected  public.  
 
If  we  understand  affective  news  streams  not  just  as  informative,  but  as  collectively 
generated,  pluralistic  arguments  on  what  should  be  news,  and  how  news  stories 
should  be  told,  we  may  interpret  affective  news  gestures  as  indicative  of  political 
statements  of  dissent  with  a  mainstream  news  culture,  and  the  agendas  that  culture 
cultivates.  (ibid.,  p.  34) 
  
All  four  authors  are  largely  concerned  in  these  papers  with  the  consumption  and  productions 
of  news  through  new  media,  and,  it  appears,  social  media  specifically.  Though  not  always 
stated,  it  is  easy  to  see  how  Hermida’s  and  Bruns’  ambient  journalism  and  produsing  emerges 
in  social  networks  that  facilitate  the  flow  and  exchange  of  information,  as  seen  on  Twitter  and 
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Facebook.  Papacharissi  specifically  cites  affective  news  streams  on  Twitter  in  the  immediate 
aftermath  of  the  Boston  Marathon  bombing,  and  Chadwick’s  hybrid  media  discusses 
journalists’  adoption  of  platforms  and  practices  used  by  non-journalists  for  expression,  as  is 
clearly  seen  in  the  uptake  of  Twitter  among  news  media  professionals.  This  work  suggests  a 
technological  determinist  streak,  whereby  it  is  not  a  deliberate  rethinking  of  professional 
routines  but  technological  innovation  and  adoption  that  is  deemed  to  pave  the  way  to 
democratising  the  news  media.  Above  all,  competition  is  the  guiding  principle  by  which 
democratisation  takes  place  in  the  hybrid  media  system,  and  professional  journalism  is  forced 
to  adapt  in  order  to  remain  relevant.  Firstly,  competition  forces  collaboration  and 
interdependence  as  a  whole  range  of  individuals  are  relied  on  to  add  value  to  newswork 
through  their  participation.  This  inadvertently  threatens  to  deprofessionalise  news  reporting 
as  it  opens  up  to  non-professionals.  Although  Papacharissi  recognises  that  ‘affective  news 
streams’  are  often  riddled  with  inaccuracies  and  therefore  produce  poor  news  coverage  in  the 
conventional  sense,  she  argues,  they  present  “liminal  paths  to  accuracy”  (ibid.  p.  35).  She 
suggests  this  will  ultimately  produce  news  of  the  same  standard  as  older  conventional  news 
reporting  but  will  have  managed  to  democratise  the  process.   9
 
All  four  authors  predicted  or  argued  that  this  collaborative  news  environment  has  a  profound 
effect  on  news  production  that  renders  it  far  more  open  to  non-elites.  An  empowering  quality 
9  In  the  case  of  the  Boston  Marathon  bombing,  others  were  more  sceptical  of  the  effect  of  a  ‘tweet 
first  fact-check  later’  approach  by  networked  journalists,  questioning  that  unfettered  self-expression  in 
the  “marketplace  of  ideas  will  eventually,  somehow,  produce  the  right  answer”  (Annany  2013). 
Annany  argues  for  a  sense  of  responsibility  in  speech.  That  a  networked  press  must  ask,  “what  if  the 
version  of  the  truth  I’m  about  to  say  is  taken  to  be  true?”   
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is  ascribed  to  new  technologies  as  far  as  breaking  down  barriers  between  the  general  public 
and  journalists  is  concerned.  From  a  macro-level,  this  activity  can  be  interpreted  as  an 
expression  of  discontent  that  forces  a  renegotiation  of  professional  routines.  Given  that 
attention  is  a  scarce  resource  in  this  ambient  news  environment,  not  only  among  news 
audience  but  also  the  public,  ordering  the  content  of  these  news  streams  in  some  meaningful 
way  becomes  inevitable.  As  already  discussed,  there  is  a  hierarchy  in  how  information  is 
likely  to  be  ordered  by  audiences,  but  more  specifically  to  this  research,  by  journalists. 
 
Roger  Silverstone  (2006 )  problematizes  this  technologically  determinist  take  on  the  media  
environment  from  a  political  theory  perspective.  In  discussing  the  global  media  sphere   he 10
places  the  onus  back  on  more  conventional  forms  of  media,  such  as  broadcast  and  the  press, 
for  mediating  an  effective  public  sphere  for  global  citizens.  Silverstone  subscribes  to  the  view 
shared  by  political  theorist  Mouffe  (discussed  in,  e,g.,  Carpenter  2008)  and  supported  by 
empirical  research  already  mentioned,  that  the  Internet  alone,  without  a  link  to  conventional, 
more  inclusive  media,  has  a  fragmenting  effect.  He  discusses  the  notion  of  ‘hospitality’  with 
regard  to  the  news  media’s  public  service  role.  Crucially,  hospitality  extends  an  invitation  to 
10  In  Media  and  Morality ,  Silverstone  is  primarily  concerned  with  the  importance  of  the  world’s  media 
in  constructing  a  moral  order  in  a  globalised  world.  As  such,  pluralism,  which  he  also  refers  to  as 
cosmopolitanism,  plays  a  central  role.  He  writes,  “Pluralism  insists  on  difference,  but  not  irreducible 
difference.  It  insists  that  the  shared  fundament  of  the  human  condition  imposes  limits  on  the  range  of 
meaningful  difference  and  likewise  enables  the  possibility  of  communication,  some  kind  of 
communication,  across  the  widest  and  deepest  channels.”  (2006,  pp.  15-16)  Therefore,  it  is  envisaged 
that  there  is  a  single  overarching  mediated  public  sphere  to  accommodate  the  plurality  of  voices  in  a 
globalised  world. 
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speak  but  also  places  a  responsibility  on  the  host  to  listen.  Such  hospitality  is  a  prerequisite 
for  a  pluralist  global  media  sphere,  demanding  not  only  that  the  right  to  speak  is  extended  to 
all,  but  also  the  right  to  an  audience.  “The  internet  is  often  seen  as  offering  such  a  space.  Yet 
the  internet  even  in  its  openness  is  not  necessarily  a  space  of  hospitality,  for  if  it  is  hospitality, 
and  this  is  its  contradiction  in  terms,  without  a  host.”  (ibid.,  p.  142)  This  cuts  to  the  core  of 
the  criticism  of  the  news  environment  on  social  media,  where  participants  can  ‘produse’  with 
abandon  but  there  is  no  impetus  on  anyone  to  listen  to  agonistic  views.  The  large  volumes  of 
academic  work  on  the  alleged  ‘filter  bubble’  and  ‘echo  chamber’  (eg.  Carlson  &  Lewis  2015; 
Jacobson  et  al.  2016;  Pariser  2012)  are  proof  that  this  criticism  has  remained  unresolved.  The 
world’s  media  therefore  has  a  role  that  cannot  be  provided  by  the  Internet  alone  as  the  ability 
to  speak  and  be  listened  to  has  to  be  extended  consciously  and  deliberately.  While  a  return  to 
disseminative  media,  such  as  broadcast,  as  the  primary  form  of  news  media  does  not  appear 
likely  (or  desirable)  online  news  sites  by  mainstream  news  media  could  perhaps  be  envisaged 
to  provide  a  hospitable  space.  This  view  on  hospitality  also  has  implications  for  the  role  of 
the  professional  journalist  on  the  Internet,  to,  arguably,  invite  and  facilitate  a  plurality  of 
voices  and  views. 
 
Both  Bruns  and  Chadwick  touch  on  the  adoption  of  digital  practices  in  professional  news 
production,  which  is  of  particular  interest  to  this  research  as  it  begins  to  explore  how 
journalists  manage  the  boundaries  between  their  organisations  and  social  media  actors. 
However,  both  authors  perceive  the  social  media  space  to  be  non-hierarchical  and  open, 
which  has  been  disputed.  Chadwick  qualifies  this  argument  somewhat,  by  pointing  out  that 
mainstream  news  media  do  remain  dominant  for  a  number  of  reasons,  but  also  forecasts  the 
slow  democratization  of  the  news  production  process  through  technology.  Yet,  the  behaviour 
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of  elite  journalists  and  the  formation  of  interest  groups  (namely  professional  journalists  in 
this  case)  also  shows  how  a  different  outcome  is  achieved,  that  displays  the  characteristics  of 
collaboration  and  diversity  but  is  in  reality  quite  exclusive  (Larsson  et  al.  2016;  Lasorsa  et  al. 
2012;  Nuernbergk  2016) . 
 
Bruns  argued  that  in  the  digital  age,  gatewatching  has  replaced  gatekeeping,  as  a 
newsgathering  practice  due  to  the  loss  of  control  over  information  distribution  by  print  and 
broadcast  (2003) ,  and  is  an  activity  engaged  in  both  by  mainstream  and  alternative  media 
(Bruns  &  Highfield  2012) .  Central  is  the  notion  of  collaboration  between  professional 
journalists  and  users  in  uncovering  and  curating  newsworthy  information,  which,  though  not 
new,  has  become  increasingly  widespread.  Bruns  (2014)  cited  crowdsourcing  projects  around 
data  dumps  as  examples  of  how  the  public  are  encouraged  to  survey  huge  quantities  of 
information  and  alert  newsworthy  findings  to  journalists,  who  then  work  them  into  stories.  
Today,  finally,  the  transition  has  been  further  sped  up  by  the  widespread  availability  of 
near  real-time  social  media  platforms  which  accelerate  the  news  cycle  even  beyond 
the  already  significant  pressures  of  24-hour  news  channels.  The  result  is  the  final 
breakdown  of  traditional  journalistic  gatekeeping  models,  and  a  corresponding  shift 
towards  gatewatching.  (ibid.,  p.  226) 
 
In  short,  there  is  no  longer  a  need  for  journalists  to  carry  out  all  the  journalistic  tasks  of  the 
past.  Instead  they  should  concentrate  their  efforts  their  “core  practices  of  investigative 
journalism  and  quality  coverage”.  The  reality,  of  course,  is  that  what  is  being  watched  is  often 
still  the  product  of  professional  news  production  (Chadwick  2011a).  It  is  also  not  entirely 
clear  where  Bruns  envisions  the  news  curation  by  users  should  take  place.  If  it  is  only  carried 
out  on  social  media  platforms  specifically,  it  is  simply  not  feasible  for  news  consumers  to 
survey  the  breadth  of  the  ‘prodused’  content  available  in  any  kind  of  time  efficient  way. 
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Although  a  US  survey  of  news  audiences  (Pew  Research  Center  2016)  shows  that  a  majority 
of  Americans  do  access  news  through  social  media,  in  many  cases  it  can  only  be  a  fraction  of 
the  available  content  that  is  skewed  by  individuals’  networks  and  power  laws.  If  the 
crowdsourced  news  curation  is  to  be  incorporated  on  news  organisation’s  own  platforms, 
there  is  inevitably  a  gatekeeping  process  that  professional  journalists  will  again  enact, 
through  the  selection  of  news  content. 
 
Bruns  assessment  of  the  news  environment  is  cast  against  the  background  of  growing 
commercial  pressures  on  the  news  industry,  in  which  the  news  media  has  to  rationalise 
resources  and  recruit  users  to  carry  out  journalistic  tasks.  Echoing  the  sentiments  of  Jenkins 
(2006)  and  Shirky,  Bruns  argues  that  in  such  a  highly  competitive  environment,  news  users 
gain  power  in  influencing  news  production  as  media  organisations  cannot  simply  exploit  their 
free  labour,  and  must  surrender  an  element  of  control.  This  tapping  of  the  ‘wisdom  of  the 
crowd’  is  seen  by  Bruns  to  potentially  deliver  a  similar  impartiality  and  objectivity  as 
required  of  professional  journalism  as  “there  is  no  indication  that  the  overall  user  base  of 
Facebook  or  Twitter  has  a  common  preference  for  one  political  view  or  another,  
for  example”  (Bruns  2014) .  Nevertheless,  in  practice,  research  showed  (Bastos  et  al.  2013; 11
Xie  et  al.  2011)  that  ideology  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  shaping  dominant  online  political 
commentary,  with  a  small  number  of  highly  active,  extremely  opinionated  voices  often 
polarising  the  conversation. 
11  This  assumption  is  seen  in  Kevin  Kelly’s  New  Rules  for  the  New  Economy  (1999),  where  the 
marketplace  of  ideas  inherently  produces  the  correct  answers.  Kelly’s  idea  of  the  ‘swarm’  believes 
that  the  participation  of  every  individual,  no  matter  how  ignorant,  contributes  to  producing  the  right 
answer.  Technology  is  considered  key  in  interpreting  participation  correctly. 
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 Shoemaker  and  Vos  (2009)  argue  gatekeeping  remains  at  the  heart  of  how  information 
reaches  conventional  news  audiences  as  well  as  bloggers  and  other  users,  who  rely  on  this 
information  for  commentary  and  news  curation.  “People  rely  on  mediators  to  transfom 
information  about  billions  of  events  into  a  manageable  subset  of  media  messages.”  (ibid.,  p. 
1)  They  consider  the  sharing  of  media  messages  by  news  audiences  on  the  Internet  as  a 
secondary  level  of  gatekeeping  that  characterises  information  diffusion  after  the  initial 
gatekeeping  of  the  mass  media.  Therefore,  news  audiences  can  also  act  as  gatekeepers.  In  her 
Networked  Gatekeeping  Theory ,  Barzilai-Nahon  (2008)  also  critiques  the  perception  of  a 
flattened  egalitarian  news  environment,  often  described  as  characteristic  of  the  convergence 
culture  generated  by  technology.  By  rethinking  traditional  notions  of  the  gatekeeper  in  the 
context  of  mass  communication,  she  produces  a  more  differentiated  model  of  gatekeeping 
that  has  currency  when  adapted  to  networks  such  as  social  media.  Barzilai-Nahon  describes 
the  network  gatekeeper’s  objectives  as  first,  preventing  the  entrance  of  undesired  information 
from  the  outside.  Second,  preventing  the  exit  of  undesired  information  to  the  outside.  Third, 
controlling  information  inside  the  network.  The  theory  suggests  that  within  networks,  the 
‘gated’,  meaning  “the  entity  subjected  to  gatekeeping”  (2008,  p.  1496)   can  possess  certain 12
attributes  that  gives  them  bargaining  power  in  their  relationship  with  gatekeepers.  In 
networks,  gatekeepers  are  not  only  the  senders  of  information  but  can  become  the  destination 
12  Moreover,  in  networks,  users  may  choose  to  be  gated.  “Being  a  subject  to  gatekeeping  does  not 
imply  that  the  gated  is  lacking  alternatives  or  that  gatekeeping  is  forced  on  her  or  him.  The  gated  is 
bounded  by  gatekeeping  sometimes  from  her  or  his  free  will.”  (ibid.  p.  1496)  Especially,  in  an  intense 
content  saturated  24/7  news  environment  and  with  a  limited  quantity  of  attention  available  to  news 
users,  trusting  gatekeepers  to  select  information  has  its  benefits. 
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points  for  information  from  the  gated.  However,  it  is  not  the  capacity  to  produce  information 
alone  that  challenges  the  gatekeeper  as  the  ability  of  the  gated  to  produce  information  does 
not  necessarily  ensure  that  information  will  reach  an  audience.  In  reverse,  this  also  means  that 
traditional  gatekeepers  –  meaning  journalists  in  this  context  –  are  now  required  to  promote 
their  own  work  since  publication  is  no  longer  the  main  mechanism  of  gatekeeping  (Vos  & 
Heinderyckx  2014)  “as  dissemination  in  an  overcrowded  information  environment  has 
become  equally  important”  (Tandoc  &  Vos  2016,  p.  962) .  
 
Barzilai-Nahon  (2008)  identifies  four  types  of  attributes,  that  contribute  to  message  salience 
from  the  gated  to  gatekeepers: 
 
(a)  their  political  power  in  relation  to  the  gatekeeper,  (b)  their  information  production 
ability,  (c)  their  relationship  with  the  gatekeeper,  and  (d)  their  alternatives  in  the 
context  of  gatekeeping.  Network  gatekeeping  predicts  that  salience  of  a  particular 
gated  to  gatekeepers  is  correlated  to  the  possession  of  these  attributes;  that  is,  low  if 
one  attribute  is  present,  moderate  if  two  attributes  are  present,  high  if  three  attributes 
are  present,  and  very  high  if  all  four  attributes  are  present.  (p.  1506) 
 
Therefore,  the  one-way  flow  of  information  from  the  gatekeeper  to  the  gated  no  longer 
applies  but  the  relationship  becomes  more  fluid,  whereby  the  gated  can  improve  their  position 
through  acquiring  these  attributes.  Nevertheless,  the  theory  still  tries  to  capture  how  a 
centralized  structure  remains  in  place  in  a  decentralized  information  space  such  as  the 
Internet. 
 
News  media  as  public  sphere 
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Habermas’  study  of  the  public  sphere  is  the  major  accepted  theoretical  model  underpinning 
the  press’  functions  in  building  a  public.  The  Structural  Transformation  of  the  Public  Sphere 
(Habermas  2003)  lays  out  an  historical  analysis  of  the  evolution  of  a  public  arena  within 
bourgeois  society.  Although  its  critics  have  highlighted  many  shortcomings,  it  provides  a 
widely  accepted  foundation  to  explain  the  emergence  of  the  public  sphere  and  democracy, 
and  the  press  as  a  democracy-building  institution.  According  to  Habermas,  this  space 
emerged  to  hold  public  opinion  –  albeit  a  public  that  was  limited  to  a  small  and  moneyed 
section  of  the  society  which  was  granted  privileged  access  –  to  exert  pressure  on  political 
decision-making  by  power  elites.  It  is  the  realm  where  private  persons  come  together  to 
discuss  issues  of  common  concern  to  them,  and  presupposes  a  strict  separation  between 
matters  considered  private  and  public.  It  is  only  the  public  that  is  concerned  with  the  common 
good  and  warrants  deliberation  and  contestation  on  a  public  stage.  In  order  for  the  opinions 
formed  to  truly  represent  those  of  the  public,  participants  must  appear  as  equals  and  the 
Habermasian  public  sphere  suggests  this  is  best  achieved  through  the  personal  dissociation 
from  private  interests. 
 
Both  the  press  and  bourgeois  public  sphere  emerged  during  a  period  characterised  by  a 
libertarian  concept  of  what  the  press  should  be  (Christians  et  al  2009).  In  this  time  the 
corporatist  emphasis  on  the  common  good,  to  the  exclusion  of  that  of  the  individual,  was 
modified  to  include  individual  liberties.  Such  liberties  were  deemed  of  benefit  only  to 
oneself.  In  the  context  of  the  liberty  of  the  press,  this  was  understood  as  the  right  to  publish 
and  read  whatever  one  wishes.  Libertarian  thinkers  believed  in  an  individualistic  approach  to 
society,  with  every  person  deemed  to  be  born  equal,  rational  and  capable  of  governing.  The 
libertarian  model  grants  individuals  the  right  to  affirm  this  equality  at  least  in  theory.  It  was 
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grounded  in  the  belief  that  where  there  is  a  free  exchange  of  ideas  in  a  public  sphere  the  truth 
will  prevail.  Therefore,  the  press  was  an  organ  that  sought  an  objective  truth.  “The  classic 
marketplace-of-ideas  theory  was  based  on  the  assumptions  that  the  truth  is  discoverable,  that 
people  can  agree  on  evidence.  It  is  assumed  that  people  are  willing  to  put  aside  their  social 
biases  and  sift  through  data  to  get  to  the  core  issues  in  a  discussion.”  (ibid.,  p.  49)  While  the 
claim  to  such  an  equal  deliberative  reality  was  clearly  never  realised ,  it  did  give  a 13
framework  to  those  who  were  subjugated  or  marginalised  for  them  to  challenge  their  position 
in  society.  
 
Habermas  proposes  the  public  sphere  of  the  bourgeois  capitalist  society,  though  it  remained 
imperfect,  can  be  understood  as  a  blueprint  for  an  inclusive  realm  where  debates  about  the 
common  good  are  staged  and  consensus  is  reached.  The  press  as  an  organ  of  public  opinion 
and  conveyor  of  information  that  is  of  public  interest  plays  a  pivotal  role  in  this.  It  allows 
individuals  to  make  informed  judgements,  but  also  acts  as  mediator  and  facilitator  of  debates 
among  a  large  and  geographically  spread  out  citizenry.  By  speaking  to  a  geographically  broad 
audience  and  manifesting  the  vernacular  in  written  form,  the  press  built  the  nation  state 
through  imagined  communities  (Anderson  1983).   It  was  with  the  appearance  of  the  press  – 
initially  in  the  form  of  the  newsletter  –  in  the  mid-17th  century  that  self-awareness  of  private 
persons  as  participants  of  a  ‘reasoning’  public  emerged.  In  tandem  with  the  growing 
interdependence  of  local,  regional  and  national  markets  during  the  height  of  merchant 
capitalism,  the  printed  newsletter  bound  together  individuals  from  beyond  the  local 
communities  and  symbolised  “communities  of  fate”  (Goode  2005,  p.  6)  .  At  the  same  time 
13  Several  theorists  (Fraser,  Livingston)  have  long  pointed  out  that  public  discourse  in  this  era  was 
dominated  by  property-owning  white  men  to  the  exclusion  of  most  others.  
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that  the  printing  press  brought  together  communities  in  a  way  that  challenged  the  traditional 
centres  of  power,  state  authorities  also  appropriated  the  press  to  reinforce  their  reign  of 
power.  “Inasmuch  as  they  made  use  of  this  instrument  to  promulgate  instructions  and 
ordinances,  the  addressees  of  the  authorities’  announcements  genuinely  became  “the  public” 
in  the  proper  sense.”  (Habermas  2003,  p.  21) 
 
Coupled  with  the  emerging  self-image  of  a  ‘reasoning’  public,  Habermas  points  out  it  was 
ironically  the  state-controlled  press  that  provided  a  model  to  challenge  the  abstract  state 
powers,  whose  physical  presence  was  increasingly  removed  from  ordinary  lives.  Instead,  the 
ruling  elite  became  represented  in  print,  in  turn  simultaneously  pioneering  the  medium  by 
which  it  could  be  challenged.  By  representing  themselves  to  geographically  distant 
communities  and  society  through  the  press,  state  powers  inadvertently  reinforced  the  idea  of 
communities  seeing  themselves  as  bound  together  as  a  public.  Persons  who  had  never  and 
would  never  meet  were  being  addressed  collectively  on  issues  that  concerned  all  of  them. 
Publicity,  through  means  of  the  press,  made  it  possible  to  hold  state  powers  accountable  to 
society.  Initially  by  scrutinizing  the  information  released  by  the  state  into  a  public  arena  and 
subjecting  it  to  public  debate  and  opinion,  and  later  by  responding  to  the  state  through  the 
press  freedom  and  freedom  of  speech  enshrined  in  law. 
 
These  technologies  enhance  the  potential  to  ‘work  through’  the  linkages  between  a 
locally  situated  lifeworld  and  the  intrusion  of  a  ‘world  out  there’,  whilst  creating  new 
distantiated  relations  through  the  dissemination  of  symbols:  ‘lived  experience’  and 
‘mediated  experience’  are  progressively  interwoven.  (Goode  2005,  p.  93) 
 
Habermas  draws  on  Kant’s  ‘principle  of  publicity’,  whereby  a  rational  and  just  judgement  on 
political  matters  is  the  result  of  debates  by  a  plurality  of  spectators.  He  believed  that 
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impartiality,  and  consequently  the  truth,  could  be  arrived  at  when  citizens  embrace  the 
viewpoint  of  others.  This  is  only  possible  when  the  exchange  of  ideas  takes  place  in  a  public 
arena  so  as  to  be  tested  against  one  another.  Parity  among  participants  in  this  exchange  is 
deemed  essential,  and  could  be  accomplished  by  the  exclusion  of  those  who  could  be 
described  as  dependent  on  others  for  their  livelihoods.  This  meant  the  exclusion  of 
non-property  owning  classes  and  women.  While  he  recognises  Marx’s  argument  that  the 
bourgeois  public  sphere  of  the  19th  century  “hid  before  itself  its  own  true  character  as  a  mask 
of  bourgeois  class  interests”  (Habermas  2003,  p.  124)  a  progressive  integration  of  lower  strata 
of  society  into  the  public  sphere,  once  brought  to  its  logical  conclusion,  would  culminate  in  a 
single  public  sphere  where  all  voices  were  represented. 
 
The  bourgeois  public  sphere  was  seen  as  a  “means  of  education”  and  “integrating  the  citizens 
into  the  state  from  above”.  (ibid.,  p.  121)  For  example,  Habermas  argues  reading  societies  of 
the  late  18th  century  educated  the  petty  bourgeoisie  and  brought  them  “up  to  the  level  of 
culture:  culture  was  not  lowered  to  that  of  the  masses.”(  ibid.,  p.  166)  Not  only  does  he 
naturalise  the  bourgeois  conception  of  the  public  sphere,  modelled  on  its  own  perception  of 
what  constitutes  objective,  educated,  and  rational  argumentation,  he  also  attempts  to  reconcile 
two  opposing  worldviews.  Here  the  Kantian  view  that  values  the  public  realm  outside  the 
power  of  the  state  as  a  forum  where  arguments  can  be  tested  and  public  opinions  formed 
stands  in  opposition  to  the  Hegelian  understanding  of  the  public  which  rejects  this  same 
realm  as  impotent  since  it  holds  no  state  power,  and  public  opinion  as  inherently  subjective. 
For  Hegel  the  public  space  was  only  present  in  the  state  and  public  institutions  had  a  duty  to 
educate  society  about  the  principles  underpinning  political  and  social  life  (Muhlman  2010,  p. 
128).  The  Habermasian  argument  that  the  press  has  a  duty  to  educate  the  public  in  their  role 
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as  citizens  is  not  without  its  difficulties.  It  would  be  difficult  to  conceive  of  effective 
democratic  citizenship  without  the  understanding  of  what  this  role  entails  or  access  to  a  basic 
level  and  quality  of  information  to  make  informed  decisions.  Yet,  at  what  point  does 
education  turn  into  the  imposition  of  a  dominant  ideology  on  society,  forcing  those  least 
served  by  it  into  a  subservient  role  pandering  to  the  interests  of  elites?  The  notion  that  lower 
strata  of  society  needed  to  be  initiated  into  the  culture  of  the  bourgeoisie  through  reading 
societies  can  also  be  perceived  as  the  attempt  to  assimilate  and  neutralize  the  unpalatable 
differences  these  social  classes  brought  to  the  public  sphere,  by  undermining  and 
marginalising  their  experiences  through  elitist  claims  to  the  right  to  define  what  constitutes 
rationality,  impartiality  and  the  common  interest.  The  public  sphere,  then,  does  not  facilitate 
the  meeting  of  participants  as  equals  until  innate  differences  that  could  lead  to  any  paradigm 
shift  in  society  are  eradicated. 
 
Habermas  saw  in  20th  century  broadcast  media  as  a  form  of  refeudalisation  where  audiences 
consume  media  in  isolation  without  a  forum  for  discussion.  Nevertheless,  Habermas  himself 
dismissed  new  media  as  harbouring  nothing  more  than  ‘global  villages’  that  reflect  the 
fragmentation  of  society  (Goode  2005,  p.  106).   He  considered  it  an  effective  way  for 
individuals  to  shield  themselves  from  opposing  views  and  opinions  by  only  focusing  on  those 
voices  that  are  in  agreement,  therefore  not  encouraging  participants  to  form  opinions  in  a 
deliberative  manner. 
 
Nancy  Fraser  scrutinized  several  assumptions  in  the  Habermasian  theory.  Citing  revisionist 
historians  she  argued  that  bourgeois  public  sphere  met  opposition  from  counter  publics 
comprising  the  disenfranchised  from  the  start.  As  it  remained  inaccessible  to  large  sections  of 
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society  it  never  lived  up  to  the  utopian  vision  of  unrestricted  discussion.  Moreover,  some 
claims  assert  that  this  was  never  its  intended  goal.  “On  the  contrary,  it  was  the  arena,  the 
training  ground,  and  eventually  the  power  base  of  a  stratum  of  bourgeois  men,  who  were 
coming  to  see  themselves  as  a  ‘universal  class’  and  preparing  their  fitness  to  govern”  (Fraser, 
1990,  p.  60) .  The  claim  to  the  bourgeois  public  sphere  as  the  only  or  true  public  sphere  to 
have  emerged  appears  profoundly  ideological,  and  Habermas’  argument  that  it  set  the 
foundation  for  a  theoretical  but  unrealised  ideal  is  thrown  into  question.  However,  Fraser’s 
work  is  not  primarily  focused  on  dismantling  the  idea  of  the  Habermasian  public  sphere  but 
to  explore  historical  counter  narratives  that  offer  lessons  in  how  its  limitations  can  be 
overcome,  equipping  it  as  a  better  counterbalance  to  political  power  elites.  
 
Three  of  those  criticisms  hold  relevance  to  social  media  as  a  public  arena.  Firstly,  Fraser 
questions  the  assumption  that  an  equality  among  actors  is  possible  by  simply  assuming  it 
rather  than  manifesting  it  in  social  and  economic  reality.  When  participants  in  the  public 
sphere  interact  as  if  they  are  equals  it  will  by  nature  benefit  the  dominant  class,  since  the 
socially  and  economically  disadvantaged  are  required  to  sideline  their  concerns.  This  is  one 
criticism  relevant  to  this  research  as  social  media  is  often  perceived  as  a  leveller  of  voices. 
Less  regard  is  given  to  the  real-world  factors  that  may  allow  some  voices  to  become  more 
prominent  or  authoritative.  What  presumptions  and  characteristics  do  social  media  users  have 
to  live  up  to,  in  order  for  their  opinions  and  information  to  resonate  across  a  wide 
demographic  and  make  it  into  newsrooms?  Secondly,  Fraser  questions  the  supremacy  of  the 
single  public  sphere  to  the  exclusion  of  other  publics.  She  argues  that  in  an  inegalitarian 
society  this  too  plays  into  the  hands  of  power  elites,  as  other  stratas  of  society  are  unable  to 
collectively  define  issues  and  opinions  relevant  to  them  as  a  community  and  agree  tactics 
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before  taking  them  to  the  larger  public  sphere  where  they  are  pitched  against  agonistic  views. 
Even  in  an  egalitarian,  and  presumably  multi-cultural  society,  multiple  publics  are  still 
necessary  for  identity-building.  Fraser  does  not  dismiss  a  greater  overarching  public  sphere 
but  rather  considers  smaller  ‘subaltern  publics’  as  fulfilling  a  necessary  function  to  level  the 
playing  field  on  a  larger  stage.  The  array  of  online  communities  speaks  to  the  demand  for 
forums  that  facilitate  certain  segments  of  society  and  is  reflected  in  several  protest 
movements  that  organised  actions  and  agitate  online  before  and  while  taking  to  the  streets. 
 
Thirdly,  the  dogmatic  separation  of  public  and  private  issues  often  worked  to  the  detriment  of 
women  and  those  in  the  lower  stratas  of  society,  for  whom  the  private  sphere  –  both 
constituting  economic  and  domestic  life  –  was  distinctly  political.  Therefore,  the  definition  of 
what  is  considered  public  has  and  must  constantly  be  revisited  and  redefined  as  the  clear 
distinction  between  the  two  spheres  shift  according  to  public  opinion.  With  social  media  the 
line  between  public  and  private  matters  has  been  blurred  beyond  recognition.  Topics  that  are 
private  are  shared  widely,  arguably  diminishing  social  media’s  potential  to  act  as  a  forum  to 
discuss  issues  of  a  common  concern.  On  the  other  hand,  this  space  also  facilitates 
communities  that  come  together  to  discuss  profoundly  public  matters.  Social  media,  then, 
might  best  be  understood  as  a  means  to  create  a  public  space,  not  the  space  itself.  And  as  a 
platform  to  facilitate  discussion  around  public  as  well  as  private  matters,  can  it  lower  the 
hurdle  for  perceived  private  matters,  that  are  nevertheless  of  public  concern,  to  cross  over 
into  public  discourse?  For  example,  the  ‘me  too’  movement  in  2017  saw  many  individuals 
share  their  private  stories  to  build  a  momentum  that  led  to  intense  public  debate  in  the 
mainstream  news  media  and  among  political  actors  about  sexual  assault  and  harassment,  and 
a  perceived  culture  that  facilitates  it. 
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 While  Habermas  believes  that  a  single  public  sphere  will  facilitate  a  plurality  of  opinions 
from  which  consensus  emerges,  pluralists  argue  that  this  does  not  acknowledge  that  public 
opinion  is  not  a  monolithic  block  and  will  necessarily  comprise  perspectives  that  are 
irreconcilable  (Mouffe  2009).  It  is  how  the  public  space  can  make  live  within  itself  these 
agonistic  views  that  is  the  key  question.  Mouffe,  like  Habermas,  also  dismisses  new  media 
for  not  providing  the  necessary  “agonistic  public  space”  that  exposes  citizens  to  conflicting 
ideas,  but  instead  makes  it  possible  to  continually  reinforce  one’s  beliefs  by  blending  out 
everything  that  does  not  correspond  with  it  (Carpentier  &  Cammaerts  2006) .  Although  she 
does  not  believe  that  the  public  space  must  lead  to  consensus  among  participants  in  the  way 
that  the  Habermasian  public  sphere  does,  she  sees  it  as  a  space  where  oppositional  views 
must  clash  and  find  a  way  to  exist  side  by  side.  Both  Habermas  and  Mouffe’s  criticisms  of 
new  media  that  allows  participants  to  circumvent  and  shield  themselves  from  confrontation 
have  been  validated  by  research  about  the  ‘echo  chamber’,  whereby  a  network  of  users  is 
only  confronted  with  views  they  agree  with,  (eg.  Barberá  2015;  Conover  et  al.  2011)  but  also 
challenged  by  research  suggesting  a  much  more  varied  news  diet  by  interested  users  than 
feared  (eg.  Bakshy  et  al.  2015;  Dubois  &  Blank  2018) .  Speaking  of  Twitter,  Fuchs  (2014) 
also  argues  against  the  notion  that  Twitter,  in  particular,  qualifies  as  a  public  sphere.  He 
argues  that  the  unrealised  promise  made  by  the  bourgeois  public  sphere  of  inclusion  and 
equality  are  just  as  absent  from  the  environment  on  Twitter.  “Capitalist  structures  of 
accumulation  operate  not  just  in  the  economy,  but  also  in  culture,  where  they  result  in  the 
accumulation  of  reputation,  visibility  and  attention  of  a  few”  (ibid.,  p.  192).  Ultimately,  the 
same  rules  apply,  whereby,  those  with  the  most  resources  hold  the  greatest  sway  and 
presence,  while  the  social  nature,  meaning  interaction  and  exchange,  is  particularly  limited. 
75 
“Twitter’s  reality  is  one  of  asymmetric  visibility;  its  democratic  potentials  are  limited  by  the 
reality  of  stratified  attention  and  the  visibility  characteristic  for  a  capitalist  culture.”  (ibid.,  p. 
192)  Rather,  he  calls  it  what  Habermas  described  as  a  “pseudo-public  sphere”  or 
“manufactured  public  sphere”  (ibid.,  p.  201).  However,  whether  or  not  social  media  qualifies 
as  a  public  sphere  is  not  the  subject  of  this  research.  The  research  considers  the  public  sphere, 
in  the  context  of  news,  as  primarily  represented  in  the  professional  global  news  flow.  The 
question  is  how  the  disruptive  nature  of  social  media  has  affected  professional  journalism  and 
been  integrated  in  the  mainstream  news  flow.  It  leans  on  Fraser’s  ‘subaltern  publics’  as  a  way 
to  understand  online  communities  discussing  matters  of  common  concern.  Mouffe,  when 
speaking  of  the  journalist  as  gatekeeper,  says  they  must  be  a  ‘gate-opener’  to  the  views  and 
arguments  put  up  by  all  sections  of  society.  To  facilitate  plurality  it  is  insufficient  to  put 
across  individual  voices  or  fragments  of  information.  Rather  communities  must  be  permitted 
to  put  across  their  agonistic  views  as  comprehensively  and  complete  as  possible  since 
pluralism  is  not  an  exercise  in  individualism  and  contains  the  idea  of  the  collective. 
 
The  literature  discussed  in  this  chapter  has  sought  to  explore  both  the  social  media  and 
conventional  news  environment  and  the  logics  that  govern  the  two.  By  exploring  how  users 
function  in  social  networks,  I  provide  a  basis  for  understanding  how  journalists  may  also 
function  there.  In  addition,  I  have  looked  at  conceptions  of  the  role  of  the  journalist  as 
opposed  to  the  amateur  or  the  everyman,  and  the  professional  boundary  work  in  journalism 
that  attempts  to  validate  journalists’  right  to  their  own  interpretive  community.  Finally,  I  have 
attempted  to  make  the  case  for  why  mainstream  news  media  remains  important  in  providing  a 
public  sphere  in  order  to  explain  why  the  research  specifically  looks  at  the  adoption  of 
collaborative  newswork  by  these  institutions.  
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3.  News  organisations  and  their  media  models 
 
As  already  mentioned,  the  news  outlets  studied  in  this  research  are  the  BBC  World  Service, 
AlJazeera’s  English-language  news  and  France  24  English.  This  warrants  a  discussion  of  the 
professional  cultures  that  these  organisations  are  based  in  and  how  they  might  carry  out 
boundary  work  before  analysing  the  findings  of  the  research.  They  outlets  were  chosen  as 
they  are  all  comparable  in  the  size  and  scope  of  their  mission  but  are  also  characterised  by 
differences  that  may  potentially  produce  contrasting  findings.  They  are  all  elite  international 
news  organisations  with  global  audiences  and  share  many  professional  norms,  albeit  in 
different  cultural  contexts.  They  also  have  a  formalised  commitment  to  interactive 
newsgathering  with  the  allocation  of  resources  to  these  kind  of  sourcing  routines.  They  also, 
in  some  cases,  carry  out  professional  training,  while  two  of  the  organisations  had  best 
practice  guidelines  in  place  when   this  research  was  performed.  By  investigating  different 
practices  in  interactive  newsgathering  at  each  of  the  news  organisations,  the  research  hopes  to 
look  at  what  approaches  are  being  developed  and  how  these  are  rationalised.  It  will  take  into 
account  the  particularities  of  the  different  media  systems  and  their  professional  cultures 
(Hallin  &  Mancini  2004)  to  help  the  interpretation  of  the  findings.  By  considering  the 
different  typologies  of  the  media  models  within  which  each  of  the  organisation  exists  the 
research  attempts  to  investigate  whether  interactive  newsgathering  practises  are  adapted  to 
and/or  reinforcing  pre-existing  norms.  The  typological  approach  to  describing  the  news 
organisations  in  terms  of  media  models  in  this  research  was  chosen  to  offer  an  understanding 
of  how  journalists  rationalise  their  own  professional  role  at  their  organisations,  and  the 
context  of  the  media  system  within  which  they  operate.  Although  professional  routines 
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suggest  common  normative  practices,  the  news  organisations  investigated  in  this  research  are 
all  embedded  in  media  systems  that  produce  defining  characteristics  that  will  be  explored 
next.  Each  of  the  organisations  has  also  defined  a  particular  ‘ethos’  or  mission  statement 
which  are  also  outlined.  
 
While  each  of  the  organisations  speaks  to  a  global  audience,  they  do  not  necessarily  speak  to 
the  same  audience,  or  may  be  valued  for  different  viewpoints  as  perceived  by  their  viewers. 
For  example,  the  BBC  sample  in  this  study  speaks  primarily  to  the  Anglophone  world,  while 
France  24  speaks  to  the  Francophone  world.  Although  this  study  examines  France  24’s 
English-language  output,  it  is  still  largely  focused  on  communicating  France’s,  or  the 
Francophone  world’s  news  agenda.  Al  Jazeera  is  focused  particularly  on  the  Arab  world  and 
competes  for  global  audiences  from  outside  the  largely  western-dominated  international  news 
media.  Nevertheless,  Al  Jazeera’s  adoption  of  western  professional  norms  provides  a  basis  for 
comparison. 
 
Both  the  BBC  and  France  24  are  public  service  media  but  embedded  in  significantly  different 
media  systems,  and  experience  differing  degrees  of  government  influence  and  journalism 
cultures.  Hallin  and  Mancini’s  (2004)  definitions  of  Western  media  systems  is  used  to 
compare  the  liberal  system,  of  which  Britain  is  a  part,  and  the  polarized-pluralist  system  that 
includes  France.  Al  Jazeera,  on  the  other  hand,  is  not  at  home  in  a  democracy  and  funded  by 
the  Qatari  government.  This  can  make  it  vulnerable  to  authoritarian  forms  of  censorship,  but 
its  business  model,  which  aims  to  attract  a  pan-Arab  audience,  was  chiefly  made  possible 
through  the  independence  of  its  journalism  (Sakr  2005)  and  the  adoption  of  western 
professional  norms.  Nonetheless,  Al  Jazeera  presents  itself  as  challenging  dominant  Western 
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global  news  outlets,  by  bringing  an  Arab  perspective  or  viewpoint  to  the  global  news  market 
(Bebawi  2015) . 
 
Although  different  forms  of  western  media  models,  preceding  but  also  informing  Hallin  and 
Mancini’s  typologies,  first  emerged  and  manifested  in  the  printed  press,  they  are  mirrored 
loosely  along  the  same  geographical  lines  in  broadcasting  (Kelly  1983) .  In  as  far  as  western 
Europe  is  concerned,  the  different  relationship  between  politics  and  the  broadcast  media  sees 
a  “formally  autonomous  system”  in  Britain,  and  a  “politics-over-broadcasting  system”  in 
France  (ibid.,  p.  73).  Hallin  and  Mancini’s  typologies  have  been  cited  for  comparative 
approaches  to  western  media  organisations  in  investigations  of  the  effect  of  the  Internet  on 
these  systems  (Benson  et  al.   2012;  Powers  &  Benson  2014) .  They  remain  relevant  and  a 
necessary  consideration  in  the  analysis  of  the  findings,  particularly  because  research  by 
Powers  and  Benson  (2014)  found  that  new  media  did  not  necessarily  have  a  homogenising 
effect  on  news  production  across  different  media  systems.   Rather,  their  particularities  were 
reaffirmed  in  online  news.  For  example,  news  outlets  in  the  US  were  more  likely  to  become 
homogenised,  while  online  news  remained  similarly  diverse  in  France  and  Denmark.  In 
relation  to  the  Anglo-Saxon  media  system,  this  is  supported  by  research  into  the  UK  media 
(Redden  &  Witschge  2010)  that  also  found  “news  organisations  often  cover  stories  from  the 
same  angle  and  different  news  organisations  repeatedly  publish  the  same  information  in  their 
stories”  (Witschge,  2011) .  However,  Power  and  Benson’s  findings  suggest  homogenisation  is 
observed  in  the  news  outlets  inside  this  one  media  system,  but  not  across  different  media 
systems. 
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BBC 
 
As  regards  Hallin  and  Mancini’s  (2004)  typologies,  the  BBC  is  couched  in  the  liberal  media 
system  that  is  characterised  by  an  informational  style  of  journalism,  political  neutrality,  and 
strongly  developed  journalistic  professionalism .  It  is  also  referred  to  as  the  Anglo-Saxon 14
model  but  several  major  differences  between  the  American  and  the  British  media  remain 
which  has  led  to  the  latter  also  being  placed  within  a  broad  definition  of  a  European  media 
model  (Mancini  2005) .  Primarily,  these  are  found  in  the  idea  of  public  service  media,  which 
is  less  developed  in  the  US.  The  BBC  was  historically  considered  the  gold  standard  for 
public-service  broadcasting  and  influenced  the  shape  of  other  PSB  across  Europe .  As  such, 15
“broadcast  journalism  was  assumed  to  be  oriented  towards  the  values  of  universalism”  (ibid., 
p.  88)   with  the  idealised  aims  of  objectivity  and  independence  that  were  said  to  be  delivered 
through  the  “political  insulation  of  public  broadcasters  and  regulatory  authorities”  (Hallin  & 
Mancini  2004,  p.  199).  The  aim  of  ‘neutrality’  does  not  mean  an  absence  of  values  but  rather 
a  centrist  position  that  attempts  to  stretch  across  mainstream  politics. 
 
The  Annan  Report  (1977)  that  directs  British  broadcasters  to  impartiality  asserts  that 
broadcasters  “are  operating  within  a  system  of  parliamentary  democracy  and  must  share  its 
14  However,  partisanship,  as  commonly  seen  in  the  British  press,  is  also  significantly  at  odds  with  the 
American  media  model,  which  is  represents  the  other  main  country  in  this  system.  Despite  this,  “the 
existence  of  ‘fact-centred  practices’  is  certainly  a  common  characteristic  of  the  two  journalisms  and, 
in  turn,  it  differentiates  them  from  many  other  journalistic  practices  in  Europe.”  (Mancini  2005) 
15  Although  it  was  also  significantly  altered,  especially  in  southern  Europe,  including  France,  where 
governments  exerted  considerable  control. 
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assumptions.”  This  means  that  voices  seeking  to  undermine  democracy  need  not  be  shown 
impartiality.  
 
In  place  of  ‘mathematical’  balance  and  ‘indifferent’  neutrality  Annan  proposes  ‘due 
impartiality’,  which  comprises  three  elements.  First,  the  broadcasters  should  allow  a 
full  range  of  views  and  opinions;  second,  they  should  take  account  of  the  weight  of 
opinion  (‘While  it  is  right  that  the  accepted  orthodoxies  should  be  challenged, 
equalise  it  is  essential  the  established  view  should  be  fully  and  clearly  put…’);  this 
they  should  recognise  that  the  range  and  weight  of  opinion  constantly  changes 
(p.269).  (Hartley  2014,  p.  51) 
 
Therefore,  ‘due  impartiality’  harbours  contradictions  that  restrict  the  degree  to  which 
broadcasting  can  challenge  orthodoxies  and  mainstream  discourse.  By  definition,  mainstream 
views  must  be  given  greater  weight ,  reinforcing  a  centrist  ideology,  while  also  representing 
other  opinions.  It  appears  that  broadcast  media  is  not  envisioned  to  be  a  substantial  force  in 
shifting  mainstream  opinion,  since,  although  required  to  represent  the  “full  range  of  views 
and  opinions”,  it  must  reinforce  established  public  opinion.  What  is  not  clear  is  how 
mainstream  views  are  defined  and  whose  they  are,  especially  in  the  case  of  the  BBC  World 
Service.  When  covering  world  news  events,  is  it  the  views  of  the  British  public  and  British 
foreign  policy  or  the  mainstream  views  of  the  country  where  the  news  event  is  taking  place 
that  must  be  given  greater  weight?  Projecting  British  mainstream  opinion  is  certainly  one 
element  that  shapes  the  news  content  of  the  BBC  as  became  clear  in  the  parliamentary  debate 
that  ensued  from  the  Annan  Report,  where  Lord  John  Vaizey  said  that  “the  BBC  World 
Service  performs  a  great  role  in  getting  our  message,  a  message  of  freedom  and  democracy, 
across”  (Annnan  Report  1977)  .  However,  this  cannot  be  taken  to  mean  that  the  BBC  is 
merely  an  extension  of  the  foreign  office,  especially  given  the  structures  designed  to 
safeguard  editorial  autonomy.  Since  its  inception,  the  BBC  was  envisioned  as  “an  intra-  or 
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cross-diasporic  contact  zone”  (Baumann  &  Gillespie  2007) .  It  was  deemed  to  present  “a 
unique  opportunity  to  foster  bonds  of  understanding  and  friendship  between  the  peoples  of 
Britain’s  scattered  dominions  and  the  mother  country,  and  to  bring  to  Britons  overseas  the 
benefits  already  enjoyed  by  the  British  public  at  home”  (Reith  1932  quoted  in  Mansell  1973 , 
p.  1).  As  the  foundation  charter  states  and  Bauman  observes,  Britain  assumed  the  central 
point  within  this  dialogue.  “We  cannot  know,  of  course,  but  may  safely  assume  that  the  BBC 
Empire  Service  was  not  meant  to  provide  a  global  diasporic  forum  for,  say,  the  descendants 
of  indentured  labourers  from  British  India  scattered  from  the  Caribbean  to  Eastern  and 
Southern  Africa”(Bauman  &  Gillespie  2007).  Returning  to  the  notion  of  ‘due  impartiality’, 
this  is  to  say  that  mainstream  views  and  opinion  informing  news  production  were,  at  least  on 
one  side,   weighted  in  favour  of  British  mainstream  public  opinion.  Perhaps  at  its  most  basic 
though  it  is  the  perpetuation  of  journalistic  professional  routines  and  norms  of  the  liberal 
media  model  and  the  BBC’s  own  version  of  social  responsibility  journalism  that  are  part  of 
the  ‘democratising  mission’  of  the  BBC.  Since  the  beginning,  the  BBC’s  mission  was  to 
actively  shape  society  with  a  remit  to  build  a  national  identity,  first  and  foremost  domestically 
(Potter  2012) .  However,  the  same  premise  was  applied  to  its  Empire  Service,  the  BBC  World 
Service’s  frontrunner. 
 
Applied  overseas,  these  ideas  came  to  mean  that  the  BBC  would  also  seek  actively  to 
reinforce  the  bonds  of  empire.  In  this  way,  it  was  believed,  broadcasting  could 
encourage  international  peace  and  order  and,  to  a  lesser  extent,  the  spread  of 
democratic  values,  thus  helping  Britain  retain  its  influence  in  the  wider  world.  (ibid., 
p.  5) 
 
The  aim  to  promote  democratic  values  perhaps  suggests  that,  already  at  its  inception,  the 
BBC  was  preparing  for  the  possible  dissolution  of  the  Empire.  Arguably,  the  professional 
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norms  adopted  in  news  production  that  create  power  relationships  between  a  plethora  of 
voices  –  more  of  which  is  discussed  further  on  –  were  providing  a  template  that  it  was  hoped 
would  be  accepted  by  audiences,  and  perhaps  replicated  by  local  media.  
  
In  the  liberal  model,  the  commercial  press  emerged  early  with,  as  already  mentioned,  a 
strongly  developed  professionalism.  Hartley  (2013)  discusses  how  the  commercial  press 
continues  to  exert  influence  over  the  BBC,  which,  although  state-funded,  exists  within  a 
commercial  media  environment  and  is  influenced  by  market-forces  through  its  competition 
with  for-profit  organisations  (p.  48).  For  example,  deregulation  of  commercial  broadcasting 
in  Britain  has  had  the  knock  on  effect  of  softening  of  news  values  in  PSB  (Curran  et  al. 
2009) .  Professionalism  in  the  liberal  media  is  defined  by  a  clearly  developed  hierarchy  in  the 
editorial  process  to  produce  a  polished  finished  product  but  that  also  inhibits  journalists’ 
autonomy  (Hallin  &  Mancini  2004) .  In  part,  professionalisation  developed  in  the  earlier  part 
of  the  20th  Century  to  shield  journalists  from  media  owners,  who  were  often  accused  of 
imposing  their  own  interests  (Curran  &  Seaton  2003) .  However,  it  also  serves  to  ensure 
widespread  appeal  by  not  limiting  its  market  through  partisan  positions  and  constrained 
journalists’  ability  to  express  their  own  views  (Gabszewicz  et  al.  2001) .  In  Britain,  this  holds 
especially  true  for  broadcast  journalism,  which  in  any  case  is  under  pressure  to  appeal  to  a 
wide  audience  due  to  the  production  costs  involved.  Moreover,  publicly-funded  broadcasting 
also  has  to  fulfil  its  public  service  mission  to  appeal  to  all  sections  of  society  in  order  to 
justify  the  license  fee  (Curran  et  al.  2009)  The  press,  on  the  other  hand,  is  characterised  by 
partisanship,  which  spells  the  biggest  difference  between  the  US  and  the  British  versions  of  
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the  Anglo-Saxon  media  model . 16
 
Therefore,  some  of  the  potential  findings  of  the  research  with  respect  to  the  BBC  might  be 
expected  to  include: 
i)  A  strong  emphasis  on  professional  norms  and  routines  in  interactive  newsgathering 
ii)  Comparatively  few  polarised  sources 
 
France  24 
 
France  24  is  embedded  in  Hallin  and  Mancini’s  (2004)  polarized-pluralist  media  system  that 
is  found  across  Europe’s  Mediterranean  region.  Although  France  differs  from  southern 
Europe,  where  many  countries  saw  major  disruptions  to  the  development  of  their  news  media 
through  periods  of  dictatorship,  it  also  exhibits  similarities  in  its  tendency  to  place  the  media 
within  the  political  sphere.  France  24,  like  all  French  public  service  broadcasters,  is  overseen 
by  a  mediating  council.  While  initially  French  broadcasting  was  under  the  control  of  the 
government  with  directors  appointed  directly  by  the  president,  since  the  1980s  there  has  been 
a  move  away  from  such  direct  intervention  with  the  establishment  of  the  Conseil  supérieur  de 
l'audiovisuel  whose  responsibility  it  is  to  regulate  broadcasters.  It  is  to  one-third  each 
appointed  by  the  president,  assembly,  and  senate.  In  addition,  one-third  of  its  members  are 
16  While  in  the  US  the  press  reacted  to  increasing  concentration  of  ownership  through  strengthening 
independence  and  norms  of  objectivity,  in  Britain  this  would  have  undermined  the  partisanship  of 
national  tabloids.  However,  Britain  also  did  not  move  to  publicly  fund  newspapers  to  encourage 
diversity  of  views,  as  is  often  the  case  in  other  European  media  models.  (Curran  &  Seaton  2003) 
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newly  appointed  every  two  years.  This  has  broken  direct  political  intervention  in  the 
day-to-day  running  of  broadcasters  (ibid.,  p.  107)  but  the  council  remains  plagued  by 
criticisms  of  being  too  politically  partisan  (Blumler  1994,  p.  151) .  
 
Benson  (2002)  captures  distinguishing  features  of  French  journalism  as  follows:  “Important 
aspects  of  the  French  ‘political/literary’  approach  to  journalism  include  the  use  of  particular 
narrative  formats,  such  as  the  interview,  the  commentary,  and  the  reactions  story,  and 
secondly,  a  style  of  writing  that  mixes  to  a  significant  extent  descriptive  and  normative 
statements.”  (ibid.,  p.  63)  A  defining  characteristic  of  this  media  model  is  the  strongly 
pronounced  partisanship  among  news  organisations  within  a  political  system  that  is  more 
pluralist  with  greater  differences  than  seen  among  mainstream  parties  in  the  rest  of  Europe 
and  North  America.  The  press  pursues  explicitly  political,  ideological  or  commercial  ends, 
and  the  professionalisation  of  journalism,  insofar  as  journalists  see  themselves  as  autonomous 
actors  independent  of  their  employer,  is  less  developed.  State  subsidies,  in  some  form  or 
another,  account  for  a  significant  portion  of  funding  among  French  media,  and  is  designated 
to  maintaining  the  plurality  of  media  voices,  especially  those  on  the  fringe.  Commentary  and 
opinion  are  established  forms  of  journalism  that  play  a  far  greater  role  than  in  the  liberal 
media  system  and  journalists  are  usually  expected  to  work  for  organisations  that  are  broadly 
sympathetic  with  their  personal  views.  Hence,  countries  that  are  regarded  as  existing  within 
this  media  model  typically  provide  a  legal  basis  by  which  journalists  can  be  compensated  if 
the  political  orientation  of  the  organisation  they  work  for  changes  since  a  journalist’s 
ideological  alignment  with  their  organisation  is  considered  intrinsic  to  their  work.  
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Historically  in  France,  many  journalists  were  part  of  power  and  ideological  elites,  not  only 
political  but  also  religious  as  well  as  scholarly,  and  for  longer  than  seen  elsewhere  in  Europe. 
They  were  mostly  directing  their  speech  at  peers.  While  there  has  been  a  shift  toward  the 
liberal  media  model  with  increased  professionalisation  of  journalism,  these  elite  voices 
continue  to  carry  greater  weight.  Therefore,  it  is  of  interest  to  this  research  to  examine  if  this 
tradition  is  translated  into  the  sourcing  of  social  media  content  or  whether  there  has  been  a 
greater  move  to  democratising  news  media  through  wider  non-elite  participation. 
 
The  rise  of  French  commercial  media,  however,  has  created  a  push  towards  the  more 
commercially-oriented  liberal  model.  This  is  also  reflected  in  broadcasting  where  the 
introduction  of  commercial  TV  has  meant  a  shift  to  more  centrist  programming  to  capture 
larger  audiences.  However,  distinguishing  qualities  of  the  polarized-pluralist  model  remain 
(Blumler  1994;  Powers  &  Benson  2014 ). 
 
The  potential  findings  of  the  research  with  respect  to  France  24  might  be  expected  to  include: 
i)  A  greater  representation  of  ideological  elites 
ii)  Greater  amounts  of  opinion  and  commentary  
ii)  More  fringe  sources  to  maintain  a  broad  sense  of  plurality 
 
Al  Jazeera 
 
Al  Jazeera’s  independence  has  always  been  a  bone  of  contention  since  the  organisation  is 
funded  by  the  rulers  of  Qatar’s  hereditary  monarchy  .  However,  much  of  its  pan-Arab  appeal 
and  success  has  been  the  result  of  its  insistence  on  independent  reporting  in  a  region 
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characterised  by  state-owned  media  that  serve  as  mouthpiece  for  governments.  This 
commitment  to  journalistic  independence  has  made  the  broadcaster  a  target  for  punishment 
by  Arab  leaders  throughout  its  lifespan  (Rinnawi  2006)  but  it  has  also  been  thanks  to  this  that 
Al  Jazeera  has  been  credited  for  altering  the  media  landscape  of  the  Arab  world,  and 
somewhat  loosening  the  grip  of  government  control  (Sakr  2005).  17
 
Its  professional  culture  also  emerged  from  the  European  public  service  broadcasting  model 
with  strong  initial  links  to  the  BBC,  but  later  shifted  towards  its  own  distinct  identity.  Sakr 
describes  the  broadcaster’s  origins,  “When  the  BBC  Arabic  news  service  folded,  Qatari 
officials  set  about  recruiting  its  redundant  members  of  staff,  thereby  forming  the  nucleus  of 
what  was  to  become  the  Al  Jazeera  satellite  Channel,  broadcast  from  Qatar’s  capital,  Doha, 
with  effect  from  the  end  of  1996”  (ibid.,  p.  148).  The  employees  took  with  them  the  training 
and  norms  that  they  acquired  in  their  work  at  the  BBC,  forming  the  core  of  the  culture  that 
would  be  cultivated  at  Al  Jazeera.  However,  the  former  BBC  employees  also  criticised  the 
broadcaster  for  failing  to  deliver  the  public  service  needed  for  Arab  audiences.  
 
It  had  been  both  a  dream  and  a  challenge,  talkshow  presenter  Sami  Haddad  told  a 
media  awards  ceremony  in  June  2003,  to  move  from  reporting  the  world  ‘from  the 
viewpoint  of  London’  to  meeting  the  ‘real  needs’  of  Arab  viewers  from  inside  the 
Arab  world,  through  ‘facts  not  propaganda,  different  views  not  sanitised  views, 
appeals  to  their  intelligence,  not  insults  to  their  intelligence’  (Haddad  2003).  (ibid.,  p. 
149) 
 
17  The  Qatari  government’s  support  for  the  Syrian  opposition  during  the  Syrian  conflict  (eg.  Maclean 
&  Finn,2016)  cannot  be  disregarded  in  Al  Jazeera’s  news  coverage.  Yet,  it  can  be  argued  that  the 
prevailing  politics  of  a  country  is  often  found  reflected  in  its  news  media.  
88 
As  a  result,  the  culture  fostered  at  Al  Jazeera  saw  journalists  largely  left  to  their  own  devices 
with  little  government  censorship.  However,  at  the  same  time,  Al  Jazeera  teased  out  its  own 
particular  brand  that  shaped  its  news  coverage  and  that  is  broadly  defined  by  the  organisation 
as  ‘giving  voice  to  the  voiceless’.  In  it  ,  it  is  implied  that  Al  Jazeera  will  turn  on  media 
imperialism  and  represent  those  that  elitist  Western  news  organisations  sideline.  As  such, 
Galtung’s  Structural  Theory  of  Imperialism  (1971)  and  the  1970s  and  1980s  push  for  a  New 
World  Information  Order  (Samarajiwa  1984)  provide  a  starting  point  to  interpret  the  sourcing 
practices  of  Al  Jazeera.  Both  the  NWIO  and  Galtung  sought  to  address  the  West’s  domination 
of  the  global  news  flow’  through  its  powerful  transnational  news  organisations  that 
centralised  agenda-setting  power  in  the  former  colonial  countries .  Galtung  defined  a 18
hierarchy  between  centre  –  meaning  Western  –  and  periphery  states,  where  the  former 
significantly  influences  the  news  agenda  of  the  latter.  Between  peripheral  states  the  news 
flow  was  found  to  be  limited.  Haynes  (1984)  disputed  Galtung’s  research  finding  a  much 
more  active  role  in  news  agenda  setting  and  framing  within  periphery  states  and  a 
considerable  emphasis  on  regional  news.  However,  the  adoption  of  similar  agenda  setting 
principles  as  those  common  in  centre  states,  was  also  found,  suggesting  an  adoption  of 
western  professional  norms  as  the  basis  for  deciding  what  and  who  is  newsworthy.  Galtung’s 
theory  was  preceded  by  Galtung  and  Ruge’s  (1965)  pioneering  work  on  news  values  tested  in 
a  study  of  international  news  reporting  in  Norwegian  newspapers.  A  combination  of  the  12 
18  According  to  a  1979  NWIO  report  presented  at  UNESCO,  80  percent  of  the  global  news  flow  came 
from  the  major  transnational  news  agencies  based  in  the  West,  while  only  20  to  30  percent  of  the  new 
produced  covered  so-called  developing  countries.  
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news  values   found  by  the  researchers  in  international  news  stories  could  increase  the 19
ranking  of  news  stories  about  non-elite  nations  or  groups  that  were  especially  disadvantaged. 
To  illustrate  this  point  they  outlined  a  number  of  hypothesis  that  included  but  were  not 
limited  to  the  following  four:  
1. “The  lower  the  rank  of  the  nation,  the  more  consonant  will  the  news  have  to  be” 
(ibid.,  p.  82)  –  meaning  it  must  affirm  preconceptions.  
2. “The  lower  the  rank  of  the  nation  the  more  negative  the  news  from  that  nation  has  to 
be”.  (ibid.,  p.  83)  
3. “The  lower  the  rank  of  the  nation,  the  higher  will  a  person  have  to  be  placed  in  that 
nation  to  make  news”.  (ibid.,  p.  83)  
4. “The  lower  the  rank  of  a  person,  the  more  negative  will  his  actions  have  to  be”.  (ibid., 
p.  83)  
 
Al  Jazeera  clearly  identified  with  the  premise  behind  the  NWIO  and  the  Structural  Theory  of 
Imperialism  and  articulated  this  in  some  of  their  corporate  branding  with  slogans  such  as, 
“‘Reversing  the  North  to  South  flow  of  information’,  ‘Setting  the  News  Agenda’,  ‘Every 
Angle  /  Every  Side’,  and  ‘  All  the  News  /  All  the  Time’.”  (Bebawi  2015,  p.  71)  The  mission 
statement  of  Al  Jazeera  and  the  geopolitical  context  within  which  the  organisation  exists 
(El-Nawawy  &  Iskandar  2003)  may  mean  that  Al  Jazeera  challenges  the  structural 
imperialism  theory  with  its  coverage  through  specific  practices  or  routines  that  differ  from 
those  by  the  other  two  news  organisations. 
 
19  Negativity,  proximity,  recency,  currency,  continuity,  uniqueness,  simplicity,   personality, 
predictability,  elite  nations  or  people,  exclusivity,  and  size. 
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Attempting  to  define  a  more  generalised  Arab  journalism,  independent  of  the  constraints 
enacted  upon  it  by  censorship,  Pintak  and  Ginges  (2009)  set  it  against  “Western  journalistic 
norms  of  objectivity  and  disengagement”. 
 
Arab  journalists  see  their  primary  mission  as  driving  political  and  social  change  in  the 
Arab  world  (Pintak  and  Ginges,  2008).  Some  leading  Arab  media  figures  wear  two 
hats,  that  of  journalist  and  that  of  politician.  (ibid.,  p.  171) 
 
The  authors  define  Western  journalistic  norms  primarily  according  to  the  Anglo-Saxon 
model,  but  Arab  journalism  considers  its  role  as  struggling  against  some  of  the  norms. 
Although,  Al  Jazeera’s  media  culture  has  integrated  characteristics  shaping  the  BBC,  there  is 
a  strongly  articulated  attempt  to  add  plurality  to  the  global  news  media  and  break  Western 
dominance  in  the  news  flow.  For  example,  a  specific  characteristic  that  Pintak  and  Ginges 
noted  to  shape  Arab  journalism  was  respect.  In  a  survey,  the  vast  majority  of  journalists 
agreed  or  partly  agreed  that  ‘‘journalists  must  balance  the  need  to  inform  the  public  with  the 
responsibility  to  show  respect”  (p.  171).  The  notion  of  respecting  the  subjects  or  groups  of 
news  reports  produced  a  journalistic  norm  within  Arab  journalism  culture. 
 
Al  Jazeera’s  mission  statement  suggests  that  it  will  attempt  to  break  or  subvert  the  routine 
reliance  on  accredited  and  authoritative  sources  in  professional  journalistic  practice. 
Therefore,  the  case  studies  will  help  explore  if  and  how  social  media  was  mobilised  to 
achieve  this.  
 
Therefore,  the  potential  findings  of  the  research  with  respect  to  Al  Jazeera  might  be  expected 
to  include: 
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i)  emphasis  on  providing  a  forum  for  citizen  voices 
ii)  Social  media-sourced  content  more  likely  to  be  sought  from  less  elite  nations 
Overview  of  social  media  strategies  at  BBC,  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera  
BBC 
 
In  2011,  the  BBC  published  a  roadmap  named  Delivering  Quality  First  (BBC  2011)  that  laid 
out  core  areas  for  the  organisation’s  online  strategy  to  “[p]repare  the  BBC  for  a 
fully-converged  digital  world”  (ibid.,  p.  52).  Among  the  listed  online  products  targeted  by 
this  strategy  was  the  BBC’s  news  service.  The  following  points  laid  out  in  the  report  were 
two  areas  relevant  to  this  research.     
Digital  curation:  use  editorial,  social  and  personal  tools  to  make  the  most  of  content, 
bring  audiences  more  of  what  they  like,  and  increase  their  engagement  and 
participation  with  the  BBC. 
 
Social  experiences:  to  make  the  most  of  the  growing  popularity  of  networks  off 
bbc.co.uk,  extend  the  reach  of  content,  engage  with  new  audiences  and  closely 
integrate  experiences  with  BBC  Online  (ibid.,  p.  52) 
 
These  two  agenda  items  show  that  the  BBC  is,  firstly,  aiming  to  distribute  its  own  news 
products  on  social  media  and  networks.  Secondly,  they  are  also  encouraging  collaboration 
and  interactivity  to  feed  back  into  BBC  Online  news  output.  However,  the  primary  strategy 
appears  to  be  to  position  the  BBC’s  output  as  the  content  around  which  audience  participation 
and  engagement  takes  place. 
 
Therefore,  the  BBC  primarily  considers  its  own  material  as  social  media  content  more 
generally.  However,  elsewhere  the  organisation  distinguishes  between  its  own  material  spread 
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through  social  media  channels  and  other  types  of  social  media  material.  The  2014/2015 
annual  report  (BBC  2015)  mentions  BBC  Live,  the  online  real-time  blog  which  was  used 
extensively  both  in  the  Greek  referendum  and  the  migrant  crisis  case  studies  presented  here. 
It  was  described  as  a  format  that  “brings  together  the  best  of  the  BBC’s  output  and  the  best  of 
social  media  to  provide  an  interactive,  immersive  experience”  (p.49).  It  aims  to  make 
“coverage  more  interactive,  social  and  relevant”  (ibid.,  p.  75).  This  description  suggests  that 
the  BBC  considers  the  material  produced  by  its  varying  services  and  channels  as  separate  to 
material  produced  outside  the  organisation.  
 
Elsewhere  in  the  report,  the  BBC  Online  newswork  is  cited  in  connection  with  delivering  and 
distributing  news  texts  through  social  media  in  accordance  with  its  own  mission  statement  to 
‘inform,  educate  and  entertain’.  Moreover,  the  report  states  that  “[a]s  the  distinction  between 
fact  and  rumour  blurs  online,  there  is  a  greater  opportunity  and  role  for  the  BBC  in  providing 
impartial  and  independent  news”  and  “[the]  Corporation’s  journalism  will  always  rely  on 
reporters  on  the  ground,  where  it  matters.  In  a  world  where  trust  is  at  a  premium,  the  BBC 
guarantees  news  that  is  trusted  and  gets  its  facts  right”  (ibid.,  p.  58).  This  suggests  that  the 
BBC  considers  its  role  online  (be  that  on  its  own  proprietary  platforms  or  outside  platforms) 
to  produce  journalism  according  to  its  own  professional  norms.  This  is  in  line  with  the 
hypothesis  laid  out  above  that  engagement  with  social  media  is  primarily  focused  on 
reaffirming  and  reflecting  journalistic  norms  and  practices.  
 
While  there  is  no  specific  reference  to  the  BBC’s  own  journalists’  activity  on  social  media, 
there  is  a  suggestion  that  the  online  strategy  is  largely  geared  towards  distributing  BBC 
output.  This  suggests  a  tendency  to  primarily  consider  Twitter  as  a  distribution  platform,  that 
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does  not  steer  far  from  the  traditional  top-down  news  delivery  of  mass  communication.  The 
annual  report  highlights  that  since  its  inception  BBC  Live  garnered  over  1  billion  page  views 
across  40  news  events  (ibid.,  p.  49).  This  shows  that  the  user-generated  content  shown  there 
has  considerable  reach. 
 
The  BBC  Outside  Source  product  launched  as  a  radio  show  in  2013  before  it  transitioned  to 
an  hour-long  daily  programme  on  the  BBC  World  News  television  channel,  also  reflects 
online  conversations  on  social  media.  Primarily,  it  aims  to  emulate  the  non-linear  interactive 
consumption  of  news  online  through  a  large  touch  screen  TV  used  by  the  presenter  to  display 
texts  originating  on  social  media.   As  a  format,  it  is  designed  to  “provide  audiences  with  a 
fully  integrated  web,  radio  and  TV  experience”  and  encourage  “audiences  to  share  their 
knowledge  and  experience  of  that  day’s  stories,  no  matter  where  they  are  in  the  world,  via 
social  media”  (BBC  Media  Centre  2014) . 
We  were  looking  online  at  how  people  consume  the  news,  and  they  don't  consume  the 
news  in  the  same  linear  way  as  they  do  in  a  broadcast  medium  [...]  They  also  take  lots 
of  relevant  and  current  information  from  a  whole  range  of  sources  rather  than  going  to 
one  source  –  whether  it's  the  BBC  or  any  other  –  and  making  that  their  own  place  to 
get  information  about  the  world.  (Reid  2015)   20
 
It  aims  to  incorporate  news  content  produced  by  the  BBC’s  different  language  services  and 
conventional  news  sources,  such  as  agencies,  on  the  one  hand,  and  to  combine  this  with 
unconventional  sources.  The  latter  are  typically  sourced  through  interactive  newsgathering  on 
social  media  platforms. 
 
In  addition  to  the  aim  to  place  the  BBC’s  brand  and  original  newswork  at  the  forefront  of  its 
social  media  strategy,  the  organisation  also  harnesses  the  newswork  of  non-journalistic  and 
20  Not  all  BBCOS  programmes  are  televised  with  some  produced  just  for  online. 
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outside  sources  when  it  is  considered  relevant  to  the  news  coverage.  The  BBC  UGC  Hub, 
which  sources,  verifies  and  distributes  user-generated  content  to  the  organisation’s  various 
news  services,  is  tasked  with  sourcing  eyewitness  material  and  non-journalist  voices  through 
social  media.  Therefore,  there  are  two  competing  interests  that  the  BBC  attempts  to  bring 
together.  Firstly,  to  represent  itself  as  a  focal  point  on  social  media,  through  which  it  positions 
itself  to  reach  news  audiences.  Secondly,  to  incorporate  networked  journalism  into  its  own 
coverage.  The  way  the  BBC  negotiates  this  conflict  is  by  placing  itself  in  an  intermediary 
position  that  shifts  its  emphasis  to  authenticating  and  vetting  voices  (Barot  2013)  ,  rather  than 
defining  its  role  as  opening  up  access  to  a  wider  array  of  voices.  However,  plurality  and 
diversity  are  obviously  an  important  journalistic  norm  and  editorial  value  that  the  BBC 
subscribes  to,  and  in  a  promotional  video  (BBC  Academy  2013) ,  senior  World  Affairs 
producer  Stuart  Hughes  asserts  that  he  mobilises  social  media  to  access  a  greater  variety  of 
sources. 
France  24 
 
France  24’s  digital  strategy,  like  the  BBC,  also  focuses  on  distributing  its  own  news  output 
through  social  media.  The  organisation’s  overarching  ethos  is  to  cover  international  news 
from  a  “French  perspective”  (France  24  2017) .  This,  again,  suggests  that  one  might  find 
evidence  of  characteristics  of  the  polarized-pluralist  media  model  specific  to  France  in  the 
networked  journalism  carried  out  by  this  organisation.  Again,  like  the  BBC  UGC  Hub, 
France  24  has  a  commitment  to  sourcing  eyewitness  media,  and  fostering  audience 
participation.  This  is  particularly  reflected  in  its  ‘The  Observers’  news  product.  The 
Observers  describes  its  aim  as  covering  World  News  through  eyewitness  media  and  invites 
non-journalistic  sources  to  share  their  material  and  draw  attention  to  issues  they  would  like  to 
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see  reflected  in  news  coverage  (France  24  n.d.) .  However,  the  editorial  team  of  the  Observers 
has  a  gatekeeping  role  in  selecting  what  to  report  on  its  platform  and  how  to  contextualise  it 
as  they  mainly  treat  the  material  and  accounts  provided  to  them  as  source  material.  The  term 
user-generated  content  is  mostly  applied  to  visual  and  audio-visual  material  captured  by 
amateurs  and  a  strong  focus  is  put  on  the  authentication  of  such  material.  France  24  also 
positions  itself  as  sifting  through,  verifying  and  transmitting  amateur  social  media  content  in 
its  mainstream  coverage.  This  is  reflected  in  The  Observers’  efforts  to  educate  news 
audiences  on  professional  routines  regarding  verification  of  amateur  content  (France  24  2018; 
France  24  2015) .  
 
France  24’s  newswork  is  closely  linked  with  the  French  press  agency  AFP   and  often  uses  its 21
news  reports  on  its  own  platforms.  AFP  has  also  laid  out  its  ethical  standards  and  verification 
processes  in  the  use  of  eyewitness  media  in  its  editorial  charter  (AFP  2016) .  Both  France  24 
and  AFP  have  formally  extended  their  newswork  to  integrate  collaboration  with 
non-journalists  but  also  stipulate  how  they  maintain  their  gatekeeping  role  by  selecting 
collaboration  based  on  what  is  deemed  relevant  to  their  news  agenda.  Therefore,  there  is  an 
expressed  commitment  by  France  24  to  mobilize  social  media  to  access  citizen  voices  and 
eyewitnesses  on  the  ground  for  direct  input  into  the  news  coverage,  through  the  material 
produced  by  these  sources.  While  The  Observers  is  the  flagship  of  networked  journalism  at 
France  24  social  media-sourced  content  is  also  found  throughout  its  other  online  coverage.  As 
21  AFP  is  the  third  largest  international  news  agency.  While  it  is  not  controlled  by  the  state,  three  of  18 
seats  on  its  board  are  controlled  by  the  French  government,  from  where  it  also  receives  approximately 
40  percent  of  its  funding.  (Allsop  2018) 
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seen  in  the  BBC,  this  is  most  prominent  in  live  blogs  —  although  France  24  enlists  this 
method  of  reporting  less  frequently  —  but  also  in  other  audio-visual  and  online  text  reports.  
  
Al  Jazeera 
 
Al  Jazeera  mobilizes  social  media  for  its  coverage  throughout  various  English-language  news 
services.  However,  two  of  its  sections,  The  Stream  and  AJPlus  concentrate  on  collaborative 
newswork  more  than  any  of  the  others.  The  Stream  is  both  a  website  and  a  webcast  that 
generates  its  content  almost  exclusively  from  social  media  content  —  usually  in  a 
discussion-style  format.  The  objectives  of  The  Stream  give  an  insight  into  how  it  mobilises 
social  media  for  its  newswork.  Al  Jazeera  put  an  emphasis  on  deliberation  and  discussion 
among  non-elite  voices  in  the  marketing  of  The  Stream  around  the  time  of  its  launch.  When  it 
first  went  live  in  April  2011,  The  Stream  was  plugged  as  a  means  to  give  ‘voice  to  the 
voiceless’.  By  focusing  on  social  media  as  news  source,  its  mission  statement  was  to  “report 
and  take  part  in  the  global  conversation”  and  to  “break  down  the  centralized  control  of  what 
constitutes  news”  (Keller  2011) .  
 
The  Stream  was  primarily  envisioned  to  take  its  lead  from  online  communities  on  social 
media  as  a  news  source  but  did  restrict  its  remit  to  “less-covered  online  communities”  (ibid.) 
with  non-mainstream  angles  and  viewpoints  on  news  events.  The  reason  to  point  this  out,  is 
that  it  was  not  an  entirely  commercially-driven  service  focused  on  bolstering  its  news 
audience  by  reporting  on  the  most  popular  themes  and  content  on  social  media.  It  was  framed 
as  fitting  into  the  wider  ethos  of  Al  Jazeera,  to  “cover  the  people  often  ignored;  people  whose 
voices  must  be  heard”  (Al  Jazeera  2014) .  Therefore,  on  one  level  Al  Jazeera  ascribes 
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user-generated  content  in  news  coverage  a  role  that  breaks  down  barriers  between  gatekeeper 
journalists  and  ordinary  citizens,  and  claims  to  offer  an  opportunity  for  online  communities  to 
act  as  agenda-setters.  Its  emphasis  is  placed  on  Al  Jazeera’s  participation  in  online 
discussions.  For  example,  The  Stream’s  hosts  typically  engage  with  audiences  on  Twitter, 
approaching  members  of  online  communities  with  questions  to  encourage  a  dialogue  around 
particular  issues.  On  the  one  hand,  The  Stream  emphasises  its  role  in  reflecting  a  global 
conversation.  On  the  other,  it  bills  itself  as  reflecting  voices  on  the  ground.  Therefore,  issues 
that  can  have  a  very  local  quality  and  focus  are  opened  up  for  a  global  discussion  through 
social  media  participation.  
 
Beyond  The  Stream,  Al  Jazeera’s  overarching  ethos  to  give  voice  to  people  and  communities 
less  covered  is  also  likely  to  inform  how  networked  journalism  is  mobilised  for  other 
audience-facing  news  products  online.   Visual  and  audio-visual  user-generated  content  was 
described  as  “critical”  (Bartlett  2014)  in  news  coverage,  in  a  2014  interview  with  former  Al 
Jazeera  English  managing  director  Al  Anstey,  and  integration  of  collaborative  news  practices 
essential  in  comprehensive  coverage  of  news  events.  Anstey  defined  such  content  as 
originating  from  non-journalistic  sources  further  underlining  how  Al  Jazeera,  primarily 
harnesses  social  media  to  source  material  produced  by  amateurs. 
 
Like  BBC  and  France  24,  Al  Jazeera  also  has  a  strategy  to  distribute  its  own  news  output 
through  social  media  platforms,  and  does  so  throughout  its  many  different  social  media 
accounts  (Ellis  2012) .  Especially,  AJPlus  provides  all  its  coverage  directly  to  audiences 
through  social  media  without  redirecting  them  to  Al  Jazeera’s  own  proprietary  platform.  By 
being  native  to  social  media  platforms,  AJPlus  both  reflects  audience  participation  through 
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the  use  of  amateur  content  and  produces  stories  that  are  generating  interest  on  these 
platforms.  However,  it  also  distributes  the  news  coverage  produced  by  its  own  staff  that  ties 
in  with  news  stories  that  are  generating  discussions  on  social  media.  As  such,  AJPlus  both 
reacts  to  hot  trending  topics  on  social  media  and  also  tries  to  steer  these  with  its  own  in-house 
produced  content.   
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4.  Methodology 
Aims  and  Objectives 
 
The  overall  aim  of  this  research  is  to  investigate  how  integration  of  collaborative  or 
interactive  newsgathering  via  social  media  platforms  has  affected  professional  sourcing 
routines  at  three  elite  international  news  organisation.  It  examines  the  role  that  traditional 
notions  of  professionalism  in  journalism  play  in  how  collaboration  is  managed  with  social 
media  users.  In  order  to  examine  the  use  of  social  media  for  newsgathering,  analysis  of  three 
case  studies  of  crisis  and  conflict  reporting  were  carried  out,  as  well  as  in-depth  interviews 
with  professionals  at  each  of  the  organisations. 
 
Often  social  media-sourced  content  that  enters  the  global  mainstream  news  flow  is 
understood  as  synonymous  with  ‘amateurism’,  meaning  that  a  citizen  journalist  dimension  is 
often  ascribed  to  it,  and  is  frequently  referred  to  by  corporate  media  as  user-generated 
content.  In  the  analysis  of  the  news  texts,  identities  of  different  kinds  of  ‘users’,  or 
‘produsers’   (Bruns  2006),  will  take  the  conventional  typologies  of  news  sources  into  account 
to  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  sourcing  and  gatekeeping  routines.  It  will  then 
investigate  the  power  relationships  between  different  types  of  social  media  users  and  the 
news  organisations  to  contribute  to  understanding  of  how  interactive  sourcing  routines  are 
affecting  professional  norms.  By  measuring  not  only  the  level  of  social  media  content,  but 
also  source  identity,  relationships,  and  framing,  the  research  attempts  to  contribute  to 
understanding  of  the  origins  and  role  of  such  user-generated  content  in  news  coverage. 
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Norms  in  journalism  refer  to  overarching  values  defined  by  the  professional  community  that 
should  be  embodied  in  their  work.  They  are  considered  integral  to  the  occupation  such  as 
impartiality,  transparency,  reliability  and  accuracy,  and  so  on.  Schmidt  (2008)  distinguishes 
between  normative  roles  and  cognitive  roles,  where  the  former  comprises  adopting  desirable 
values  and  the  latter  is  about  the  methods  by  which  these  are  put  into  action.  In  journalism, 
normative  roles  are  fairly  persistent  although  emphasis  can  shift  overtime.  For  example, 
while  impartiality  persists  as  a  norm  for  much  of  journalism,  it  is  losing  importance  for 
journalists  engaging  on  social  media  as  studies  have  shown  (Lasorsa  et  al.  2012;  Vis  2013) . 
Instead,  transparency  has  emerged  as  a  more  important  norm  among  journalists  (Singer  2015) 
as  journalists  reveal  how  they  work  in  an  almost  real-time  news  environment  where  the  flow 
of  information  may  undermine  accuracy.  Rather,  journalists  aim  to  build  trust  with  audiences 
by  sharing  their  practices  to  show  how  they  arrive  at  the  best  version  of  the  truth  at  a 
particular  moment  in  time,  and  acknowledging  if  this  information  is  revealed  to  be  inaccurate 
at  a  later  stage.  Norms  can  therefore  be  said  to  have  longevity  as  a  code  of  ethics  that 
journalists  sign  up  to  as  a  community.  As  the  news  environment  changes,  emphasis  on 
different  normative  roles  may  shift  to  accommodate  the  professional  reality.  Cognitive  roles 
can  be  understood  as  professional  routines,  which  are  “concerned  with  those  patterns  of 
behavior  that  form  the  immediate  structures  of  mediawork”  (Reese  &  Shoemaker  2016,  p. 
399).  They  are  the  mechanisms  that  have  been  legitimised  and  adopted  by  the  journalistic 
community  to  fulfil  their  norms.  The  analysis  of  the  effects  of  collaborative  newsgathering  on 
professional  norms  and  routines  are  broken  down  into  the  following  three  research  questions 
that  form  the  focus  of  the  study. 
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RQ1:  Is  social  media  sourcing  affecting  the  power  relationships  between  primary  and 
secondary  definers? 
 
RQ2:  How  do  professional  journalists  create  and  articulate  professional  boundaries  in  the 
participation  by  non-authoritative  citizen  voices/audiences? 
 
RQ3:  What  mechanisms  do  professional  journalists  use  to  maintain  their  gatekeeping  role? 
 
As  I  have  explored  in  the  previous  chapter,  the  three  news  organisations  comprising  this 
research  are  based  in  different  media  models  and  traditions.  Therefore,  the  ways  in  which 
journalists  engage  with  non-journalists  and  the  type  of  newswork  they  produce  should  be 
considered  in  their  specific  context.  The  respective  media  models  can  arguably  be  expected  to 
determine  and  shape  the  professional  boundary  work  done  in  collaborative  newswork  by 
journalists  at  the  respective  news  organisations,  and  this  provides  a  frame  in  which  to 
interpret  the  findings  to  the  research  questions.  With  regard  to  RQ1,  the  specific  media  model 
may  affect  the  identity  and  representation  of  primary  and  secondary  definers,  and  how  these 
two  interact.  With  regard  to  RQ2  and  RQ3,  media  models  may  affect  the  extent  of  inclusion 
or  exclusion  of  audiences  and  the  roles  they  are  attributed. 
 
 
Case  studies 
 
The  research  comprised  three  main  case  studies  that  spanned  between  eight  and  28 
consecutive  days  of  coverage  of  a  news  event.  These  news  events  were  selected  based  on 
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three  criteria.  Firstly,  they  had  to  exhibit  an  international  dimension  that  made  them 
significant  news  events  to  the  sample  of  media  organisations  described  above  and  would 
dominate  the  news  agenda  for  at  least  a  few  weeks.  Secondly,  they  had  to  be  examples  of 
crisis  and  conflict  reporting  that  would  foster  citizen  engagement  both  online  and  offline 
through  discussions,  debate  and  actions.  For  example,  the  social  media  discussions  might 
provoke  widespread  interest  and  participation,  but  can  also  translate  into  actions  in  the  real 
world  through  protests.  Citizen  engagement,  therefore,  did  not  remain  solely  in  the  virtual 
realm,  but  its  real  world  manifestations  also  fed  back  into  it  through  tweets,  photos  and 
videos.  Lastly,  all  case  studies  had  to  exhibit  a  strong  social  media  dimension  in  how 
newsworthy  information  was  shared  and  could  therefore  affect  news  coverage. 
 
News  coverage  in  each  case  study  was  analysed  for  social  media-sourced  material.  This 
material  was  filtered  out  and  analysed  separately  from  other  content  comprised  in  the 
coverage.  News  coverage  by  each  organisation  was  collected  through  selecting  all  relevant 
news  texts  via  the  online  news  archive  where  possible.  Some  of  the  news  organisations’ 
archives  were  better  suited  than  others  as  they  provided  search  functions  that  enabled  filtering 
by  date  and  keywords.  For  the  three  main  news  organisations,  this  was  the  case  on 
aljazeera.com,  stream.aljazeera.com,  and  observers.france24.com.  In  other  cases,  the  search 
functions  were  linked  with  algorithms  that  did  not  allow  a  systematic  filtering  of  all  coverage 
but  returned  results  for  certain  keywords  based  on  popularity,.  This  was  the  case  for  the  BBC 
World  News  website  and  the  website  of  France  24  English.  Therefore,  a  complete  set  of  news 
coverage  could  not  be  obtained  through  searching  the  website  alone.  Since  all  of  the  news 
organisations  distribute  their  news  output  on  Twitter,  the  workaround  solution  was  to  search 
the  organisations’  main  Twitter  accounts.  Tweets  from  their  accounts  were  filtered  for 
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keywords  through  advanced  Twitter  search  across  the  entire  timespan  of  each  case  study.  For 
the  BBC,  the  Twitter  accounts  trawled  were  @BBCWorld,  @BBCTrending, 
@BBCMonitoring  and  @BBCOS.  For  France  24  English,  the  Twitter  accounts  included 
@FRANCE24,  @France24_en,  @France24Debate  and  @BreakingF24.  In  addition,  two  Al 
Jazeera  Twitter  accounts  were  also  examined  —  @AJPlus  and  @AJStream. 
 
The  research  focussed  on  three  separate  case  studies: 
 
1. News  coverage  of  the  Greek  debt  crisis  around  the  time  of  the  referendum  in  July 
2015.  All  news  coverage  by  BBC  World  News,  France  24  English  and  Al  Jazeera 
English  between  26  June  and  15  July  were  collected  and  analysed  for  social 
media-sourced  content.  The  dates  spanned  the  period  during  which  the  story  most 
dominated  the  international  news  agenda,  and  started  on  the  date  the  referendum  was 
announced  until  the  Greek  parliament  voted  on  legislation  that  was  demanded  in  the 
negotiations  for  further  loans. 
 
2. News  coverage  of  the  migrant  crisis  for  four  weeks  in  2015  from  the  20  August  until 
the  17  September.  During  this  period,  events  dominated  headlines  across  all  three 
news  organisations.  The  news  event  had  a  strong  civic  dimension  and  public  pressure 
led  governments  to  take  actions  that  had  far-reaching  consequences  for  migrants  and 
refugees.  
 
3. News  coverage  during  the  air  offensive  in  the  battle  for  Aleppo,  in  Syria,  in 
November  2016.  The  online  news  coverage  by  BBC,  France  24  English  and  Al 
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Jazeera  English  was  gathered  from  the  15  November  to  22  November.  The  period 
studied  started  with  the  end  of  a  ceasefire  between  rebels  and  the  Syrian  regime  and 
Russian  military.  
 
As  all  the  case  studies  involve  global  news  events,  the  research  cannot  reveal  anything  about 
how  practices  might  differ  when  the  events  take  place  in  closer  proximity  to  the  news 
organisations  studied.  All  the  news  organisations  are  global  players  and  national  or  local 
news  outlets  may  have  significantly  different  approaches  to  interactive  newswork  on  stories 
on  regional  or  national  stories.   While  the  media  system  varies  with  regard  to  the  news  outlets 
in  the  research  the  type  of  story  remains  in  some  ways  the  same.  A  study  of  the  demarcation 
between  local  and  national  boundary  work  found  that  “local  press’  boundary  intersection  with 
national  coverage  [...]  signified  a  desire  to  maintain  local  expertise  when  reporting  on  local 
identities  and  issues”  (Gutsche  Jr  &  Shumow  2017,  p.  12).  Local  news  media  sought  to  claim 
authority  by  delegitimising  national  news  media,  which  suggests  two  different  journalist 
communities  that  behave  differently.  It  may  be  reasonably  assumed  that  this  distinction 
between  journalistic  communities  holds  true  for  national  and  global  news  media  as  well. 
There  are,  however,  other  ways  in  which  these  news  events  differ.  One  is  largely  cast  as  an 
economic  news  event,  while  another  cast  as  an  humanitarian  event,  and  the  third  as  an 
example  of  war  reporting.  For  example,  differences  in  levels  and  forms  of  citizen  inclusion 
are  observed  in  some  types  of  news  stories  over  others.  
Case  study  analysis 
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The  three  case  studies  of  international  crisis  reporting  provide  a  basis  for  a  comparative 
approach  to  examine  how  the  three  news  organisations  mobilised  social  media.  As  the 
discussion  of  the  media  models  and  social  media  strategies  attempted  to  spell  out,  the  case 
studies  sought  to  explore  how  networked  journalism  may  be  affecting  the  commonalities  and 
differences  between  each  of  the  organisations.  Sourcing  practices  is  one  way  in  which  this 
can  be  studied.  For  example,  it  was  used  as  methodological  approach  in  a  study  by  Benson 
(2002)  to  determine  whether  commercialisation  of  the  news  media  resulted  in  a  shift  towards 
a  more  ideologically  centrist  news  media  in  France.  Benson  wrote  that  “[i]deological 
diversity  can  be  measured  according  to  the  social  actors  who  are  given  voice,  or  the  content 
of  the  pronouncements,  regardless  of  source,  which  are  mentioned  in  journalistic  accounts.” 
(ibid.,  p.  56)  By  employing  this  methodology  over  several  case  studies,  a  comparative 
analysis  of  how  networked  journalism  is  integrated  into  news  production  within  each 
organisation  over  an  18-month  period  and  across  different  news  stories  is  possible. 
 
The  research  aims  to  provide  a  clearer  view  of  the  extent  to  which  networked  journalism  is 
integrated  into  routines  by  limiting  anecdotal  evidence  through  a  structured  content  analysis 
of  the  all  relevant  news  texts  over  the  course  of  the  case  studies.  By  studying  all  the  social 
media-sourced  content  over  the  same  period  for  each  organisation,  the  aim  is  to  take  a  holistic 
view  of  networked  journalism.  While  the  analysis  of  specific  incidents  of  collaboration  and 
participation  on  news  production  by  amateurs  is  valuable  in  its  own  right,  the  value  in  this 
research  is  considered  to  be  in  a  more  comprehensive  analysis  of  newsgathering  routines  that 
attempts  to  provide  a  more  representative  picture  of  the  relationships  between  journalists  and 
non-journalists  in  their  collaboration.  Three  case  studies  spanning  international  crisis  or 
conflict  reporting  across  the  three  organisations  over  a  set  period  aim  to  provide  a  broad 
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enough  basis  for  comparisons  that  are  not  only  case-specific  but  allow  a  wider  inference 
about  the  role  of  networked  journalism  in  news  reporting. 
 
Quantitative  content  analysis  is  an  established  method  for  the  systematic  study  of  mass 
media.  It  is  considered  “an  extremely  useful  tool  for  summarizing  a  large  quantity  of  data  and 
establishing  relationships  among  different  factors  with  a  known  degree  of  certainty”  (Priest 
2010,  p.  7) .  Its  use  as  a  research  method  in  mass  communication  has  consistently  grown 
throughout  the  second  half  of  the  last  century  (Neuendorf  2002,  p.  27)  and  it  is  used 
extensively  throughout  the  three  case  studies  of  this  research.  The  Lasswell  model  was 
developed  to  study  propaganda  messages  in  the  two  world  wars  and  is  best  summed  up  as 
” who  says  what  to  whom  via  what  channel  with  what  effect ”  (ibid.,  p.  34).  Quantitative 
content  analysis  was  used,  for  example,  in  the  study  of  contributors  to  the  e-zine 
openDemocracy ,  that  laid  bare  a  social  inequality  in  dominant  voices  out  of  step  with  the 
site’s  proclaimed  aims  (Curran  &  Witschge  2010).  The  research  aims  to  define  the  level  of 
agency  granted  to  different  groups  active  on  social  media  by  empirically  recording  the 
sources  of  social  media  content  used  in  newswork,  the  frequency  of  their  use,  and  the  type  of 
messages  they  contain.  The  method  seeks  to  reveal  the  voices  with  the  greatest  ability  to 
access  traditional  news  media  with  their  messages  along  with  what  type  of  messages  are  able 
to  cross  into  mainstream  media. 
 
To  establish  if  and  how  sourcing  routines  are  applied  in  networked  journalism  and  whether 
they  involve  significant  levels  of  inclusivity  and  involvement  of  non-elite  sources,  for 
example,  it  is  important  to  code  the  sources.   For  the  purpose  of  the  research,  sources  were 
coded  by  referencing  primary  and  secondary  definers  (Hall  et  al  1978).  In  addition,  the 
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identities  of  non-elite  sources  comprised  amateurs,  citizens,  accidental  eyewitnesses,  and 
citizen  journalists,  and  were  therefore  neither  conventional  primary  or  secondary  definers.  As 
discussed  in  the  previous  chapter,  conventional  primary  definers  are  typically  representatives 
of  major  social  institutions,  mainstream  politics,  and  accredited  experts.  Conventional  notions 
of  secondary  definers  are  professional  journalists  and  their  institutions  that  rely  primary 
definers  to  influence  framing  of  the  news  agenda.  The  identities  of  those  involved  in  the 
networked  journalism  found  in  the  case  studies  were  therefore  grouped  into  seven  broad 
categories: 
 
1. Professional  journalists  of  the  respective  news  organisations,  described  as  ‘in-house 
journalists :  These  were  social  media  sources  that  were  directly  affiliated  with  the 
respective  news  organisation  that  was  analysed  in  the  case  study.  For  example,  BBC 
journalists  were  considered  in-house  journalists  across  BBC  news  texts. 
 
2. Professional  journalists  of  other  news  organisations :  These  were  those  who  were 
affiliated  with  other  professional  news  organisations. 
 
3. Professional  news  media :  These  were  the  social  media  accounts  of  professional  news 
media,  and  included  both  those  of  the  news  organisation  studied  and  others.  However, 
the  data  indicates  how  many  of  the  news  organisation’s  own  social  media  accounts 
were  used.  
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4. Political  representatives :  These  included  politicians  in  mainstream  politics  or 
spokespeople  of  political  parties,  governments,  and  the  institutions  linked  to 
governments. 
 
5. Experts :  These  included  individuals  or  organisations  that  were  sought  out  for  their 
professional  expertise  in  a  given  topic  but  were  not  linked  to  any  of  the  previously 
stated  groups.  For  example,  these  might  include  academics  or  analysts.  
 
6. Citizen  and  amateur  voices :  These  were  conventional  non-elite  voices,  who  were 
speaking  as  private  citizens,  amateurs,  voluntary  activists  and  citizen  journalists,  or 
grassroots  movements.  
 
7. Other  sources :  Some  sources  did  not  fall  into  any  of  the  above  definitions.  Often, 
these  involved  famous  personalities  who,  by  the  nature  of  their  personas,  were 
speaking  in  a  semi-public  capacity  with  their  activity  on  social  media. 
 
Confining  sourcing  routines  to  a  count  of  the  sources  in  each  category  does  not  necessarily 
reflect  how  each  group  ranked  in  terms  of  access  to  the  mainstream  news  coverage. 
Therefore,  measuring  the  ‘weight’  –  or  the  ‘source  power’  –  (Cottle  et  al.  1998,  pp.  110-111) 
that  each  group  possess  in  the  collaborative  newswork  had  to  take  frequency  of  each  groups 
access  to  the  professional  newswork  into  account.  Each  category  was  not  only  analysed  for 
its  number  of  sources  in  the  news  coverage  but  also  how  much  importance  these  voices  were 
given  in  the  news  texts.  This  was  done  by  the  method  of  calculating  the  average  number  of 
times  that  sources  in  each  category  were  able  to  cross  their  message  into  the  news  texts  of  the 
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case  studies.  For  instance,  two  same-sized  groups  may  not  have  the  same  source  power  if  one 
is  relied  on  more  frequently  to  inform  the  news  texts. 
 
As  social  media  is  a  very  broad  spectrum  of  platforms,  the  research  sought  to  avoid  excessive 
generalisation  of  networked  sourcing  routines  by  differentiating  between  them.   For  example, 
while  Twitter  is  a  popular  platform  with  journalists,  it  has  far  fewer  users  than  Facebook  and 
is  dominated  by  a  different  demographic.  As  explored  through  the  literature,  the  degree  to 
which  the  news  organisations  rely  on  specific  platform  is  another  way  of  testing  what  types  of 
sources  and  messages  our  sought.  Interpreting  the  results  of  the  case  studies  without 
acknowledging  the  environments  created  on  social  networking  sites  would  suggest  a 
homogeneity  that  is  not  representative  of  social   media.  Therefore,  wherever  possible  the 
gathered  data  was  separated  by  the  platform  that  it  originated  from.  While  this  was  not 
always  possible  (eg.  sources  may  have  cross-posted  content  on  a  number  of  platforms  or  the 
content  could  not  be  traced  back  to  a  platform),  in  the  majority  of  cases  the  origins  of 
material  was  either  clearly  signposted  ora  reverse  search  of  the  material  linked  it  to  a  specific 
social  media  account.  This  enabled  the  research  to  answer  a  number  of  additional  questions  at 
a  level  under  the  main  research  questions  defined  at  the  beginning  of  this  chapter.  These 
questions  provided  a  more  nuanced  analysis  of  the  research  questions,  by  exploring 
gatekeeping  mechanisms,  boundary  work,  and  power  relationships  found  in  the  case  studies 
with  regard  to  specific  social  media  environments. 
 
1. What  were  the  most  popular  social  media  platforms  for  newsgathering  by  each  of  the 
organisations? 
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2. Were  there  differences  between  the  news  organisations  in  what  platforms  they  sought 
out  for  their  sourcing  routines? 
3. What  types  of  sources,  according  to  the  seven  categories,  were  obtained  through 
which  platforms? 
  
Though  the  exception  rather  than  the  norm,  sources  were  not  always  attributed  when  their 
content  was  used  in  the  coverage  creating  potential  obstacles  in  identifying  all  of  the  content 
creators.  Furthermore,  mobile  technology  has  made  it  possible  for  some  user-generated 
content  to  become  practically  indistinguishable  from  professional  content.  The  news  output 
of  social  media  news  agency  Storyful,  which  specialises  in  sourcing  and  verification  of 
eyewitness  and  amateur  material  for  professional  news  organisations,  could  be  accessed  for 
cross-checking  some  of  the  content  where  sources  were  not  clearly  identifiable.  As  a 
journalist  at  Storyful  at  the  time  of  the  research,  I  worked  on  all  of  the  news  stories  comprised 
in  these  case  studies  and  therefore  had  in-depth  knowledge  of  the  material  that  was  being 
circulated  through  social  media  at  the  time  and  where  it  originated  from. 
 
While  Lasswell’s  model  provides  empirical  data,  it  is  a  mostly  descriptive  method  and  does 
not  generally  allow  inferences  about  intent  of  the  message  or  its  sources  (Neuendorf  2002,  p. 
53)  Clearly,  all  of  the  user  identity  categories  named  are  very  broad  and  while  they  provide 
some  insight  into  the  kind  of  sourcing  routines  on  social  media,  a  solely  quantitative  analysis 
could  miss  some  of  the  nuances  in  professional  practices  that  emerged.  Therefore,  qualitative 
analysis  of  the  sources  in  each  category  was  necessary  to  explore  the  identities  of  these 
voices  and  the  nature  of  the  collaboration  in  more  depth.  By  only  categorizing  sources  there 
is  the  risk  of  reification,  that  is  “thinking  that  abstractions  like  attitudes,  values,  and  content 
111 
themes  are  objectively  real  when  they  are  actually  just  convenient  categories  invented  by  the 
researcher”  (Priest  2010,  p.  6).  For  example,  political  sources  may  have  also  been  analysed 
for  affiliation.  Did  they  represent  the  mainstream  centre  of  politics  or  fringe  elements?  In  an 
international  context,  what  type  of  political  sources  may  have  gained  more  access  to  elite 
media  through  their  social  media  activity? 
 
Critical  discourse  analysis  as  a  means  to  investigate  representations,  identities  and  relations 
of  such  actors  complemented  the  quantitative  analysis  of  actors  and  and  their  source  power. 
Of  particular  interest  is  Norman  Fairclough’s  argument  that  discourse  analysis  can  shed  light 
on  relationships,  which  ties  in  with  the  research  aim  to  investigate  power-relationships  and 
hierarchies  established  in  networked  journalism.  How  the  source  groups  interacted  and  what 
relationships  were  constructed  between  conventional  primary  and  secondary  definers,  and 
non-elites,  explored  whether  the  position  of  the  different  groups  to  define  news  texts  had  been 
altered  and  how.  
1. How  is  the  world  (events,  relationships,  etc.)  represented? 
2. What  identities  are  set  up  for  those  involved  in  the  programme  or  story 
(reporters,  audiences,  ‘third  parties’  referred  to  or  interviewed)? 
3. What  relationships  are  set  up  between  those  involved  (for  example, 
reporter-audience,  expert-audience  or  politician-audience  relationships)? 
(Gillespie  &  Toynbee  2006,  pp.  122-123)  
 
Fairclough  (2010)  describes  the  methodology:  “the  discourse  analyst  will  focus  on  discourse, 
but  never  in  isolation,  always  in  its  relations  with  other  elements,  and  always  in  ways  which 
accord  with  the  formulation  of  the  common  object  of  research”  (p.  5).  In  the  context  of  this 
research,  textual  analysis  explores  the  ways  in  which  collaboration  takes  place  and  is 
presented.  This  means  that  the  relationships  that  are  manifested  in  networked  journalism  are 
explored  with  reference  to  the  discourse  of  journalistic  professionalism  and  the  discourse  of 
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collaboration.  Therefore,  the  case  studies  did  not  serve  to  analyse  the  representation  of  the 
news  event  itself  but  the  relationships  and  practices  that  were  played  out  through 
collaborative  newswork.  In  other  words,  the  research  analysed  how  two  discourses,  those  of 
collaboration  and  professionalism,  were  manifested  in  the  news  texts.  
 
Therefore,  among  the  key  concepts  of  textual  analysis,  the  most  relevant  ones  to  the  case 
studies  were:  actors  and  their  framing  or  agenda-setting  power;  language,  grammar  and 
rhetoric  of  and  to  describe  different  social  media  actors  and  their  content;  discursive 
strategies.  The  most  obvious  discursive  strategy  employed  is  framing  and  selection  to 
produce  a  text.  Others  include  positioning,  legitimation,  politicization  (Carvalho,  2008) . 
 
Positioning  is  a  discursive  strategy  that  involves  constructing  social  actors  into  a 
certain  relationship  with  others,  that  may,  for  instance,  entitle  them  to  do  certain 
things  (cf.  Davies  and  Harré,  1990;  Hajer,  1995).  Positioning  can  also  be  viewed  as  a 
wider  process  of  constitution  of  the  identity  of  the  subject  through  discourse.  [...] 
Legitimation  consists  in  justifying  and  sanctioning  a  certain  action  or  power,  on  the 
basis  of  normative  or  other  reasons  (cf.  van  Leeuwen  and  Wodak,  1999). 
Politicization  is  the  attribution  of  a  political  nature  or  status  to  a  certain  reality[…]. 
Some  of  these  strategies  have  a  reverse,  such  as  de-legitimation  and  de-politicization. 
(ibid.,  pp.  169-170) 
 
For  the  purpose  of  the  research,  examining  positioning  means  investigating  what  relationship 
is  constructed  between  social  media  actors  and  their  content  in  news  texts.  Legitimation 
examines  how  much  power  social  media  actors  possess  to  have  their  viewpoint  affirmed  or 
translated  comprehensively  in  texts.  Politicization  examines  to  what  extent  sources  are 
represented  as  political  or  apolitical  voices,  which,  in  terms  of  collaboration  can  have  bearing 
on  how  authoritative  they  may  appear  since  professionalism  in  journalism  is  often 
represented  through  values  of  impartiality  and  autonomy.  For  example,  to  be  entrusted  with 
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the  role  of  collaborating  on  newswork,  those  involved  may  need  to  prove  they  can  adopt 
journalistic  values.  Of  course,  discursive  strategies  are  not  only  the  realm  of  journalists  but 
also  other  users  publishing  on  social  media,  whose  content  is  used  in  the  news  texts.  “A  good 
method  of  discourse  analysis  should  account  for  those  two  levels  of  discursive  intervention 
over  a  certain  ‘‘object’’  –  the  sources’  or  social  actors’  intervention,  and  the  journalists’ 
intervention”  (Carvalho  2008).  The  research  therefore  considers  the  legitimation  of  discursive 
strategies  by  actors  on  social  media  as  a  component  in  defining  the  authority  they  are  granted 
in  the  news  texts.  This  means,  to  what  extent  are  the  discursive  strategies  by  different  types  of 
social  media  users  replicated  or  contested  in  news  texts?  
 
Discourse  analysis  often  examines  only  key  texts  or  texts  over  a  very  short  time  span. 
However,  changes  in  discourse  over  time  should  be  a  component  of  analysis,  which  is 
addressed  in  the  research  in  two  ways,  by  examining  case  studies  of  coverage  in  2015  and 
2016,  as  well  as  examining  a  sample  of  texts  over  varying  time  spans  from  eight  days  to  28 
days.  In  order  to  put  the  findings  in  some  context  of  news  developments  and  how  they  may 
have  affected  networked  newswork. 
 
A  final  consideration  was  the  ‘liquid’  nature  of  digital  journalism,  meaning  that  news  texts 
are  able  to  be  edited  after  initial  publication  and  news  content  deleted.  This  has  led  to  some 
calls  for  new  research  methods  in  studying  online  news  texts  (Karlsson  &  Sjøvaag  2016)  by 
analysing  them  in  real-time  and  revisiting  them  periodically  to  check  for  changes.  The 
resources  required  for  such  analysis  were  outside  the  scope  of  the  research  and  all  news  texts 
were  analysed  retrospectively,  at  a  time  when  any  further  changes  to  the  texts  were  unlikely. 
Karlsson  and  Sjøvaag  also  acknowledge  that  the  need  for  new  methodological  approaches 
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may  be  “overstated  as  they  relate  to  the  practice  of   news  enterprises  that  have  not  changed  as 
much  as  digital  media  allows”  (ibid.,  p.  188).  In  the  case  studies,  the  texts  were  also  largely 
likely  to  be  static  for  the  following  two  reasons.  Live  blogs,  though  evolving,  build  on 
information  and  are  not  generally  changed  retrospectively,  and  audio-visual  texts  are  too 
labour  intensive  to  produce  to  be  edited  and  republished  multiple  times. 
 
Interviews 
In  order  to  triangulate  the  findings  in  the  case  studies,  interviews  were  conducted  with  editors 
at  the  three  news  organisations.  These  interviews  served  mainly  two  purposes;  to  identify  key 
themes,  trends  and  emphasis  representative  of  each  news  organisations’  approach  to 
collaborative  news  production;  to  explore  some  of  the  findings  in  the  case  studies  further,  and 
corroborate  conclusions  drawn  from  them.  
 
The  primary  focus  on  news  texts  ensured  that  the  research  remained  modeled  on  the  state  of 
practice  in  journalism  as  it  is,  not  as  it  is  perceived  to  be  by  media  professionals.  The 
pervasiveness  of  theory  ascribing  democratising  qualities  to  social  networks,  especially 
among  those  who  are  deeply  engaged  in  it  professionally,  runs  the  risk  of  colouring 
interviewees’  perception  of  how  social  media-source  content  is  incorporated  into  news 
coverage.  For  example,  former  editor  of  the  BBC  College  of  Journalism  Kevin  Marsh 
welcomed  the  emergence  of  the  ‘journogeek’  as  a  means  to  return  to  one  of  journalism’s  core 
values  of  involving  the  public  in  news  production.  He  wrote:  “At  last,  we  can  use  thousands  – 
sometimes  tens  of  thousands  –  in  our  audiences  to  build  accurate  pictures  of  what's  really 
happening  in  our  communities”  (Marsh  2008) .  Similarly,  the  Guardian’s  former  editor  Alan 
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Rusbridger  described  Twitter  as  a  ‘level  playing  field’,  where  it  is  what  you  say,  not  who  you 
are,  that  matters,  and  argued  that  the  news  environment  on  the  platform  possessed  its  own 
values  and  agenda  which  could  influence  newsdesks  (Rusbridger  2010) .  This  perception  of 
the  integration  of  social  media  in  mainstream  news  production  is  visibly  at  odds  with  critics, 
who  accuse  old-school  journalists  of  hostility  towards  the  opportunities  offered  by  new  media 
(Lee-Wright  2010).  More  recently,  media  academics  have  pointed  to  the  persisting  gap 
between  professional  journalists  and  online  communities,  calling  for  ‘relationship  building’ 
to  facilitate  greater  collaboration  (De  Aguiar  2015;  Schaffer  2015) .  Therefore,  subjective 
perceptions  and  interpretations  of  the  impact  that  social  media  has  on  news  routines  without 
empirical  data  offer  very  limited  insight. 
 
Nevertheless,  textual  analysis  alone  also  offers  little  insight  into  how  the  journalists  at  the 
news  organisations  perceive  their  role  in  relation  to  social  media  newsgathering.  Interviews 
were  therefore  aiming  to  contribute  to  an  understanding  of  how  editors  at  the  news 
organisations  studied  perceive  their  interaction  with  social  media  content  and  what  routines 
they  apply  to  this.  As  a  research  method,  interviews  provide  a  representation  of  experience 
and  perception  rather  than  complete  access  to  a  person’s  thoughts  (Silverman  2006) . 
However,  they  are  a  means  to  tease  out  the  intentions  of  professional  journalists.  Despite  their 
limitations,  interviews  can  offer  an  insight  into  the  meanings  ascribed  by  journalists  to  social 
media-sourced  content  and  how  they  negotiate  the  challenges  posed  by  social  media  to 
professional  norms  and  practices.  
 
A  special  interest  of  qualitative  researchers  lies  in  the  perspectives  of  the  subjects  of  a 
study.  Qualitative  researchers  want  to  know  what  the  participants  in  a  study  are 
thinking  and  why  they  think  what  they  do.  Assumptions,  motives,  reasons,  goals,  and 
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values—all  are  of  interest  and  likely  to  be  the  focus  of  the  researcher’s  questions. 
(ibid.,  p.  423) 
 
Semi-structured  in-depth  interviews  were  considered  a  means  to  obtain  an  insider  perspective 
at  each  of  the  organisations.  “In  a  semi-structured  interview,  some  topics  are  chosen  before 
beginning  the  research  based  on  the  literature  or  practice.  However,  when  and  how  the  topics 
are  presented  is  not  structured”  (Corbin  &  Strauss  2013,  p.  39).  Together  with  the  text 
analysis  it  was  possible  to  probe  stated  aims  for  social  media  newsgathering,  and  the  possible 
practical  and  professional  reasons  for  any  discrepancies  shown  up  in  the  case  studies  (Cottle 
et  al.  1998,  pp.  44-45). 
 
An  interview  guide  was  drawn  up  in  advance  outlining  questions  addressing  specific  themes 
in  relation  to  sourcing  practices  on  social  media.  The  questions  were  open-ended  and  delved 
into  the  editors’  knowledge  of  their  routines,  experiences,  as  well  as  opinions.  Instead  of 
fixed  questions  the  guide  was  deemed  to  offer  enough  flexibility  throughout  the  interviews  to 
tease  out  nuances  and  details  in  the  interviewees’  responses.  It  allowed  specific  topics  to  be 
explored  further  ad  hoc  and  permitted  participants  to  provide  additional  information  if  they 
wanted.  The  final  question  of  each  interview  allowed  the  participants  to  raise  anything  that 
they  felt  was  of  importance  but  not  addressed  upto  that  point. 
 
Interviews  were  carried  out  with  editors  responsible  for  formulating  and  applying  the 
organisations’  news  production  processes  for  collaborative  newswork  through  social  media. 
The  interviews  comprised  many  of  the  same  questions,  although  they  were  not  necessarily 
asked  in  the  same  order.  There  was  flexibility  in  the  interview,  with  some  questions  skipped 
or  adapted  to  explore  in  more  detail  if  the  topic  had  already  been  addressed  in  another 
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answer.  Overall,  the  interviews  addressed  all  the  same  themes  and  subjects  making  it  possible 
to  largely  compare  the  answers  of  the  three  editors  systematically.  
 
As  the  methodology  was  designed  to  explore  the  integration  of  collaborative  newswork  into 
coverage,  the  news  organisations’  editors  and  producers  tasked  with  developing  social  media 
use  for  networked  newswork  were  best  placed  to  offer  this  insight.  With  the  responsibility  of 
gatekeeping  through  selection  and  oversight  of  news  stories  they  were  deemed  to  provide 
information  that  would  allow  conclusions  representative  of  each  news  organisation’s 
approach  to  collaborative  news  production  to  be  drawn.  The  interviewees  were  conducted 
after  the  completion  of  the  first  two  case  studies.  The  participants  were  BBC  social  media 
editor  Mark  Frankel,  France  24  Observers  producer  Julien  Pain,  and  AJPlus  executive 
producer  Ethar  El-Katatney.  Julien  Pain  was  the  only  interviewee  no  longer  employed  at  the 
relevant  organisation  at  the  time  of  the  interview,  However,  he   had  been  working  there 
during  the  period  spanned  by  the  first  two  case  studies  and  was  therefore  the  appropriate 
person  to  discuss  the  coverage. 
 
The  interviews  were  recorded  with  the  permission  of  the  interviewees  and  later  transcribed. 
All  three  interviews  lasted  between  25  and  30  minutes  and  and  were  carried  out  over  the 
phone  or  via  a  video  call,  while  the  interviewees  were  in  their  workplace.  They  had  all 
received  an  introduction  on  the  topics  that  would  be  covered  in  the  interview  several  weeks  in 
advance,  including  the  case  studies  that  had  been  analysed. 
 
The  following  questions  were  addressed  by  all  the  interviewees  in  some  shape  during  the 
course  of  the  interviews  : 
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 1. Is  there  a  formalised  strategy  in  place  at  your  news  organisation  for  how  social  media 
is  used  in  news  reporting? 
2. How  does  citizen  journalism  and  participatory  journalism  fit  into  this? 
3. How  would  you  define  the  sourcing  criteria  of  social  media  content  for  news 
reporting?  What  qualities  should  it  possess  to  be  picked  up  for  your  news  coverage? 
4. What  would  you  consider  the  biggest  impediments  to  the  use  of 
user-generated-content  from  citizen  journalists  in  your  news  production? 
5. If  you  had  to  define  how  an  extra-media  source  was  to  most  easily  be  featured  with 
their  content  hoping  for  it  to  be  covered,  what  would  that  look  like? 
6. Do  you  believe  there  are  guidelines  necessary  for  journalists  in  how  they  use  social 
media  for  newsgathering? 
 
Other  questions  asked  specifically  about  the  findings  in  the  first  two  case  studies.  Such 
questions  attempted  to  tease  out  some  of  the  reasoning  behind  the  use  of  social  media  content 
by  correspondents,  experts  or  citizen  journalists  in  the  case  studies. 
 
The  transcripts  were  analysed  according  to  the  questions  and  themes  laid  out  in  the  interview 
guide.  This  ensured  a  systematic  approach  to  the  textual  analysis  that  provides  a  basis  for 
comparison  and  a  focus  on  the  questions  set  out  (Cottle  et  al.  1998,  pp.  279-280).  The 
findings  of  the  interviews  were  also  considered  within  the  framework  of  the  media  models 
relevant  to  each  of  the  organisations,  as  already  described. 
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Journalist  as  researcher 
My  professional  experience  as  a  practitioner  affected  the  choice  of  methodology  and  the 
weighting  of  different  methodological  approaches.  It  prompted  me  to  focus  on  the  empirical 
and  textual  analysis  as  the  foundation  of  my  research,  that  was  followed  up  and  explored 
further  with  interviews  but  aimed  not  to  allow  these  to  supersede  the  case  study  analysis.  For 
one,  I  thought  that  raw  data  found  in  news  texts  could  provide  a  frame  for  the  subsequent 
interviews  and  a  basis  to  limit  the  subjectivity  of  their  analysis.  In  my  experience,  journalists 
are  often  accomplished  rhetoricians  and  frequently  speak  in  anecdotes.  I  believe  an  empirical 
approach  built  on  with  textual  analysis  could  act  as  a  corrective  to  this  while  the  interviews 
still  offer  valuable  professional  insights  that  social  media  editors  could  provide.  The  news 
text  analysis  could  provide  context  or  potentially  dispute  some  of  the  interview  findings.  
 
Through  my  work  at  Storyful  I  had  considerable  exposure  to  the  news  events  in  all  three  case 
studies.  I  had  been  covering  the  Greek  debt  crisis,  the  so-called  refugee  crisis,  and  the  Syrian 
war  since  the  uprising,  giving  me  an  in  depth  knowledge  of  the  social  media  content  that 
shaped  their  reporting  before  I  began  analysing  the  news  texts  in  this  research.  This  was 
beneficial  in  terms  of  establishing  as  much  accuracy  as  possible  in  the  empirical  data  of  the 
case  studies  as  it  can  be  difficult  to  always  trace  users  and  content  retrospectively,  especially 
where  information  is  deleted  or  edited  or  becomes  unavailable  in  some  other  way.  For 
example,  having  covered  the  Syrian  war  through  collaborative  newswork  from  the  days  of  the 
uprising,  I  was  familiar  with  many  of  the  actors  shaping  the  news  coverage.  This  meant  I  was 
able  to  identify  them  and  had  knowledge  of  how  and  where  they  distributed  information.  It 
also  meant  I  had  a  degree  of  background  knowledge  of  how  these  actors  evolved,  where  they 
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were  located  and  how  they  had  established  themselves  as  news  producers.  Similarly  with  the 
Greek  debt  crisis,  I  was  aware  of  the  daily  nuances  and  developments  of  how  information 
emerged  and  events  unfolded  online.  This  gave  me  the  privileged  position  of  also  having  a 
broader  view  of  other  social  media  content  available  beyond  that  found  in  the  news  texts  of 
this  research.  But  perhaps  most  importantly,  it  meant  that  I  had  experienced  the  newswork 
through  social  media  in  all  three  case  studies  at  different  points  in  real  time,  leading  me  to 
acquire  a  level  of  detailed  knowledge  of  the  news  events  that  might  otherwise  have  not  been 
possible  to  achieve. 
 
Of  course,  my  professional  involvement  in  precisely  the  type  of  collaborative  newswork  this 
research  explores  has  meant  that  I  am  familiar  with  the  practices  involved  in  appropriating 
and  legitimising  non-journalists’  newswork  for  professional  news  media.   My  professional 
role  as  journalist  made  it  easier  to  gain  access  to  the  interviewees  and  allowed  me  to  conduct 
the  interviews  on  a  level  of  peers  rather  than  as  an  outsider.  Applying  a  set  of  routines  to 
make  material  by  non-journalists  fit  for  use  in  professional  news  reporting  is  at  the  heart  of 
the  work  I  do  everyday.  I  know  how  these  routines  are  adapted  to  different  types  of 
collaborative  newswork,  depending  on  who  journalists  engage  with.  Coming  from  a  company 
that  in  many  ways  set  the  industry  standard  for  collaborative  newswork,  I  entered  this 
research  already  deeply  familiar  with  much  of  the  rationale  behind  it.  However,  the  routines 
and  practices,  and  the  rationale  that  supports  them,  is  something  that  has  evolved  over  the 
time  that  I  worked  in  this  area.  From  a  personal  point  of  view,  the  methodology  also 
permitted  me  to  take  a  step  back  from  my  professional  involvement  and  explore  the 
consequences  of  this  type  of  work  based  on  raw  data.  I  should  add  that  my  reasons  for 
choosing  the  news  organisations  here  rather  than  Storyful  was  because  I  believed  that  it  was 
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more  representative  of  how  collaborative  newswork  is  presented  to  audiences.  Storyful’s 
news  agency  model  means  that  there  is  a  buffer  between  the  collaborative  newswork  done  by 
the  journalists  and  its  final  presentation  to  news  audiences.  Public-facing  professional  news 
organisations  can  play  a  stronger  role  in  communicating  professional  boundary  work.  
Summary 
RQ1:  Is  social  media  sourcing  affecting  the  power  relationships  between  primary  and 
secondary  definers? 
 
The  quantitative  analysis  was  designed  to  help  answer  RQ1  by  identifying  the  user  groups 
most  relied  on  in  interactive  newsgathering  and  by  attempting  to  measure  their  source  power. 
Textual  analysis  of  the  framing  and  contextualising  of  collaborative  newswork  with  different 
user  groups  also  sought  to  investigate  power  relationships  and  hierarchies  created  in  the 
collaboration. 
 
RQ2:  How  do  professional  journalists  create  and  articulate  professional  boundaries  in  the 
participation  by  non-authoritative  citizen  voices/audiences? 
 
RQ3:  What  mechanisms  do  professional  journalists  use  to  maintain  their  gatekeeping  role? 
 
The  textual  analysis  played  a  large  role  in  exploring  RQ2  and  RQ3  focusing  on  how  social 
media  sourced  content  was  presented  and  referenced.  It  looked  at  how  power  relationships 
were  formed  between  journalists  and  non-journalists.  It  specifically  attempted  to  identify 
collaboration  with  citizen  users  and  explore  how  this  was  framed  by  focusing  on  what  place 
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these  users  took  in  the  news  texts,  how  they  were  described  and  whether  and/or  how  the 
activity  of  collaboration  was  highlighted  explicitly  to  news  audiences.  The  quantitative 
analysis  of  the  breakdown  of  sources  according  to  social  media  platform  explored  one  the 
mechanisms  by  which  collaboration  was  managed  and  allowed  further  insight  into  what  role 
the  platforms  play  in  boundary  work.  
 
The  consideration  given  to  different  media  cultures  sought  to  explore  all  three  research 
questions  within  their  cultural  context.  The  interviews  sought  to  explore  these  research 
questions  in  further  detail  by  analysing  the  way  that  social  media  editors  articulated  their 
professional  norms,  routines,  and  practices  to  describe  and  validate  collaborative  newswork. 
 
5.  Gatekeeping  the  Greek  financial  crisis 
The  Greek  referendum  in  July  2015  amid  the  country’s  financial  crisis  became  global 
headline  news  and  was  covered  extensively  by  all  three  news  organisations.  In  June  2015,  it 
became  apparent  that  talks  between  international  lenders  and  Greece’s  young  Syriza 
government  were  deadlocked.  Syriza  had  been  trying  to  negotiate  new  loan  conditions  for  the 
country’s  ailing  economy  that  would  not  entail  more  austerity  measures  but  had  made  no 
headway.  As  a  loan  repayment  deadline  loomed  but  lenders  refused  to  release  further  funds 
unless  their  conditions  were  met,  the  government  called  a  referendum  in  a  last  ditch  attempt 
to  break  the  deadlock.  The  timeframe  of  this  case  study  covered  the  main  part  of  the  news 
coverage  about  the  referendum.  As  a  democratic  exercise,  the  vote  naturally  generated  large 
amounts  of  discussion  on  social  media  platforms  and  news  texts  about  it  were  shared  widely. 
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Framed  as  a  stand-off  between  eurozone  lenders,  the  IMF,  and  Greece,  it  was  presented  as  a 
pan-European  news  event  that  did  not  just  affect  Greeks  but  members  of  the  public  in  other 
European  nations.  New  developments  in  the  negotiations  were  frequently  broken  on  social 
networks  by  political  and  social  actors,  as  well  as  journalists.  The  tendency  for  any  new 
developments  to  be  tweeted  almost  instantaneously  created  extremely  fast-paced  news 
coverage  that  relied  heavily  on  interactive  newsgathering.  Therefore,  the  key  role  that  social 
media  played  in  the  newsgathering  and  the  platform  it  offered  to  civic  engagement  made  it  a 
prime  candidate  for  this  research.  
 
The  crisis  and  the  vote  itself  saw  news  content,  information  and  commentary  widely  shared 
on  social  media  platforms  not  only  in  Greece  but  internationally.  The  use  of  popular  hashtags 
  illustrates  some  of  the  social  media  discussion  generated  by  the  referendum  itself. 22
#Greferendum,  #Oxi,  #Nai  and  other  hashtags  relating  to  the  financial  crisis  were  trending  23
on  Twitter,  providing  forums  for  commentary  and  the  sharing  of  information.  #Greferendum 
was  tweeted  over  310,000  times  in  the  seven  days  preceding  the  referendum,  while 
#dimopsifisma  –  an  English  transliteration  of  the  Greek  word  for  referendum  –  was  tweeted 
22  On  Twitter,  hashtags  are  keywords  that  allow  the  sorting  and  filtering  of  tweets.  They  essentially 
provide  open  forums  to  users  on  specific  topics.  To  participate  in  one  of  these  forums  one  simply  adds 
the  same  hashtag  to  one’s  tweet. 
23  A  trending  hashtag  is  one  that  stands  out  for  its  popularity  and  is  highlighted  to  users.  It  is 
determined  by  Twitter  algorithmically  and  is  visible  to  users  based  on  their  geographical  location. 
(Twitter,  n.d.) 
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145,000  times .  The  Greek  word  for  ‘no’,  oxi,  became  another  popular  hashtag  with  nearly 24
290,000  tweets  in  the  seven  days  preceding  the  vote. 
Timeline 
A  timeline  of  the  key  events  throughout  the  news  coverage  allows  some  of  the  findings  to  be 
placed  within  the  news  context.  As  professional  routines  may  be  adapted  according  to  news 
events,  an  overview  is  useful  for  understanding  the  social  media  components  of  news  texts.  
 
● 26/06 :  The  Greek  Prime  Minister  Alexis  Tsipras  announced  a  referendum  on  the 
conditions  attached  to  talks  about  new  loans  to  support  his  country’s  economy.  
● 29/06 :  Capital  controls  were  imposed  on  Greek  banks  that  saw  limits  set  on  the 
withdrawal  of  money  from  private  accounts.  A  large  demonstration  was  staged  in 
Athens  against  the  loan  conditions,  calling  for  a  No  vote. 
● 30/06 :  A  large  demonstration  took  place  in  Athens  calling  for  a  Yes  vote. 
● 03/07 :  Rival  protests  took  place  in  Athens  calling  for  a  No  and  a  Yes  vote. 
● 05/07 :  The  referendum  took  place,  returning  a  No  vote. 
● 13/07 :  Eurozone  members  agreed  a  deal  for  new  loan  discussions  to  start. 
● 15/07 :  The  Greek  parliament  passed  legislation  to  satisfy  conditions  for  new  loan 
discussions  against  the  backdrop  of  angry  protests  and  rioting  in  Athens. 
24  These  figures  were  obtained  through  online  Twitter  analysis  tool  topsy.com  on  July  5.  The  tool 
counts  the  number  of  times  a  hashtag  is  tweeted  in  a  period  of  up  to  one  month  previous  from  the  date 
it  is  used.  The  term  #greferendum  was  not  found  to  have  been  tweeted  earlier  than  June  26,  while 
#dimopsifisma  had  been  tweeted  almost  another  85,000  times  in  the  three  weeks  before  Greek  prime 
minister  Alexis  Tsipras  announced  the  referendum. 
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 News  texts  between  26  June  and  15  July  were  examined  for  social  media-sourced  content  and 
relevant  texts  were  gathered  and  analysed.  The  period  under  investigation  started  with  the 
Greek  government’s  announcement  to  hold  a  referendum  on  5  July  regarding  conditions 
attached  to  potential  new  loans.  The  period  between  26  June  and  the  referendum  saw  a 
number  of  protests  for  and  against  the  conditions.  It  also  saw  the  introduction  of  capital 
controls  which  limited  ordinary  Greeks’  access  to  their  savings  and  put  caps  on  cash 
withdrawals.  Following  the  referendum  that  delivered  a  ‘no’  vote,  discussions  with  eurozone 
members  and  international  lenders  ramped  up.  This  culminated  in  a  deal  on  the  13  July  that 
was  largely  perceived  as  damaging  to  the  Greek  public.  On  the  night  of  the  15  July,  the  Greek 
parliament  voted  through  legislation  that  would  fulfill  conditions  attached  to  the  deal  against 
the  backdrop  of  civil  unrest  in  Athens.  While  the  financial  crisis  had  been  rumbling  on  over  a 
long  period,  the  announcement  of  a  referendum  had  been  unexpected.  
Sample  of  news  texts  
News  texts  were  collected  according  to  the  methodology  in  the  last  chapter  with  only  texts 
containing  social  media-sourced  content  selected  for  analysis.  The  BBC  coverage  comprised 
17  online  news  texts  that  were  relevant  to  this  study;  15  of  the  texts  were  live  blogs  that 
published  rolling  updates  on  new  developments.  Each  blog  was  typically  closed  within  a  24 
hour  period.  Aside  from  regularly  updated  main  news  stories  in  the  more  traditional  format  of 
a  closed  news  article,  live  blogs  provided  the  BBC’s  main  online  news  coverage  on  the 
financial  crisis.   The  remaining  two  texts  were  reports  on  memes  that  emerged  on  social 25
25  Research  on  the  prevalence  of  live  blogs  in  breaking  news  coverage  showed  that  “15  percent  of 
news  consumers  use  live  blogs  on  a  weekly  basis”  (Newman  and  Thurman  2014,  p.  662)  reaching  a 
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media  platforms  in  response  to  the  news  coverage  of  the  Greek  debt  crisis.  There  were  no 
‘native  content’  texts  identified,  which  is  industry  terminology  for  texts  published  solely  on 
one  of  the  BBC’s  social  media  accounts  without  a  hyperlink  back  to  the  organisation’s  own 
proprietary  platform.  France  24  English  published  16  relevant  news  texts  of  which  10 
contained  live  blogs  similar  in  format  to  those  published  by  the  BBC.  The  remaining  two 
news  texts  featuring  social  media  sourced-content  were  closed-format  texts  found  on  the 
France  24  website  and  featured  embedded  tweets  as  well  as  multimedia  material.  Al  Jazeera 
produced  10  relevant  news  texts.  Their  emphasis  and  format  differed  significantly  from  the 
BBC  and  France  24  with  no  use  of  social  media  content  in  live  online  coverage.  The  texts 
comprised  six  written  and  closed  news  texts,  five  of  which  were  published  on  the  Al  Jazeera 
English  main  website,  while  one  was  featured  on  the  The  Stream  website.  The  latter  was  also 
the  basis  for  a  webcast  that  comprised  the  extensive  use  of  social  media  users  in  a  live 
discussion  on  the  Greek  financial  crisis.  The  format  invites  Twitter  users  to  participate  in  the 
discussion  and  their  tweets  are  reflected  in  the  webcast  or  amplified  by  @AJStream  through 
retweets,  creating  a  virtual  forum.  The  online  news  text  published  in  the  runup  to  the  webcast 
featured  social  media  content  on  the  financial  crisis  which  also  comprised  commentary  and 
testimonies  circulating  on  social  media.  There  were  also  three  ‘native’  multimedia  texts 
published  on  a  verified  Al  Jazeera  social  media  account.  Fig.  1  lists  the  news  texts  analysed 
according  to  their  date  of  publication. 
 
 BBC France  24 Al  Jazeera 
26.06    
27.06    
popularity  on  par  with  news  videos  and  audio  and  that  audience  participation  was  twice  as  high  as  in 
other  online  news  (ibid,  p.  663). 
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bbc.com 
F24  Live 
Media  Watch 
aljazeera.com 
30.06 BBC  Live Media  Watch 
France  24  Debate 
 
1.07 BBC  Live F24  Live 1.  Aljazeera.com 
2.  AJPlus  video 
2.07 BBC  Live  1.  The  Stream  online 
report 
2.  The  Stream 
webcast 
3.07 BBC  Live   
4.07   aljazeera.com 
5.07 BBC  Live 1.  F24  Live 
2.  france24.com 
 
6.07 BBC  Live 1.  France  24 
2.  Media  Watch 
1.  aljazeera.com 
2.  aljazeera.com 
7.07 BBC  Live 1.  F24  Live 
2.  france24.com 
 
8.07   BBC  Live F24  Live  
9.07 BBC  Live F24  Live  
10.07 BBC  Live F24  Live  
11.07    
12.07 BBC  Live F24  Live  
13.07 1.  BBC  Live 
2.  bbc.com 
F24  Live AJPlus  video 
14.07 BBC  Live   
15.07 BBC  Live F24  Live aljazeera.com 
 
Figure  1.  Sample  of  news  texts  covering  the  Greek  financial  crisis 
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Sometimes  a  single  piece  of  content  sourced  through  social  media  was  used  in  several  news 
texts  of  the  same  news  organisation.  For  example,  they  may  have  been  featured  in  a  live  blog 
first  as  well  as  a  closed-format  news  text  a  short  time  later.  In  the  quantitative  analysis,  each 
piece  of  content  was  counted  only  once  and  the  initial  report  was  sought  out  and  included  in 
the  sample  shown  in  Fig.  1.  However,  each  new  piece  of  content  referenced  in  the  news 
coverage,  including  where  its  source  was  cited  with  other  information  in  another  news  text, 
was  included  in  the  study.  As  stated  in  the  methodology,  the  number  of  times  that  a  source 
was  able  to  contribute  to  news  coverage  with  pieces  of  social  media  content  was  considered  a 
marker  for  source  power.  
 
The  vast  majority  of  sources  across  all  three  news  organisations  originated  on  Twitter.  This 
can  be  largely  attributed  to  its  accessibility  as  a  crowdsourcing  tool  and  its  structure  that 
allows  to  act  as  a  one-to-many  publishing  platform.  The  microblog’s  public  nature  means 
most  of  its  users’  tweets  can  be  viewed  by  anyone.  The  indexing  of  tweets  with  the  ability  to 
search  keywords  and  hashtags  chronologically,  as  well  as  the  retweet  function,  means  that  it 
is  relatively  easy  to  identify  the  original  sources  of  information.  Compared  to  other  more 
popular  social  media  platforms,  such  as  Facebook  with  its  privacy  settings  and  algorithmic 
search  function,  Twitter  content  is  considerably  more  transparent.  Given  the  importance  of 
accuracy  and  verification  in  journalism,  it  is  therefore  far  easier  to  incorporate  in  professional 
routines.  However,  the  number  of  active  monthly  users  on  Twitter  in  2015  was  304  million, 
according  to  figures  published  in  July  2015,  compared  with  the  1.4  billion  Facebook  users, 
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who  log  into  their  account  at  least  once  a  month .  Twitter  and  Facebook  user  demographics 26
also  differ  in  terms  of  age,  education  level,  income  and  geography,  with  Twitter  users 
younger,  more  educated,  wealthier  and  more  likely  to  live  in  urban  areas  than  Facebook 
users.  While  social  media  networks  cannot  be  viewed  as  representative  of  global  society  with 
its  huge  disparities  in  accessibility  around  the  world  both  from  an  economic  and 
infrastructure  perspective,  it  is,  however,  evident  that  Twitter  is  far  less  popular  as  a  means  to 
publish  and  share  information  and  less  diverse. 
Quantitative  Analysis 
Twitter  users  and  source  power 
 
The  BBC’s  news  coverage  used  the  greatest  number  of  Twitter  sources  (195),  followed  by 
France  24  (167)  and  Al  Jazeera  (44).  In  the  quantitative  analysis  of  these  sources,  they  were 
grouped  according  to  the  categories  discussed  in  the  literature  review  and  methodology.  They 
are  shown  in  Fig.  2  and  Fig.  3  and  include:  journalists  of  the  respective  news  organisation; 
other  journalists  with  mainstream  news  media;  official  news  media  sources,  political  sources; 
expert  and  analyst  sources;  citizen  voices  such  as  eyewitnesses,  bloggers,  grassroots 
movements  and  opinions  by  private  members  of  the  public;  and  finally,  sources  that  did  not 
fit  into  any  of  the  aforementioned  groups. 
 
 In-house 
journalists 
Other 
journalists 
News 
Orgs 
Political 
sources 
Analysts 
/Expert 
sources 
Citizen 
contributo 
rs 
Other 
26  Figures  published  at  the  end  of  the  second  quarter  of  2015  showed  a  0.7  per  cent  growth  in  its 
membership  quarter  on  quarter  with  the  growth  rate  significantly  declining  year-on-year  since  2013. 
(Arthur  2015;  Scholer  2015) 
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BBC 31 66  (8)* 10  (5)* 
(3)** 
28  (5)* 14  (1)* 41  (22)* 5 
France 
24 
5 56  (7)* 24  (1)* 
(1)** 
(8)*** 
20  (2)* 30  (1)* 31  (7)* 1 
Al 
Jazeera 
 4  (2)* 1** 2* 1* 44  (14)*  
 
With  the  largest  group  of  Twitter  users  in  the  BBC  sample,  it  follows  that  the  outlet  also 
sourced  the  greatest  number  of  tweets  (533),  again  followed  by  France  24  (313)  and  Al 
Jazeera  (55).  Fig.  3  lays  out  the  number  of  tweets  reflected  in  the  news  texts  according  to 
each  category  of  users  as  another  quantitative  measurement  of  source  power  –  the  number  of 
tweets  by  each  group  were  divided  by  the  number  of  users  in  them  to  indicate  the  source 
power  of  the  group  by  average  number  of  tweets  per  account.  The  higher  the  average  number 
of  tweets  per  account  in  each  group  the  greater  weight  and  authority  the  group  was 
considered  to  have  been  given  in  the  coverage. 
 
 In-house 
journalists 
Other 
journalists 
News 
Orgs 
Political 
sources 
Analysts 
/Expert 
sources 
Citizen 
contributo 
rs 
Other 
BBC 199 124 24  (3)* 87 34 60 5 
France 
24 
21 120 37  (7)* 40 54 39 1 
Al 
Jazeera 
 6 1 3 1 62  
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Overall,  both  the  BBC  and  France  24  showed  a  much  greater  proportional  use  of  journalist 
sources,  or  conventional  secondary  definers.  In  addition  these  sources  also  had  considerable 
access  to  the  news  flow  through  their  tweeting  than  other  groups.  Of  a  total  533  tweets  in  the 
BBC  coverage,  199  tweets  came  from  their  31  in-house  staff.  In  terms  of  source  power,  an 
average  of  6.4  tweets  were  referenced  in  the  news  texts  by  each  account  in  this  group. 
Another  125  tweets  from  66  other  professional  journalists  were  found  in  the  texts,  meaning 
an  average  1.9  tweets  per  account  Political  sources,  though  a  comparatively  small  group  of 
accounts  (28)  in  the  BBC  coverage,  had  the  second  greatest  weight  as  sources  with  an 
average  of  3.1  tweets  each.  Citizen  sources  had  the  least  weight  with  an  average  1.5  tweets 
per  user. 
 
France  24  published  313  tweets  of  which  141  were  posted  by  professional  journalists.  In  this 
user  group,  France  24  relied  mainly  on  professional  journalists  from  other  mainstream  news 
media  with  a  slightly  higher  average  to  the  BBC  of  2.1  tweets  per  account.  Its  own  inhouse 
staff  comprised  only  5  sources,  but  they  too  were  most  often  referenced  with  4.2  tweets. 
Twitter  accounts  by  news  organisations  or  those  aggregating  professional  news  texts  were 
also  heavily  relied  on.  Citizen  sources  had  the  least  weight  with  1.3  tweets  per  user.  There 
were  two  main  differences  to  the  BBC’s  sourcing  found  in  the  texts.  Firstly,  France  24’s 
greater  reliance  on  expert  users.  This  user  group  was  proportionally  much  greater  in  France 
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24  coverage  although  the  BBC  gave  greater  weight  to  those  users  that  it  did  reference. 
Secondly,  the  BBC  made  considerably  greater  use  of  its  own  journalists’  tweets. 
 
In  this  sense,  both  the  BBC  and  France  24’s  use  of  social  media  conformed  to  the  more 
conventional  gatekeeping  approach  of  professional  journalism  and  is  consistent  with  research 
on  live  blogs  that  found  innovative  new  approaches  to  sourcing,  correction  and  verification 
but  not  necessarily  a  radically  new  approach  to  the  inclusion  of  citizen  testimony  (Thurman 
and  Newman  2014,  p.  663).  It  also  chimes  with  Reich’s  analysis  (2015)  showing  no 
significantly  greater  involvement  of  citizen  testimony  in  online  news  compared  to  older  news 
mediums,  especially  in  political  and  financial  news.  However,  what  the  data  does  show  is  the 
strong  reliance  on  professional  journalists  on  social  media  from  across  a  wide  range  of 
mainstream  news  media.  The  overwhelming  majority  of  journalist  Twitter  users  were  not 
Greek  and  all  tweeted  in  English.  While  this  could  be  partly  explained  by  the  pan-European 
nature  of  the  news  event  as  it  played  out  in  several  geographical  locations  (Athens,  Brussels, 
Frankfurt),  the  vast  majority  of  journalist  users  worked  for  elite  news  organisations  as  foreign 
correspondents.  Therefore,  journalists  from  similarly  elite  organisations  to  the  BBC  and 
France  24  served  as  the  preferred  contributors  for  networked  journalism.  
 
A  third  way  to  quantify  source  power  was  to  look  at  the  overlap  in  sources  between  news 
organisations,  meaning  the  individual  accounts  that  had  been  able  to  enter  the  global  news 
flow  through  more  than  one  of  the  news  organisations.  This  overlap  was  particularly 
significant  between  the  BBC  and  France  24  with  tweets  by  51  users  referenced  in  the 
coverage  by  both  organisations.  This  accounted  for  26%  and  31%  of  all  Twitter  sources 
respectively.  These  sources  were  almost  exclusively  accounts  of  power  elites  and  journalists, 
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meaning  that  they  did  not  originate  among  the  citizen  user  group.  The  overlap  of  sources 
indicates  that  both  news  organisations  approached  collaborative  newsgathering  in  a  similar 
way  from  a  common  pool  of  sources.  
 
There  were  some  changes  observed  in  the  type  of  Twitter  users  found  in  the  BBC’s  news 
texts  over  time.  Texts  published  in  the  earlier  part  of  the  period  studied  showed  a  heavier 
reliance  on  the  BBC’s  journalists  as  Twitter  sources  when  compared  to  later  texts.  The  live 
blog  published  on  the  Greek  debt  crisis  on  29  June  contains  13  tweets  from  BBC  journalists 
compared  to  just  7  from  other  sources.  The  following  day,  12  tweets  had  been  tweeted  by 
BBC  journalists  compared  to  8  by  other  accounts.  Both  days  one  official  BBC  Twitter 
account  tweet  was  included  in  the  blogs.  On  5  July,  the  day  of  the  referendum,  40  of  the 
blog’s  tweets  had  been  posted  by  BBC  journalists  whereas  34  tweets  were  posted  by  other 
sources.  By  12  July,  the  day  of  the  eurozone  summit  where  a  deal  was  struck,  it  was 
non-BBC  related  accounts  that  took  the  lead  with  67  of  88  tweets  not  posted  by  the 
organisation’s  own  journalists.  Again,  on  15  July,  when  the  Greek  parliament  passed 
legislation  required  by  the  deal,  only  14  tweets  published  on  the  blog  came  from  BBC 
journalists  compared  to  41  from  other  accounts.  
 
These  changes  over  time  may  have  two  reasons.  One  being  that  as  the  Greek  debt  crisis 
dragged  on  dominating  the  international  news  agenda  correspondents  from  around  the  world 
travelled  to  Athens  and  Brussels,  many  of  them  also  tweeting  the  latest  developments.  This 
led  to  a  pooling  of  information  and  resources  from  across  news  organisations  which  became 
available  to  everyone,  including  newsrooms.  Journalists  from  other  similarly  elite  news 
organisations  are  likely  to  have  been  trusted  to  employ  similar  professional  routines  to  those 
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of  the  BBC,  making  them  easy  to  incorporate  in  the  BBC’s  own  coverage.  Secondly, 
journalists  in  the  BBC’s  newsroom  may  have  developed  more  trust  towards  specific  outside 
sources  over  time,  leading  to  their  direct  commentary  becoming  increasingly  reflected  in  the 
news  coverage.  As  the  BBC’s  staff  monitored  Twitter  accounts  tweeting  about  the  financial 
crisis,  over  time  they  were  able  to  identify  key  voices  that  fit  the  organisation’s  criteria  for 
authoritative,  newsworthy  and  trustworthy  sources.  Therefore,  reporters  editing  the  live  blogs 
had  time  to  refine  their  sourcing  of  Twitter  comments  and  reports,  picking  information  from 
accounts  that  had  established  themselves  within  the  context  of  the  news  event. 
 
As  shown  in  Fig.  2  and  Fig.  3,  Al  Jazeera  mobilised  Twitter  differently  with  a  much  greater 
emphasis  on  users  in  the  citizen  category.  While  these  users  had  a  similar  weight  to  the  same 
type  of  sources  used  in  the  BBC  and  France  24  coverage,  Al  Jazeera  almost  exclusively 
sourced  information  from  these  users.  As  a  result,  there  was  also  only  a  very  small  overlap  in 
sources  between  Al  Jazeera,  the  BBC  and  France  24  with  only  3  sources  in  common.  The  fact 
that  there  was  such  little  overlap  between  Al  Jazeera’s  Twitter  sources  and  those  of  the  other 
two  news  organisations,  also  underlines  the  weaker  source  power  of  citizen  voices  in  their 
access  to  multiple  news  organisations.  Only  one  source  in  this  group  was  found  among  all 
three  news  organisations  and  went  by  the  Twitter  handle  @GreekAnalyst.  Their  true  identity 
was  never  revealed  and  they  described  themself  in  their  hyperlinked  blog  as  “providing  on 
spot,  real-time  coverage  and  analysis  of  the  Greek  economic  crisis”.  The  commentary  this 
accounts  was  tweeting  was  largely  in  opposition  to  the  Syriza  government.  The  account 
tweeted  both  in  English  and  Greek,  and  although  the  location  of  the  person  behind  the 
account  was  undisclosed  this  suggests  that  they  were  in  fact  Greek.  One  might  argue  that  the 
anonymity  of  may  have  meant  that  the  source  was  miscategorised.  Yet,  as  there  was  no  other 
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information  available  it  was  treated  as  a  non-elite  source  as  it  presented  itself  as  such  and 
gained  no  obvious  advantage  from  a  potentially  different  status.   The  other  two  sources  that 
all  three  organisations  had  in  common  were  political  sources. 
 
In  terms  of  its  news  output,  one  significant  difference  between  Al  Jazeera  and  the  other  two 
organisations  was  that  it  did  not  run  any  live  blogs  on  the  debt  crisis.  Instead  of  using 
interactive  newsgathering  in  a  breaking  news/rolling  coverage  format,  it  was  used  largely  to 
gather  commentary  and  testimonies  to  reflect  a  plurality  of  opinions  in  citizen  debates  taking 
place.  The  majority  of  all  users  in  the  Al  Jazeera  coverage  were  found  in  two  news  items 
featured  on  The  Stream.  In  the  run-up  to  the  referendum  on  2  July  The  Stream  published  an 
online  news  text  entitled  The  great  Greek  drama ,  which  also  became  the  subject  of  a  live 
webcast.  By  not  relying  on  Twitter  for  real-time  newsgathering  to  reflect  the  latest 
developments,  Al  Jazeera  could  focus  on  citizen  testimony  and  commentary  to  reflect  a 
public  debate.  Rather  than  using  social  media  for  conventional  newsgathering  with  its  focus 
on  authoritative  voices,  it  gave  space  to  opinions  and  first-hand  experiences  of  the  Greek 
financial  crisis  by  members  of  the  public.  Real-time  collaborative  newsgathering  arguably 
places  a  lot  of  pressure  on  reporters  to  ensure  accuracy  and  verification  of  information  from  a 
distance  and  within  a  very  short  timeframe. 
Type  of  sources  in  user  groups 
 
As  mentioned  already,  the  vast  majority  of  tweets  used  in  Al  Jazeera’s  news  texts  was  found 
in  the  two  texts  by  The  Stream.  In  the  The  Stream  webcast  four  Greek  interviewees,  a  hotel 
owner,  a  student  living  in  London,  an  unemployed  man  and  a  psychologist  posed  as  a  virtual 
panel  of  interviewees  that  were  dialed  into  the  show  on  a  conference  call.  The  show’s 
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moderators  then  invited  questions  and  comments  via  Twitter  in  real-time  but  had  also 
preselected  older  comments  and  questions  to  put  to  the  panel.  In  the  days  before  the 
programme  The  Stream’s  Twitter  account  had  put  out  calls  to  participate  in  the  live  webcast 
by  tweeting  comments,  questions  and  accounts  of  personal  experiences  directed  at 
@AJStream  or  with  the  hashtag  # AJStream.  A  call  was  also  put  out  via  Facebook  but  yielded 
considerably  less  engagement,  none  of  which  was  represented  in  the  webcast  and  other  online 
news  text.  
 
Among  the  accounts  used  by  Al  Jazeera  in  the  citizen  group,  13  were  Greek.  Greek  sources 
were  generally  given  greater  weight  with  multiple  tweets  used  in  the  news  texts  of  The 
Stream.  The  remaining  accounts  were  spread  across  the  world,  with  some  in  India,  Australia, 
the  US,  Zimbabwe,  South  Africa,  Latvia,  Ireland  and  elsewhere.  Some  of  these  users  were 
tweeting  questions  directed  at  Greeks,  while  others  expressed  opinions.  This  created  a  global 
discussion  around  a  news  event  that  was  otherwise  framed  by  The  Stream  as  a  very  local 
event  in  Greece  and  the  experiences  of  ordinary  Greek  citizens.  This  global  discussion  and 
opining  on  an  issue  experienced  largely  by  Greeks  was  also  acknowledged  by  the 
programme’s  host  in  a  comment  to  the  panel.  In  contrast,  among  the  citizen  users  sourced  by 
the  BBC  and  France  24,  a  large  section  of  them  were  not  Greeks  and  of  those  that  were,  there 
was  not  necessarily  more  authority  attributed  to  them.  In  the  BBC  sample,  Greeks  were  the 
largest  group  (22)  in  the  citizen  group  with  19  others  from  around  the  world,  while  there  were 
just  six  among  the  same  group  in  the  France  24  texts.  This  raises  questions  about  what 
purpose  is  served  by  drawing  in  comments  by  those  who  remain  unaffected  by  the   news 
event. 
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Greeks  were  the  smallest  group  among  the  expert  accounts  with  only  one  Greek  in  this  group 
both  used  by  the  BBC  and  France  24.  Therefore,  the  power  to  interpret  the  Greek  financial 
crisis  by  sources  that  were  typically  referenced  by  the  BBC  and  France  24  for  their  perceived 
disinterested  expertise  (Hall  et  al.,  1978)  was  granted  almost  exclusively  to  non-Greeks.  The 
following  are  some  of  the  users  found  in  this  category:  head  of  analysis  at  the  Danish 
free-market  think  tank  CEPOS,  Otto  Brøns-Petersen;  head  of  European  macro  credit  research 
at  RBS,  Alberto  Gallo;  political  analyst  at  think  tank  Open  Europe,  Vincenzo  Scarpetta; 
Professor  at  European  Politics  at  the  Fletcher  School  of  Tufts  University,  Kostas  Lavdas;  the 
German  central  bank  and  the  World  Economic  Forum.  
 
Politicians,  party  spokespersons  or  representatives  of  political  institutions  played  a  large  role 
in  the  BBC  coverage  with  significant  weight  given  to  them .  In  this  category  the  largest 27
single  group,  comprising  10  Twitter  accounts,  were  EU  sources.  They  included  EU  council 
and  commission  representatives,  their  spokespersons,  MEPs  or  the  EU  institutions’  media 
relations  operation.  Leader  of  the  Eurogroup  and  Dutch  finance  minister  Jeroen  Dijsselbloem 
was  counted  among  this  group  but  could  also  be  considered  as  acting  both  as  an  EU  as  well 
as  a  national  representative.  five  sources  were  Greek,  three  Spanish,  two  British,  and  the 
remaining  eight  were  from  Slovakia,  Slovenia,  Cyprus,  Luxemburg,  Belgium,  Italy,  Finland 
and  Malta.  German  politicians  or  German  government  sources  were  absent  despite  being  the 
most  influential  political  players  in  the  negotiations.  All  of  the  represented  sources  tweeted 
consistently  and  overwhelmingly  in  English.  With  regards  to  Germany  neither  Chancellor 
Angela  Merkel  nor  Finance  Minister  Wolfgang  Schäuble  had  a  social  media  presence, 
27  This  may  be  explained  by  a  professional  practice  that  prefers  to  seek  out  those  who  can  be  held 
accountable,  as  once  put  by  a  BBC  Newsnight  editor  (Katz  2017). 
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although  other  official  government  sources  do  exist  but  mainly  tweet  in  German.  There  was  a 
very  limited  use  of  official  French  government  sources  with  one  tweet  by  President  Francois 
Hollande.  Both  Hollande  and  his  prime  minister,  Manuel  Valls,  tweeted  almost  exclusively  in 
French,  as  did  the  official  government  Twitter  account  @Elysee.  The  German  and  French 
governments’  positions  were  amplified  and  represented  almost  exclusively  by  reporters.  For 
more  peripheral  political  voices  from  smaller  or  less  influential  nations,  the  use  of  social 
media  appeared  to  give  them  greater  representation  both  in  the  BBC’s  and  France  24’s  news 
coverage.  They  were  mostly  members  of  the  political  elite  in  their  own  respective  nations 
such  as  government  leaders,  ministers  and  their  spokespersons.  It  can  be  assumed  that  their 
access  to  the  global  news  flow  was  helped  by  their  strong  social  media  presence.  The 
engagement  with  social  media  platforms  alone  did  not  ensure  access  but  needed  to  be  linked 
with  tweeting  in  English  –  a  foreign  language  to  most.  Twitter  voices  that  either  did  not  have 
the  ability  or  will  to  tweet  in  English  were  excluded  from  social  media-sourced  news 
coverage.  Therefore  the  political  voices  included  in  the  coverage  were  actively  seeking  to 
address  an  international  audience  rather  than  their  own  national  one.  Overall,  political  sources 
that  were  sufficiently  elite  to  be  counted  among  the  favoured  source  types  perceived  as 
authoritative  were  able  to  use  social  media  in  a  way  that  enabled  them  to  enter  the  global 
news  flow.  Nevertheless,  these  same  sources  may  previously  not  have  been  given  the  same 
weight  in  news  coverage  as  they  were  not  considered  the  main  or  most  important  actors  in  the 
news  event.  Therefore,  Twitter  engagement  raised  their  profiles  and  permitted  ‘authoritative’ 
but  less  influential  sources  to  draw  more  attention  to  themselves  through  their  tweeting, 
leading  to  a  greater  likelihood  of  inclusion  in  news  coverage. 
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Text  analysis 
 
Power  relationships 
 
The  source  power  findings  in  the  quantitative  analysis  was  also  borne  out  in  the  textual 
analysis.  Investigating  the  power  relationships  between  users  from  different  groups  and  the 
representation  of  their  content  in  the  news  coverage  showed  a  similar  hierarchy  both  in  the 
BBC  and  the  France  24  news  texts.  The  BBC  more  frequently  represented  its  journalists  as 
authoritative  sources  on  Twitter  and  set  out  to  build  communities  of  non-authoritative  users 
around  them.  In  several  of  the  live  blogs,  readers  were  directed  to  BBC  journalists  active  on 
Twitter  to  ask  questions  or  follow  for  updates.  This  responded  to  changing  ways  in  which 
news  is  consumed  in  an  increasingly  interactive  collaborative  way  on  social  media,  as  for 
example,  described  by  the  “affective  news  stream”  (Papacharissi  2016).  It  suggests  that 
audiences  may  be  disinclined  to  click  through  to  BBC’s  own  online  platform  and  wish  to  be 
informed  mainly  through  their  Twitter  feeds.  Individual  reporters  became  ‘social  media 
anchors’  with  whom  audience  interaction  was  encouraged  through  Twitter.  For  example,  the 
BBC  live  blog  pointed  readers  to  its  Athens-based  correspondent  tweeting  as 
@BBCRosAtkins  to  direct  questions  on  the  Greek  debt  crisis  to  (see  Fig.  7).  It  also  pointed 
readers  to  its  economics  correspondent  Robert  Peston  on  @Peston,  Athens  correspondent  on 
@jasminecoleman  and  business  correspondent  on  @Theothebald.  Similarly,  the  BBC  Outside 
Source  programme  that  is  marketed  as  providing  a  platform  for  non-elite  voices  also  invited 
questions  from  social  media  users  to  ask  Peston  in  a  webcast  on  13  July .  28
28  This  programme  could  not  be  reviewed  later  but  the  tone  in  the  relationship  created  was  concluded 
based  on  the  invitation  for  questions. 
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These  interactions  taking  place  with  BBC  journalists  on  Twitter  were  always  framed  as 
audiences  being  informed  rather  than  as  a  reciprocal  level  relationship.  Journalists  were 
framed  as  holding  the  power  to  create  meaning  and  presented  as  authoritative.  While  their 
Twitter  activity  also  provided  straightforward  reporting,  a  large  portion  of  the  BBC 
journalists’  Twitter-sourced  content  consisted  of  opining.  As  the  news  events  moved  along 
rapidly  with  information  often  emerging  not  from  reporters  in  the  first  instance  but  through 
actors  involved  in  the  news  event,  such  as  politicians,  journalists  took  on  the  role  of 
contextualising.  In  addition  to  their  commentary  and  analysis,  it  was  also  BBC  journalists’ 
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anecdotes  and  personal  experiences  that  were  reflected  in  the  liveblogs,  that  centred  the  focus 
on  them  (see  Fig.  5). 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The  tweets  of  other  journalists  found  in  the  coverage  were  more  likely  to  resemble  the  solely 
factual  reporting  characterising  hard  news,  such  as  quotes  from  officials,  breaking  news 
updates,  or  other  information  that  had  become  available  and  fit  with  professional  routines  in 
newsgathering.  Therefore,  the  mobilisation  of  Twitter  to  conduct  a  reciprocal  level  networked 
journalism  was  illustrated  primarily  through  the  interactions  with  other  professional 
journalists.  As  journalists  pooled  their  resources  through  the  loosely  connected  social 
networks  created  on  Twitter  information  spread  quickly  between  them.  However,  these 
journalists  were  often  similarly  elite  and  all  English-speaking,  showing  that  the  group  itself 
was  to  an  extent  homogenous.  BBC  correspondents’  tweets  were  more  likely  to  be  sourced  if 
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they  contained  some  form  of  analysis,  positioning  these  journalists  as  a  type  of  primary 
definer  and  authoritative  voice  by  representing  them  as  an  expert  source.  Other  journalists 
were  more  likely  to  be  sourced  for  their  own  newsgathering  befitting  the  role  of  a  reporter. 
BBC  journalists  opined  alongside  other  elite  sources  and  linked  into  a  loose  network  of 
influential  users  that  could  be  described  as  news-  and  opinion-makers.  In  other  words,  their 
analysis  was  based  around  the  actions  and  viewpoints  expressed  by  other  elite  sources,  who 
they  most  interacted  and  pooled  information  with.  Primary  definers  such  as  politicians  and 
experts  had  significant  clout  as  newsmakers,  as  the  quantitative  analysis  of  source  power 
showed,  and  they  were  able  to  access  the  news  flow  with  announcements  or  their 
commentary  and  analysis.  The  greater  level  of  opining  by  journalists  on  Twitter  has  been 
pointed  out  in  previous  research  (Lasorsa  et  al.  2012).  However,  amid  a  loss  in  the  ability  to 
report  news  due  to  a  news  environment  saturated  with  information,  the  textual  analysis  shows 
that  opinion  and  commentary  by  journalists  is  used  to  add  value  to  the  coverage.  Although  it 
has  been  suggested  that  the  greater  amount  of  commentary  in  the  news  reporting  would  open 
up  professional  newswork  to  bloggers  and  blur  lines  between  professional  journalism  and 
amateurs,  this  was  not  proven  to  be  the  case  in  the  BBC  texts.  Instead,  the  organisation, 
seemed  to  attempt  to  consolidate  –  and,  by  including  opinion,  effectively  to  extend  –  the  role 
of  its  journalists  through  social  media. 
 
In  the  France  24  news  texts,  content  by  journalist  Twitter  users  typically  had  a  more 
informational  style.  Given  the  small  number  of  France  24  correspondents  among  this  Twitter 
group,  it  mirrors  the  way  that  information  was  interactively  gathered  through  a  broad 
community  of  similarly  elite  international  correspondents  as  the  BBC.  The  journalists’  tweets 
often  deferred  to  traditional  primary  definers  and  reported  on  their  words  or  contained  images 
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of  documents  or  events  with  a  few  also  providing  analysis.  However,  analysis  in  Twitter 
content  was  mostly  left  to  the  expert  users.  Although,  as  will  be  discussed,  France  24 
journalists  played  a  significant  role  in  general  in  framing  and  contextualising  pertinent  social 
media  content  that  had  surfaced.  Outside  of  the  extensive  use  of  journalist  users  in  their  live 
blogs,  France  24  also  used  tweets  to  link  to  what  other  news  organisations  were  reporting.  All 
of  these  organisations  were  elite  French  and  international  media,  further  emphasising  that 
Twitter  was  appropriated  primarily  to  highlight  and  promote  the  work  of  professional  news 
media  (see  example  in  Fig.  6).  It  was  comparable  to  the  news  reviews  often  done  by  news 
outlets,  which,  on  the  face  of  it,  summarise  a  diversity  of  views  and  stories  from  across  the 
news  media.  However,  it  also  reinforced  the  echo  chamber  of  similarly  elite  journalists  and 
their  organisations  using  Twitter  as  a  distribution  platform  for  their  content  to  audiences  as 
well  as  other  news  outlets.  In  addition,  there  were  24  sources  identified  as  news  organisations 
in  the  France  24  coverage  of  which  only  one  was  Greek.  However,  eight  were  not  news 
organisations  in  the  traditional  sense  but  Twitter  accounts  that  aggregate  and  republish  news. 
They  have  here  been  described  as  ‘aggregator’  accounts  and  are  usually  characterised  by  their 
lack  of  transparency,  meaning  it  is  not  possible  to  identify  the  group  or  person  operating  these 
Twitter  accounts.  Their  main  purpose  is  to  collect  news  through  Twitter  and  amplify  it  by 
sharing  it,  while  not  producing  any  of  the  information  themselves.  They  may  also  be  bots, 
meaning  the  tweeting  of  news  content  is  automated  and  there  is  no  additional  information,  be 
it  opinion  or  commentary  added.  Therefore  these  accounts  were  listed  in  the  news  media 
group  of  users.  Even  tweets  by  citizen  Twitter  users  were  at  times  reflected  to  amplify 
professional  news  coverage.  These  tweets  were  not  sought  out  for  a  representation  of  these 
users’  views  other  than  their  retweeting  or  hyperlinking  to  professional  news  reports.  This 
was  specifically  a  peculiarity  of  the  France  24  news  texts.  Therefore,  the  use  of  non-elite 
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sources  and  citizen  commentary  contributed  to  a  very  mainstream  media-centric  view  of  the 
Twitter  activity  around  the  news  event. 
  
As  already  shown,  Al  Jazeera  took  a  significantly  different  approach  as  it  focused  on  building 
a  ‘community’  around  AJ  Stream’s  social  media  presence  that  aimed  to  facilitate  a 
conversation  between  its  members.  There  was  a  very  limited  amount  of  Twitter-sourced 
content  found  in  the  straight  reporting  of  the  crisis  on  aljazeera.com.  Where  it  was 
incorporated  it  followed  the  same  professional  sourcing  routines  as  the  BBC  and  France  24, 
such  as  users  who  were  journalists  and  politicians  but  none  of  the  tweets  were  sourced  from 
Al  Jazeera  journalists.  The  Twitter  interactions  seen  in  Fig.  7  and  Fig.  8  are  representative  of 
a  typical  exchange  between  The  Stream  producers  and  citizen  users  participating  in  the 
webcast.  The  Twitter  interaction  is  reciprocal  and  non-hierarchical.  It  is  also  one-to-one  as  the 
Twitter  accounts  respond  to  each  other  through  the  use  of  their  Twitter  handles  at  the  start  of 
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each  tweet,  which  eliminated  the  tweets  from  the  timelines  of  their  followers.  The  comments 
emerging  from  citizen  users  in  these  conversations  were  amplified  through  retweets  and/or 
inclusion  in  the  Stream  programme.  
By  comparison,  the  questions  and  answers  format  with  BBC  correspondents  (Fig.  4)  did  not 
see  them  personally  engaging  with  individual  users  at  all.  The  testimonies  and  opinions  of 
citizen  users  were  at  the  centre  of  the  conversation.  It  followed  a  style  of  interaction 
comparable  to  the  vox-pop  format  that  is  typically  used  in  news  reports  to  gauge  public 
opinion.  Through  the  real-time  reflection  of  these  Twitter  accounts  in  the  programme 
interactions  between  them  could  develop  as  users  were  able  to  advance  the  conversation  and 
respond  to  the  opinions  of  other  users.  It  was  the  only  example  among  all  the  news  coverage  
 
 
146 
 where  citizen  users  had  the  opportunity  to  be  represented  as  primary  definers  in  a  news  text 
and  granted  the  ability  to  shape  the  discussion  with  their  views.  Both  of  the  other  news 
organisations  attempted  similar  engagement  but  with  limited  success.  Comments  were  invited 
via  @France24Debate  or  #F24Debate  as  well  as  @BBC_WHYS  and  #WHYS  –  an  acronym 
for  World  Have  Your  Say.  The  France  24  Debate  webcast  however  did  not  feature  a  single 
social  media  comment  and  comments  sent  to  the  BBC  were  few  and  far  between,  suggesting 
that  their  Twitter  presence  was  not  considered  sufficiently  engaging  for  users  inclined  to  enter 
into  a  conversation.  
 
Overall,  cartoons  were  very  common  in  the  tweets  sourced  from  citizen  users  among  all  three 
news  organisations.  Complex  messages  that  would  have  been  too  difficult  to  fit  into  a  single 
tweet  were  conveyed  in  a  way  that  was  visually  engaging.  These  messages  were  presented 
largely  unmediated,  meaning  that  control  over  the  type  of  comments  that  were  represented 
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was  practiced  primarily  in  the  selection  process  rather  than  through  framing.  However,  it  also 
meant  that  these  tweets  were  mostly  used  to  add  colour  to  an  otherwise  complex  political  and 
financial  issue  and  were  presented  as  less  important.  The  users  were  rarely,  if  ever,  introduced 
or  contextualised,  unlike  the  sources  from  the  other  user  categories.  Left  largely  nameless, 
this  contributed  to  defining  their  level  of  importance  as  below  that  of  other  users.  With  the 
exception  of  the  report  discussed  by  The  Stream,  the  selection  of  the  tweets  seemed  to  be 
mostly  based  on  editors’  preferences  rather  than  any  clearly  defined  approach  to  sourcing 
such  tweets.  For  example,  there  were  no  particular  qualities  among  the  sources’  identities, 
such  as  personal  involvement  or  experience,  and  origin.  The  only  common  trait  that  all 
possessed  was  that  they  tweeted  in  English.  What  was  presented  both  in  the  BBC  and  France 
24  news  texts  was  often  an  undifferentiated  global  conversation  around  the  news  event, 
where  voices  within  the  citizen  user  group  were  largely  presented  as  indistinguishable . 29
 
I  also  analysed  source  power  in  two  examples  of  specific  events  that  took  place  during  the 
period  studies  and  the  findings  are  presented  in  the  following  two  sub-sections.  
 
Varoufakis’  resignation 
 
As  social  media  have  created  a  news  environment  comprising  huge  amounts  of  information, 
legacy  media  compete  for  the  ability  to  define  what  that  information  means.  As  already 
mentioned,  collaborative  newsgathering  has  been  integrated  into  sourcing  routines  which  is 
29  This  was  not  the  case  for  emails  reflected  in  the  coverage,  sent  by  readers.  Citations  from  these 
were  often  accompanied  by  a  preamble  about  the  writer’s  identity  and  reason  for  their  interest.  For 
example,  they  were  holidaying  on  a  Greek  island  or  were  a  British  citizen  living  in  Greece. 
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more  about  distilling  information  rather  than  producing  news.  In  an  information  saturated 
news  environment,  where  journalists  have  lost  the  privilege  of  being  the  only  ones  to  publish 
and  broadcast,  their  personal  input  is  to  select,  frame  and  analyse  the  news.  Through  the 
newsmakers’  ability  to  publish  to  audiences  it  is  possible  to  compare  original  texts  published 
on  social  media  with  how  they  are  reproduced  in  the  news  texts  of  the  research.  This  arguably 
offers  more  transparency  about  the  selection  process  in  newswork,  as  press  releases  which 
used  to  be  sent  to  journalists  were  largely  inaccessible  to  the  general  public.   A  comparison 
between  the  blog  posts  of  Greek  Finance  Minister  Yanis  Varoufakis  and  their  reproduction  in 
news  texts  could  reveal  what  was  selected  and  what  was  omitted.  
 
Newsmakers,  meaning  those  individuals  who  are  influential  in  shaping  news  agendas  through 
their  words  and  actions  because  they  are  a  major  actor  in  news  events,  may  not  primarily  (or 
even  at  all)  try  to  get  the  attention  of  professional  news  media  but  rather  bypass  it  to  speak  to 
their  audiences  directly  through  social  media.  This  was  most  clearly  seen  in  the  social  media 
activity  of  Greek  Prime  Minister  Alexis  Tsipras  and  his  finance  minister.  Both  tweeted 
regularly  throughout  the  period  and  frequently  in  English,  suggesting  that  they  were  not 
addressing  Greeks  but  the  international  community.  Moreover,  the  news  of  important 
developments  were  often  broken  through  their  Twitter  engagement,  bypassing  the 
‘gatekeeper’  journalists.  For  example,  Varoufakis’  surprise  resignation  on  6  July,  the  day  after 
the  referendum,  was  announced  in  his  blog  to  which  he  tweeted  a  hyperlink.  It  was  just  one 
of  numerous  examples  of  how  actors  in  the  news  events  themselves  published  their  own 
breaking  news  outside  of  the  orbit  of  professional  news  media.  Varoufakis  published  and 
tweeted  his  resignation  only  in  English,  retaining  the  greatest  possible  level  of  control  over 
how  the  announcement  would  be  framed  for  news  audiences  outside  of  Greece.  A 
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comparison  between  the  original  text  and  its  treatment  in  the  news  coverage  is  discussed 
shortly,  and  illustrates  how  professional  journalists  assume  their  role  in  interpreting  and 
analysing  news  events  for  audiences.  The  interpretation  offered  by  both  the  BBC  and  France 
24  focused  on  Varoufakis’  rhetorical  and  negotiating  style  with  creditors.  It  was  both  his 
personality  and  conduct  that  was  framed  as  the  major  barrier  in  reaching  any  agreement  in  the 
talks. 
 
In  the  BBC’s  live  blog  on  6  July  there  are  several  references  to  two  blog  posts  published  by 
Varoufakis  throughout  the  day.  The  first  was  about  the  previous  day’s  vote  and  the  second 
announced  his  resignation.  Two  extracts  from  these  posts  were  cited  in  the  BBC  texts,  both  of 
which  are  presented  below.  The  extracts  of  the  first  blog  were  featured  in  the  BBC  live  blog  30
with  two  citations  that  were  contextualised  with  a  short  comment  by  the  journalist  calling 
them  a  “mixed  message”  and  “tough  words”. 
 
From  the  moment  our  election  seemed  likely,  last  December,  the  powers-that-be 
started  a  bank  run  and  planned,  eventually,  to  shut  Greece’s  banks  down.  
[...] 
Today’s  referendum  delivered  a  resounding  call  for  a  mutually  beneficial  agreement 
between  Greece  and  our  European  partners  (Varoufakis  2015a) . 
 
The  second  blog  post  announcing  that  he  was  stepping  down,  was  also  cited  but  the  citations 
focused  on  the  interpersonal  aspects  of  the  negotiations.  While  Varoufakis  listed  bullet  points 
on  what  he  believed  the  Greek  government  had  attempted  to  achieve  in  its  time  in  office,  how 
he  believed  creditors  had  reacted,  and  how  the  Greek  government  planned  to  approach 
negotiations  in  light  of  the  referendum  result,  these  did  not  become  subject  of  the  news  text  – 
30  This  blog  post  was  not  quoted  in  the  news  texts  of  either  France  24  or  Al  Jazeera.  
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either  through  direct  quotation  or  paraphrasing.  The  first  extract  that  was  used  in  the  BBC 
text  was  as  follows: 
 
Soon  after  the  announcement  of  the  referendum  results,  I  was  made  aware  of  a  certain 
preference  by  some  Eurogroup  participants,  and  assorted  ‘partners’,  for  my  ‘absence’ 
from  its  meetings;  an  idea  that  the  Prime  Minister  judged  to  be  potentially  helpful  to 
him  in  reaching  an  agreement.  For  this  reason  I  am  leaving  the  Ministry  of  Finance 
today  (Varoufakis  2015b) . 
 
A  second  citation  of  the  resignation,  quoted  him  writing  "I  shall  wear  the  creditors'  loathing 
with  pride".  This  was  followed  by  two  tweets  from  BBC  correspondents  that  provided 
analysis  and  commentary  about  the  resignation.  There  were  several  other  pieces  of  analysis  in 
the  live  blog  and  elsewhere  in  the  BBC  coverage  but  none  that  were  sourced  through  Twitter 
. 31
 
The  France  24  reports  on  the  resignation  also  contained  quotes  from  Varoufakis’  blog  post. 
The  blog  was  cited  in  one  multimedia  text  that  contextualised  and  commented  on  the  finance 
minister’s  five  months  in  office,  mixing  it  with  some  analysis.  In  the  France  24  Media  Watch 
programme  on  6  July,  the  resignation  became  a  topic  for  analysis  and  featured  three 
journalists  and  three  citizen  Twitter  users  sourced  alongside  other  journalists’  commentary. 
Four  out  of  the  five  tweets  sourced  for  this  programme  focused  on  Varoufakis’  appearance, 
and  his  much  commented  on  departure  on  his  motorbike  with  his  wife,  while  only  two 
reflected  the  Twitter  users’  opinion  of  his  policies  or  what  his  resignation  means  in  a  political 
context  (see  examples  in  Fig  9).  The  Debate,  another  programme  aimed  at  providing  analysis, 
also  discussed  Varoufakis  resignation.  While  the  programme  invites  discussion  and 
comments  through  social  media  it  did  not  feature  any  social  media  content.  So  France  24  too 
31  There  were  also  numerous  quotes  from  emails  to  the  BBC  by  readers,  most  of  whom  were  British. 
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responded  largely  with  opinions  and  analysis  in  how  it  reported  the  resignation,  imposing  its 
control  over  the  message  that  was  contained  in  the  blog  post.  It  turned  to  social  media  mainly 
to  add  some  lighthearted  commentary  rather  than  involve  and  invite  participation  in  the  way 
that  meaning  was  constructed.  
 
 
 
 
 
Al  Jazeera  news  texts  took  three  quotes  directly  from  the  blog  post.  It  was  followed  with  one 
quote  of  analysis  from  the  Al  Jazeera  correspondent  in  Athens  that  was  not  taken  from  social 
media.  All  of  the  news  organisations  contained  the  second  quote  above  regarding  Varoufakis’ 
decision  to  step  down  after  the  referendum’s  No  vote  as  he  was  made  aware  that  some  of  the 
Eurogroup  members  preferred  for  him  not  to  be  taking  part  in  the  negotiations.  Al  Jazeera 
and  BBC  also  quoted  the  sentence,  “And  I  shall  wear  the  creditors’  loathing  with  pride.”  
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While  the  blog  post  was  hyperlinked  to  in  news  texts,  the  quotes  reflected  were  limited.  A 
strong  focus  among  all  the  news  organisations  was  the  fact  of  Varoufakis  resignation  due  to 
the  Eurogroup  members  dislike  for  him  and  his  overt  defiance.  It  was  particularly  the 
personal  animosities  that  received  coverage,  while  his  blog  post  comments  describing  the 
vote  by  the  Greek  people  as  a  democratic  action  and  his  call  for  different  loan  conditions 
based  on  this  were  not  cited.  The  text  subsequently  became  the  subject  of  extensive  analysis 
with  journalists  and  expert  sources  largely  left  to  provide  interpretations.  There  were  also  a 
small  number  of  citizen  sources,  who  most  commonly  tweeted  caricatures  that  were 
presented  in  the  programme.  For  example,  all  of  the  tweets  by  citizen  users  in  the  France  24 
Media  Watch  programme  contained  illustrations.  These  tweets  were  not  solicited  by  France 
24  or  specifically  targeting  the  programme,  but  rather  were  selected  by  its  producers  from  the 
range  of  commentary  available  on  social  networks.  So  it  did  not  appear  to  be  a  design  of  the 
programme  to  include  only  illustration  from  such  type  of  users,  but  rather  the  outcome  of 
where  journalists  and  producers  see  value  in  citizen  participation. 
 
Protest  representation 
 
Several  protests  took  place  in  Athens  in  the  run  up  to  the  referendum  during  which 
eyewitness  multimedia  material  was  posted  online.  While  the  demonstrations  received  news 
coverage  across  all  the  news  organisations,  this  was  mostly  limited  to  traditional  reporting 
styles.  Reports  were  filed  by  correspondents  at  the  rallies,  who  often  also  tweeted  about  them. 
 
France  24  did  not  include  any  social  media-sourced  content,  Twitter  or  otherwise,  of  the 
protests  in  their  news  coverage.  The  BBC  used  a  number  of  tweets  containing  images  and 
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text  reports  but  all  of  them  belonged  to  their  own  correspondents  in  Athens.  They  followed  a 
format  that  concentrated  largely  on  the  size  of  the  turn-out  while  incorporating  a  small 
number  of  citizen  testimonies,  relayed  by  the  BBC  correspondents.  The  BBC  live  blog  on  29 
July  included  four  tweets  about  the  rally  by  one  BBC  correspondent.  The  first  referred  to  the 
arrival  of  a  colleague  at  the  rally.  The  second  commented  on  the  size  of  the  rally  with  an 
image  overlooking  the  protest  and  the  final  two  contained  images  of  protesters  amid  the 
protest.  There  was  also  a  reference  to  a  solidarity  march  in  London  with  a  hyperlink  to  a 
Periscope  video  shot  by  a  Guardian  journalist.  The  BBC  live  blog  on  30  June  included  three 
tweets  about  the  rally.  All  of  them  by  BBC  correspondents.  Again,  two  comprised  images 
taken  from  a  nearby  balcony  overlooking  the  protest  and  the  third  cited  a  slogan  chanted  by 
the  protesters.  On  3  June,  two  rival  protests  took  place  in  Athens,  the  larger  one  saw 
thousands  rally  in  front  of  the  Greek  parliament  calling  for  a  rejection  of  the  loan  conditions. 
The  smaller  one  called  for  voters  to  accept  the  conditions.  In  the  BBC’s  liveblog,  three  tweets 
by  two  of  the  organisation’s  correspondents  in  Athens  contained  bird’s  eye-view  images  of 
the  larger  rally.  As  in  the  previous  days,  they  were  taken  from  high  up  balconies  of  nearby 
buildings.  One  of  these  was  a  short  video.  It  also  included  two  tweets  by  Tsipras,  who 
addressed  the  rally. 
 
In  the  coverage  of  civic  action  through  protests,  an  event  that  might  be  considered 
particularly  well  suited  for  collaborative  newsgathering  with  citizen  users,  coverage  remained 
entirely  under  the  control  of  BBC  reporters.  There  were  no  tweets  by  citizen  users  sharing 
images  or  comments  from  or  about  the  protests.  The  voice  of  protesters  was  gauged  in  terms 
of  numbers,  while  journalists  were  distinguished  by  their  named  presence.  A  very  limited 
amount  of  amateur  footage  was  used  in  the  news  coverage  and  the  lack  of  attribution  to  its 
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sources  allowed  little  deeper  analysis  into  its  origin.  The  fact  that  were  was  such  little 
eyewitness  material  is  likely  to  be  down  to  the  fact  that  a  large  number  of  professional 
journalists  from  across  the  world  had  travelled  to  Athens  to  cover  events  and  news 
organisations  had  their  own  crews  on  the  ground  to  provide  high  quality  multimedia  material. 
The  amateur  footage  that  was  used  showed  clashes  outside  the  European  Commission  offices 
in  Athens  on  2  July,  where  news  crews  were  not  present,  and  some  of  the  clashes  on  15  July. 
Therefore,  the  exception  in  sourcing  material  from  citizen  users  was  when  the  footage  could 
be  considered  novel,  such  as  showing  the  breakout  of  violence,  in  the  absence  of  any  news 
camera  crews.  In  these  cases,  the  citizen  user  carried  out  an  act  of  journalism  that  was 
consistent  with  the  news  agenda  and  therefore  could  easily  be  incorporated  into  the  coverage. 
However,  the  large  media  presence  in  Athens  meant  there  was  little  occasion  for  this 
scenario.  Al  Jazeera’s  main  coverage  of  these  protests  also  contained  no  social  media-sourced 
content.  However,  The  Streams’  coverage  did  involve  citizen  users  referring  to  the  protests 
and  voicing  their  opinions,  including  one  user  tweeting  from  one  of  the  rallies.  All  social 
media  content  was  in  English,  across  all  three  news  organisations,  limiting  the  number  of 
Greek  voices  that  were  represented.  Those  Greek  voices  that  were  sourced  were  not  speaking 
to  each  other  or  the  Greek  media  but  specifically  aimed  to  reach  a  global  audience. 
Inadvertently,  this  excluded  those  who  did  not  speak  English,  or  used  social  media  primarily 
to  communicate  with  other  Greeks. 
 
Platforms 
 
The  reliance  on  the  social  media  platform  Twitter  over  other  platforms  may  have  affected  the 
types  of  users  that  news  organisations  involved  in  their  coverage.  Since  Twitter  users  can 
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easily  send  out  their  messages  in  the  traditional  one-to-many  style  while  capitalising  on  loose 
networks  that  amplify  tweets  in  a  many-to-many  broadcasting  format,  the  platform  is  a 
natural  fit  for  newsmakers  and  journalists,  who  already  benefit  from  larger  followings  that 
allow  them  to  broadcast  more  widely.  Other  social  media  platforms  are  more  popular  with 
ordinary  citizen  users  by  comparison  and  a  focus  on  delving  into  the  online  communities  on 
them  might  produce  different  results. 
 
In  this  case  study,  however,  other  platforms  were  used  very  sparingly  for  interactive 
newsgathering.  On  29  June,  Greek  banks  imposed  controls  on  cash  withdrawals  that  limited 
customers  to  withdrawing  a  maximum  of  60  euro  a  day.  Several  images  used  in  news  texts 
showed  long  queues  of  anguished-looking  people  outside  banks.  There  were  seven  social 
media-sourced  contributions  on  the  capital  controls  in  the  The  Stream  report.  Of  these,  six 
came  from  citizen  users,  and  only  two  of  these  had  been  posted  on  Twitter.  The  other  four  had 
been  published  on  Reddit and  were  in  English.  The  contributors  described  their  daily  lives 32
being  largely  unaffected  by  the  bank  closures,  writing:  “Common  people  carry  on  with  their 
lives  like  before.  It's  not  like  we  have  any  substantial  amount  of  money  left  in  the  bank”  and 
“as  long  as  you  don't  watch  TV,  it's  just  another  day.”  The  overall  message  was  that  for  many 
spending  60  euro  a  day  was  far  beyond  their  means  and  therefore  the  limit  did  not  have  any 
palpable  effect  on  them.  
 
Although  some  of  this  was  also  evident  in  the  BBC  coverage  as  correspondents  noted  the 
calm  in  Athens,  there  was  little  offered  in  terms  of  an  explanation.  Such  citizen  testimonies, 
however,  did  provide  exactly  that.  These  kind  of  personal  accounts  of  how  Greeks  felt 
32  Reddit  is  best  described  as  huge  messaging  board  where  users  can  share  information  in  threads  and 
vote  other  users’  messages  up  or  down,  determining  their  visibility  in  the  thread.  (Bond  2018) 
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affected  by  the  financial  crisis  and  unfolding  events  were  largely  missing  from  the  social 
media-sourced  content  in  the  BBC  and  France  24  coverage.  A  link  between  the  type  of  users 
that  were  reflected  and  the  preference  for  Twitter  became  evident.  Although  The  Stream  did 
also  source  many  citizen  Twitter  users,  this  particular  social  platform  was  easy  to  adapt  to  the 
existing  sourcing  routines  by  France  24  and  the  BBC. 
 
In  general,  where  France  24  and  the  BBC  used  social  media  sources  from  other  platforms 
than  Twitter  they  also  showed  a  strong  reliance  on  traditional  sources.  The  BBC  incorporated 
four  blog  posts  by  Greek  finance  minister  Varoufakis,  a  blog  post  by  IMF  chief  economist 
Olivier  Blanchard,  one  by  American  economist  Jeffrey  Sachs  and  a  contribution  by  political 
analyst  Professor  Richard  Rose  on  the  London  School  of  Economics  blog.  There  was  also 
one  Facebook  post  by  Italian  prime  minister  Matteo  Renzi.  A  Facebook  post  by  the  Greek 
Solidarity  Campaign  on  29  June  called  for  a  protest  at  London’s,  Trafalgar  Square  –  one  of 
the  few  representations  of  citizens  as  activists.  But  a  video  shot  by  a  Guardian  contributor  of 
the  rally  was  used  to  illustrate  the  protest  in  a  later  text. 
 
Both  France  24  and  the  BBC  used  a  YouTube  video  of  MEP  and  former  Belgian  Prime 
Minister  Guy  Verhofstadt  delivering  a  confrontational  speech  in  the  European  Parliament  on 
8  July,  accusing  the  Tsipras  government  of  not  offering  any  concrete  commitment  to  reforms 
on  “five  points”,  including  downsizing  the  public  sector,  “opening  the  markets”  and 
privatising  public  banks,  and  ending  corruption  and  “privilege”.  The  speech  elicited  a  great 
deal  of  social  media  reaction.  Both  organisations  also  published  a  YouTube  clip  of  European 
Council  President  Donald  Tusk  addressing  reporters,  one  on  9  July  and  one  on  13  July.  In  the 
latter  he  announced  an  “agreekment”  in  the  euro  summit  talks,  sparking  reaction  on  social 
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networks  under  the  hashtag  #Agreekment.  France  24  also  linked  to  an  EU  Council  livestream 
on  7  July  and  two  statements  by  the  council’s  communications  department.  The  BBC  on  5 
July  linked  to  a  statement  by  the  President  of  the  European  Commission,  Jean-Claude 
Juncker.  On  6  July,  both  France  24  and  BBC  linked  to  a  press  release  by  the  European  Central 
Bank.  Together  with  the  reliance  on  EU  Twitter  sources  for  breaking  news  updates,  this 
shows  that  power-elites  were  able  to  use  several  social  media  platforms  and  their  own 
websites  as  an  additional  way  in  which  to  enter  the  news  flow.  
Summary 
 
Non-elites  sources  were  largely  marginalised  in  the  networked  journalism  that  was  evident  in 
both  France  24’s  and  the  BBC’s  news  coverage.  By  and  large  social  networks  were  not  found 
to  be  used  to  represent  citizen  testimony  directly.  Ordinary  citizens  were  given  voice  almost 
exclusively  through  traditional  format  interviews  in  online  text  and  audio-visual  reports.  In 
the  live  blogs,  significantly  more  of  the  citizen  commentary  reflected  was  sent  directly  to  the 
BBC  via  email.  However,  this  type  of  content  is  outside  of  the  scope  of  this  study  for  two 
reasons.  Firstly,  this  type  of  commentary,  in  contrast  to  citizen  testimony  published  on  social 
media,  is  self-selected  as  contributors  have  to  take  the  initiative  and  put  in  effort  to  address 
the  BBC  directly.  This  is  likely  to  skew  the  spectrum  of  opinions.  For  example,  it  is  unlikely 
that  an  ordinary  Greek  would  take  the  time  to  write  to  a  foreign  news  outlet  in  the  same  way 
that  they  might  embrace  Twitter  or  other  social  media  to  publish  their  comments,  opinions 
and  experiences.  Secondly,  it  is  also  not  possible  to  review  the  gatekeeping  done  by  the  BBC 
in  selecting  comment  for  publication  as  there  is  no  knowledge  of  what  was  not  published. 
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Where  Twitter  was  used  mainly  to  mobilise  public  participation  in  news  coverage  –  as  seen  in 
the  Al  Jazeera  sample  of  sources  –  as  expected,  the  vast  majority  of  sources  fall  into  the 
citizen  user  group  of  which  many  were  Greek  sources  with  greater  source  power  than  other 
users   in  the  news  products.  At  the  same  time,  there  was  a  wider  global  social  media  debate 
reflected,  not  only  by  Al  Jazeera  but  also  the  BBC,  with  participation  from  several  sources 
that  had  no  stake  in  the  news  events.  This  raises  questions  about  the  value  of  some  of  these 
contributions  and  the  news  organisations’  rationale  for  publishing  them.  If  the  objective  is  to 
depict  a  more  authentic  picture  of  public  opinion  and  news  events  through  interactive 
newsgathering  and  social  media  commentary  then  the  aim  may  be  better  served  by  virtually 
getting  as  close  to  news  events  as  possible.  Diluting  the  commentary  and  information  shared 
by  citizen  with  a  personal  stake  in  what  is  being  reported  with  an  undifferentiated  global 
input  threatens  to  erode  the  specific  geopolitical  context  of  a  news  event  and  undermines  the 
voices  of  those  directly  involved  and  affected.  However,  other  factors  may  have  driven  the 
choices  made  by  journalists  such  as  building  a  model  of  participation  that  involves  actual 
audiences  of  the  news  organisations,  rather  than  the  most  relevant  ones.  Such  decisions  may 
have  given  more  weight  to  commercial  considerations. 
 
The  BBC’s  own  staff  were  producing  an  overwhelming  amount  of  the  social  media  content 
that  was  used  by  the  news  organisation,  suggesting  a  trend  towards  social  networks  being 
used  as  a  tool  to  publish  reports  in  a  less  formal  matter.  The  interview  chapter  of  this  thesis 
explores  further  how  the  BBC  formalised  news  production  for  social  media  audiences,  but 
this  research  demonstrates  that  journalists’  participation  on  social  media  was  sanctioned  by 
the  organisation  and  incorporated  in  a  number  of  different  ways.  As  the  BBC’s 
correspondents  build  up  a  presence  on  Twitter  they  are  trading  on  their  status  as  professional 
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journalist  and  benefit  from  their  employers’  reputation.  At  the  same  time  they  become  Twitter 
personalities  in  their  own  right  with  their  organisation  taking  second  place.  This  is  a  departure 
from  traditional  news  coverage,  where  the  byline  is  largely  less  important  than  the  brand  or 
title  of  a  news  product. 
 
The  pooling  of  information  and  commentary  of  professional  journalists  from  a  wide  variety 
of  news  outlets  and  the  considerable  overlap  of  sources  used  both  by  the  BBC  and  France  24 
may  point  towards  a  homogenisation  of  mainstream  media  rather  than  the  diversification  of 
sources.  The  data  shows  that  the  dominant  accounts  used  in  the  news  coverage  by  two  of  the 
three  organisations  were  most  commonly  professional  journalists  from  a  wide  spectrum  of 
news  outlets.  On  the  one  hand  this  undoubtedly  ensures  that  acquired  knowledge  is  spread 
widely  and  pushes  for  news  organisations  to  reflect  it.  On  the  other  hand,  while  this  pooling 
of  information  and  commentary  has  been  argued  to  have  a  diversifying  effect,  when  it  takes 
place  almost  exclusively  among  established  media  professionals  it  can  also  have  the  opposite 
effect  of  leveling  the  differences  between  the  news  outlets  as  the  organisations  develop  a 
symbiotic  relationship  among  each  other.  In  short,  the  distinctions  between  a  report  by  France 
24,  the  BBC  or  another  news  outlet  collecting  information  in  the  same  way  are  minimised 
despite  a  greater  number  of  sources.  When  the  content  published  by  different  news 
organisations  is  substantially  identical,  plurality  suffers. 
 
The  attraction  of  drawing  on  the  work  by  professional  journalists  working  for  other 
organisations  shared  is  self-evident,  as  they  are  usually  abiding  by  similar  professional 
standards  while  producing  news  content  at  no  extra  cost.  Crowdsourcing  information  in  this 
manner  is  very  cost  efficient.  Material  by  bloggers,  citizen-journalists  and  eyewitnesses  on 
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the  other  hand,  can  add  an  extra  layer  of  work  for  the  mainstream  news  organisations  in 
discovering  such  content,  contextualising,  and  verifying  it.  In-house  journalists  need  to  have 
the  skills  and  time  to  thoroughly  engage  with  the  news  content  produced  by  non-journalists  to 
ensure  that  the  standards  on  which  news  organisations  build  their  reputation  are  met. 
 
The  research  shows  bottlenecks  and  obstacles  in  the  two-way  flow  of  information  between 
social  media  users  and  professional  news  media.  I  believe  there  are  two  aspects  to  this.  One  is 
mainly  practical  and  based  on  a  necessary  selection  process  to  whittle  down  the  overload  of 
information  available.  The  social  media  gatekeepers  serve  an  important  function  of  separating 
important  and  accurate  information  from  unimportant  and  inaccurate  information.  The  as 
professional  journalists  active  on  social  media,  these  gatekeepers  adhere  to  the  same 
conventional  selection  criteria  that  inform  professional  routines  elsewhere  adapting  their 
practices  to  a  different  environment  rather  than  allowing  the  environment  to  significantly 
shape  their  news  reporting.  
 
As  the  data  showed,  France  24  also  used  citizen  sources  as  a  way  to  link  to  news  texts  created 
by  mainstream  news  organisation.  This  means  the  number  of  citizen  users  among  its  coverage 
were  not  reflective  of  the  actual  amount  of  original  content  they  provided  in  the  news 
coverage.  In  the  overall  composition  of  the  live  blogs  it  created  the  impression  that  social 
media  users  remain  largely  passive  in  their  consumption  of  mass  media  and  their  engagement 
is  reduced  to  simply  sharing  professionally  produced  news.  The  also  seemingly  arbitrary 
choice  of  most  citizen  sources  diminished  their  value  significantly  in  contrast  to  the  other 
sources. 
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The  entire  source  sample  showed  a  clear  preference  for  English-language  contributions  with 
non-English  social  media  content  facing  much  greater  hurdles  in  accessing  anglophone 
international  mainstream  media.  There  is  a  genuine  possibility  that  where  information  is 
originally  not  produced  in  English  but  gathers  momentum  through  retweets  and  wider 
discussion,  it  will  eventually  be  tweeted  and  commented  on  by  English-language  sources. 
Yet,  this  does  not  detract  from  the  fact  that  non-English  sources  are  disadvantaged  in  the 
access  to  these  news  organisations;  a  significant  problem  when  the  news  event  is  taking  place 
in  a  non-anglophone  country.  Essentially,  they  rely  on  privileged  social  media  gatekeepers  to 
show  an  interest.  A  willingness  by  elite  global  news  media  to  engage  with  social  media  users 
in  their  local  language  would  perhaps  be  helpful  in  achieving  a  more  authentic  representation 
in  news  coverage. 
 
Several  examples  showed  France  24  and  the  BBC  using  material  shared  on  social  media  that 
fuelled  online  discussion  but  not  necessarily  following  through  in  reflecting  the  ensuing 
engagement.  This  suggests  that  both  organisations  sought  to  assume  leadership  roles  in  social 
media  debate.  In  addition,  the  BBC’s  efforts  to  build  up  a  strong  presence  on  social  media 
with  its  own  staff  shows  that  the  aim  is  predominantly  for  these  news  outlets  to  place 
themselves  at  the  helm  of  public  debate.  Social  media  did  at  times  fulfill  the  function  of 
contributing  to  news  coverage  in  unconventional  ways  and  arguably  the  trickle  down  effect  of 
a  vibrant  social  media  forum  leads  to  elite  journalist  sources  within  that  environment  being 
informed  by  it  and  eventually  enabling  it  to  enter  the  global  news  flow.  However,  the 
opportunity  of  direct  public  access  to  the  professional  news  flow,  as  seen  in  the  findings 
relating  to  France  24  and  the  BBC,  is  far  more  limited  in  scope  than  commonly  held 
assumptions  about  social  networks’  power  to  transfer  privileged  media  access  to  non-elites.  
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6.  Migrant  crisis:  the  pursuit  of  journalism’s  ethics 
This  case  study  sought  to  investigate  the  use  of  interactive  newsgathering  in  the  coverage  of 
what  came  to  be  known  as  the  ‘migrant  crisis’  in  Europe.  It  analysed  online  news  coverage 
across  four  weeks  straddling  August  and  September  2015.  The  chosen  timeframe  both  saw 
the  migrant  issue  surge  to  the  top  of  the  news  agenda  among  mainstream  news  media  and 
spark  public  debate,  citizen  initiatives  and  protests  organised  and  discussed  on  social 
networks.  Social  media  played  a  multi-faceted  role  in  how  it  facilitated  public  engagement 
around  the  topic,  affected  developments  in  the  news  events,  and  also  served  news 
organisations  as  a  tool  in  their  own  news  production.  
 
Below  are  the  main  news  events  relevant  to  the  collaborative  newswork  found  in  the  news 
texts.  They  are  listed  in  chronological  order  and  provide  an  overview  of  the  period  covered  in 
this  study  and  the  pace  at  which  news  events  developed.  As  is  evident,  the  migrant  crisis  was 
a  truly  pan-European  news  event  that  sparked  public  debate  across  borders  and  provided  the 
basis  for  reporting  on  local,  national  and  international  level. 
 
Timeline 
 
● 22/08  –  23/08 :  Rioting  broke  out  in  the  eastern  German  town  of  Heidenau  over  a 
planned  asylum  seekers  home.  Videos  of  the  clashes  with  local  police  were  shared 
online  by  the  local  branch  of  the  left  of  centre  Social  Democrats  Party  (SPD). 
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● 25/08 :  German  authorities  announce  the  suspension  of  the  Dublin  II  agreement  for 
Syrian  asylum  seekers  via  Twitter. 
● 27/08 :  The  bodies  of  dozens  of  suffocated  migrants  are  discovered  in  a  truck  parked 
on  the  side  of  a  motorway  in  Austria. 
● 02/09 :  The  body  of  drowned  Syrian  toddler  Alan  Kurdi  is  found  washed  up  on  the 
beach  in  Bodrum,  in  Turkey.  The  boat  carrying  his  family  capsized  during  the 
crossing  to  Greece,  killing  him,  his  brother  and  mother.  Photos  of  the  dead  boy  lying 
on  the  beach  are  captured  by  a  Turkish  photographer  and  used  prominently  across 
international  news  media. 
● 03/09 :  An  Austria-bound  train  carrying  migrants  was  allowed  to  leave  Budapest’s 
Keleti  station  after  weeks  of  stand  off  between  migrants  and  Hungarian  authorities.  It 
was  then  stopped  in  the  Hungarian  border  town  of  Biscke  with  news  crews  at  the 
scene. 
● 04/09 :  Migrants  stranded  in  Budapest  set  off  on  foot  to  the  Austrian  border. 
● 05/09 :  First  trains  carrying  migrants  from  Budapest  arrived  in  Munich. 
● 09/09 :  Migrants  broke  through  a  police  cordon  at  Roszke,  in  Hungry,  where  they  had 
been  held.  Video  of  a  Hungarian  camerawoman  showing  her  tripping  up  a  man 
carrying  a  child  quickly  spread  across  social  media.  Meanwhile,  in  Denmark 
authorities  suspended  the  rail-link  to  Germany. 
● 12/09 :  German  authorities  said  40,000  migrants  arrived  in  the  country  in  one  day. 
● 16/09 :  Clashes  between  migrants  and  security  forces  broke  out  on  the  Hungary-Serbia 
border. 
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As  large  numbers  of  migrants  crossed  European  borders  and  made  their  way  into  central  and 
western  Europe,  social  media  platforms  saw  high  levels  of  news  content  shared  both  from 
mainstream  news  media,  official  sources,  and  alternative  media  sources.  The  rampant 
exchange  of  communication  contributed  to  an  impression  that  public  opinion  was  vocalised 
through  online  social  networks  precipitating  action  from  state  powers.  Germany  announced 
the  suspension  of  the  Dublin  II  agreement  that  requires  asylum  applications  to  be  submitted 
in  the  country  of  migrants’  first  entry  to  the  EU.  At  the  start  of  September  a  photo  of  a 
drowned  toddler  on  a  Turkish  beach  hit  front  pages  around  the  world  and  prompted  a  public 
outcry.  The  extent  to  which  political  actions  can  be  traced  back  to  public  social  media 
engagement  is  not  clear  but  platforms  were  used  as  spaces  to  organise  civic  engagement  in 
the  real  world.  While  the  number  of  migrant  arrivals  to  the  EU  peaked  in  October  (UNHCR, 
n.d.)  the  scene  for  this  development  was  set  in  August  and  September  when  developments  in 
the  political  arena  surrounding  the  migrant  crisis  developed  rapidly.  Activities  on  social 
media  were  prominent  at  different  points  during  the  course  of  this  study  and  were  used 
extensively  to  share  news  texts  among  audiences,  as  well  as  provide  a  platform  for 
commentary.  They  facilitated  the  organisation  and  coordination  of  numerous  citizen 
initiatives  across  Europe  and  drummed  up  support  for  anti-asylum  seeker  protests.  Social 
media  was  also  used  as  a  means  of  communication  between  authorities  and  citizens  as  well  as 
migrants.  Other  times,  information  and  eyewitness  media  was  shared  through  social  networks 
revealing  the  mistreatment  of  refugees.  Social  media  also  served  as  a  way  for  human 
traffickers  to  publicise  their  service  and  a  means  for  migrants  to  share  their  own 
user-generated  content,  as  well  as  advice  and  information  to  fellow  migrants  about  their 
journey  to  western  Europe.  Thus,  the  group  least  able  to  access  mainstream  media,  the 
migrants  themselves,  was  given  a  forum  on  social  media  through  which  their  voices  could  be 
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represented.  However,  given  the  precarious  situation  many  migrants  found  themselves  in, 
content  owned  by  them  was  often  shared  publicly  by  third  parties  to  protect  the  anonymity  of 
the  original  owner.  Social  media  engagement  also  sparked  heated  debates  on  freedom  of 
speech  in  Germany  and  led  the  German  public  broadcaster  to  run  a  campaign  against  online 
hate  speech. 
Sample  of  news  texts 
The  websites  of  the  news  organisations  as  well  as  the  Twitter  accounts  –  named  in  the 
methodology  –  were  searched  for  the  keywords  ‘migrant’,  ‘migrants’,  ‘refugee’  and 
‘refugees’.  All  texts  between  18  August  and  17  September  were  examined.  All  of  the 
identified  news  texts  over  the  timeframe  were  then  selected  and  scanned  for  social  media 
content.  All  news  texts  that  did  not  contain  any  clearly  identifiable  social  media  content  were 
disregarded,  whereas  those  that  did  were  analysed  using  qualitative  and  quantitative 
methodologies.  Fig.  10  shows  a  break  down  of  the  total  number  of  online  news  pages 
gathered  from  the  BBC,  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera  coverage.  They  illustrate  the  news  texts 
found  that  contained  social  media  content.  
 
 BBC France  24 Al  Jazeera 
18.8 BBC  Trending   
19.8    
20.8 BBC  Outside  Source  AFP @ajplus 
21.8    
22.8    
23.8  france24.com  
24.8    
166 
25.8 BBC  Trending 
bbc.com 
 Al  Jazeera  Blog 
26.8 BBC  Trending 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
 @ajplus 
27.8 bbc.com AFP 
Media  Watch 
AFP 
 
28.8 @BBCOS 
@BBCOS 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
Observers  
29.8   aljazeera.com 
30.8 BBC  Trending   
31.8   Aljazeera.com 
@ajplus 
1.9 bbc.com france24.com @ajplus 
@AJStream 
2.9  AFP 
france24.com 
The  Stream 
aljazeera.com 
aljazeera.com 
3.9 bbc.com 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
BBC  Live 
france24.com 
france24.com 
AFP 
france24.com 
AFP 
@ajplus 
aljazeera.com 
4.9 BBC  Live 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
@BBCOS 
@BBCOS 
@BBCOS 
bbc.com 
france24.com 
AFP 
france24.com 
France24.com 
France  24  YouTube 
aljazeera.com 
@AJEnglish 
5.9 BBC  Live 
bbc.com 
AFP 
AFP 
aljazeera.com 
aljazeera.com 
6.9 bbc.com 
@BBCWorld 
france24.com 
france24.com 
aljazeera.com 
167 
7.9 bbc.com 
bbc.com 
Observers aljazeera.com 
aljazeera.com 
aljazeera.com 
8.9 @BBCOS 
@BBCOS 
@BBCOS 
bbc.com 
AFP 
AFP 
france24.com 
Opinion 
9.9 bbc.com 
BBC  Trending 
bbc.com 
france24.com 
france24.com 
AFP 
france24.com 
AFP 
aljazeera.com 
@ajplus 
aljazeera.com 
10.9 BBC  Trending 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
AFP 
AFP 
AFP 
Media  Watch 
France  24 
france24.com 
france24.com 
@ajplus 
@ajplus 
11.9 bbc.com 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
bbc.com 
AFP 
france24.com 
france24.com 
Aljazeera.com 
@ajplus 
The  Stream 
@ajplus 
12.9 BBC  Trending AFP @AJEnglish 
The  Listening  Post 
13.9   @ajplus 
@ajplus 
aljazeera.com 
14.9  france24.com The  Listening  Post 
15.9 bbc.com Observers 
AFP 
 
16.9 BBC  Trending 
BBC  Live 
@BBCOS 
AFP The  Stream 
@AJEnglish 
@ajplus 
17.9   aljazeera.com 
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The  BBC  sample  consists  of  49  texts.  They  comprise  40  texts  published  on  bbc.co.uk  and  an 
additional  10  tweets  published  on  one  of  the  BBC  Twitter  accounts  listed  in  the  methodology. 
All  of  these  texts,  including  the  tweets,  contained  or  referenced  content  that  could  be  traced 
back  to  originating  on  social  media.  The  social  media-sourced  content  comprised  text,  images 
and  audio-visual  material.  Overall,  there  were  47  online  news  pages  found  on  France  24’s 
English-language  digital  platforms  that  contained  or  explicitly  referenced  social  media 
content.  The  texts  were  published  both  on  france24.com/en  and  observers.france24.com/en. 
France  24  features  not  only  its  own  content  but  also  frequently  news  output  by  news  agency 
Agence  France-Presse  (AFP).  Since  AFP  coverage  is  featured  across  france24.com  and 
subsequently  distributed  through  France  24  Twitter  accounts,  it  was  not  possible  to  separate 
the  news  texts  from  one  another.  Therefore,  all  18  AFP  online  news  texts  used  or  distributed 
by  France  24  is  comprised  in  the  sample  of  the  coverage.  Al  Jazeera  featured  a  total  of  41 
news  texts.  The  main  website  aljazeera.com  featured  21  texts  comprising  or  referencing 
content  originating  on  social  media.  Four  texts  were  published  on  the  digital  platforms  of  the 
Stream  web  community.  These  include  news  texts  on  stream.aljazeera.com,  @AJStream  and 
a  webcast.  In  addition,  all  tweets  published  on  the  @ajplus  and  @AJEnglish  accounts 
containing  the  keywords  were  examined  of  which  16  featured  content  sourced  through  social 
media.  These  tweets  did  not  link  back  to  any  coverage  on  Al  Jazeera’s  own  websites.  They 
were  all  also  analysed  as  part  of  this  research. 
 
A  wide  variety  of  news  texts  featured  social  media  content  across  all  three  news 
organisations,  ranging  from  hard  news  reports  to  opinion  pieces,  media  reviews,  live  blogs 
and  social  media  focused  sections.  While  Twitter  remained  the  most  commonly  used  social 
media  platform  for  newsgathering  –  similar  to  the  previous  case  study  –  Facebook  was  also 
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used  extensively  for  newsgathering.  A  comparison  between  Twitter  and  Facebook  sources 
shows  differences  in  the  type  of  users  that  were  sought  out.  This  was  especially  true  for  the 
news  texts  of  the  BBC  and  France  24,  where  collaborative  newsgathering  on  Twitter  has  been 
shown  to  be  shaped  significantly  by  elite  journalists  and  the  professional  news  media. 
 
Quantitative  Analysis 
Twitter  Sources 
Twitter  users  were  divided  into  nine  groups:  in-house  journalists  working  at  the  respective 
news  organisation,  other  professional  journalists,  news  organisations,  politicians,  state 
authorities,  aid  organisations,  experts,  citizens,  and  others.  Humanitarian  aid  organisations, 
due  to  their  activist  nature,  were  not  considered  ‘expert’  users,  while  their  formalised  and 
professional  organisational  structures  also  did  not  fit  the  citizen  user  group.  
 
 in-hou 
se 
journal 
ists 
other 
journal 
ists 
news 
org 
politici 
an 
authori 
ties 
Aid expert citizen other 
BBC 26 24 3  (1)* 2 3 4 3 22 4 
F24 5 5 - 3 3 - 2 11 3 
AJ 2 13 3 
(1)** 
6 1 4 3 56 3 
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The  BBC  had  a  total  of  91  different  Twitter  sources  with  the  use  of  content  tweeted  by 
in-house  journalists  highest.  While  BBC  employees  comprised  the  largest  group  of  Twitter 
sources  it  was  closely  followed  by  other  professional  journalists  with  52  sources  overall 
originating  in  the  mainstream  media,  mirroring  the  media-centric  approach  to  collaborative 
newsgathering  that  was  also  found  in  the  case  study  of  the  Greek  financial  crisis.  Moverover, 
the  sample  in  Fig.  11  only  comprises  the  BBC  journalists  whose  Twitter  content  was  found  in 
the  news  texts.  In  addition,  the  BBC  directed  readers  to  a  Twitter  list  of  33  of  its  own 
correspondents  to  follow  for  updates,  illustrating  an  effort  to  build  social  networks  around  its 
own  journalists  speaking  directly  to  news  audiences  through  the  micro-blogging  site.  The 
hierarchy  of  this  conversation  is  primarily  one-to-many  from  the  position  of  the  journalist, 
who  is  not  required  to  follow  back  the  users  following  them  making  the  conversation 
primarily  uni-directional  (Murthy,  2013).  The  hoped  for  result  is  that  users  who  follow  the  list 
will  retweet  some  of  its  content,  which  then  turns  it  into  a  many-to-many  form  of  distribution 
(Kwak  et  al,  2010).  The  journalists  from  other  news  organisations  were  typically  similarly 
elite  and  English-speaking.  They  originated  from  international  news  organisations  such  as 
Channel  4,  New  York  Times,  ITV,  The  Guardian,  as  well  as  younger  but  by  now  assimilated 
professional  news  organisations  such  as  Buzzfeed.  Others  included  German  broadcaster  RTL 
and  Arabic  news  outlet  Al  Alan  TV.  The  third  largest  group  were  citizens  users.  They  were 
geographically  spread  out,  comprising  users  across  the  world  but  with  an  emphasis  on  Arabic 
voices.  Users  that  could  be  identified  as  hailing  from  countries  affected  by  conflict  were 
limited.  Where  there  were  such  users,  they  were  usually  speaking  about  their  perception  of 
the  migrant  crisis  from  the  viewpoint  of  an  outsider  rather  than  as  someone  with  personal 
experience  of  it. 
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France  24  stood  out  for  its  very  limited  use  of  Twitter  for  newsgathering  with  only  32  sources 
overall.  Almost  a  third  of  them  were  journalists  and  another  third  were  citizen  users.  Since 
the  news  event  often  played  out  in  remote  areas  and  involved  people  with  very  little 
opportunity  to  relay  their  experiences  to  a  wider  audience  by  themselves  (ie.  without 
mainstream  news  coverage),  journalists  very  arguably  facing  less  competition  from 
non-journalist  sources  in  reporting  from  the  field  and  could  default  to  more  conventional 
news  reporting  through  its  own  proprietary  platforms.  The  BBC’s  extensive  use  of  Twitter 
was  used  primarily  to  highlight  their  reporters’  presence  on  the  platform  as  a  means  for  news 
distribution.  France  24  on  the  other  hand  appeared  less  invested  in  building  social  media 
audiences  around  its  individual  reporters. 
 
Al  Jazeera  had  the  largest  number  of  Twitter  sources  (91)  with  the  vast  majority  defined  as 
citizen  users.  This  corresponds  with  the  findings  in  the  coverage  of  the  Greek  debt  crisis 
although  in  this  sample  the  use  of  Twitter  was  more  broadly  spread  out  across  many  different 
types  of  news  texts.  In  the  last  case  study  they  were  almost  limited  to  a  single  webcast  by  The 
Stream,  suggesting  that  the  use  of  Twitter  was  not  prominent  in  the  overall  coverage. 
Nevertheless,  a  large  number  of  Twitter  sources  in  this  study  were  also  found  in  a  webcast  by 
The  Stream  and  the  related  written  news  text  published  on  11  September.  The  format  to  host 
citizen  voices  through  the  interactivity  that  social  media  allows  puts  these  types  of  users  front 
and  centre  of  the  programme,  which  is  not  necessarily  the  case  in  any  other  of  the  Al  Jazeera 
texts.  
 
The  overlap  in  sources  between  the  news  organisations  was  limited,  given  the  very  different 
approaches  to  Twitter  sourcing  routines  between  the  BBC  and  Al  Jazeera.  All  three 
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organisations  shared  only  two  Twitter  sources:  a  cameraman  for  German  broadcaster  RTL 
(@RichterSteph),  and  the  emergency  director  at  Human  Rights  Watch  (@bouckap).  Despite 
France  24’s  extremely  limited  newsgathering  through  Twitter  it  had  more  sources  in  common 
with  the  BBC  (five)  than  Al  Jazeera  (three)  did.  These  sources  were  in  addition  to  the  two 
sources  found  across  the  news  texts  by  all  three  organisations.  France  24  also  had  three 
sources  in  common  with  Al  Jazeera.  Most  overlap  was  found  among  journalist  sources,  while 
there  was  also  some  overlap  among  citizen  users.  As  already  stated  in  the  last  chapter, 
sources  with  access  to  multiple  news  organisations  can  be  considered  to  have  more  weight 
and  authority  than  those  who  are  represented  in  the  texts  of  only  one. 
 
Twitter  Source  Power 
 
The  quantitative  analysis  of  source  power  was  measured  in  terms  of  the  number  of  tweets  by 
each  user  group  that  was  included  or  referenced  in  the  news  texts.  Although  a  tweet  may  have 
been  used  more  than  once  in  different  news  texts,  individual  tweets  were  only  recorded  once.  
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BBC 80 46 3 3 5 5 3 24 4 
F24 10 5 - 3 4  4 11 4 
AJ 3 15 3 7 1 4 4 65 3 
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Among  the  173  tweets  found  in  the  BBC  news  texts  nearly  half  originated  from  its  own 
reporters  tweeting  from  the  field.  On  average  a  BBC  reporter  would  see  their  tweets  used  3.1 
times  in  the  BBC’s  coverage,  while  other  journalist  users  would  be  featured  with  around  2 
tweets  on  average.  Citizen  users,  while  being  the  third  largest  user  group,  would  have 
comparatively  little  source  power  with  just  over  1  tweet  per  user.  Overall,  France  24  featured 
41  tweets.  Albeit  a  much  smaller  sample  group  than  that  of  the  BBC,  the  outlet  also  gave  the 
greatest  platform  to  its  own  journalists  with  two  tweets  per  user  on  average.  Other  journalists 
were  only  represented  with  one  tweet  each,  putting  them  on  par  with  citizen  users.  The  two 
expert  users  featured  were  represented  with  two  tweets  each.  Al  Jazeera  had  the  largest 
number  of  Twitter  sources  but  only  107  tweets  in  its  coverage.  This  can  be  explained  with  the 
greater  reliance  on  citizen  users,  a  group  generally  associated  with  less  source  power.  Citizen 
users  were  represented  in  the  coverage  with  an  average  of  1.2  tweets.  However,  Al  Jazeera 
did  not  give  greater  preference  to  professional  journalist  sources  either  with  only  1.2  tweet 
per  user.  The  much  more  limited  use  of  media  sources  and  the  equal  source  weighting 
underlines  Al  Jazeera’s  more  non-elite  approach  to  interactive  newsgathering  on  Twitter,  and 
social  media  overall. 
 
However,  this  quantitative  method  to  measure  source  power  could  not  reflect  the  interest  and 
attention  that  some  pieces  of  content  generated.  For  example,  a  particularly  high-value  tweet 
may  have  been  used  several  times  across  numerous  texts  but  was  only  recorded  once  here. 
Therefore,  the  news  texts  around  a  range  of  pieces  of  content  that  were  able  to  generate  a 
considerable  amount  of  coverage  or  were  presented  in  a  more  prominent  way  are  investigated 
more  closely  in  the  textual  analysis. 
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Facebook  Sources 
The  sample  in  this  case  study  had  a  much  greater  amount  of  Facebook-sourced  content  than 
the  Greek  debt  crisis,  which  permitted  interactive  newsgathering  to  be  broken  down 
according  to  platforms  and  examine  differences  in  sourcing  routines.  Facebook  was  used 
primarily  as  a  platform  to  source  citizen  users,  and  distinctions  between  the  identities  of 
non-elite  sources  provided  a  better  idea  of  who  they  were.  As  seen  in  the  breakdown  of  the 
users  according  to  their  identity  in  Fig.  13,  four  groups  comprised  sources  that  are  non-elite 
users  and  which  would  have  been  grouped  into  the  citizen  user  group  among  the  Twitter 
sample. 
 
 BBC F24 Al  Jazeera 
Syrian 10 2 2 
Other  individuals 8 5  (1)*  4 
Communities/Initiati 
ves 
8  (1)** 7 6 
Media 
activism/Citizen 
Journalism 
/ 2  (1)** / 
Professional 
Journalists 
/ / 3 
News  Media 1 2 / 
Government/Pol 1 3 2 
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As  already  mentioned,  the  refugee  crisis  generated  considerable  civic  engagement  (both  in 
support  and  opposition  to  refugees)  that  also  received  widespread  news  coverage.  Often 
organisation  of  citizen  groups  and  initiatives  took  place  on  Facebook  and  the  platform  itself 
received  media  coverage  amid  a  political  outcry  in  Germany  over  the  unchecked  publication 
of  hate  speech  by  users. 
 
Syrians,  the  main  focus  of  the  refugee  crisis  coverage,  were  all  but  absent  from  the  sample  of 
Twitter  users.  However,  the  BBC  focused  much  of  its  Facebook  newsgathering  on  finding 
users  that  identified  themselves  as  Syrian.  Although  Facebook  played  a  role  in  the  coverage, 
source  power  through  this  platform  was  limited.  Where  individual  users  were  referenced  it 
was  usually  only  once  throughout  the  news  texts.  Groups  and  initiatives  were  reported  on  but 
not  necessarily  named  or  linked  to.  The  overlap  in  users  again  mirrored  the  trend  found  in  the 
Twitter  news  sourcing,  with  BBC  and  France  24  having  the  most  sources  in  common  (three), 
while  the  three  organisations  only  had  one  source  in  common.  The  one  Facebook  user 
comprised  in  the  news  coverage  of  all  three  outlets  was  an  Icelandic  initiative  calling  on 
Icelanders  to  open  their  homes  to  refugees.  The  page  received  12,000  likes  within  days   and 33
was  treated  in  the  coverage  as  representing  public  sentiment  towards  the  refugee  crisis.  The 
other  two  users  shared  by  the  BBC  and  France  24  were  a  Syrian  refugee  and  activist  living  in 
Vienna  and  a  Hungarian  TV  station.  The  TV  station  attracted  media  attention  due  to  footage 
tweeted  by  a  German  journalist,  showing  its  camerawoman  tripping  up  a  man  carrying  a  child 
as  refugees  broke  through  a  police  line.  Hence,  it  was  related  to  a  news  item  that  was  initially 
broken  on  Twitter  by  a  reporter  and  not  necessarily  representative  of  the  sourcing  routines 
specific  to  the  platform.  The  limited  overlap  across  the  board  underscored  the  overall  trend 
33  Iceland  had  a  population  of  under  330,000  in  2015. 
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that  sees  less  source  power  for  non-elite  users,  which  accounted  for  the  majority  of  Facebook 
accounts.  
 
Source  power  was  limited  for  citizen  users,  with  far  less  access  to  the  global  news  flow,  but 
the  range  of  voices  showed  sourcing  practices  that  led  to  plurality  in  who  was  represented. 
Sources  sought  out  by  the  different  organisations  showed  diversity  in  users,  meaning  the 
sources  of  the  organisations  were  not  originating  from  similar  demographics.  For  example,  Al 
Jazeera  reported  on  a  Turkish  Facebook  page  that  organised  boat  crossings  to  Greece  and  an 
Islamist  Facebook  community  accused  of  providing  a  platform  for  extremists  to  divide  Arab 
nations.  This  provided  a  more  non-European  perspective  on  the  coverage,  and  included  other 
regions  that  had  a  role  to  play  in  the  migrant  crisis.  By  comparison,  France  24  took  a 
Europe-centric  approach  that  focused  both  on  European  initiatives  supportive  of  refugees  as 
well  as  those  strongly  critical  of  the  intake  of  refugees,  including  a  Croatian  Facebook 
community  and  the  British  incarnation  of  the  German  anti-immigrant  PEGIDA  movement. 
Similarly,  the  BBC  focused  on  the  different  ways  in  which  citizen  were  organising  their 
support  and  help  across  Europe,  but  did  not  mention  any  anti-refugee  Facebook  content. 
 
In  general,  Facebook  content  was  often  used  to  construct  a  representation  of  public  opinion. 
One  way  in  which  the  BBC  did  this  was  through  Facebook  sources  that  published 
illustrations,  including  satirical  cartoons.  The  sharing  of  illustrations  was  understood  to  be 
indicative  of  how  the  users  thought  about  the  news  topic.  However,  the  representation  of 
Facebook  as  a  gauge  of  public  sentiment  was  common  to  all  three  organisations.  Hence, 
Facebook  groups,  and  community  and  events  pages  represented  the  largest  number  of 
Facebook  sources  for  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera.  Where  these  sources  were  referenced  in  the 
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news  coverage,  what  was  typically  reported  on  was  their  existence  and  their  purpose,  while 
actual  content  posted  to  these  pages  by  individual  users  was  typically  absent.  With  a  few 
exceptions,  individual  users  were  not  the  focus  of  the  coverage.  Instead,  the  views  expressed 
through  Facebook  campaigns  and  how  they  organised  concrete  actions  offline  were  seens  as  a 
barometer  of  the  public  mood.  
YouTube  Sources 
Content  originating  on  video-sharing  platform  YouTube  was  not  pervasive  in  the  coverage 
with  Al  Jazeera  making  the  most  extensive  use  of  the  platform  for  newsgathering  with  11 
videos.  While  some  of  the  videos  may  have  been  posted  on  YouTube,  the  news  organisations 
may  have  become  aware  of  them  through  another  platform.  For  example,  embedded  YouTube 
videos  are  common  in  tweets  or  on  Facebook  and  can  be  viewed  without  leaving  either  of  the 
platforms.  By  comparison,  links  to  Facebook  content  are  less  common  on  Twitter  as  there  is 
no  embed  option  for  Facebook  posts.  Therefore,  Facebook  content  is  likely  to  have  been 
discovered  initially  on  the  platform,  whereas  YouTube  content  may  have  been  first  found  on 
other  social  media  platforms.  This  does  not  allow  any  analysis  of  how  journalists  specifically 
use  YouTube  for  newsgathering. 
 
Footage  sourced  on  YouTube  tended  to  be  of  a  high  production  and  playback  quality  which 
limited  the  range  of  sources.  Only  poor  quality  footage  deemed  to  be  of  high  public  interest 
would  warrant  inclusion  in  news  coverage.  However,  one  such  video  had  the  highest  source 
power  as  it  was  featured  by  all  three  news  organisations.  It  was  the  only  video  featured  by 
more  than  one  of  the  organisations  and  filmed  by  an  Austrian  volunteer  at  a  Hungarian 
reception  centre  for  refugees  in  Roszke,  Hungary.  The  footage  showed  refugees  scrambling 
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for  sandwiches  thrown  at  them  by  security  guards.  The  clip  was  shared  on  social  media  by 
the  volunteer’s  husband,  an  Austrian  politician. 
 
The  tables  below  list  the  number  of  videos  sourced  through  YouTube  by  each  of  the  news 
outlets,  and  details  their  title,  content  and  uploader.  The  uploader  in  each  case  is  also  the 
producer  of  each  of  the  clips.  
 
BBC 
 
Title Description Uploader 
‘ The  millionaire  saving 
migrants  in  the 
Mediterranean’ 
A  short  documentary  about 
non-profit  rescue  mission 
MOAS 
timesXtwo  –  an  ABC  and 
BBC  collaboration 
‘Syrian  Border  Stories’ A  short  documentary  about 
four  displaced  Syrians 
timesXtwo  –  an  ABC  and 
BBC  collaboration 
The  national  team:  Spot 
against  racism 
 
Video  campaign  against 
racism 
DFB  Team  –  German 
Football  Association 
Unknown Video  of  refugees 
demanding  to  be  let  into 
Keleti  train  station  in 
Budapest  (deleted) 
 
Unknown  
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Refugee  camp  Roszke Secretly  filmed  footage  of 
security  throwing  food  into 
crowd  of  refugees  in  Roszke 
Sprido08  –  Austrian 
politician 
  Online  –  Arabic  satirical  site  
 
 
The  @BBCTrending  Twitter  account  linked  to  two  short  documentaries  published  on 
YouTube  by  a  joint  ABC  and  BBC  venture.  News  content  reported  on  by  BBC  Trending  is 
framed  as  originating  in  social  media  and  of  interest  to  audiences  in  this  space.  However,  it 
was  also  used  to  highlight  and  distribute  content  created  by  the  BBC.  This  follows  the  BBC’s 
trend  in  highlighting  content  created  by  its  own  or  affiliated  journalists.  One  of  the  short 
documentaries,  ‘ The  millionaire  saving  migrants  in  the  Mediterranean’,  documents  the  work 
of  the  MOAS  rescue  boat  charity,  which  raised  its  profile  especially  through  its  Twitter 
activity,  where  it  published  photos,  footage  and  updates  from  rescue  missions.  The 
documentary  may  have  therefore  benefitted  from  MOAS’  prominence  when  distributed  on 
Twitter  and  other  social  media  platforms.  
 
France  24 
 
Title Description Uploader 
Refugee  camp  Röszke Secretly  filmed  footage  of 
security  throwing  food  into 
crowd  of  refugees  in  Roszke 
Sprido08-  Austrian 
politician 
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‘MEDITERRANEA  by 
Jonas  Carpignano  (Official 
Trailer)’ 
 
Documentary  trailer  NDM  Ventas  internacionales 
–  Film  production  company 
 
 
Al  Jazeera 
 
Title Description Uploader 
Musical  presentation  by 
youths  of  Yarmouk  camp 
Video  of  Palestinian  man 
playing  the  piano  amid 
rubble 
Al  Yarmouk  Camp  –  media 
activists  in  Yarmouk,  Syria 
You  are  not  welcome  here! Video  of  the  mayor  of 
Béziers  visiting  refugees 
occupying  an  empty 
building 
Mairie  de  Béziers  –  Mayor 
of  French  town  Béziers 
Destruction  in  the  market  of 
Douma 
Video  of  the  aftermath  of  a 
bombing  in  the  centre  of  the 
Syrian  city  of  Douma 
amran  amar  –  media 
activists  in  Douma,  Syria 
Refugees  Welcome  –  FC 
Bayern  Make  a  Statement 
Footage  of  FC  Bayern 
players  walking  onto  pitch 
with  child  refugees 
Bundesliga  –  German 
Football  League 
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Unknown 
 
Aerial  footage  of  an  airstrike 
carried  out  by  coalition 
forces  
US  Central  Command  – 
US-led  military  coalition  
Migrants  break  through 
security  line  in  Roszke 
Video  shows  migrants 
breaking  through  police 
lines  in  Roszke  
Nemzeti1tv  –  Hungarian  TV 
station 
Refugee  camp  Röszke Secretly  filmed  footage  of 
security  throwing  food  into 
crowd  of  refugees  in  Roszke 
Sprido08-  Austrian 
politician 
Werde  Fluchthelfer.in 
 
Campaign  calling  on  people 
to  ferry  migrants  across 
borders 
Robyns  Lifehack  Palace  – 
citizen  activist 
Public  dialogue  "Living  well 
in  Germany  –  what’s 
important  to  us":  Chancellor 
in  conversation  with 
students 
 
German  chancellor  Merkel 
takes  questions  from 
highschool  children,  among 
them  a  Palestinian  girl 
fearing  deportation. 
Bundesregierung  –  German 
government 
Anja  Reschke:  "Push  back  – 
Open  your  mouth"  
 
Clip  showing  news  anchor 
calling  on  people  to  speak 
out  against  racism 
ARD  –  German  public 
service  broadcaster 
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Project:  Refugee  Smiles 
 
Video  about  charitable  work 
done  by  American  dentists 
for  refugees 
Deah  Barakat  –  citizen 
activist 
 
 
Al  Jazeera  featured  the  widest  range  of  YouTube  videos  originating  from  professional  media 
and  citizen  journalists,  as  well  as  government  sources.  The  selection  of  YouTube  videos 
shows  some  of  the  same  news  topics  emerge  as  found  in  the  news  texts  by  the  other  two  news 
organisations.  For  example,  the  issue  of  hate  speech  and  anti-refugee  sentiments  was  given 
voice  through  some  of  the  Facebook  and  Twitter  content  in  the  France  24  coverage.  The 
anti-refugee  mayor  of  the  southern  French  town  of  Bezier  received  coverage  by  France  24 
and  AFP  after  he  used  an  altered  AFP  photo  of  refugees  waiting  to  board  a  train.  Attention 
was  drawn  to  the  use  of  the  photograph  via  a  tweet  by  an  AFP  journalist  (Lemarchand,  2015) 
comparing  it  to  the  original.  Al  Jazeera  covered  the  mayor’s  attitude  through  the  use  of  one  of 
his  YouTube  videos  showing  him  visiting  a  group  of  Syrian  refugees  to  tell  them  that  they  are 
not  welcome  in  the  city.  Al  Jazeera  also  featured  a  YouTube  video  of  a  German  news 
presenter  calling  on  people  to  speak  up  when  they  encounter  racism.  The  use  of  BBC 
YouTube  videos  mirrored  the  overall  trend  of  a  heavier  emphasis  on  professional  journalistic 
sources,  while  Syrian  citizen  journalists  and  activists  were  most  likely  to  feature  among  the 
Al  Jazeera  sample.  
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Text  analysis 
Journalists  as  sources 
 
While  the  quantitative  analysis  showed  tweets  by  journalists  were  sourced  extensively, 
textual  analysis  of  some  of  the  news  texts  reiterated  that  point.  Journalists  reporting  on  the 
refugee  crisis  were  given  special  coverage  by  news  organisations  highlighting  the  popularity 
of  the  social  media  content  they  posted.  With  Twitter  employed  as  a  broadcasting  and 
self-promotion  tool  for  journalists,  news  organisations  gave  prominence  to  some  of  the  most 
popular  material  tweeted  by  journalists. 
 
For  example,  the  BBC  gave  prominent  coverage  to  a  photograph  by  a  photojournalist.  But 
before  it  became  the  subject  of  news  reports,  the  image  had  been  widely  shared  on  Twitter 
and  the  following  analysis  partly  investigates  how  this  dissemination  took  place. 
Photojournalist  Daniel  Etter,  who  was  commissioned  by  the  New  York  Times  to  cover  the 
migrant  crisis,  was  interviewed  by  BBC  Outside  Source  after  one  of  his  photographs  attracted 
huge  amounts  of  attention  on  Twitter.  The  photograph  showed  a  father’s  tears  of  relief  as  he 
disembarked  an  inflatable  boat  that  had  safely  landed  on  the  shores  of  the  Greek  island  of 
Kos.  The  photo  was  one  of  a  series  that  Etter  produced  on  the  migrant  crisis,  and  which  went 
on  to  win  the  2016  Pulitzer  Prize  in  Breaking  News  Photography  (The  Pulitzer  Prizes,  2016). 
A  tweet  by  @BBCOS  on  the  20  August  said,  “We  speak  to  @DanielEtterFoto  whose 
incredible  photo  of  a  refugee  family  has  gone  viral.”  The  BBC  Outside  Source  video  could 
not  be  viewed  for  this  research;,  however,  it  is  clear  from  available  summaries  that  Etter  was 
interviewed  about  his  personal  experience  witnessing  and  photographing  refugees  arriving  in 
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Greece  and  his  reaction  to  seeing  his  photo  gain  so  much  traction.  The  photo  also  received  a 
special  mention  in  a  news  piece  titled  “10  moving  photos  of  Europe's  migrant  crisis”  which 
was  published  by  BBC  Magazine  two  weeks  later.  A  short  text  accompanying  the  photograph 
included  a  tweeted  comment  by  an  Irish  journalist  for  Ireland’s  leading  broadsheet  Irish 
Times,  saying,  "An  entire  country's  pain  captured  in  one  father's  face."  The  apparent  impact 
that  the  photo  had  on  social  media  platforms  was  used  to  frame  why  this  particular  photo  was 
chosen  for  coverage.  It  was  not  only  a  compelling  photo  by  a  professional  photographer  but  a 
photo  worthy  of  coverage  because  it  ‘went  viral’.  The  image’s  popularity  was  presented  as  a 
measure  of  its  newsworthiness  and  proof  of  its  ability  to  capture  the  public  imagination.  
 
The  photo  was  first  published  by  the  New  York  Times  on  the  16  August  and  some  of  the 
earliest  mentions  of  the  photograph  on  Twitter  originate  on  accounts  by  New  York  Times 
staff  (Tufekci,  2015;  Yeginsu,  2015).  A  cursory  analysis  of  all  the  accounts  mentioning 
@DanielEtterFoto  in  reference  to  the  photo  throughout  the  day  shows  that  many  of  them 
were  elite  professional  journalists.  Among  those  who  shared  the  photo  early  on,  were 
journalists  from  the  Wall  Street  Journal,  NPR  and  Vice.  The  photo  was  also  tweeted  by  Barry 
Malone  (Malone,  2015),  the  producer  of  The  Stream.  Given  that  The  Stream  has  built  a 
particularly  large  social  media  community  around  it,  the  tweet  unsurprisingly  received 
thousands  of  retweets.  Etter  tweeted  the  photo  himself  on  17  August  (Etter,  2015),  writing,  “I 
am  overwhelmed  by  the  reaction  to  this  family's  tears  of  relief.  This  is  why  I  do  what  I  do.” 
In  the  coming  days,  the  photo  went  on  to  be  featured  by  many  professional  global  news 
organisations  and  their  journalists.  The  reconstruction  of  the  earliest  users  to  share  the  image 
shows  that  professional  journalists  played  a  significant  role  in  the  distribution  of  the 
photograph  on  Twitter  for  several  days.  Effectively,  the  BBC’s  coverage  simply  contributed 
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to  building  public  awareness  of  the  image  and  helping  it  be  distributed  further.  The  choice  of 
a  tweet  by  the  Irish  journalist  to  contextualise  the  photograph  in  the  BBC  Magazine  news  text 
just  underscored  further  how  much  weight  is  given  to  journalists  users  in  selecting  what 
content  makes  the  grade  for  collaborative  newswork.  As  is  perhaps  to  be  expected,  often  this 
is  content  created  by  fellow  journalists. 
 
In  a  BBC  Trending  story  published  on  10  September,  a  photo  by  BBC  correspondent 
Manveen  Rana  was  featured  for  ‘going  viral’  on  Twitter.  The  photo  was  described  as  showing 
a  policeman  hugging  a  Syrian  toddler  near  a  crossing  in  southern  Serbia  and  the  news  text 
was  framed  as  discussing  why  the  photo  attracted  so  much  social  media  attention.  The 
headline  of  the  news  text  said:  “  Why  this  picture  of  a  migrant  child  being  hugged  went 
viral.”  In  the  title  the  photo  of  a  BBC  journalist  was  contextualised  as  pertinent  in  the  eyes  of 
the  public.  The  first  six  paragraphs  of  the  news  text  described  the  scene  and  quoted  Rana  on 
what  she  witnessed  at  the  border  crossing  putting  the  spotlight  on  her  as  the  reporter. 
 
In  the  fifth  paragraph,  Rana  is  quoted  on  the  Twitter  reaction  she  received  to  the  photo  from 
Serbians.  In  the  seventh  and  eight  paragraph,  some  of  the  tweets  from  Serbians  reacting  to  the 
photo  were  published  without  identifying  the  users  and  the  report  claimed  that  echoes  of  the 
Balkans  War  were  the  reason  why  the  images  resonated  with  many.  Despite  the  headline’s 
promise,  the  public  debate  was  not  given  prominence  in  the  news  text.  Rather,  the  focus  was 
firmly  on  the  BBC  correspondent  and  the  material  she  produced,  making  her  the  main  subject 
of  the  report,  while  social  media  discussion  independent  of  her  was  buried  far  down  in  the 
article.  The  fact  of  the  social  media  reaction  itself  was  again  framed  as  the  reason  why  the 
images  were  worthy  of  special  coverage  on  the  BBC’s  own  platform.  
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 In  the  BBC  coverage,  marketing  the  ‘buzz’  around  the  social  media  content  created  by 
professional  journalists,  and  especially  that  around  BBC  reporters,  was  found  to  be  a  core 
element  of  their  social  media  newsgathering  routines.  Social  media  was  not  only  a  reporting 
tool,  or  a  newsgathering  tool  but  also  an  important  promotion  tool.  While  publishing  news 
content  through  social  media  platforms  is  a  part  of  almost  every  news  organisation’s 
distribution  strategy,  it  was  the  reciprocal  relationship  between  news  organisations  and 
individual  reporters  in  the  marketing  and  distribution  of  their  own  content  that  stood  out  in 
the  findings. 
 
Although  interactive  newsgathering  using  Twitter  was  less  prominent  in  the  France  24 
sample,  one  of  its  own  reporters’  Twitter  activity  was  at  the  centre  of  several  news  reports.  In 
a  text  headlined  “The  journey  to  exile  notebook’”,  three  France  24  correspondents  reported 
on  joining  refugees  on  their  trip  along  the  Balkan  route  to  central  and  western  Europe.  The 
text  features  a  photo  of  the  reporters  at  the  top  and  presents  a  diary  running  from  31  August 
to  4  September  that  concludes  with  a  feed  to  one  of  the  reporter’s  Twitter  account, 
@Fernande_VT,  embedded  at  the  bottom.  But  her  Twitter  activity  and  a  link  to  her  account  is 
already  featured  in  the  lead  of  the  news  text.  While  the  France  24  texts  also  includes  some  of 
the  images  shared  on  Van  Tet’s  Twitter  account,  most  of  the  report  appeared  to  have  been 
produced  exclusively  for  France  24’s  online  website.  In  the  most  part  the  Twitter  account 
featured  different  content  from  that  presented  on  the  website  and  the  cross-over  between  the 
two  was  less  evident  than  in  news  texts  by  the  BBC  featuring  their  own  correspondents’ 
tweets.   Twitter  served  mainly  as  a  tool  to  diversify  news  content  distribution  and  the  reporter 
was  partly  tasked  with  distributing  their  own  coverage  in  tandem  with  their  organisation 
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highlighting  their  newswork.  Like  the  BBC,  France  24  used  Twitter  as  a  one-to-many 
broadcasting  platform  where  the  journalist  takes  on  responsibility  of  broadcasting  their  own 
content  directly  to  audiences  without  the  intermediary  of  the  newsroom  and  its  editors. 
Therefore,  the  attraction  to  tune  into  this  journalist  is  dependent  on  the  appeal  of  her  news 
content.  As  news  audiences  source  their  own  content  on  particular  issues,  the  news 
organisations  tried  to  push  their  own  correspondents  into  the  limelight  and  assume  the  role  of 
a  one-person  new  outlet.  However,  as  news  organisations  seek  to  protect  the  professional 
routines  and  practices  in  order  to  distinguish  themselves  from  amateurs,  encouraging 
audiences  to  follow  correspondents  on  a  platform  where  their  reporting  bypasses  newsroom 
routines,  also  undermines  professional  boundaries.  Journalists  are  expected  to  embody 
established  practices  and  routines  without  the  structures  (ie.  the  editor  and  copy  editor)  that 
are  responsible  for  implementing  them.  Aside  from  acting  as  a  reporter,  the  journalist  acts  as 
representative  of  their  profession  on  Twitter,  assumed  to  be  acquiring  authority  and  a  high 
reputation  by  doing  so.  
 
Al  Jazeera  did  not  carry  out  this  type  of  promotion  of  individual  journalists  as  sources  for 
news  audiences.  In  one  report  (Phillips,  2015),  Al  Jazeera  journalist  Barnaby  Phillips 
described  his  week  on  a  refugee  rescue  boat  in  the  Mediterranean.  The  report  featured  a  photo 
Phillips  had  tweeted  looking  out  over  the  sea  from  a  cabin  but  while  Phillips  recorded  his 
experiences  on  Twitter,  the  report  did  not  mention  his  Twitter  account  or  activity  there  nor 
cited  the  social  media  platform  as  the  origin  of  the  photo.  In  short,  the  report  was  mainly  a 
conventional  news  report  of  a  journalist  reporting  from  the  field  without  any  special  mention 
given  to  his  social  media  activity. 
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Hungarian  camera  woman 
Many  of  the  news  texts  promoted  professional  journalists  by  introducing  them,  naming  them 
and  actively  encouraging  audiences  to  follow  them.  In  one  instance,  though,  it  was  the 
disappearance  of  the  journalist  from  the  news  content  they  provided  that  appeared  to 
emphasise  the  value  of  the  independent  observer.  This  image  of  independence  and  apparent 
autonomy  is  often  embodied  by  the  foreign  correspondent,  who  supposedly  lacks  ties  and 
subjectivity  and  is  therefore  free  to  report  events  as  they  really  are.  
 
A  short  video  by  a  German  reporter  and  shared  on  Twitter  became  the  focus  of  several  news 
items  by  each  of  the  news  organisations,  revealing  the  hierarchy  within  the  profession.  The 
footage  itself  was  filmed  by  a  correspondent  for  German  TV  broadcaster  RTL,  while  the 
subject  of  the  footage  was  Petra  Laszlo,  a  camerawoman  for  Hungarian  news  outlet  N1TV.  In 
the  footage,  she  is  seen  tripping  up  a  male  refugee  carrying  a  child  as  hundreds  break  through 
a  police  line  at  a  collection  point  in  Roszke.  The  video  was  the  focus  of  four  BBC  news  texts, 
four  France  24  news  texts  and  two  Al  Jazeera  news  texts,  making  it  a  particularly  prominent 
piece  of  social  media-sourced  content.  Unlike  the  previous  examples  of  prominence  given  to 
journalists’  coverage,  the  source  of  the  footage  received  no  special  mention,  except  in  the 
attribution  of  the  footage.  There  was  an  inversion  of  the  trend  to  give  greater  importance  to 
journalist  personalities,  whereby  he  assumed  the  traditional  representation  of  the  professional 
journalist:  impartial,  objective,  invisible.  
 
While  local  reporters  were  mostly  absent  in  the  journalist  user  group  of  all  three  news 
organisations,  the  news  texts  involving  this  video  were  particularly  focused  on  scrutinizing 
189 
and  commentating  on  the  camerawoman’s  local  Hungarian  media  outlet.  Laszlo’s  employer 
was  given  prominence  and  always  described  in  terms  of  its  political  affiliation.  Description  of 
N1TV  ranged  from  “Internet-based  television  station  close  to  Hungary's  far-right  Jobbik 
party”  (Agence  France  Presse,  2015) ,  “It  supports  anti-immigrant  party  Jobbik”  (BBC,  2015) 
to  “part  of  the  far-right  Jobbik  party’s  media  empire”  (AJPlus,  2015) .  By  stressing  the  link 
between  N1TV  and  Hungary’s  ruling  anti-migrant  Jobbik  party,  the  news  texts  devalued  the 
camerawoman  as  an  independent  and  impartial  observer  and  the  video  itself  clearly  displays 
her  bias.  Laszlo  is  relegated  to  a  servant  for  anti-immigrant  demagogues.  In  other  words  she 
was  shown  as  embodying  the  worst  traits  of  journalism.  Falling  from  the  privileged  position 
of  the  decent  journalist,  she  became  the  manifestation  of  the  public  mood  –  neither  objective 
nor  impartial  –  and  was  widely  condemned  as  deviant.  In  France  24’s  Media  Watch 
programme  Laszlo  is  even  described  as  “a  bit  of  a  hate  figure  of  the  European  press”.  The 
Media  Watch  programme  shows  that  what  is  at  stake  in  the  editorialising  of  this  news  events 
were  journalistic  values  and  the  professional  code  of  ethics.  Both  the  overt  political  affiliation 
of  her  news  outlet  and  her  personal  intervention  in  the  news  event  break  drastically  with 
professional  journalistic  practices.  By  becoming  the  story,  Laszlo  is  framed  not  just  in  terms 
of  the  moral  value  of  her  actions  –  tripping  up  a  refugee  carrying  a  child  –  but  what  it  means 
to  be  a  good  journalist.  This  makes  the  treatment  of  the  camerawoman  in  the  news  texts  a 
stark  example  of  how  deviance,  and  the  exclusion  it  implies,  were  applied  and  reinforced  in 
boundary  work  (Carlson  and  Lewis,  2015). 
 
Contrary  to  the  aforementioned  examples  of  journalists’  social  media  content  being  used  to 
promote  the  individual,  the  journalist  in  this  case  was  the  fly  on  the  wall.  In  all  of  the  news 
texts,  he  was  neither  seen  nor  heard  allowing  his  content  to  appear  objective  and  impartial. 
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And  it  was  in  this  role  that  professional  journalism  was  vindicated,  and  specifically  the  value 
of  the  foreign  correspondent  as  independent  observer.  A  journalist  who  will  overtly  help  the 
police  during  a  news  event  cannot  be  perceived  as  independent  and  much  less  as  ‘speaking 
truth  to  power’  as  the  enduring  myth  of  professional  journalism  states.  The  presence  of 
foreign  correspondents  to  cover  the  fate  of  refugees  was  therefore  seen  as  elemental  to 
covering  the  refugee  crisis  appropriately  as  they  were  the  untarnished  and  impartial  observers 
that  could  discover  and  report  the  truth  as  a  public  service. 
 
Although  the  source  of  the  content  remained  largely  out  of  view  in  the  coverage,  his  ability  to 
grab  widespread  attention  on  social  media  was  cited  as  a  reason  for  the  mainstream  media 
attention.  The  video  was  framed  within  the  context  of  ‘going  viral’  online  and  eliciting  a 
‘global  public  outcry’.  Again,  it  was  the  reaction  by  social  media  users  that  was  used  to 
explain  the  broad  coverage  of  the  video,  and  which  ultimately  led  to  the  firing  of  the 
camerawoman.  Professional  journalistic  values  were  vindicated  first  through  the  ‘global 
public  outcry’  and  finally  through  the  exclusion  of  Laszlo  from  the  profession.  The  sacking 
of  the  Hungarian  reporter  contributed  to  boundary  work  in  professional  journalism,  not  just 
through  reinforcing  the  ethical  code  of  the  profession  but  by  also  implying  that 
professionalism  is  intact. 
 
Alan  Kurdi 
On  2  September  the  lifeless  body  of  a  Syrian  toddler  was  discovered  washed  up  on  a  beach  in 
Turkey.  The  boy,  Alan  Kurdi,  drowned  along  with  his  mother  and  brother  when  their  boat 
capsized.  Photos  of  the  boy  were  widely  shared  and  discussed  on  social  media  before  being 
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splashed  across  front  pages  and  news  broadcasts  around  the  world.  All  three  organisations  ran 
several  news  texts  about  his  death.  
 
It  was  Turkish  photojournalist  Nilüfer  Demir  (2015)  who  captured  the  images  that  went  on  to 
go  around  the  world  but  was  given  no  special  mention  alongside  the  iconic  photographs. 
Instead,  it  was  the  tweeting  of  three  of  the  photographs  by  the  Human  Rights  Watch 
emergency  director  Peter  Bouckaert  that  became  the  subject  of  a  number  of  news  texts. 
Bouckaert,  was  categorised  in  the  data  set  as  an  expert  source.  Arguably  this  is  only  partly 
applicable  as  he  can  be  said  to  be  independent  but  not  disinterested  given  his  position  inside 
an  advocacy  organisation.  However,  in  this  case  his  bias  is  considered  to  be  outweighed  by 
his  perceived  independence.  Both  Al  Jazeera  and  the  BBC  cited  Bouckaert  directly  in  their 
coverage.  Although  France  24  also  covered  the  images  extensively  in  their  news  coverage  it 
did  not  cite  him  explicitly  in  any  of  it. 
 
Research  (D’Orazio  in  Vis  and  Goriunova  2015)  tracked  the  spread  of  the  images  on  Twitter 
after  initial  Turkish  news  reports  featured  several  photos  of  the  tragedy,  including  four  of 
Alan  Kurdi.  The  first  tweet   that  showed  the  toddler  lying  face  down  in  the  surf  at  Bodrum 34
was  published  by  Michelle  Demishevich,  a  Turkish  journalist  and  activist.  While  a  small 
number  of  Twitter  users  from  Greece  and  Spain  shared  the  photos  as  a  result,  the  audience 
remained  mainly  in  Turkey  before  several  users  in  the  Middle  East  picked  up  on  the  images 
and  began  tweeting  them.  Bouckaert,  who  was  based  in  Geneva,  was  identified  as  the  first 
user  to  tweet  the  images  with  considerable  impact  outside  the  MENA  region.  However,  while 
his  tweet  was  retweeted  hundreds  of  times,  it  was  in  fact  the  Washington  Post’s  Beirut  Bureau 
34  The  tweet  was  could  not  be  accessed  at  time  of  writing.  
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Chief,  Liz  Sly  (@Lizsly)  who’s  tweet  about  Kurdi  really  stood  out  as  the  most  widely  spread 
globally  with  over  7,000  retweets.  Nevertheless,  Bouckaert  was  cited  in  news  texts  both  by 
Al  Jazeera  and  the  BBC.  A  comparison  between  how  both  organisations  used  this  source 
shows  substantially  different  approached  and  representation  of  Bouckaert. 
 
In  an  Al  Jazeera  video  report,  Bouckaert  was  interviewed  about  how  his  tweet  went  viral  and 
asked  what  his  personal  response  was  to  the  impact  that  his  tweet  had.  His  involvement  in  the 
spread  of  the  images  were  reflected  in  a  positive  way,  and  presented  as  a  catalyst  for  change 
in  public  opinion  about  the  migrant  crisis.  As  such  he  was  presented  as  a  source  of  the 
photographs.  A  BBC  news  text  cited  Bouckaert  as  the  author  of  a  blog  post  explaining  why 
he  decided  to  tweet  the  photos  of  the  dead  toddler.  Both  of  the  reports  focused  on  the  ethical 
questions  around  the  sharing  of  graphic  imagery.  The  interest  in  Bouckaert  was  framed  in  the 
context  of  i)  his  ability  to  reach  a  large  audience  with  his  tweet  and  ii)  the  timeless  issue  of 
ethics  in  photojournalism  with  regard  to  the  portrayal  of  death  and  victims  of  violence. 
 
Al  Jazeera: 
Bouckaert  was  interviewed  for  an  episode  of  Al  Jazeera’s  Listening  Post  published  on  12th  of 
September  about  how  the  photos  of  Alan  Kurdi  shifted  public  opinion  to  become  more 
sympathetic  towards  refugees.   In  it,  Bouckaert  described  how  he  felt  about  the  impact  that 
his  tweet  had.  
 
The  almost  seven  and  a  half  minute  report  starts  with  describing  the  anti-refugee  stance  of  the 
Hungarian  government  and  much  of  the  country’s  media  coverage  before  claiming  that  the 
photos  of  the  boy  had  a  profound  effect  on  how  Europeans  viewed  the  refugee  crisis. 
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 Narrator:  However,  a  single  tragedy  captured  by  a  lone  photographer  on  a  Turkish 
beach  undermined  their  arguments  and  shifted  the  debate  as  well  as  the  news 
coverage.  The  photographer  works  for  Turkey's  Dogan  News  Agency  and  her  images 
went  global  after  they  were  tweeted  out  by  Peter  Bouckaert  of  the  NGO  Human 
Rights  Watch.  
 
Bouckaert  is  shown  at  a  laptop  simulating  typing  the  tweet  that  was  so  widely  shared  
 
Bouckaert  speaks  to  camera:  I  wasn't  surprised  that  it  went  viral  on  Twitter.  I  had 
expected  that.  I  was  taken  aback  by  the  fact  that  so  many  people  came  out  on  the 
streets  and  said,  'enough  is  enough.  I'm  going  to  do  something  to  make  sure  these 
refugees  get  to  Germany.'  Two  thousands  drivers  in  Austria  alone  drove  into  Hungary 
to  pick  people  up  and  I  think  that's  a  very  beautiful  reaction. 
 
The  report  then  continues  with  interviews  with  a  lecturer  at  Goldsmiths,  University  of 
London,  about  the  symbolism  of  the  photos  and  a  Hungarian  journalist  arguing  that  it  is 
important  for  these  types  of  images  to  be  shown.  The  Al  Jazeera  report  focused  on  the  ability 
of  a  non-journalist,  in  this  case  an  NGO  worker,  to  make  a  profound  impact  on  public  opinion 
and  galvanise  civic  engagement  with  his  tweets.  There  is  a  positive  representation  of  this  kind 
of  public  speech  as  he  is  framed  as  empowered  to  reach  potentially  huge  audience  and  have  a 
real-world  impact.  The  ethics  of  the  publication  of  the  graphic  photos  becomes  the  subject  of 
the  report.  The  viewpoint  that  is  presented  is  one  that  is  supportive,  arguing  that  it  is 
necessary  to  depict  the  gruesome  reality  that  migrants  face  in  order  to  provoke  a  public 
response. 
 
BBC 
In  a  BBC  Trending  report  headlined  “Alan  Kurdi:  Has  one  picture  shifted  our  view  of 
refugees?”  a  hyperlink  leads  to  Bouckaert’s  blog  post  explaining  his  reasons  for  sharing  the 
images.  
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3.  Is  it  even  right  to  share  this  image? 
The  BBC  has  chosen  to  publish  only  one  photograph  of  Aylan,  in  which  he  is  being 
carried  by  a  Turkish  police  officer  and  is  unidentifiable.  However,  several  news 
organisations  have  published  more  graphic  images  of  the  boy. 
Image  copyright  AP,   Image  caption  The  boy's  lifeless  body  was  captured  in  a  series 
of  images  released  by  a  Turkish  news  agency 
On  social  media  there  was  a  similar  debate  about  what  purpose  was  served  by 
retweeting  or  sharing  such  a  graphic  image.  A  blog  post  by  human  rights  watch  was 
widely  shared,  arguing  the  image  being  shared  might  influence  European  leaders.  But 
many  others  urged  people  not  to  share  the  image,  as  it  was  too  heartbreaking  and 
graphic  to  take  in.  
 
 
 
In  contrast  to  Al  Jazeera,  the  BBC  took  a  more  critical  approach  to  the  decision  to  tweet  the 
images  and  implicitly  questioned  the  ethics  of  sharing  graphic  photos  of  a  dead  child. 
Preceding  the  extract  featured  above  was  a  section  in  the  news  text  describing  calls  by  the 
toddler’s  aunt  to  share  images  taken  of  him  when  he  was  still  alive.  In  response,  photos  taken 
when  the  boy  was  still  alive  were  tweeted,  especially  by  journalists  (Vis  2015).  A  tweet  by  an 
American  journalist  of  one  such  photo,  said:  “Aylan  Kurdi,  the  3  yr  old  who  washed  up  at 
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Antalya  and  captured  the  world’s  attention,  as  he  should  be  remembered:”.  The  BBC  frames 
the  issue  as  a  discussion  on  the  ethics  of  anyone  sharing  the  images  and  positions  itself  as 
authoritative  voice  in  shaping  that  discussion  on  what  it  means  to  act  ethically  in  the 
alternative  news  environment  of  social  media  platforms.  The  broadcaster  also  used  this 
discussion  to  set  itself  apart  from  other  news  organisations.  The  photos  had  in  fact  been  taken 
by  a  photojournalist  and  were  originally  published  by  a  professional  news  outlet,  followed  by 
many  other  news  organisations  around  the  world.  So,  whether  intentionally  or  not,  the  BBC 
did  not  only  argue  against  the  widespread  sharing  of  the  photo  by  non-journalists  but  by 
professionals  as  well,  reflecting  a  struggle  to  dominate  in  defining  professional  conduct  in  the 
global  news  flow  on  two  fronts. 
 
Bouckaert  is  not  mentioned  in  the  report  by  name  and  his  blog  to  explain  his  motives  for  the 
tweet,  which  was  widely  seen  as  contributing  significantly  to  the  spread  of  the  image,  is 
summed  up  in  one  sentence  and  no  quotes.  It  is  positioned  between  calls  for  sharing  photos 
showing  Alan  alive,  the  BBC’s  own  editorial  position  on  what  is  ethically  right,  and  a 
hyperlink  to  a  tweet  criticising  the  spread  of  the  graphic  photos.  The  blog  post  is  not 
primarily  represented  to  discuss  Bouckaert’s  views  or  considerations  of  ethics  but  contributes 
to  constructing  the  BBC’s  argument  on  publishing  the  photo.  It  presents  the  BBC  as  having 
taken  the  views  expressed  in  the  blog  into  account  in  its  own  editorial  decision,  while  also 
distancing  itself.  The  final  say  on  what  is  deemed  ethical  lies  with  the  news  organisation 
reinforcing  its  position  as  authoritative.  The  social  media  debate  about  the  images  is  taken  as 
a  cue  to  provide  transparency  about  editorial  decisions  that  validate  professional  practices. 
The  fact  that  Bouckaert  and  other  social  media  users  are  sourced  for  a  news  text  that  reflect 
on  an  ethical  debate  in  news  coverage  is  particularly  interesting  as  they  ultimately  serve  as 
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representing  ‘the  other’  to  professionalism  and  also  draws  on  the  idea  of  deviance.  Since  the 
professionalisation  of  journalism  was  characterised  by  the  emergence  of  a  code  of  ethics  and 
a  code  of  practice,  the  text  can  be  read  as  a  reflection  on  how  the  BBC’s  coverage  of  the 
image  is  of  a  higher  value  than  the  distribution  of  the  images  by  thousands  of  users.  The  blog 
post  is  used  as  a  means  for  the  BBC  to  explain  how  it  considered  different  sides  of  the 
argument  and  to  claw  back  authority  as  a  leading  voice  in  defining  the  ethics  of  how  such 
sensitive  material  should  be  presented  to  a  news  audience.  In  this  scenario  Bouckaert’s  voice 
and  reasoning,  as  expressed  in  his  post,  carries  much  less  weight  than  in  the  Al  Jazeera  news 
text.  However,  I  argue  that  as  a  means  for  showcasing  deviant  behaviour  it  was  not  nearly  as 
successful  as  the  video  of  the  Hungarian  camerawoman,  because  the  position  among  all  three 
news  organisations  differed  in  this  case.  The  BBC  took  a  different  position,  not  only  against 
the  social  media  habit  of  non-journalists  but  against  their  peers,  revealing  the  difference 
inside  the  professional  group  that  could  easily  seem  like  a  power  struggle  among  news 
professionals.  
 
The  Al  Jazeera  report  also  addressed  the  issue  of  ethics  but  in  a  way  that  focused  on 
galvanising  a  public  reaction  that  would  force  political  change.  Bouckaert’s  decision  to  tweet 
the  images  taken  by  a  Turkish  journalist,  is  supported  by  a  Hungarian  journalist,  who  is  also 
interviewed  for  the  report.  He  says:  “We  must  share  these  kind  of  pictures.  Without  them  we 
cannot  truly  understand  this  refugee  crisis.  In  the  last  couple  of  weeks  the  intense  tragic 
developments  did  affect  public  opinion  in  a  positive  way.  No  longer  is  the  entire  narrative 
focused  on  the  imagined  danger  that  the  refugees  pose.”  The  sympathetic  approach  to 
Bouckaert’s  voice  and  message,  and  positive  reflection  of  the  impact  that  tweeting  of  the 
images  had  on  media  coverage  and  politics,  is  consistent  with  the  Al  Jazeera’s  overall 
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approach  to  represent  itself  as  facilitator  of  social  media  debate  and  discussion,  that  gives 
such  voices  prominence.  Engaging  in  a  form  of  activism,  Bouckaert  represents  the 
empowerment  of  individuals  to  spread  messages  through  social  media.  If  nothing  else,  the 
case  of  Alan  Kurdi’s  death  showed  that  universal  ethics  in  journalism  can  be  evasive  and  the 
struggle  to  define  them  are  not  only  between  news  organisations  and  non-journalists  but 
inside  the  circle  of  professional  news  organisations  as  well.  
 
What  about  Bouckaert’s  identity  as  a  user?  Bouckaert  straddles  two  identities;  those  of  expert 
and  activist.  Expert,  through  his  work  for  a  human  rights  NGO,  and  activist  for  the  same 
reason.  Above  that,  he  shares  characteristics  of  the  professional  elite  journalist  that  may  have 
qualified  him  as  an  appealing  source.  He  filled  the  journalistic  role  of  simply  reporting 
information  sourced  from  elsewhere  and  capitalising  on  the  influence  he  yielded  on  Twitter  to 
distribute  it.  Overall,  like  many  of  the  elite  journalists  he  was  an  outsider  to  the  events  and 
reported  on  them  from  afar.  In  a  way  he  became  a  gatekeeper,  or  rather  a  ‘gate-opener’,  as  his 
personal  involvement  in  spreading  the  message  was  central  in  precipitating  a  public  outcry. 
Despite  the  Washington  Post  correspondent’s  much  wider  reach  in  tweeting  about  the  toddler, 
it  is  Bouckaert  that  gets  to  speak  about  making  an  impact  with  his  tweet  in  the  report.  He  is 
both  different  from  journalists  but  clearly  a  polished  communicator  who  can  adopt  the  role  of 
an  accredited  voice.  His  identity  is  not  so  wildly  different  to  those  that  audiences  would  be 
used  to  that  it  was  easy  to  integrate  him  into  some  of  the  coverage  as  an  equal  user. 
Therefore,  the  extent  this  really  reflected  a  greater  involvement  and  access  to  non-journalists, 
even  by  Al  Jazeera,  is  debatable 
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 Palestinian  pen  seller 
The  blogger  tweeting  under  the  handle  @GissiSim  was  one  of  the  few  citizen  users  who 
attracted  enough  media  attention  to  become  the  main  source  of  several  news  texts  by  both 
BBC  and  Al  Jazeera.  According  to  his  website,  gissisim.com ,  the  man  behind  the  account  is 35
Gissur  Simonarson,  a  web  developer  and  consultant  living  in  Oslo.  He  also  runs  the  Conflict 
News  website  (“About  Conflict  News,”  n.d.),  an  independent  news  website  that  gathers  and 
curates  social  media  content  from  conflict  zones.  On  25  August,  Simonarson  tweeted  photos 
he  obtained  showing  a  Palestinian  man  from  Damascus  selling  pens  on  the  streets  of  Beirut 
while  carrying  his  sleeping  daughter.  The  tweet  received  a  huge  number  of  retweets  and 
elicited  a  surge  of  commentary  on  social  media  platforms.  In  response  to  the  public  interest 
that  the  photos  generated,  Simonarson  set  up  a  crowdfunding  campaign  for  the  man  and  set 
out  to  track  him  down.  Through  his  network  of  social  media  connections,  he  was  soon  able  to 
locate  the  man  and  present  him  with  the  money  that  was  raised.  In  both  the  BBC  (Fig.  18) 
and  the  Al  Jazeera  (Fig.  19)  news  texts  the  content  was  presented  as  an  example  of  the  power 
of  social  media  as  a  tool  to  generate  public  action  which  will  have  a  real-world  impact. 
 
35  No  longer  available  at  time  of  thesis  submission 
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200 
Simonarson  was  acting  as  a  private  citizen  but  he  has  some  common  characteristics  with  a 
foreign  correspondent  in  that  he  too  had  an  outsider  status.  He  was  personally  unaffected  by 
the  Syrian  conflict  and  had  no  obvious  personal  interest,  which  reflects  the  idealised 
impartiality  of  professional  journalism.  There  was  a  sense  of  purity  in  his  actions.  On  the 
other  hand,  his  efforts  to  find  the  man  in  the  photos  in  order  to  present  him  with  the  money 
gathered  through  his  crowdfunding  campaign  moved  him  into  an  area  of  activism  meaning 
that  he  did  become  personally  involved.  His  appeal  as  a  source  may  therefore  have  been  in 
his  identity  as  impartial  observer  and  distributor  of  information,  which  brought  him  in  line 
with  journalistic  ideals.  The  photos  are  presented  as  visual  quotes  of  an  unbearable  situation 
which  Simonarson  framed  in  his  social  media  posts  and  managed  to  distribute  to  a  wide 
audience.  What  followed  from  this  position  of  impartiality  in  a  situation  far  away,  were 
emotions  of  empathy  that  led  to  acts  of  altruism. 
 
Both  the  BBC  and  Al  Jazeera  treated  Simonarson  quite  differently  as  a  source  in  their  news 
texts.  In  the  BBC  texts  he  was  given  the  space  to  speak  about  his  crowdsourcing  experience 
and  was  given  similar  prominence  to  the  aforementioned  journalists,  whose  images  went  viral 
on  social  media.  The  Al  Jazeera  coverage  focused  on  the  subject  of  the  photos,  Abdul  Halim 
Attar,  and  the  impact  his  unexpected  fame  on  Twitter  and  the  crowdfunding  campaign  had  on 
his  life.  Attar’s  own  personal  experiences  were  framed  in  a  wider  discussion  of  how  Syrian 
refugees  lived  in  Lebanon  (Fig.  20),  while  Attar  was  also  given  room  to  express  what  he 
planned  to  do  with  the  money  and  help  he  received.  The  social  media  source  for  this  news 
story  therefore  directly  led  to  another  source  to  emerge.  In  this  case,  the  social  media  content 
was  a  way  to  reach  those  individuals  with  the  least  opportunity  to  communicate  to  large  news 
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audiences.  So,  while  the  BBC  coverage  ended  with  the  blogger  given  a  greater  platform  to  be 
heard  by  BBC  audiences,  the  Al  Jazeera  coverage  used  him  primarily  to  reach  another  source. 
 
 
 
 
An  interesting  contrast  emerges  between  the  coverage  by  the  BBC  and  Al  Jazeera  in  this 
example  and  the  previous  one  of  images  shared  of  Alan  Kurdi.  While  Al  Jazeera  gave  voice 
to  Attar  in  this  case,  it  gave  voice  primarily  to  the  NGO  director  who  was  partly  responsible 
for  the  spread  of  the  photos  of  the  drowned  toddler,  while  ignoring  calls  by  Kurdi’s  aunt  not 
to  share  the  graphic  images.  In  fact,  an  entire  video  report  was  dedicated  to  justifying  the 
spread  of  the  images.  Kurdi’s  aunt,  who  was  reported  as  living  in  Canada,  was  not 
represented.  
 
On  the  other  hand,  the  BBC  relegated  HRW  director  Bouckaert’s  voice  on  his  reasons  for 
sharing  the  images  to  a  link  to  his  blog  and  without  mentioning  him  by  name.  Kurdi’s  aunt’s 
stance  was  used  show  the  debate  generated  around  the  ethics  around  sharing  graphic  images. 
Her  call  for  people  to  share  images  of  the  boy  when  he  was  still  alive,  chimed  with  many 
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western  journalists,  among  whom  the  use  of  graphic  imagery  in  news  reporting  is  often 
deemed  more  problematic.  In  both  cases,  the  debate  was  centred  around  ethical  issues  of 
spreading  the  images  and  in  both  cases  the  organisations  used  sources  to  prop  up  their  own 
stance. 
 
Al  Jazeera’s  claim  to  give  ‘voice  to  the  voiceless’  is  framed  as  reflected  in  sharing  photos  of 
the  ultimately  voiceless;  the  dead  refugee  child.  The  reasoning  is  that  not  to  show  the  tragic 
outcome  of  this  little  boy’s  journey  to  reach  Europe  would  be  to  silence  him  and  the 
thousands  of  others  who  drowned  trying  to  make  the  crossing.  By  the  same  token,  the  BBC’s 
reason  for  citing  Kurdi’s  aunt  and  several  journalists  attempting  to  counter  the  spread  of  the 
photos  with  images  of  him  alive  fell  in  line  with  upholding  western  journalistic  ethics. 
 
In  the  case  of  the  pen  seller,  Attar  was  arguably  far  more  marginalised  and  voiceless  than  the 
tech-savvy  and  comparatively  affluent  web  developer  and  blogger  Simonarson.  Except  for 
the  fact  of  his  tweets  drawing  attention  to  the  plight  of  Attar  and  his  family,  he  was  not  given 
much  space  to  speak  in  the  Al  Jazeera  coverage,  while  his  Twitter  activity  was  used  to  direct 
the  focus  on  its  subject.  The  BBC’s  focus  on  the  blogger  over  the  subject  of  the  photos  he 
shared,  instead  throws  the  focus  on  the  perceived  impartial  distribution  of  news  content  by  an 
outsider  and  how  this  can  spark  positive  public  engagement  with  a  real-world  impact.  Despite 
the  use  of  a  citizen  user  by  these  two  news  organisations,  the  representation  of  Simonarson’s 
social  media  material  underscored  the  overall  trend  found  in  the  sourcing  practices  in  the 
quantitative  analysis  whereby  Al  Jazeera  focuses  its  social  media  newsgathering  to  source 
content  that  is  seen  to  offer  a  platform  to  marginalised  individuals  and  groups,  while  the  BBC 
emphasises  entrenched  professional  routines.  Simonarson’s  treatment  as  a  high-impact  source 
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in  his  interview,  similar  to  that  of  some  BBC  journalists,  suggests  under  certain 
circumstances  some  non-journalistic  unaccredited  sources  can  cross  the  boundary  between 
blogger  and  established  mainstream  media  but  that  the  characteristics  of  such  a  user  overlap 
with  those  of  a  professional. 
 
The  Kempsons 
A  video  report  by  France  24  Observers  documented  volunteers  helping  refugees  arriving  on 
the  Greek  island  of  Lesbos,  which  was  one  of  the  busiest  arrival  points  for  refugees  coming 
to  Europe.  The  report  featured  the  Kempsons,  a  British  couple  living  on  Lesbos,  who  were 
heavily  involved  in  raising  awareness  about  the  plight  of  refugees  on  the  island  and  put  out 
calls  for  donations  through  their  social  media  accounts.  The  12-minute  report  features  Julien 
Pain,  a  France  24  journalist,  visiting  the  island  to  interview  the  Kempsons  and  follow  them  as 
they  help  new  refugees  arriving  on  the  island.  People  interviewed  in  the  report  are  sometimes 
identified  with  graphics  as  seen  below,  mentioning  their  Twitter  handles,  where  available.  
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The  report  also  features  several  short  interviews  with  refugees  as  well  as  ordinary  Greek 
residents.  In  the  context  of  this  research  the  Kempsons  were  categorised  as  citizen  users,  and 
they  were  counted  among  the  Facebook  users  and  Twitter  users  in  the  samples  but  most  of 
their  material  was  published  on  Facebook.  One  of  the  themes  is  the  Kempsons’  use  of 
Facebook  to  mobilise  aid  and  other  support,  although  none  of  their  actual  social  media 
content  is  featured.  Nevertheless,  it  becomes  clear  that  it  was  their  social  media  activity  that 
raised  their  profiles  as  users  of  interest  for  a  news  report.  The  repeated  mention  of  the 
Kempson’s  Twitter  handle  accompanying  their  interviews  shows  news  audiences  how  they 
can  follow  the  couple  and  perhaps  respond  to  their  calls  for  support.  Together  with  the 
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interviews  and  the  glimpse  into  their  voluntary  work,  the  couple  are  framed  as  a  legitimate 
source  for  updates  on  refugees’  lives  on  the  island. 
 
A  number  of  other  sources  emerged  from  the  interview  with  the  Kempsons,  including 
refugees,  Greek  residents  on  Lesbos  and  the  mayor  of  Lesbos.  Of  course,  all  of  the 
organisations  in  this  study  featured  reports  interviewing  these  types  of  sources  throughout 
their  coverage.  Nevertheless,  in  this  particular  news  text,  the  Kempsons’  ability  to  attract 
mainstream  media  interest  through  their  citizen  journalism  and  activism  on  social  media  was 
also  found  to  lead  to  the  inclusion  of  voices  with  the  least  ability  to  gain  representation  in 
mainstream  media.  
Summary 
The  comparatively  diverse  use  of  social  networks  in  collaborative  newsgathering  in  this  case 
study  compared  to  the  previous,  showed  that  platforms  were  used  to  gather  different  types  of 
content.  While  Twitter  was  used  to  source  ‘opinion  makers’  that  are  more  traditionally  elite, 
Facebook  was  used  almost  exclusively  to  source  citizen  users  and  to  represent  the  public 
mood  or  opinion.  However,  professional  journalists  remained  those  with  the  greatest  source 
power  overall  and  Twitter  was  still  the  dominant  platform  for  collaborative  newsgathering. 
While  platforms  host  different  types  of  users  and  it  would  be  wrong  to  assume  that  Twitter 
necessarily  results  in  the  prominence  of  elite  source.  Al  Jazeera  maintained  its  focus  on 
citizen  users  across  platforms,  setting  it  apart  from  the  BBC  and  France  24  approach  to  social 
newsgathering.  The  migrant  crisis  was  a  news  event  where  news  organisations  could  easily 
dominate  given  the  inaccessibility  of  many  of  the  locations  to  ordinary  citizens.  For  France 
24,  this  meant  that  it  used  relatively  few  Twitter  users,  rather  relying  on  its  own  reporters  to 
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produce  online  news  text  that  followed  traditional  formats.  At  the  BBC,  in-house  journalists 
were  promoted  as  reputable  and  authoritative  voices  on  Twitter  for  audiences  to  follow. 
 
Discourse  on  ethical  content  and  ethical  behaviour  in  journalism  was  found  across  all  three 
news  outlets,  showing  that  they  were  all  involved  in  boundary  work  (Carlson  and  Lewis, 
2015).  For  example,  the  BBC  attempted  to  assert  its  authority  and  set  itself  apart  from  other 
news  organisations  and  ordinary  users.  While  discussions  of  ethical  codes  attempted  to 
increase  authority,  the  discourse  around  the  use  of  the  photos  of  Alan  Kurdi  showed  there  was 
no  consensus  on  what  these  codes  are.  This,  in  turn,  undermines  a  claim  to  professional 
practices  as  news  organisations  and  journalists  diverged  so  significantly  in  their  views 
(Hanitzsch  &  Vos  2017).  Professional  routines  and  norms  were  validated  and  at  times 
explained  through  non-professional  users  at  the  BBC,  while  Al  Jazeera  used  their  own 
sourcing  routines  primarily  to  back  up  its  claim  to  inclusion.  As  a  result,  the  ethics  debate 
also  highlighted  the  fissures  that  undermined  notions  of  professionalism  versus  amateurism. 
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7.  Battle  for  Aleppo:  sanctioning  amateur  journalists 
 
Few  news  events  have  seen  media  activists  and  citizen  journalists  relied  on  by  the 
professional  news  media  to  the  extent  seen  in  the  Syrian  conflict.  Since  its  start  in  2011,  large 
amounts  of  multimedia  material  and  other  information  found  in  international  news  coverage 
originated  from  networks  of  citizen  activists  and  fighters,  who  shared  eyewitness  material 
and  updates  via  social  media  platf orms  (Wall  &  El-Zahed  2015).  As  Reporters  Without 
Borders  called  it  the  deadliest  conflict  for  journalists,  the  Syrian  war  was  characterised  by  a 
notable  lack  of  professional  journalists  on  the  ground.  By  March  2017,  the  NGO  recorded 
211  journalists  and  citizen  journalists  killed  since  the  start  of  the  war  (Reporters  Without 
Borders  2017).  Analysis  of  news  texts  by  the  three  news  organisations  in  November  2016 
examined  how  professional  journalism  negotiated  the  reliance  on  amateur  sources  with  the 
requirements  of  professional  routines. 
 
Eastern  districts  of  Aleppo,  Syria’s  second  largest  city,  had  been  under  rebel-control  since 
2012.  In  the  summer  of  2016  the  Syrian  army  and  its  allies  launched  a  major  offensive  to  cut 
off  supply  routes  and  regain  control  of  the  areas.  On  November  15,  a  one-month  moratorium 
on  Russian  air  strikes  in  northwestern  Syria  came  to  an  end  and  a  major  air  and  ground 
offensive  resumed  to  seize  control  of  all  of  Aleppo  from  an  alliance  of  armed  opposition 
fighters  within  a  month.  In  mid-November  an  estimated  250,000  people  continued  to  live  in 
the  east  of  the  city  and  the  vast  majority  of  the  information  that  emerged  from  rebel-held 
areas  originated  from  a  little  more  than  a  dozen  citizen  activist  and  rebel  sources.  In  the 
almost  complete  absence  of  professional  journalists  on  the  ground,  social  media  platforms 
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such  as  Facebook,  Twitter  and  YouTube  were  used  extensively  to  distribute  high-quality 
multimedia  material  and  breaking  news  updates  from  within  eastern  Aleppo.  The  period 
investigated  spanned  eight  days  from  15  to  22  November,  covering  the  resumption  of  fighting 
in  Aleppo  after  a  period  of  relative  calm.  During  this  time  air  raids  by  the  Syrian  army  made 
headlines  on  an  almost  daily  basis.  News  coverage  was  dominated  by  reports  of  hospitals 
targeted  across  eastern  Aleppo,  which  prompted  the  World  Health  Organisation  (World 
Health  Organization,  2016)  to  condemn  the  air  strikes. 
Timeline 
From  15  to  22  November  2016 
● 15/11 :  A  moratorium  on  Russian  air  strikes  on  rebel-held  areas  of  Aleppo  ended  and 
air  raids  on  northwestern  Syria  resumed 
● 16/11 :  BBC  reported  a  children’s  hospital  in  eastern  Aleppo  was  struck. 
● 18/11 :  Al  Jazeera  reported  another  air  strike  on  a  children’s  hospital  in  eastern  Aleppo 
while  one  of  their  news  crew  was  inside  the  facility. 
● 19/11 :  The  World  Health  Organisation  reported  all  hospitals  in  eastern  Aleppo  had 
been  put  out  of  service  by  the  fighting 
The  period  investigated  started  with  the  end  of  a  one-month  moratorium  on  airstrikes  by 
Russia,  which  led  to  a  renewed  push  to  retake  eastern  and  southern  parts  of  Aleppo  from 
armed  opposition  groups.  The  offensive  lasted  a  month  with  opposition-held  areas  fully 
brought  under  Syrian  army  control  by  mid-December.  
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Sample  of  news  texts 
 
News  texts  published  by  all  three  news  organisations  were  gathered  by  the  same  method  as  in 
the  other  two  studies  –  both  through  the  organisations’  online  archives  and  the  specified 
Twitter  accounts.  All  relevant  texts  spanning  the  eight  days  from  15  to  22  November  were 
then  analysed  for  social  media-sourced  material  and  all  texts  without  clearly  identifiable 
content  originating  from  these  platforms  were  disregarded.  Based  on  some  of  the  news  texts 
in  the  sample,  it  could  be  confirmed  that  both  Al  Jazeera  and  AFP  had  journalists  of  their 
own  inside  east  Aleppo.  In  one  interview,  a  BBC  Arabic  editor  said  that  the  organisation  was 
relying  mainly  on  citizen  journalists  and  state  media.  However,  the  BBC  also  had  at  least  one 
correspondent  in  Syria  at  the  time,  although  it  was  not  clear  if  they  were  in  Aleppo. 
Nevertheless,  all  of  the  three  outlets  used  social  media  content  extensively.  This  type  of 
content  often  captured  events  at  the  heart  of  the  fighting  in  areas  that  would  have  been  the 
most  dangerous  to  access.  Therefore,  news  organisations  were  not  able  to  rely  on  their  own 
reporters  to  provide  coverage,  excluding  amateur  journalists,  without  missing  some  of  the 
most  important  information  and  multimedia  material  to  come  out  of  the  conflict.  This  meant 
news  organisations  were  forced  to  integrate  reporting  by  amateurs  into  their  coverage,  at 
times  creating  entire  news  texts  solely  sourced  through  such  social  media  users. 
 
Unlike  the  previous  two  case  studies,  it  was  more  difficult  to  ringfence  the  social  media 
sources  found  in  the  texts.  On  the  one  hand,  most  of  the  coverage  about  the  Syrian  war  relied 
heavily  on  social  media  users.  On  the  other  hand  the  platforms,  or  even  the  users,  where  the 
material  originated  was  often  not  explicitly  stated.  Moreover,  the  news  texts  investigated  in 
this  case  study  built  on  years  of  news  coverage,  much  of  which  was  also  influenced  by 
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activists  sharing  material  on  social  media  but  which  was  impossible  to  capture  in  this  data  set. 
Therefore,  it  was  not  possible  to  trace  back  all  of  the  information  supplied  to  its  original 
source.  In  order  to  keep  the  study  as  focused  as  possible,  the  news  texts  reflected  in  this 
sample  explicitly  cited  specific  sources  that  were  known  to  have  primarily  used  social  media 
to  reach  mass  audiences.  The  inclusion  of  these  sources  was  based  on  the  assumption  that  the 
news  organisations  would  have  become  aware  of  them  initially  thanks  to  their  use  of  social 
media  platforms.  However,  relationships  fostered  with  these  sources  overtime  may  have  led 
to  some  of  the  supplied  information  or  content  being  sent  directly  to  the  news  organisations.  
 
Similarly,  it  was  not  possible  to  separate  the  sources  by  platform  in  many  of  the  cases  as  the 
users,  the  vast  majority  of  them  activist  and  citizen  sources,  used  several  platforms  to  share 
the  same  content  and  hyperlinked  from  one  platform  to  others  or  cross  posted  the  same 
content  on  several  platforms  –  for  example,  on  Twitter,  Facebook,  YouTube  or  their  own 
blogs.  
 
 BBC F24 AJ 
15.11 @BBCWorld 
BBC.com 
AFP  
16.11 @ BBCOS 
BBC.com 
BBC.com 
BBC.com 
France24  (Reuters) 
France  24 
AFP 
aljazeera.com 
aljazeera.com 
17.11 BBC.com France  24 Aljazeera.com 
@ AJPlus 
18.11  AFP 
France24.com 
aljazeera.com 
19.11 BBC.com AFP 
AFP 
AFP 
Aljazeera.com 
Aljazeera.com 
@AJEnglish 
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20.11 BBC.com AFP 
AFP 
Aljazeera.com 
Aljazeera.com 
@ajplus 
Aljazeera.com 
21.11 BBC.com  (First 
broadcasted  in 
September) 
france24.com Aljazeera.com 
22.11 BBC.com  (possible 
short  clips  of  UGC) 
AFP 
AFP 
A ljazeera.com 
Aljazeera.com 
Aljazeera.com 
Figure  22.  Sample  of  news  texts  covering  the  Battle  for  Aleppo 
 
Quantitative  Analysis 
Source  power  and  identities 
 
Over  the  sample  period  all  three  news  organisations  published  numerous  news  texts  about  the 
renewed  fighting  in  Aleppo.  Al  Jazeera  produced  19  news  texts  about  Aleppo  of  which  15 
contained  multimedia  material,  photographs  and  text  originating  on  social  media.  France  24 
published  23  news  texts  of  which  14  contained  social  media-sourced  content.  The  BBC 
produced  11  news  pieces,  all  of  which  contained  some  social  media-sourced  content. 
Included  in  the  BBC  sample  was  one  documentary  entitled  ‘Inside  Aleppo’.  The  45  minute 
video  had  been  first  published  in  September  but  was  republished  by  the  BBC  on  21 
November.  As  such,  France  24  had  the  greatest  share  of  news  texts  without  any  obviously 
identifiable  social  media-sourced  content,  followed  by  Al  Jazeera  with  almost  a  quarter  of 
news  texts  that  did  not  rely  on  interactive  newsgathering.  The  prominence  of  social 
media-sourced  content  in  the  coverage  throughout  the  period   shows  the  extensive  reliance  on 
amateur  and  citizen-journalists,  who  were  often  but  not  always  described  as  ‘activists’  by  the 
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news  organisations.  The  vast  majority  of  social  media  sources  were  therefore  framed  as 
having  civic  qualities. 
 
As  already  mentioned,  the  vast  majority  of  sources  were  neither  professional  journalists  nor 
conventionally  authoritative  or  accredited  sources  but  rather  citizen  journalists  and  media 
activists,  publishing  content  on  Facebook,  Twitter  and  YouTube.  In  the  context  of  Aleppo, 
this  group  also  included  search  and  rescue  volunteers,  medics  and  opposition  fighters  as  well 
as  fighters  aligned  with  the  Syrian  army.  The  sources  were  not  always  fully  identified  in  the 
news  texts.  While  France  24  and  AFP  attributed  reports  by  such  sources  consistently,  BBC 
and  Al  Jazeera  often  simply  referred  to  ‘activists’  or  ‘medics’.  On  some  occasions,  Al  Jazeera 
also  blurred  logos  that  identified  the  sources  of  amateur  media.  This  made  it  difficult  to  gain  a 
comprehensive  list  of  the  sources  used  in  the  sample.  However,  it  mostly  remained  possible 
to  identify  these  sources  as  originating  on  social  media  and  the  user  group  they  belonged  to. 
In  some  instances  the  exact  source  were  identified  through  searches  of  amateur  material 
released  in  the  period  investigated. 
 
Sixteen  different  sources  could  be  identified  in  the  BBC  coverage,  which  in  total  provided 
information  or  multimedia  material  35  times.  In  addition  there  were  14  references  to  sources 
that  could  not  be  identified.  This  is  not  to  say  that  there  were  an  additional  14  sources  as 
some  of  these,  or  even  all,  may  have  been  the  same  as  those  that  were  identified  and 
attributed  in  the  news  texts.  Al  Jazeera  referenced  15  identified  social  media  sources  a  total  of 
67  times.  A  further  19  references  were  made  to  unattributed  sources.  France  24  sourced 
content  from  a  total  of  18  sources  49  times  with  no  references  to  unidentified  sources. 
Quantitatively,  the  greatest  source  power  was  found  among  sources  that  were  clearly 
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sympathetic  towards  opposition  fighters  in  eastern  Aleppo.  Given  the  difficulty  in  access  to 
the  rebel-controlled  areas  this  is  unsurprising.  Fig.  23  shows  six  sources  were  successful  in 
gaining  entry  to  the  professional  global  news  flow  through  the  BBC,  France  24  and  Al 
Jazeera.  They  comprised  about  a  third  of  each  organisation’s  attributed  sources,  showing  the 
dominance  of  a  small  group  of  amateurs.  However,  cited  most  regularly  by  a  considerable 
margin  was  the  Syrian  Observatory  for  Human  Rights  (SOHR),  which  was  mainly  run  by  a 
Syrian  citizen-journalist  based  in  the  UK.  He  recorded  death  tolls  and  locations  of  fighting 
and  air  raids.  Fig.  23  lists  the  most  influential  sources,  meaning  they  appeared  in  news  texts 
of  more  than  one  of  the  news  organisations,  while  Fig.  27  lists  the  remaining  sources  that 
could  be  identified  and  their  weight  in  the  coverage  of  each  of  the  organisations  as  measured 
through  the  number  of  times  that  they  were  sourced  for  different  pieces  of  information.  
  
 BBC F24 AJ 
Syrian  Observatory  for  Human  Rights 
(SOHR)  –  Citizen  journalist  documenting 
number  of  casualties  and  reports  of  fighting 
through  network  of  activists  on  the  grounds   6 20 19 
White  Helmets  in  Aleppo -  Network  of  search 
and  rescue  volunteers  in  opposition-held 
areas  of  Syria 6 5 15 
Aleppo  Media  Center  (AMC)  – 
Pro-opposition  media  activists 3 3 6 
HNN  –  pro-opposition  media  activists 4 2 2 
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Thqa  –  pro-opposition  media  activists 2 2 3 
Independent  Doctors  Association  (IDA)  – 
Medics  in  opposition-held  Aleppo 3 1 2 
SMART  –  pro-opposition  activists  reporting 
through  network  from  across  Syria 1 3 (1) 
Ibrahim  Abu  al-Laith  –  White  Helmets 
spokesman  1 3 
Local  Coordination  Committee  (LCC)  – 
Syrian  network  of  anti-Assad  activists 2  1 
Russian  Ministry  of  Defence  2 1 
Syrian  Arab  News  Agency  (SANA)  –  state 
media  1 2 
STEP  –  pro-opposition  activists  reporting 
through  network  from  across  Syria 1 1  
Fatemah  Alabed  –  citizens  in  opposition-held 
Aleppo  reporting  on  events  through  Twitter 1  1 
 
 
 
By  far  the  most  influential  source  across  all  of  the  organisations  was  SOHR.  Some  of  the 
news  texts  in  the  sample  of  this  case  study  relied  overwhelmingly,  even  sometimes 
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exclusively,  on  the  information  provided  by  SOHR.  For  example,  on  19  November,  France  24 
published  an  AFP  report  under  the  headlined  “Regime  bombardment  kills  27  civilians  in 
Aleppo:  monitor”.  The  first  four  paragraphs  cited  SOHR  and  their  founder  Abdul  Rahman  on 
the  latest  updates  from  the  fighting  in  eastern  Aleppo,  while  the  remaining  two  paragraphs 
provided  some  background  context  about  the  offensive. 
 
In  an  interview  with  the  New  York  Times  in  2013,  SOHR  founder  Rami  Abdul  Rahman  (a 
pseudonym),  was  reported  to  be  working  out  of  his  home  in  Coventry,  England,  together  with 
four  other  members  inside  Syria,  collating  reports  of  death  tolls  from  a  network  of  230 
activists  across  the  country  (MacFarquhar  2013).  According  to  the  same  report,  he  fled  Syria 
in  2000  over  anti-government  activism  after  two  of  his  associates  were  arrested.  Profiling  the 
group  in  the  early  days  of  the  conflict  in  2011,  the  BBC  described  it  as  apolitical  in  nature. 
However,  at  the  same  time  it  was  also  explicitly  in  favour  of  Syrian  President  Bashar 
al-Assad  stepping  down. 
 
It  now  has  more  than  200  members  and  affiliates,  covering  every  province  in  Syria, 
with  some  volunteers  aggregating  and  publicising  information  from  the  UK. 
 
Those  in  Syria  work  to  confirm  casualty  reports  of  people  that  have  come  from 
activists  or  been  cited  in  the  media,  checking  with  family  members,  witnesses  or 
medics  on  the  ground. 
 
As  foreign  journalists  are  unable  to  operate  freely  in  Syria  to  verify  reports 
themselves,  the  media  are  increasingly  reliant  on  such  information. 
 
The  group  says  it  is  impartial  in  its  reporting,  recording  the  deaths  of  soldiers  as  well 
as  civilians  and  protesters.  (Lang  2011) 
 
The  New  York  Times  described  the  means  by  which  Abdul  Rahman  gathered  death  tolls  in 
the  following  passage: 
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 Activists  in  every  province  belong  to  a  Skype  contact  group  that  Mr.  Abdul  Rahman 
and  his  aides  tap  into  in  an  effort  to  confirm  independently  the  details  of  significant 
events.  He  depends  on  local  doctors  and  tries  to  get  witnesses.  On  the  telephone,  for 
instance,  speaking  in  his  rapid-fire  style,  he  asked  one  activist  to  visit  a  field  hospital 
to  count  the  dead  from  an  attack. 
 
With  government  soldiers,  he  consults  contacts  in  small  villages,  using  connections 
from  his  youth  on  the  coast  among  Alawites,  the  minority  sect  of  Mr.  Assad,  which 
constitutes  the  backbone  of  the  army. 
 
Mr.  Abdul  Rahman  has  been  faulted  for  not  opening  his  list  up  for  public  access 
online,  but  the  world  of  nongovernmental  organizations  gives  him  mostly  high  marks. 
(MacFarquhar  2013) 
 
The  reported  methods  by  which  the  group  gathered  the  death  tolls  were  similar  to  how  news 
media  and  journalists  may  have  gone  about  collecting  such  information.  Further,  the  question 
of  impartiality  was  addressed  the  New  York  Times  article  as  well  as  the  BBC  report  through 
the  claim  to  record  deaths  on  both  side  of  the  conflict.  Despite  Abdul  Rahman’s  personal 
history  as  a  dissident  who  fled  Syria,  both  reports  laid  out  his  work  as  attempting  to  remain  a 
neutral  source  amid  the  fighting.  Given  the  notion  of  impartiality  as  a  cornerstone  of 
professional  journalism  practice,  it  lent  authority  to  SOHR  as  a  source.  
 
In  a  war  where  access  was  extremely  limited  for  professional  journalists,  some  of  the  work 
traditionally  done  by  them  was  effectively  outsourced  to  amateurs.  Stories  and  passages  such 
as  the  ones  above   created  some  transparency  about  the  work  processes  and  routines  of 
SOHR,  thus  helping  legitimise  it  as  a  credible  source.  They  also  serve  to  separate  the 
partisanship  from  the  work  that  was  produced  by  describing  norms  and  methods  that  lay 
claim  to  a  separation  of  factual  truth  and  subjective  bias.  However,  the  opaque  network  of  the 
group  meant  that  most  information  about  how  information  was  gathered  came  from  the 
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founder  himself.  While  the  lack  of  transparency  may  be  attributable  to  concerns  for  the  safety 
of  volunteers  gathering  information,  it  remains  clear  that  an  activist  source  with  a  wide 
network  of  amateur  sources,  which  by  the  BBC’s  own  account  the  media  had  become 
increasingly  reliant  on,  was  referenced  consistently  for  updates  on  death  tolls  in  fighting,  and 
became  a  quasi-authoritative  source  for  such  information.  The  SOHR  took  on  a  prominent 
role  in  the  news  coverage  as  a  source  that  had  adopted  journalistic  norms  and  values, 
especially  with  regards  to  impartiality  and  accuracy.  As  such  it  was  seen  as  carrying  out  acts 
of  journalism  instead  of  citizen  activism,  the  latter  of  which,  through  its  partisan  nature, 
presents  a  greater  barrier  to  entry  into  the  mainstream  news  flow.  Frequently,  it  was  referred 
to  not  as  ‘activist’  but  as  ‘monitor’  across  all  three  news  organisations,  implying  a  detached 
and  disinterested  character.   
 
The  second  most  influential  source  was  the  White  Helmets.  It  shared  the  same  amount  of 
influence  as  the  SOHR  in  the  BBC  coverage  and  provided  content  in  at  least  15  cases  in  the 
Al  Jazeera  coverage  over  the  eight  days.  The  group  (also  known  as  the  Syrian  Civil  Defense) 
comprised  a  network  of  search  and  rescue  volunteers  active  across  opposition-held  areas  of 
Syria.  It  also  presents  itself  as  an  impartial  and  neutral  civil  society  group  but  also  states  that 
it  only  operates  in  areas  outside  of  the  Syrian  government  control.  On  the  group’s  website  it 
described  itself  as  follows: 
 
The  volunteers  save  people  on  all  sides  of  the  conflict  –  pledging  commitment  to  the 
principles  of  ‘Humanity,  Solidarity,  Impartiality’  as  outlined  by  the  International  Civil 
Defence  Organisation.  [...] 
 
The  White  Helmets  mostly  deal  with  the  aftermath  of  government  air  attacks.  Yet  they 
have  risked  sniper  fire  to  rescue  bodies  of  government  soldiers  to  give  them  a  proper 
burial. 
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Bakers,  tailors,  engineers,  pharmacists,  painters,  carpenters,  students  and  many  more, 
the  White  Helmets  are  volunteers  from  all  walks  of  life.  Many  have  paid  the  ultimate 
price  for  their  compassion  –  204  have  been  killed  while  saving  others. 
 
As  well  as  saving  lives  the  White  Helmets  deliver  public  services  to  nearly  7  million 
people,  including  reconnecting  electrical  cables,  providing  safety  information  to 
children  and  securing  buildings.  They  are  the  largest  civil  society  organisation 
operating  in  areas  outside  of  government  control,  and  their  actions  provide  hope  for 
millions.  (White  Helmets,  n.d.) 
 
The  voluntary  amateur  nature  of  the  group  places  it  among  the  citizen  user  group,  while  the 
claim  to  impartiality  aligns  it  with  qualities  sought  out  by  news  organisations  to  fit  with 
professional  routines  and  practices.  This  group  published  high  quality  videos,  images  and 
updates  from  Syria’s  different  provinces  across  multiple  platforms,  including  Facebook, 
Twitter  and  YouTube.  Over  the  course  of  the  conflict,  the  social  media  activity  of  this  group 
became  increasingly  sophisticated.  In  addition  to  its  main  social  media  accounts  that 
published  content  pulled  together  from  its  volunteers  across  the  country,  there  was  a  second 
tier  of  social  media  accounts  designated  to  specific  provinces  that  shared  content  only  from 
these  areas.  Local  social  media  accounts  from  Aleppo,  for  example,  published  content  only 
specific  to  Aleppo.  Some  of  this  material  was  republished  by  the  overarching  White  Helmets 
social  media  accounts.  This  resembled  a  centralised  media  network  with  local  outlets 
responsible  for  the  reporting  of  events  on  their  doorstep.  A  number  of  spokesmen  for  the 
White  Helmets  also  had  a  strong  social  media  presence,  operating  their  own  social  media 
accounts.  In  its  structure,  therefore,  the  White  Helmets’  citizen  journalism  outlets  resembled 
that  of  news  networks  or  the  communications  operations  of  large  NGOs.  Navigating  the  sites 
and  tracing  back  the  origins  of  the  content  to  specific  locations  was  made  reasonably  easy 
with  members  of  the  White  Helmets,  such  as  Ibrahim  Abu  al-Laith  (Fig.  23),  found 
personally  giving  interviews  to  news  outlets. 
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 Other  citizen  journalists  ran  similarly  sophisticated  media  operations  through  designated 
YouTube,  Facebook  and  Twitter  accounts,  ensuring  that  content,  much  of  which  was 
audio-visual  material,  was  publicised  widely.  Titles  of  videos  and  keywords  in  tweets  made 
content  easily  searchable  and  identifiable,  usually  containing  the  name  of  the  neighbourhood, 
city  and  date.  Logos  of  different  citizen  journalist  groups,  such  as  the  Aleppo  Media  Center 
(AMC),  Halab  News  Network  (HNN),  Thiqa,  and  others  meant  that  videos  were  easy  to 
identify  as  originating  from  these  users,  and  ensuring  that  news  organisations  could  trace 
videos  back  to  the  source  in  their  verification  process.  In  addition  to  the  logo,  a  feature  of 
White  Helmets  videos  was  to  show  its  members  dressed  in  their  distinctive  uniform, 
eliminating  doubt  about  who  the  footage  showed.  Aware  of  the  requirements  of  news 
organisations  for  reliable  information,  citizen  journalists  took  great  care  to  make  the  videos  as 
accessible  as  possible,  with  a  clear  labeling  format  that  was  replicated  across  different  citizen 
journalist  groups.  
 
Despite  a  relatively  small  sample  of  identifiable  social  media  users  (ranging  between  16  and 
18  sources)  used  by  all  three  news  outlets  the  crossover  of  sources  between  them  was 
significant.  All  three  organisations  had  at  least  six  sources  in  common,  all  of  them  citizen 
journalists,  activists,  and  voluntary  organisations  of  medics  and  rescue  workers.  For  each 
news  organisation,  this  represented  more  than  than  a  third  of  their  social  media  sources. 
Another  seven  sources  were  found  in  the  coverage  by  two  of  the  three  news  organisations. 
 
Only  two  of  the  sources  in  Fig.  23  were  not  citizen  journalist  or  civil  society  groups.  These 
were  the  Russian  Ministry  of  Defence  and  the  Syrian  state-media  outlet,  the  Syrian  Arab  New 
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Agency  (SANA).  Both  were  sourced  through  social  media  channels  significantly  less  than 
some  of  the  other  users.  However,  these  sources  were  cited  many  more  times  in  the  total 
sample  of  news  texts  across  all  of  the  news  organisations  but  those  references  were 
eliminated  from  the  study  as  it  could  not  be  conclusively  traced  back  to  originating  on  social 
media  platforms.  Information  originating  from  SANA  is  likely  to  have  been  mostly  sourced 
through  its  website,  while  the  Russian  MOD  had  more  traditional  channels  to  disseminate 
their  information  to  news  media  such  as  through  press  releases,  press  conferences  as  well  as 
their  website. 
 
The  social  media  users  with  the  most  source  power  were  typically  outside 
government-controlled  areas  as  well  as  often  partial  to  the  cause  of  anti-government  activism. 
However,  at  the  same  time  there  was  an  effort  made  to  present  themselves  as  impartial  in 
their  reporting.  Those  users  with  the  least  source  power  were,  though  active  on  social  media, 
the  warring  parties  (Fig.  24).  These  sources’  overt  interest  in  presenting  their  side  of  the  story 
may  have  meant  that  they  were  not  deemed  suitable  except  in  exceptional  cases,  whereas  the 
other  sources’  self-presentation  as  quasi  media  outlets  fit  more  easily  with  journalistic 
routines  and  practices. 
 
BBC France  24 Al  Jazeera 
Unknown  opposition  activists 
and  citizen  journalists  (14) 
Jabhat  Fateh  al-Sham 
Opposition  fighters 
(2) 
Other  unidentified  opposition 
activist  
(15) 
THA  
opposition  media  activists 
(1) 
Modar  Shekho 
Nurse  in  Aleppo 
(1) 
@AlabedBana  
Young  girl  living  in  Aleppo 
(6) 
SHAM  Front 
Opposition  fighters  
(1) 
Syrian  Democratic  Forces 
Opposition   (1) 
Pro-Assad  activist  footage 
(2) 
Basel  Ibrahim  
Media  activist @UNReliefChief 
Syrian  Army  
(2) 
221 
(1) United  Nations 
Under-Secretary-General  for 
Humanitarian  Affairs  and 
Emergency  Relief  Coordinator 
  (1) 
Seraj  Aldeen  AlOmar  
Member  of  opposition  media 
activists  Al  Buraq  Media 
(1) 
Milad  Shahabi  
Opposition  media  activist  
(1) 
Unidentified  ‘health’  official 
cited  
(1) 
Ahmed  Hashisho  
Member  of  opposition  media 
activists  Al  Buraq  Media  
(1 )  
Boffle  Spoffel 
Citizen 
(1) 
Basem  Ayyoubi 
Opposition  media  activist  
(1 )  
Pro-Assad  militia 
(1) 
  
Free  Syrian  Army 
(1) 
 
 
 
Textual  Analysis 
16th  of  November 
 
Textual  analysis  of  three  news  texts  published  on  16  November  across  the  three  news 
organisations  analysed  the  difference  in  how  the  BBC,  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera  framed 
activists.  Albeit  a  limited  sample,  it  aimed  to  investigate  the  power-relationship  established  in 
the  texts  between  activists  and  journalists,  and  activist  and  other  sources.  
BBC 
 
Fig.  25  shows  10  stills  from  a  BBC  video  report  titled  “More  airstrikes  on  Aleppo”.  The  order 
of  the  selected  stills  are  indicated  by  the  number  in  the  top  left  corner.  They  display  the  entire  
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 Figure  25.  ‘More  air  strikes  on  Aleppo’  by  BBC  on  16.11.2016 
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written  text  that  was  overlaid  onto  the  footage.  The  first  image  sets  the  scene  with  footage  of 
bombs  dropping  onto  buildings  described  as  located  in  eastern  Aleppo.  It  was  sourced 
through  the  Aleppo  Media  Center  (AMC),  one  of  the  most  popular  pro-opposition  citizen 
journalist  groups  that  recorded  and  publishing  multimedia  material  (see  Fig.  23).  Against 
these  images  as  backdrop,  the  report  cites  Syrian  government  and  army  sources  claiming  to 
be  targeting  the  depots  of  rebel  fighters  in  their  air  strikes.  It  then  cuts  back  to  the  AMC 
framing  the  attacks  as  targeting  civilians  with  video  material  and  interviews.  Footage  shows 
young  girls  walking  through  rubble  and  a  short  interview  with  one  man  wearing  a  jacket 
imprinted  with  the  words  ‘Syria  Charity’  –  a  Paris-based  non-profit,  according  to  its  website 
–  describing  the  targeting  of  “civilian  areas  with  barrel  bombs”  and  “medical  facilities.” 
Subsequently,  the  report  cites  SOHR  and  other  activists.  The  AMC  footage  is  reinforced  with 
further  audio-visual  material  from  another  three  pro-opposition  citizen  journalist  groups  – 
Halab  News  Network,  White  Helmets,  and  SMART.  In  this  news  text  example  the 
information  provided  by  the  Syrian  authorities  is  presented  only  to  be  delegitimised  in  the 
narrative  constructed  by  citizen  journalists.  The  activists’  claims  remain  unquestioned  in  the 
absence  of  other  independent  reporting  and  are  reproduced  through  the  piecing  together  of 
content  produced  by  east  Aleppo’s  pro-opposition  citizen  journalists,  be  that  high  quality  raw 
video  material,  interviews,  casualty  counts  and  other  reports  providing  information  on  the 
fighting.  However,  notably  absent  in  this  content  were  the  opposition  fighters  as 
citizen-journalists  frame  the  conflict  almost  exclusively  in  civilian  and  humanitarian  terms. 
Fig.  25  also  shows  one  example  of  how  these  pro-opposition  sources  are  legitimised  more 
than  others.  The  perceived  credibility  of  the  opaque  information  gathering  by  the  SOHR  is 
boosted  with  a  reference  to  its  casualty  count  that  is  described  as  conservative  compared  to 
that  given  by  activists  on  the  ground.  The  implication  being  that  the  rigorous  verification 
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practices  carried  out  by  SOHR  may  play  down  the  true  death  toll.  This  creates  a  tier  system 
of  trustworthiness,  with  SOHR  framed  as  the  most  trustworthy,  while  activists  may  be 
somewhat  less  precise  but  can  be  relied  on  for  journalistic  material  nonetheless. 
 
France  24 
 
“Syria:  Russia  resumes  air  strikes  in  rebel-held  East  Aleppo  after  ceasefire”  was  a  video 
report  published  by  France  24  on  the  same  date.  In  Fig.  26  the  audio  narration  is  transcribed 
on  the  right  and  descriptions  and  sourcing  of  the  video  material  is  detailed  on  the  left.  This 
textual  analysis  shows  that  France  24  relied  on  a  much  broader  pool  of  sources,  many  of  them 
fitting  Hall  et  al’s  conventional  primary  definers  with  pro-opposition  citizen-journalists  as  an 
alternative  view  that  contributes  but  does  not  extensively  shape  the  overall  narrative. 
 
 
Video  material Reporter  narration 
Jets  taking  off  from  an  aircraft  carrier 
(Source:  Russian  Defence  Ministry, 
YouTube) 
Taking  off  for  battle,  Russian  carrier  jets 
take  off  to  pound  opposition  targets  in  Syria. 
Footage  of  cruise  missile  being  launched 
from  aircraft  carrier.  (Source:  Russian 
Defence  Ministry  on  social  media) 
For  the  first  time,  Moscow  is  using  its  only 
aircraft  carrier  in  combat  alongside  cruise 
missiles  from  its  naval  frigate. 
Footage  of  Russian  Defence  Minister  Sergei 
Shoigu  briefing  Russian  President  Vladimir 
Putin.  (Source:  Media  or  official  Kremlin 
footage) 
Interpreter  translation  of  Shoigu :  [...]  cruise 
missiles  were  launched  from  the  Admiral 
Grigorovich  frigates  to  hit  predetermined 
targets.  Separately  Bastion  coastal  missiles 
have  been  launched  to  hit  targets  deep  into 
the  Syrian  territory. 
Military  aerial  footage  of  strikes  on  targets. 
(Source:  Russian  military) 
Russia  kept  silent  about  targeting  Aleppo 
saying  its  offensive  was  aimed  at  the 
Islamic  State  group  and  the  Al  Qaeda  
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Footage  of  ground  rocket  launch.  (Source: 
Unknown) 
affiliated  al-Nusra  front  in  rebel-held  Idlib 
and  Homs  provinces.  Moscow  claims  no 
Russian  nor  Syrian  jet  has  bombed  Aleppo’s 
Old  City  in  the  past  28  days. 
Video  of  column  of  dust  rising  from 
buildings.  (Source:  Aleppo  pro-opposition 
citizen  journalist  group  Thiqa  on  social 
media)  
Three  weeks  of  relative  calm  was  shattered 
the  same  day  Russia  launched  its  offensive 
as  dozens  of  air  raids  pounded 
opposition-held  eastern  Aleppo. 
Footage  filmed  in  rubble  and  dust 
suggesting  recent  bombing  or  shelling  of  the 
area.  (Source:  White  Helmets  on  social 
media) 
Residents  of  the  besieged  neighbourhoods 
believe  Moscow’s  escalation  of  the  violence 
is  just  a  prelude  to  a  major  ground 
operation.  Syrian  state  TV  reported  that 
regime  troops  were  preparing  to  attack  from 
nine  directions. 
Footage  of  tanks  rolling  down  a  road. 
(Source:  Unknown) 
Footage  of  opposition  fighters’  tanks  and 
rocket  launchers  firing.  (Source:  Jabhat 
Fateh  al  Sham  on  social  media  ) 
In  the  last  four  weeks  opposition  fighters 
have  rejected  repeated  Russian  offers  of 
humanitarian  pause  in  fighting  to  leave  the 
city. 
Video  of  rubble-filled  roads  and  bombed  out 
buildings  (Source:  Pro-opposition  citizen 
journalists  AMC  on  social  media) 
No  aid  has  entered  the  area  since  July.  The 
UN  warns  that  a  quarter  of  a  million  people 
trapped  in  the  city’s  rebel-held  east  are 
facing  mass  starvation. 
 
Figure  26.  ‘Syria:  Russia  resumes  air  strikes  in  rebel-held  east  Aleppo  after  ceasefire’  by 
France  24  on  16.11.2016 
 
 
Compared  with  the  BBC  report,  pro-opposition  citizen  journalists’  power  to  frame  the 
narrative  was  curtailed  by  France  24  reporters  through  the  inclusion  of  competing  narratives 
by  other  sources.  A  large  and  leading  part  of  the  report  was  framed  by  Russian  military  and 
government  sources,  reproducing  their  narrative  of  fighting  extremists  in  Syria.  The  initial  50 
seconds  of  the  report  –  just  over  half  of  the  total  length  –  shows  footage  of  military  hardware, 
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a  military  briefing  and  aerial  footage  of  an  air  strike.  The  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  military 
aspect  of  the  conflict  and  the  image  created  by  these  sources  is  a  largely  sanitized  one.  The 
inclusion  of  footage  by  opposition  fighters  showing  the  firing  of  rockets  and  tanks  also  put 
the  focus  on  the  conflict  as  two  opposing  armed  sides.  Furthermore,  the  pro-opposition 
citizen  journalist  narrative  –  focused  on  emphasising  the  civilian  cost  –  is  framed  not  just  as 
the  outcome  of  Syrian  regime  and  Russian  military  action  but  contextualised  as  also  resulting 
from  opposition  fighters’  refusal  to  accept  a  ceasefire.  This  narrative  is  wholly  absent  from 
the  citizen-journalist  controlled  BBC  report.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  claim  that  their 
military  is  not  targeting  Aleppo  is  called  into  question  by  the  content  produced  by 
citizen-journalists  which  created  a  counter-narrative  that  asserts  Russian  involvement. 
Competing  narratives  are  presented  to  the  news  audience  throughout  the  report  with  the 
opportunity  for  different  actors  to  reframe  and  contest  each  others’  claims.  Unlike  in  the  BBC 
report  (Fig.  25)  pro-opposition  citizen  journalists  could  attract  the  attention  of  the  France  24 
producers  and  succeeded  in  relaying  their  claims  but  this  was  not  uncontested  and  they  were 
not  dominant  in  framing  the  overall  news  text.  As  such,  citizen-journalists  were  not  carrying 
out  the  journalists’  work  in  overwhelmingly  producing  the  news  text  but  were  treated 
primarily  as  sources.  The  power  to  select  and  contextualise  the  different  sources  and  material 
comprising  the  news  text  remained  far  more  evidently  in  the  hands  of  professional  journalists. 
The  wide  selection  of  sources  to  counterbalance  one  another  also  implies  the  lack  of 
impartiality  by  each  actor  that  requires  representation  of  different  sources  to  produce  a  more 
notionally  balanced  news  text.  By  contrast,  the  BBC  news  text  saw  responsibility  for 
reporting  on  events  abdicated  to  citizen-journalists  to  the  point  that  it  incorporated  an 
interview  staged  by  them. 
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Al  Jazeera 
 
The  Al  Jazeera  video  report  on  16  November  gave  significant  framing  power  to 
pro-opposition  citizen-journalists.  Fig.  27  also  breaks  down  the  audio  narration  on  the  right 
and  stills  from  the  video  material  on  the  left  with  information  about  its  sourcing  detailed 
beneath  them.  As  seen  in  the  BBC  video  report,  citizen-journalists  were  dominant  in  the 
framing  of  the  news  text  but  unlike  in  the  BBC  news  text,  their  message  was  largely  mediated 
through  the  narration  of  an  Al  Jazeera  journalist.  Although  BBC  journalists  selected  the 
material  and  reports  for  their  news  text,  in  many  ways  this  content  was  left  to  speak  for  itself 
appearing  to  show  a  low  level  of  mediation  by  professional  journalists.  By  comparison,  the 
Al  Jazeera  news  text  is  heavily  mediated  through  narration,  albeit  sympathetic  of  the 
citizen-journalists’  framing.  Moreover,  the  blurring  of  the  logos  identifying  the  source  of  the 
activist  material  used  implies  a  sense  of  ownership  and  responsibility  adopted  by  Al  Jazeera 
for  this  material.  The  line  separating  Al  Jazeera’s  own  content  from  that  of  pro-opposition 
citizen-journalists  is  blurred  as  activists  are  more  deeply  integrated  into  the  news  text.  The 
narrator  reported  the  claims  and  reports  of  citizen-journalists  as  their  own  without  attribution. 
 
 
Video  material Reporter  Narration 
 
(Source:  White  Helmets) 
There’s  panic  on  the  streets  of  Aleppo. 
Places  like  Al-Ferdous  neighbourhood  are 
few  areas  where  rescuers  can  still  reach 
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(Source:  White  Helmets) 
Scores  of  people  have  been  wounded  in  the 
latest  round  of  attacks. 
 
(Source:  White  Helmets) 
These  are  some  of  the  most  intense  air 
strikes  by  the  Assad  government’s  jets  in 
three  weeks. 
 
(Source:  White  Helmets) 
Elsewhere  in  the  city,  when  the  suffocating 
dust  and  smoke  settled,  the  destruction 
became  clear. 
 
(Source:  White  Helmets) 
This  is  the  Haderiya  neighbourhood.  One  of 
the  nine  areas  which  came  under  attack  in 
the  besieged  city  of  Aleppo. 
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(Source:  Unidentified  activist) 
This  man  in  the  Hanano  neighbourhood 
says  barrel  bombs  targeted  this  area.  He 
tried  to  save  a  little  girl  here  but  she  died. 
 
(Source:  Unknown) 
Suheil  al-Hassan  is  an  important  leader  of 
the  Assad  military.  His  troops  say  they’re 
ready  to  take  the  city  of  Aleppo. 
 
(Source:  Al  Jazeera) 
We  spoke  to  one  of  the  rescuers  who  was 
unable  to  go  and  help  others.  
Al  Jazeera  reporter:  “Ismael  tell  me  where 
you  are  and  what  is  happening  around  you.” 
 
( Source:  Al  Jazeera)  
White  Helmets  spokesman  Ismail 
Alabdullah:  “What’s  happened,  just  around 
12  o’clock,  there  was  a  huge  wave  of 
bombing  which  started  on  Aleppo  city 
targeting  many  neighbourhoods,  actually  all 
the  neighbourhoods.  I  was  trapped  in  my 
apartment  until  now,  and  maybe  in  a  few 
minutes  I  will  try  to  go  there” 
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(Source:  Syrian  state  TV  but  originating 
from  Russian  Ministry  of  Defence) 
The  attacks  in  Aleppo  were  timed  with 
Russian  strikes  on  Idlib  and  Homs. 
Pro-government  TV  uploaded  this  video, 
which  it  says  was  shot  just  before  the 
Russian  aircraft  carrier  Kuznetsov  was  used 
for  the  first  time.  Russia’s  defence  ministry 
says  it  will  be  targeting  [Islamic  State  in 
Iraq  and  the  Levant]  positions  and  Jabhat 
Fateh  al-Sham,  a  group  formerly  known  as 
al-Nusra  Front.  Many  see  this  as  Russian 
muscle  flexing  of  its  military  might.  
 
(Source:  Unknown) 
Since  last  year,  the  military  support  for  the 
Assad  government  has  turned  the  tide  and 
reversed  opposition  gains. 
 
(Source:  Al  Jazeera) 
Reporter:  “Rebels  say  they  are  being 
attacked  by  Syrian,  Russian,  Iranian  and 
Lebanese  forces.  People  in  the  city  of 
Aleppo  say  they  knew  these  attacks  were 
coming  but  could  do  little  to  prepare  and  as 
world  leaders  have  failed  to  provide  a 
solution  the  people  of  Syria  continue  to 
suffer.” 
 
Figure  27.  ‘ Syria  war:  Aleppo  pounded  by  air  strikes  as  pause  ends’  by  Al  Jazeera  on 
16.11.2016 
 
For  the  first  38  seconds  (of  2’05”)  video  material  is  largely  provided  by  the  White  Helmets. 
The  reports  by  its  members’  and  other  pro-opposition  citizen-journalists  is  cited  throughout 
without  attribution  even  though  the  only  Al  Jazeera  journalist  seen  in  the  footage  is  located 
across  the  border  in  Turkey’s  city  of  Gaziantep.  Mediated  through  the  journalist’s  voice  it 
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conveys  a  sense  of  objectivity  –  a  problematic  but  persevering  value  of  professional 
journalism  (Kovach  and  Rosenstiel,  2007;  Muñoz-Torres,  2012;  Skovsgaard  et  al.,  2015).  In 
fact,  the  news  text  illustrates  citizen-journalists  becoming  primary  definers  as  they  provide 
the  majority  of  the  information,  while  also  merging  with  secondary  definers  –  the  news  media 
–  as  they  adopt  the  role  of  the  reporter  themselves.  Al  Jazeera’s  news  text  is  the  starkest 
example  of  the  break-down  of  the  separation  between  citizen-journalism  and  professional 
journalism  as  the  two  are  not  only  in  a  symbiotic  relationship  with  one  another  but  the 
division  becomes  all  but  invisible.  By  contrast  the  BBC  provided  the  platform  for  the 
narrative  and  content  of  citizen-journalists  to  be  reproduced  without  adopting  the  same  extent 
of  responsibility  and  ownership  of  this  material.  Afterall,  such  sources  were  typically 
described  as  activists  –  a  term  that  implies  strong  partisanship  and  runs  counter  to  notions  of 
the  Anglo-Saxon  media  model’s  emphasis  on  neutrality  and  impartiality.  As  such  it  fell  short 
of  attributing  full  professional  journalistic  values  to  these  sources  despite  efforts  to  legitimise 
them  for  the  purpose  of  the  news  coverage.  Nevertheless,  at  the  same  time,  these  sources 
were  presented  as  providing  journalistic  work  and  the  BBC  became  strongly  reliant  on  them. 
In  fact,  the  term  ‘activist’  did  little  to  diminish  these  source’s  value,  if  not,  in  fact,  elevated  it. 
 
Claim  to  Impartiality 
Sources  are  typically  not  expected  to  be  impartial.  In  fact,  most  of  the  sources  listed  under 
Hall  et  al’s  (1978)  primary  definers  are  political  actors,  social  institutions  and  civic  groups 
with  interests  that  at  times  compete  and  at  other  times  are  aligned.  The  only  exception  is  the 
expert,  whose  value  lies  in  their  perceived  disinterested  expertise.  However,  notions  of 
impartiality  lie  at  the  heart  of  journalism  practice,  as  most  journalists  pride  themselves  at 
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least  on  applying  routines  designed  to  provide  impartiality  and  a  level  of  autonomy  that 
enables  their  work  to  be  untarnished  by  interest  groups  (Kovach  and  Rosenstiel  2007). 
Therefore,  it  is  particularly  noteworthy  to  see  impartiality  mentioned  in  relation  to  these 
sources,  suggesting  they  are  viewed  not  only  as  journalistic  sources.  In  the  absence  of 
professional  journalists  on  the  ground,  these  users  provided  many  of  the  components  of  the 
news  coverage,  in  terms  of  audiovisual  material  and  news  updates.  While  the  news  coverage 
often  did  refer  to  pro-opposition  citizen  journalists  as  activists,  the  White  Helmets  were  also 
referred  to  by  the  more  neutral  term  of  medics ,  while  SOHR  was  frequently  referenced  as 
monitor ,  suggesting  a  disinterested  character.  These  sources  were  therefore  partly  legitimised 
through  the  appearance  of  neutrality.  Furthermore,  while  the  term  ‘activist’  was  used 
frequently  to  describe  pro-opposition  citizen  journalists,  this  did  not  prevent  them  from 
receiving  a  prominent  role  in  many  of  the  news  texts,  and  often  being  cited  in  the  first 
paragraph. 
 
Below  are  the  first  paragraphs  of  two  of  the  BBC  news  texts: 
Syrian  opposition  activists  say  at  least  five  people  have  been  killed  after  Syrian 
government  aircraft  bombed  rebel-held 
eastern  Aleppo.  (BBC,  November  15,  2016) 
 
At  least  25  people  have  died  in  a  third  consecutive  day  of  Syrian  government  air 
strikes  and  shelling  on  rebel-held 
parts  of  Aleppo,  activists  say.  (BBC,  November  17,  2016) 
 
On  16  November,  the  BBC  published  a  news  text  entitled  “Aleppo:  Mother  films  bombing 
from  rooftop”.  It  featured  the  footage  of  Fatemah  Alabed,  a  woman  living  in  Aleppo,  filmed 
from  a  rooftop  showing  the  bombing  of  buildings  as  she  spoke  into  the  microphone.  The 
entire  text  was  contextualised  by  the  BBC  only  through  the  headline  and  the  following 
accompanying  paragraph:  “  Fatemah  Alabed  is  an  English  teacher  living  in  East  Aleppo  –  she 
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has  three  children.  Standing  on  her  rooftop,  she  filmed  the  scene  as  Syrian  jets  resumed  their 
bombing  of  the  city  after  nearly  a  month's  break.”  Initially,  Alabed  attracted  the  interest  of 
mainstream  news  media  through  a  Twitter  account  allegedly  used  by  her  seven-year-old 
daughter  Bana  for  tweeting  her  experience  of  the  war.  Located  in  the  opposition  controlled 
area  of  Aleppo,  the  tweets  painted  an  emotional  picture  of  living  under  threat  from 
bombardment.  In  November  2016,  the  account,  @AlabedBana,  had  more  than  a  quarter  of  a 
million  followers. 
 
While  Alabed  said  she  managed  the  account,  sometimes  tweeting  her  own  updates, 
others  were  described  as  sent  by  her  daughter.  All  of  the  tweets  were  sent  in  English, 
prompting  some  to  question  the  level  of  influence  and  control  yielded  by  adults  in  what  Bana 
posted.  Regardless,  Alabed’s  obvious  attempts  to  reach  large  audiences  together  with  her 
daughter  through  their  savvy  use  of  technology  attracted  the  interest  of  mainstream  media 
and 
arguably  put  her  into  the  role  of  an  activist.  In  the  news  text  “Aleppo:  Mother  films  bombing 
from  rooftop”,  a  huge  level  of  control  was  placed  with  Alabed  in  producing  the  news  text, 
with  only  minimal  amount  of  input  by  BBC  journalists  themselves.  In  the  short  paragraph, 
the  BBC  reference  to  Alabed  as  a  mother  and  resident  of  Aleppo,  suggests  a  more  neutral  role 
as  citizen  witness.  The  text  does  not  reference  the  means  by  which  she  came  to  the  news 
media’s  attention  –  primarily  through  the  Twitter  account  in  her  daughter’s  name  portraying 
the  conflict  as  the  Syrian  army  attacking  vulnerable  civilians  —  a  child,  in  this  case.  Other 
video  reports  also  relied  overwhelmingly,  if  not  exclusively,  on  footage  provided  by  citizen 
journalists. 
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To  a  large  extent,  the  coverage  from  inside  eastern  Aleppo  was  placed  in  the  hands  of 
extremely  social  media  savvy  users,  who  did  much  more  than  simply  act  as  a  source.  Instead 
they  stepped  into  the  role  of  the  journalist  themselves,  which  explains  the  tendency  to 
legitimise  their  voice  through  the  values  of  professional  journalist  routines.  As  the  BBC  at 
times  attributed  professional  practices  to  such  users,  elevating  the  value  of  their  content,  it 
created  room  for  these  users  to  provide  the  news  coverage  that  was  hard  to  obtain  through 
other  means.  And  yet,  by  assuring  that  methods  of  newsgathering  and  reporting  by  these 
users  was  coherent  with  professional  practices,  it  did  so  without  undermining  the  value  of 
professional  routines  as  a  whole. 
 
However,  attempted  impartiality  is  generally  at  odds  with  the  role  of  the  citizen  journalist. 
For  example,  blogs,  a  popular  forum  for  citizen  journalists  before  social  media  truly  came 
into  its  own,  have  been  specifically  described  to  “not  follow  the  canons  in  factchecking, 
seeking  out  alternative  or  opposing  views,  or  attempted  impartiality”  (Halavais  200,  p.:  29). 
Other  content  analysis  studies  of  citizen  journalism  have  also  shown  it  not  to  hold  true  to 
professional  understanding  of  objectivity  (Carpenter  2008;  Paulussen  &  D’heer  2013). 
Despite  attempts  to  bestow  the  values  of  professional  routines  on  some  of  the  citizen 
journalism  used,  the  BBC  clearly  grappled  with  the  contradictions  and  sought  to  address 
potential  criticisms  of  imbalance  in  the  news  coverage  created  by  the  dominance  of 
pro-opposition  citizen  journalists.  Speaking  on  the  BBC  Outside  Source  programme  on  16 
November,  presenter  Nuala  McGovern  asked  a  BBC  Arabic  journalist  about  the  reliance  on 
‘activists’  in  the  news  coverage  of  Aleppo.  This  interview  followed  directly  after  a  2  minute 
and  15  second  segment  in  which  McGovern  interviewed  a  member  of  the  White  Helmets. 
McGovern  introduces  the  White  Helmets  interviewee  as  located  in  the  Turkish  city  of 
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Gaziantep  but  in  contact  with  other  volunteers  in  Aleppo,  presenting  him  as  a  spokesperson 
for  the  organisation.  The  interview  then  goes  on  to  discuss  the  alleged  casualties  of  overnight 
air  raids  attributed  to  Syrian  and  Russian  forces,  with  the  interviewee  stating  a  precise 
number  of  warplanes  and  helicopters.  During  the  interview  McGovern  probes  her  interviewee 
about  the  origin  of  the  information. 
 
BBCOS  presenter :  Where  do  you  get  your  figures  from?  Who  tells  you 
who  has  died? 
White  Helmets  spokesman:  Our  teams.  Syrian  Civil  Defense  teams.  As  you  know, 
we  are  the  only  one  responding  to  the  attacks.  So  we  have  about  120  volunteers 
inside  eastern  Aleppo  city. 
 
The  answer  is  noteworthy  for  three  reasons.  Firstly,  words  such  as  ‘responding’  and 
‘volunteers’  suggests  an  altruistic  dimension  to  the  group’s  work  akin  to  that  of  nonprofits. 
The  use  of  material  provided  by  NGOs  in  news  production  has  long  been  normalised  with 
non-profits  adopting  a  media  logic  that  mimics  journalistic  norms  in  order  to  increase  their 
chances  of  mainstream  news  media  integrating  such  material  in  their  coverage  (Cottle  and 
Nolan,  2007;  Fenton,  2009).  However,  news  organisations  themselves  form  “new 
legitimating  rationales”  (Wright  2014,  p.  396)  around  their  dominant  moral  values  that  gives 
preference  to  some  non-profits  over  others.  Research  into  the  use  of  NGOs’  multimedia 
material  by  mainstream  news  reporting  on  Africa,  found  the  BBC  World  Service  “blended 
ideas  of  ‘public  service  journalism’,  including  notions  of  ‘impartiality’  and  ‘balance’,  with  a 
Reithian  approach  to  the  educative  purpose  of  media  consumption;  and  an  ‘African  service 
ethos’  which  privileged  representing  ‘ordinary  Africans’”  (Wright  2014,  p.  397).  Similar 
legitimating  rationales  are  extended  to  the  use  of  citizen-journalist  material  from  Aleppo  that 
blurs  the  lines  between  how  to  identify  these  actors  –  it  is  not  clear  if  they  are  seen  wholy  as 
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NGOs  or  citizen-journalists.  While  the  answer  above  emphasises  the  voluntary  non-profit 
nature  of  the  group,  for  whom  a  framework  of  legitimation  already  exists  through  perceived 
execution  of  journalistic  routines,  it  also  plays  on  the  notion  of  ‘ordinary  citizens’  on  the 
ground  to  provide  independent  reports.  Therefore,  attempts  to  legitimate  the  reliance  on  these 
sources  combine  the  argument  of  impartiality  with  the  representation  of  ‘ordinary  citizens’. 
By  stressing  the  voluntary  nature  of  the  work  done  by  the  White  Helmets,  combined  with  a 
wide  network  of  120  members,  it  implies  a  level  of  independence  and  autonomy  by  these 
actors  who  are  presented  as  not  beholden  to  the  organisation  for  financial  gain  and  able  to 
report  truthfully  what  they  see  and  experience.  However,  perhaps  most  glaringly,  the 
interviewee  states  in  his  pitch  for  his  organisation  that  the  BBC  have  little  choice  in  who  to 
source  their  information  from.  Therefore,  in  a  further  attempt  to  legitimate  the  reliance  on 
such  sources,  notions  of  balance  are  discussed  in  the  subsequent  interview  segment  between 
the  BBCOS  presenter  and  the  BBC  Arabic  journalist.  
 
BBCOS  presenter:  Do  we  always  have  to  rely  on  activists  that  are  there?  Is  it  ever 
possible  for  reporters  to  get  in,  in  this  particular  instance  and  what’s  happening  with 
air  strikes? 
 
BBC  Arabic  journalist:  It  is  very  problematic  for  the  reporters  to  go  there  actually 
because  either  they  go  with  the  one  part,  either  they’re  embedded  with  the  Syrian 
regime  troops  and  these  will  show  you  what’s  happening  in  the  western  part  or  you  go 
embedded  with  the  Free  Syrian  Army  let’s  say  or  Jabhat  al-Nusra,  Jabhat  Fateh 
[al-Sham].  Now,  and  this  is  a  problem  as  you  will  see  what’s  happening  in  the  eastern 
part.  This  situation  is  very  loaded  in  terms  of  sectarianism,  very  loaded  with  terms  of 
political  division.  It’s  very  hard  and  difficult  in  a  devastated  situation  like  in  Aleppo  – 
in  all  Syria,  actually.  Activists  are  one  source  erm,  ah  of  the  sources,  as  well  as  the 
official  line.  So  we  try  to  balance  and  listen  to  both  stories.  (BBCOS,  November  11, 
2016) 
 
Noteworthy  is  that  the  threat  to  journalists’  safety  in  accessing  areas  of  conflict  in  Aleppo  is 
not  addressed  directly  in  the  interview  despite  it  being  perhaps  the  most  compelling  practical 
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reason  for  the  lack  of  on-the-ground  reporting  by  professional  journalists.  Rather  surprisingly 
perhaps,  the  argument  being  made  is  that  on-the-ground  reporting  in  this  instance  has  become 
redundant  due  to  the  volume  of  information  released  by  both  sides.  The  interviewee  mentions 
“political  divisions”  and  “sectarianism”,  along  with  the  need  to  embed  reporters  on  either 
side,  as  reasons  why  the  potential  work  done  by  them  would  differ  little  from  the  information 
already  emerging  from  the  conflict.  The  barriers  facing  journalists  in  assuming  an 
autonomous  and  impartial  role  once  embedded  with  a  warring  party  have  been  made  by 
veteran  war  correspondents  such  as  Patrick  Cockburn,  who  writes,  “Journalists  cannot  help 
reflecting  to  some  degree  the  viewpoint  of  the  soldiers  they  are  accompanying.  The  very  fact 
of  being  with  an  occupying  army  means  that  the  journalist  is  confined  to  a  small  and  atypical 
segment  of  the  political-military  battlefield.”  (Cockburn  2010)  As  Cockburn  asserts,  one  of 
the  main  flaws  of  the  practice  of  embedding  is  that  journalists  come  to  view  the  conflict  only 
in  military  terms  missing  the  broader  picture  .  Nevertheless,  there  are  also  defences  for  the 
practice  as  “[a]ccompanying  armies  in  the  field  is  usually  the  only  way  of  finding  out  what 
they  are  doing  or  think  they  are  doing.”  (ibid.  2010)  Criticisms  of  embedded  journalism 
typically  reflect  the  view  that  it  provides  a  limited  and  controlled  view  of  a  small  section  of  a 
conflict  that  is  not  necessarily  reflective  of  the  wider  picture  and  sees  journalists  turn  into 
spokesmen  for  the  military  (Al-Kindi  2004).  The  practice  is  tainted  by  journalists’  instinctive 
sympathy  for  those  they  are  reliant  on  for  their  safety,  leading  to  a  symbiotic  relationship  –  as 
demonstrated  by  Gordon  Dillow’s  account  of  embedding  with  US  Marines  during  the  Iraq 
war  (Dillow  2003).  Nevertheless,  a  survey  of  embedded  journalists  in  the  Iraq  War  have  still 
found  them  to  view  their  role  as  beneficial  to  journalism  (Fahmy  &  Johnson  2005).  This  view 
was  dependent  on  the  understanding  that  their  main  task  was  simply  to  reflect  a  narrow  and 
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incomplete  view  of  the  conflict  that  could  contribute  to  the  broader  picture  when 
complimented  by  the  work  of  non-embedded  journalists.  
 
The  idea  that  embedded  journalists  do  little  more  than  the  public  relations  work  of  the  army 
they  are  embedded  with  has  also  been  contested.  Reviewing  the  practice  of  embedding 
journalists  with  the  US  military,  Buchanan  (2011)  argues  that  there  are  push  and  pull  factors 
that  can  lead  the  media  and  military  interests  to  diverge.  The  media’s  reliance  on  ratings  and 
audiences  means  ultimately  they  are  not  entirely  beholden  to  the  interests  of  the  military  and 
will  seek  out  more  autonomy  and  independence  when  viewers  tire  of  the  dominant  narrative. 
This  paints  a  much  more  complex  picture  of  the  benefits  and  drawbacks  of  the  practice  of 
embedding  journalists  than  what  the  BBC  Arabic  journalist  concedes  in  the  interview. 
Arguing,  as  he  does,  that  journalists  would  merely  be  used  as  pawns  by  the  warring  parties, 
he  suggests  that  balanced  reporting  can  be  obtained  by  simply  weighing  up  the  information 
released  by  opposing  sides.  The  burden  and  responsibility  of  reporting  is  then  shifted  onto 
actors  in  the  conflict  and  activists  on  the  ground  while  their  information  is  ‘managed’  by 
BBC  journalists  in  remote  newsrooms.  Reverting  back  to  the  pro-opposition  activist  users 
relied  on  so  heavily  for  the  news  coverage,  they  are  much  more  than  mere  sources  but  relied 
on  and  legitimised  to  do  the  actual  work  of  journalists.  Moreover,  as  professional  journalists 
are  distanced  from  the  events  they  are  tasked  with  covering  they  become  less  able  to 
contextualise  events  independently,  leaving  activists  and  citizen  journalists  to  fill  not  just  the 
gap  of  reporter  but  also  of  expert.  As  such  they  emerge  as  primary  definers  through  their 
supposed  expertise,  while  their  reporting  role,  together  with  their  means  to  create  high  quality 
multimedia  content,  defines  the  narrative  and  framing  of  events.  His  explanation  does  leave 
one  question  open,  which  is  supported  by  the  cited  research  and  argues  that  while  embedded 
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journalists  may  only  be  able  to  provide  a  narrow  view  of  conflicts  from  within  their  relatively 
controlled  space,  it  can  contribute  to  more  complete  coverage  when  read  in  tandem  with 
coverage  by  other  journalists.  Therefore,  the  BBC  could  have  embedded  journalists  on  either 
side  to  build  up  more  balanced  reporting  but  chose  not  to  likely  due  to  the  increased  targeting 
of  reporters  by  insurgents,  the  rise  of  which  was  already  recorded  in  conflicts  in  Afghanistan 
and  Iraq  (Buchanan  2011,  Cockburn  2010),  and  were  also  a  hallmark  of  the  Syrian  conflict. 
However,  explicitly  acknowledging  this  state  of  affairs  may  have  undermined  the 
representation  of  pro-opposition  activists  and  citizen-journalists  inside  rebel-controlled 
districts  of  Aleppo  as  carrying  out  acts  of  journalism  compatible  with  valued  professional 
practices,  especially  with  respect  to  notions  of  impartiality  and  autonomy.  Media  activists’ 
freedom  to  report  from  east  Aleppo  while  the  area  remained  too  dangerous  for  many  reporters 
at  least  raises  questions  about  their  interest  in  controlling  the  emerging  narrative. 
 
The  BBC’s  claim  to  balance  by  sourcing  information  from  both  sides  is  not  supported  by  the 
data  set,  which  shows  an  overwhelming  preference  for  pro-opposition  social  media  users.  In 
fact,  all  of  the  social  media  users  identified  in  the  sample  were  sympathetic  to  the  rebels. 
Syrian  army  and  Syrian  state  media  were  cited  in  the  news  texts  though  their  content  was  not 
primarily  distributed  through  social  media  and  therefore  is  not  part  of  the  sample  studied  in 
the  research.  Nevertheless,  only  one  of  the  news  texts  analysed  led  with  the  information 
released  by  the  Syrian  government  or  a  source  sympathetic  towards  the  Syrian  government. 
The  remaining  news  texts  all  led  with  activist  sources,  or  juxtapose  activist  sources  with 
pro-government  sources  creating  a  frame  that  undermines  the  latter.  
Objectivity 
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Above  all  else,  the  findings  in  this  case  study  raise  questions  about  the  autonomy  of  news 
organisations  in  the  newswork.  Where  does  the  treatment  of  openly  partisan  sources  as 
journalist-like  leave  the  objectivity  norm?  Objectivity  as  a  normative  practice  in  journalism 
emerged  in  the  early  part  of  the  20th  century  and  is  based  in  a  scientific  approach  (eg.  see 
Janowitz  1975;  Shoemaker  &  Reese  1996)  to  determining  an  objective  truth  about  events  that 
are  deemed  newsworthy.  “The  objectivity  norm  has  been  the  means  employed  by  journalists 
to  convince  receivers  that  they  produce  reliable  and  valid  descriptions  of  reality.  This 
legitimating  function  has  made  objectivity  a  beacon  which  guides  the  work  journalists  do  – 
when  they  select,  collect,  and  present  the  news.”  (Skovsgaard  et  al.  2015,  p.  24)  The  claim  to 
objectivity  has  been  criticised  on  several  counts  but  nevertheless  the  ambition  to  report 
objectively  persists  as  a  cornerstone  of  professional  practice.  One  obvious  flaw  is  the  inherent 
subjectivity  of  the  individual  that  critics  argue  reduces  objectivity  to  an  unachievable  ideal. 
Nevertheless,  the  development  of  normative  practices  in  journalism  sought  to  create  a  method 
which  removed  journalists’  subjectivity  from  the  output  of  their  work  in  order  to  permit  a 
claim  to  neutrality  and  objectivity.  Emphasis  was  put  on  the  practice  not  the  individual  and 
what  was  developed  was  “[u]nity  of  method  rather  than  aim”  (Kovach  and  Rosenstiel,  2007: 
84).  By  recognising  the  inevitability  of  personal  and  cultural  bias,  a  code  of  practice  allowed 
subjective  individuals  to  produce  work  that  was  not  just  deemed  objectively  true,  but  also 
permitted  subjective  views  to  be  argued  in  a  manner  that  would  stand  up  to  scrutiny. 
Therefore,  the  objectivity  norm  did  not  only  set  out  to  report  in  a  neutral  way  but  also  to 
allow  a  method  by  which  arguments  could  be  formed.  By  emphasising  the  manner  by  which 
sources  produced  their  information  rather  than  the  beliefs,  views  and  motivations  of  the 
sources  themselves,  the  BBC,  for  example,  could  present  the  SOHR  as  a  reliable  source 
despite  the  founder’s  personal  history  as  a  dissident.  In  short,  the  description  of  his  impartial 
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methods  served  to  legitimise  him  as  producing  valuable  journalistic  work.  The  discussion  of 
the  sources’  newsgathering  practices  served  to  lay  claim  to  a  commitment  to  professionally 
sound,  approved  practices . 36
 
However,  the  claim  to  objectivity  evidently  still  remained  an  issue  for  the  news  organisations, 
judging  by  the  loaded  term  ‘activist’  frequently  used  to  describe  the  users  that  much  of  the 
reporting  was  effectively  outsourced  to.  As  the  objectivity  norm  diminishes  in  news  content 
with  the  spread  of  amateur  and  citizen-journalism  (eg.  see  Carpenter,  2008),  news 
organisations  are  at  pains  to  elevate  their  value  through  claims  to  professional  practices. 
Therefore,  another  method  of  legitimising  their  reporting  was  with  the  claim  to  providing 
balance  –  another  professional  practice  aimed  towards  producing  objective  reporting 
(Shoemaker  and  Reese  1996,  p.  15).  In  this  case,  the  role  of  the  news  organisation  itself  was 
emphasised  to  argue  it  met  the  requirements  of  professional  practices.  In  the  BBC  Outside 
Source  interview,  for  example,  a  claim  to  balance  was  made  by  arguing  readers  were 
provided  with  the  different  sides  of  the  story  through  information  released  from  both 
anti-Assad  and  Syrian  government  and  military  sources.  By  producing  ‘balanced’  reporting, 
meaning  a  range  of  opposing  views  are  represented  and  heard,  journalists  adopt  a  passive  role 
in  creating  meaning.  Rather  than  steering  audiences  through  value  judgements  made  by 
journalists,  audiences  are  provided  with  an  array  of  information  from  which  to  form  their 
own  opinions.  Balance  through  the  mere  presentation  of  opposing  voices,  however,  is  not 
considered  sufficient  to  provide  good  reporting.  The  claims  made  by  them  have  to  be 
scrutinised  and  critically  engaged  with  to  test  them  for  validity  (Ryan,  2001;  Skovsgaard  et 
al.,  2015).  Only  then  can  audiences  reach  informed  conclusions.  Therefore,  journalists  are 
36  Despite  much  academic  research  providing  evidence  to  the  contrary. 
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still  called  on  to  do  the  work  of  gathering  hard  facts  and  considering  opposing  claims  and 
arguments.  In  terms  of  social  media-sourced  content  that  clearly  dominated  news  coverage  of 
events  in  east  Aleppo,  these  hard  facts  could  in  most  cases  not  be  obtained  independently 
through  journalists  reporting  as  detached  observers  from  the  ground,  or  from  what  would 
constitute  an  independent  source.  Aside  from  the  data  showing  a  preference  for 
pro-opposition  activists  in  sourcing  multimedia  material  and  news  updates,  suggesting 
balance  of  viewpoints  was  often  not  achieved,  critical  engagement  with  sources  was  almost 
impossible.  This  risked  reducing  coverage  to  unverifiable  claims  and  counter-claims. 
 
The  departure  from  the  objectivity  norm  in  online  news  was  already  predicted  by  Bruns 
(2003)  who  argued  that  gatewatching,  rather  than  gatekeeping,  would  become  the  method  by 
which  information  is  vetted  and  distributed  to  wider  audiences.  As  news  organisations 
grappled  with  their  obligation  to  produce  coverage  in  line  with  their  professional  standards 
while  outsourcing  much  of  the  reporting  to  amateurs,  the  gatekeepers  ultimately  became 
gatewatchers,  choosing  which  sources  would  be  elevated  to  prominence  for  their  audiences. 
Bruns  (ibid)  argued  that  interactive  newsgathering  will  make  objectivity  an  obsolete  ideal  and 
normative  practice.  With  the  abundance  of  information  available  online  the  onus  is  no  longer 
on  a  limited  number  of  news  outlets  to  produce  objective  journalism.  Rather,  the  information 
saturation  rather  than  scarcity  means  gatewatching  replaces  gatekeeping.  Hereby,  groups  of 
“online  librarians”  survey  relevant  and  reliable  information  emerging  and  point  those  seeking 
this  information  towards  it.  
 
Online  news  operations  are  therefore  not  primarily  charged  with  an  obligation  to 
report  objectively  and  impartially,  or  to  work  to  a  set  amount  of  column  inches  or 
airtime,  but  rather  with  the  task  of  evaluating  what  is  ‘reliable’  information  in  all  the 
topical  fields  they  cover.  Due  to  the  abundance  of  potential  news  sources  in  the 
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networked  environment  of  the  World  Wide  Web,  such  information  evaluation 
becomes  a  critical  task,  and  for  many  online  newsgatherers  their  role  is  less  similar  to 
that  of  the  traditional  journalist  than  it  is  to  that  of  the  specialist  librarian,  who 
constantly  surveys  what  information  becomes  available  in  a  variety  of  media  and 
serves  as  a  guide  to  the  most  relevant  sources  when  approached  by 
information-seekers.  This  ‘librarian’  position  contrasts  markedly  with  that  of  the 
traditional  ideal  of  the  ‘disinterested’  gatekeeper-journalist  –  instead,  Internet 
‘librarians’  (if  we  accept  this  term  for  now)  are  usually  personally  involved,  ‘of  the 
people’,  and  partisan;  they  support  the  case  of  those  seeking  information  rather  than 
that  of  the  information  providers  or  controllers.  (ibid) 
 
Bruns  is  clear,  however,  that  these  librarians  are  not  reporting,  rather  they  are  collecting  texts. 
He  predicted  that  newsrooms  themselves  will  host  a  collaboration  between  traditional 
journalists  and  such  gatewatchers.  This  integration  of  the  gatewatcher  into  newsrooms  is 
supported  by  the  evidence  in  this  case  study.  As  the  BBC  Arabic  editor  himself  suggests  in 
the  interview,  journalists  adopted  primarily  a  gatewatching  role,  gathering  texts  released  on 
both  sides  of  the  conflict.  The  news  texts  by  France  24  and  Al  Jazeera  showed  a  similar 
reliance  on  such  material.  In  addition  to  carrying  out  the  work  of  the  gatewacher,  newsrooms 
also  relied  heavily  on  other  non-journalist  gatewatchers  such  as  the  Syrian  Observatory  for 
Human  Rights.  In  this  case  study,  in  fact,  the  journalists  largely  abandoned  their  traditional 
role  as  those  reporting  the  news  but  acted  as  the  conduits  through  which  other  sources’ 
information  was  distributed.  Gatewatching  was  deemed  sufficient  to  produce  coverage  to 
professional  standards.The  editor  in  the  interview  expressed  a  striving  for  balance  that  he 
asserts  is  provided  by  listening  to  voices  on  different  sides  of  the  conflict.  While  balance  is 
generally  not  considered  equivalent  to  the  idea  of  impartiality  and  objectivity  (Kovach  and 
Rosenstiel  2007)  the  sourcing  in  news  items  also  showed  an  extensive  reliance  on 
pro-opposition  activists  and  citizen-journalists  that,  at  least  in  the  period  investigated,  did  not 
support  claims  to  balance.  As  Bruns  argues  though  that  the  role  of  the  newsgatherer  is  not  to 
ensure  impartiality,  balance  or  objectivity  in  each  text  they  help  distribute  further.  Rather 
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gatewatchers  help  collect  as  wide  a  range  of  reliable  texts  as  possible,  which  viewed  as  a 
whole  may  provide  the  greatest  and  most  up-to-date  amount  of  information  on  a  given  topic. 
However,  in  the  case  of  the  Syrian  war,  the  ability  to  release  information  was  arguably 
limited,  not  least  with  regards  to  the  technological  means  and  know-how  to  produce  and 
distribute  their  own  material  in  a  way  that  made  it  widely  accessible.  The  lack  of 
transparency  in  the  sources  themselves  also  meant  that  the  “specialist  librarians”  –  meaning 
the  newsroom  editors  using  the  content  –  had  little  means  to  assess  the  worth  and  reliability 
of  the  texts.  Implicit  in  the  online  news  environment  that  Bruns  describes  is  the  expectation 
of  extreme  diversity  as  well  as  freedom  of  speech,  which  replaces  impartiality.  Yet,  again 
there  was  no  way  to  be  sure  that  either  such  diversity  or  freedom  of  speech  existed.  As 
veteran  Middle  East  correspondent  Cockburn  (2016)  pointed  out,  it  seems  implausible  that  in 
an  area  largely  off  limits  to  independent  journalists,  citizen  journalists  would  be  granted  any 
autonomy  to  report  independently .  This  is  not  to  argue  that  the  reporting  by  activists  was 37
without  merit  or  accuracy  but  that  the  information  released  may  have  been  tightly  controlled 
and  incomplete. 
 
As  Hall  et  al.  (1978)  argue,  creating  authoritative  and  accredited  sources  is  vital  to  satisfying 
professional  routines  in  journalism.  This  systematically  implants  bias  in  favour  of  these 
sources  into  news  texts  as  they  are  influential  in  deciding  which  issues  are  problematised  and 
37  Others  have  questioned  widespread  criticism  of  some  of  the  activists  reporting,  specifically  White 
Helmets,  uncovering  a  concerted  effort  to  delegitimise  the  group  through  online  campaigns  (Solon, 
2017).  However,  the  issues  raised  here  are  not  in  reference  to  misinformation  campaigns  against  the 
White  Helmets  but  rather  how  much  the  reporting  done  by  the  group  can  credibly  be  argued  to  step  in 
for  the  absence  of  independent  professional  journalists. 
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how  they  are  framed  and  discussed.  A  number  of  activist  sources  achieved  this  position  to  the 
extent  that  they  were  elevated  above  sources  that  may  have  been  more  conventionally 
considered  primary  source  such  as  the  Syrian  government  or  army.  While  the  Syrian 
government  was  understood  and  portrayed  as  inherently  biased,  activists  adopted  a  hybrid 
role  of  the  disinterested  expert/war  correspondent,  which  gave  them  a  powerful  voice  in  the 
news  coverage.  By  framing  these  sources  in  such  a  way,  the  news  organisations  managed  to 
not  only  produce  large  volumes  of  news  coverage  on  events  that  were  practically  off-limits 
but  could  use  it  as  a  chance  to  advocate  for  professional  practices  by  bringing  the  issue  to 
audience’s  awareness. 
Summary 
 
Holzscheiter  (2005)  differentiates  between  power  in  discourse  and  power  over  discourse.  In 
this  study,  power  in  the  discourse  of  the  news  event  was  often  held  by  activists.  This  also 
largely  held  true  of  the  power  over  the  discourse  as  activists  were  almost  the  only  sources 
who  were  able  to  report  from  inside  east  Aleppo.  If  the  news  organisations  covered  the  events 
in  east  Aleppo,  they  had  to  relinquish  much  journalistic  control  to  activists,  who  provided  a 
large  extent  of  the  material  that  comprised  the  news  coverage.  However,  power  in  the 
discourse  of  professional  journalism  in  collaborative  news  production  was  dominated  by  the 
news  organisation,  and  this  was  achieved  through  the  admission  of  citizen  journalists  who 
were  perceived  to  carry  out  acts  of  journalism  according  to  professional  norms.  Therefore, 
the  hierarchy  of  the  concept  of  professionalism  over  amateurism  was  maintained  through  the 
legitimising  of  citizen  journalists  through  professional  norms. 
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Citizen  activists  oftentimes  took  on  the  role  of  reporters  in  the  coverage  of  the  Battle  for 
Aleppo  and  were  required  to  appear  to  adopt  journalistic  norms,  such  as  impartiality  (Yousuf 
&  Taylor  2016) ,  as  well  as  a  level  of  transparency  around  the  origins  of  their  news  content 
(Andén-Papadopoulos  &  Pantti  2013) .  Although  they  were  frequently  described  as  ‘activists’, 
there  was  little  discussion  of  what  this  term  meant  and  especially  in  the  BBC  and  Al  Jazeera 
coverage  was  no  barrier  to  heavily  influencing  the  news  narrative.  As  such  citizen  activists 
were  very  powerful  not  just  as  primary  definers  but  also  secondary  definers  as  they  were  able 
to  select  what  information  and  sources  inside  east  Aleppo  were  given  coverage.  For  example, 
they  often  gave  prominence  to  images  of  the  civilian  cost  of  the  conflict,  while  giving  little 
insight  into  the  military  activity  of  the  opposition  fighters.  
 
While  the  news  organisations  acted  as  secondary  definers  by  providing  access  to  the  global 
news  flow,  media  activists  already  possessed  this  access  through  social  media  alone.  News 
organisations,  in  fact,  had  very  little  power  to  mediate  these  messages.  The  extensive  use  of 
news  content  produced  by  media  activists  and  the  legitimising  of  this  content  through  the 
discourse  of  professional  journalism  meant  they  took  on  more  than  a  simple  primary  definer 
role.  In  a  collaborative  news  environment  such  as  this,  the  news  production  by  professional 
journalists  could  not  be  isolated  from  that  of  the  citizen  activist.  While  steps  were  taken  to 
make  news  content  accessible  and  valuable  to  mainstream  news  media  the  personal 
motivations,  connections,  circumstances  and  sources  of  citizen  activists  usually  remained 
opaque.  This  differs  from  traditional  ideas  of  primary  definers  such  as  ruling  politicians. 
Primary  definers,  with  the  exception  of  the  ‘expert’,  are  not  deferred  to  for  their  perceived 
adoption  of  journalistic  ethics  and  values.  Whereas  the  Syrian  regime,  its  state-controlled 
media  and  the  Russian  government  were  framed  as  biased  with  narratives  that  could  be 
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contested  by  others,  the  framing  of  citizen-activists’  content  as  providing  impartial  and 
authentic  reports  framed  them  not  only  as  more  valuable  sources  but  also  as  fellow 
journalists. 
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8.  Interviews:  making  sense  of  networked  journalism 
 
Interviews  with  editors  at  the  three  news  organisations  attempted  to  investigate  the  role  that 
interactive  newsgathering  played  in  news  production  in  each  of  the  newsrooms.  Analysis  of 
the  themes  and  issues  raised  by  the  editors  in  these  interviews  aimed  to  help  me  interpret  the 
findings  in  the  previous  three  chapters.  The  questions  discussed  revolved  around  the  aim  and 
purpose  that  was  pursued  with  networked  journalism,  and  what  defined  the  rationale  behind 
interactive  newsgathering  in  professional  newswork.  Specifically,  it  explored  whether  news 
organisations  acknowledged  the  use  of  social  media-sourced  material  as  a  means  to  involve 
audiences  and  foster  participation.  Consistent  with  the  methodology  throughout  the  case 
studies,  the  interviews  compared  the  organisations’  perceptions  of  their  use  of  collaborative 
newswork  in  the  context  of  their  respective  media  models  and  culture.  Therefore,  it  compared 
and  contrasted  how  editors  responsible  for  defining  the  processes  behind  networked 
journalism  were  led  by  the  media  model  of  their  organisation.  In  doing  so,  the  interviews 
attempted  to  investigate  the  differences  found  in  the  case  studies.  To  a  large  extent  this  meant 
discussing  how  professional  routines  were  adapted  to  the  practice  of  interactive 
newsgathering  and  explored  power-relations  between  non-journalists  and  the  news 
organisation.  Most  importantly,  it  sought  to  explore  how  editors  viewed  their  role  in 
managing  these  interactions.  Since  this  research  investigates  the  potential  shift  of  power  in 
who  can  influence  and  participate  in  the  global  news  flow,  the  interviews  sought  to  explore 
how  the  news  organisations  perceived  their  position  in  managing  audience  participation  and 
to  what  end.  A  particular  focus  was  placed  on  the  process  of  gatekeeping  and  how  routines 
were  adapted  to  create  hierarchy  in  source  power.  So,  for  example,  did  editors  perceive 
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interactive  newsgathering  primarily  as  a  way  to  gather  information  from  accredited  sources? 
Was  collaborative  newswork  understood  foremost  as  a  means  to  engage  audiences?  Or  was  it 
perceived  as  a  means  for  pooling  –  or  crowdsourcing  –  information  from  peers  in  a  fast  paced 
real-time  news  environment?  Particular  attention  was  paid  to  the  perception  of  audience 
participation  in  interactive  newsgathering,  which  meant  the  participation  of  users  that  were 
not  accredited  sources  or  professional  journalists.  What  role,  if  any,  could  they  play  in 
agenda-setting  and  how  were  they  most  likely  to  draw  the  attention  of  news  organisations? 
 
Exploring  gatekeeping  practices  at  the  organisations  was  the  main  focus  to  determine  the 
power-relationship  created  in  interactive  newsgathering.  Therefore,  questions  asked  included: 
 
1. Has  social  media,  in  your  opinion,  broadened  access  to  news  coverage  for  specific 
groups  over  others? 
2. What  qualities  should  social  media  content  possess  to  access  the  mainstream  news 
flow? 
3. What  are  the  main  impediments  to  the  use  of  user-generated  content  in  news 
coverage? 
4. If  you  were  to  define  how  a  citizen  journalist  or  eye-witness  was  to  most  easily  gain 
your  attention  with  their  content  to  have  it  covered,  what  would  that  be? 
 
Interviews  are  an  established  method  in  journalism  research  and  can  serve  to  “explore  and 
analyze  the  various  ways  in  which  [expert  professionals]  give  meaning  to  their  everyday 
work”  (Deuze,  2005).  The  use  of  interviews  assumes  a  degree  of  reflexivity  in  how 
professionals  view  the  role  of  social  media  in  newsgathering  and  news  production.  They  were 
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considered  a  suitable  way  to  investigate  the  editors’  perceptions  and  intentions,  and  provided 
a  means  to  investigate  how  these  were  reflected  in  the  findings  of  the  case  studies.  The 
findings  of  the  case  studies  were  used  to  explore  how  consistent  the  news  texts  were  with 
how  professionals  rationalised  networked  journalism  practices.  In  turn,  this  made  it  possible 
to  investigate  divergences  between  the  findings  in  the  case  studies  and  the  reflection  on  the 
use  of  collaborative  newsgathering.  
 
Questions  posed  to  the  interviewees  especially  explored  issues  around  power-relations 
between  social  media  sources  and  news  organisations  by  discussing  gatekeeping  practices, 
audience  participation  and  agenda  setting.  This  tied  into  the  three  research  questions  set  out 
in  the  methodology  chapter.  
 
RQ1:  Is  social  media  sourcing  affecting  the  identities  and  power  relationship  between 
primary  and  secondary  definers? 
 
RQ2:   How  do  professional  journalists  create  and  articulate  professional  boundaries  in  the 
participation  by  non-authoritative  citizen  voices/audiences? 
 
RQ3:  What  mechanisms  do  professional  journalists  use  to  maintain  their  gatekeeping  role? 
 
The  interviewees  were  asked  a  mix  of  general  questions  about  the  approach  to  interactive 
newsgathering  by  their  respective  organisations,  and  questions  exploring  some  of  the  findings 
of  the  case  studies  that  were  tailored  to  each  of  the  news  organisations.  General  questions 
posed  were,  for  example,  whether  there  was  a  strategy  or  process  in  place  for  how  each 
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organisation  approached  collaborative  newsgathering.  They  explored  how  these  processes 
may  or  may  not  tie  into  the  media  model  or  culture  of  the  respective  organisation,  and 
whether  there  was  an  explicit  commitment  to  uphold  this  culture  in  networked  journalism 
routines.  As  laid  out  in  the  methodology  chapter  each  news  organisation  is  embedded  in  a 
specific  media  model  and  ethos  and  contextualised  with  this  in  mind.  Therefore,  this  section 
of  the  interview  allowed  to  compare  and  contrast  the  organisations  according  to  those  models. 
Case  study  specific  questions  delved  into  the  differences  between  the  organisations  but 
explored  each  organisations’  routines  in  their  own  context.  The  interviewees  at  the  BBC  and 
France  24  were  asked  about  some  of  the  reasons  for  relying  on  conventional  authoritative 
news  sources  on  social  media,  whereas  the  interview  with  Al  Jazeera  explored  the  use  of 
non-authoritative  sources. 
 
The  interviews  were  conducted  in  the  last  three  months  of  2015  and  first  half  of  2016, 
following  conclusion  of  the  first  two  case  studies  on  the  Greek  debt  crisis  and  the  refugee 
crisis.  This  meant  the  Aleppo  case  study  did  not  feature  in  the  questions.  All  three  editors 
were  contacted  by  email  and  agreed  to  be  interviewed  for  this  research.  As  the  interviewees 
were  located  in  San  Francisco,  Paris  and  London,  the  interviews  were  carried  out  by 
telephone  or  Viber.  They  lasted  between  25  and  30  minutes  and  consisted  of  open-ended 
questions. 
 
The  first  part  of  the  interviews  explored  topics  specific  to  the  respective  news  organisation, 
including  the  role  of  the  news  organisations’  culture  in  their  overall  approach  to  interactive 
newsgathering.  They  also  sought  insight  into  the  reasons  for  the  findings  of  the  case  studies. 
The  second  part  explored  sourcing  criteria  of  social  media  content.  This  included  questions 
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about  what  qualities  or  attributes  were  desirable  in  social  media-sourced  material  for  news; 
what  might  prevent  certain  social  media  content  from  being  used;  and  how  important  the 
editors  perceived  professional  guidelines  or  training  for  interactive  newsgathering. 
 
The  interviews  were  conducted  with  BBC  social  media  editor  Mark  Frankel,  France  24 
Observers  editor  Julien  Pain,  and  AJPlus  executive  producer  Ethar  El-Katatney.  Six  main 
themes  emerged.  All  of  them  were  consistent  with  the  main  themes  that  emerged  from  the 
case  study  content  analysis.  They  were:  
 
i)  An  organisation-specific  social  media  strategy 
ii)  Agenda-setting  qualities  in  social  media-sourced  material 
iii)  Audience  participation 
iv)  Format  of  the  professional  news  product 
v)  The  role  of  different  social  media  platforms  in  networked  journalism 
vi)  Verification  of  newswork  by  non-journalists 
Strategy 
 
The  first  theme  discussed  in  the  interviews  was  whether  each  organisation  had  a  defined 
strategy  or  approach  to  the  use  of  social  media  and  what  it  comprised.  The  discussion  of  a 
defined  strategy  was  framed  in  the  context  of  the  organisations’  ethos,  as  it  was  discussed  in 
the  methodology,  and  also  analysed  with  the  organisations’  respective  media  model  in  mind. 
The  aim  was  to  explore  the  main  uses  and  meaning  that  collaborative  newsgathering  had  for 
the  organisations.  The  question  was  open-ended  and  non-directed  and  produced  responses 
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that  described  two  different  approaches  to  social  media  use  for  the  news  organisations.  The 
first  involved  the  distribution  of  the  organisations’  own  news  products  to  audiences  on  social 
media  platforms  and  the  second  was  about  collaborative  newsgathering  and  newswork.  From 
the  editors’  point  of  view  these  two  uses  for  social  media  were  understood  as  distinct  and 
separate  from  each  other.  This  indicated  that  collaborative  newswork  did  not  directly  entail 
the  audiences  of  the  news  organisations  in  one  sense.  In  another  though,  it  did  not  chime  with 
the  findings  of  some  of  the  case  studies  that  newsgathering  and  distribution  could  also  be 
strongly  interlinked  when  it  involved  the  networked  journalists  at  BBC  and  France  24.  Both 
outlets  did  not  only  source  content  from  third  parties,  which  was  then  redistributed  through 
their  own  channels.  Especially  the  BBC,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  France  24,  used  their  own 
correspondents  as  social  media  sources  and  distribution  channels  simultaneously.  Therefore, 
the  strict  separation  between  sourcing  and  distribution  could  not  be  identified  as  BBC 
journalists  could  act  both  as  distributors  of  their  newswork  (which  is  simultaneously  BBC 
newswork)  and  act  as  sources  for  BBC  coverage  through  their  Twitter  activity  with  the  same 
material.  Nevertheless,  both  Frankel  and  Pain  conceptualised  the  two  uses  of  social  media  by 
their  organisations  as  separate.  In  the  following  extract  Pain  discussed  how  different  teams 
were  designated  for  the  different  uses  of  social  media. 
 
At  France  24,  we  had  basically  two  teams.  There  was  one  team  that  is  more  about 
community  management  so  they  were  publishing  only  articles,  videos  we  produced 
and  pushing  it  online  and  social  media  platforms  and  adapting  it  to  every  platform, 
and  then  interacting  with  the  audience;  answering  questions  and  emmm  sometimes 
gathering  questions  from  the  audience  and  transferring  it  to  the  journalist.  But  that 
was  about  it.  It’s  just  community  management.  There  was  another  team,  which  I 
handled,  the  Observers  where  we  were  engaging  more  with  the  audience,  so  meaning 
if  you  take  the  refugee  crisis  for  example,  we  were  trying  to  spot  refugees  who  were 
tweeting  and  posting  things  on  Facebook  and  trying  to  ask  them  to  sometimes  do 
more  with  us;  to  answer  questions,  to  produce  videos  –  showing  their  trips,  showing 
their  problems.  And  then  we  had  a  full  team  of  journalists  actually  editing  their 
content  and  producing  specific  video  and  text  based  on  these  UGC.  And  that’s  really 
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two  different  things;  a  team  of  journalists  and  a  team  of  community  managers.  (J. 
Pain,  phone  interview,  July  5,  2016)  
 
 
In  terms  of  the  internal  workflow,  the  France  24  editor  spoke  of  community  management 
(meaning  news  distribution  and  interaction  with  audiences  through  the  France  24  social 
media  accounts)  as  carried  out  by  a  different  team  of  journalists  to  those  engaging  in 
collaborative  newsgathering.  Moreover,  these  two  roles  are  understood  as  requiring  different 
expertise  and  skill  sets.  This  suggests  that  audience  feedback  and  engagement  is  kept  separate 
from  the  everyday  work  of  journalists  who  source  newsworthy  material  through  social  media. 
Although  some  of  the  feedback  may  be  redirected  to  journalists  and  editors,  they  are  one  step 
removed  from  this  interaction.  Interactive  newsgathering  then  is  not  responsive  to  the 
audience  of  France  24  and  their  engagement  with  the  news  organisation  through  social  media 
channels,  but  is  shaped  by  a  proactive  approach  by  journalists  seeking  out  content  deemed 
worthy  of  news  coverage.  The  selection  process  for  content  primarily  results  from  the  news 
values  defined  by  France  24  journalists  –  although  in  exceptional  circumstances  it  may  be 
influenced  by  the  two-way  communication  with  the  audience.  However,  while  there  are  some 
allowances  made  for  the  audience’s  feedback,  the  audience  is  managed  and  kept  at  a  distance 
from  newswork  process.  Professionals  can  often  refer  to  social  media  users  as  audiences  in  a 
general  term  (see  Frankel),  but  the  audience  targeted  by  community  managers  and  referred  to 
by  Pain  is  solely  the  audience  of  France  24’s  news  products.  This  audience  is  clearly  defined 
through,  for  example,  the  number  of  followers  of  France  24’s  Facebook  or  Twitter  accounts 
but  may  also  grow  and  change  for  each  news  item  that  is  shared  by  followers.  While  there  is 
some  receptiveness  in  these  interactions,  the  primary  objective  for  community  managers  is 
the  marketing  of  news  products  on  social  media  since  community  management  in  most  cases 
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entails  distributing  France  24’s  newswork  and  engaging  with  responses  to  them  to  foster  a 
relationship  with  audiences  that  may  encourage  audience  loyalty.  Largely,  users  among  this 
audience  are  not  those  that  news  content  is  sourced  from.  In  this  scenario,  community 
managers  navigate  social  media  mainly  as  a  “many-to-many”  broadcasting  platform  (Kwak  et 
al,  2010)  where  the  main  flow  of  information  is  uni-directional.  The  separation  of  audience 
engagement  and  collaborative  newsgathering,  both  in  professional  roles  and  workflows, 
shows  the  structural  limitations  to  the  two-way  flow  of  information  between  the  news 
organisation  and  its  audience.  With  one  eye  on  audience  responses  to  engage  where  necessary 
or  desirable,  actual  audience  participation  in  news  production  remains  the  exception  with 
mechanisms  in  place  to  enable  effective  gatekeeping.  This  is  not  to  say  that  these  mechanisms 
are  only  deliberately  limiting  audience  participation  but  could  also  result  from  a  lack  of 
resources  to  monitor  and  relay  feedback  to  journalists.  However,  the  fact  remains  that 
throughout  the  case  studies,  there  was  little  evidence  of  responsiveness  to  audiences  in  the 
news  items  themselves  or  the  inclusion  of  content  produced  by  France  24’s  social  media 
audience.  Being  an  engaged  member  of  France  24’s  audience  on  social  media  platforms 
therefore  offers  little  opportunity  to  be  heard  by  its  newsroom  and  influence  news  coverage  in 
a  way  substantially  different  from  how  TV  ratings  do. 
 
The  BBC  social  media  editor  also  described  two  distinct  roles  for  social  media  in  news 
production.  Again,  one  of  them  is  the  distribution  of  BBC’s  news  content  and  the  other  is  the 
sourcing  of  user-generated  content  for  its  news  coverage.  However,  Frankel  also  described 
interactive  newsgathering  as  audience  involvement.  This  suggests  that,  unlike  France  24,  the 
BBC  conceives  of  collaborative  newswork  in  itself  as  a  form  of  community  management  by 
involving  audiences.  Yet,  as  the  case  studies  showed,  there  was  little  evidence  of  directly 
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involving  BBC  audiences  on  a  particular  piece  of  news  coverage.  Rather  social  media  users, 
some  of  whom  may  be  considered  the  wider  target  audience  of  the  BBC  World  Service,  were 
represented  in  the  news  texts.  There  was  no  identifiable  link  between  the  users  and  the  BBC. 
 
I  think  that  there  is  a  sort  of  misnomer  about  UGC,  that  UGC  is  all  about  something 
that  is  just  of  the  moment.  Actually,  no,  UGC  is  the  audience.  It’s  involving  our 
audience  in  any  aspect  of  our  journalism.  So  that  can  be  both  planned  or  reactive.  (M. 
Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
While  the  BBC  had  mechanisms  by  which  it  invited  comment  and  engagement  from 
audiences  on  social  media,  there  was  again  little  evidence  of  this  content  being  used  in  the 
news  texts  of  the  Greek  debt  crisis  and  refugee  crisis  case  studies.  In  part  this  may  have  been 
because  there  was  little  response  to  the  BBC’s  calls  for  engagement.  Therefore,  Frankel’s 
description  of  audience  involvement  may  more  accurately  describe  the  incorporation  of 
content  created  by  users  who  have  no  identifiable  reason  to  be  involved.  In  that  sense,  like 
France  24,  journalists  retain  full  control  over  gatekeeping  as  users  are  unable  to  determine 
how  their  content  is  used  in  newswork.  This  type  of  user  involvement  cannot  be  described  as 
citizen  participation  in  the  normative  sense  as  it  would  require  the  users’  own  deliberate 
involvement  in  the  newswork  and  power  for  them  to  directly  select  news  topics  and  frame 
news  texts.  Therefore,  to  a  great  extent  audience  participation  in  news  production  appears  to 
be  about  animating  and  engaging  users  who  the  BBC  wishes  to  attract  with  its  news 
coverage. 
 
In  the  first  two  case  studies,  power  to  select  content  remained  solely  in  the  hands  of  the  news 
organisations  and  involvement  of  non-elites  was  ad  hoc.  By  contrast,  in  the  Aleppo  case 
study,  the  power  to  select  information  and  frame  the  conflict  was  significantly  weighted  in 
257 
favour  of  amateurs.  Framing  has  been  described  by  Tankard  et  al  (1991)  as   ‘‘the  central 
organizing  idea  for  news  content  that  supplies  a  context  and  suggests  what  the  issue  is 
through  the  use  of  selection,  emphasis,  exclusion,  and  elaboration”  (Reese  2001,  p.  10).  The 
content  creators  were  clearly  seeking  out  access  to  the  global  news  flow  and  were  presenting 
and  distributing  their  multimedia  material  targeted  at  international  news  organisations. 
Collaborative  newswork  was  deliberate  and  power  in  this  relationship  was  not  necessarily  in 
the  hands  of  the  news  organisations.  However,  it  is  difficult  to  argue  that  these  users  can  be 
understood  as  audiences  of  the  news  organisations  in  question.  The  BBC  was  likely  not  trying 
to  speak  to  a  predominantly  Syrian  audience  when  covering  events  in  Syria.   If  the  findings 
of  the  case  studies  are  applied  to  the  concept  of  audience  involvement,  this  concept  is 
arguably  so  loose  to  render  it  meaningless.  It  is  not  clear  if  these  are  BBC  audiences,  or 
anyone  who  may  be  part  of  a  news  audience  anywhere  at  any  time.  If  audiences  involvement 
was  the  driving  factor  behind  the  findings  of  the  first  two  case  studies,  this  audience  would 
primarily  consist  of  professionals  journalists  and  accredited  sources,  followed  by 
non-accredited  sources.  Therefore,  the  term  audience  involvement  appears  to  have  been  used 
as  little  more  than  a  catch-all  phrase  without  much  analysis  of  what  it  means  in  practice  and 
whether  it  is  applicable.  Nevertheless,  it  may  signal  an  intent.  The  use  of  the  term  ‘audience’ 
throughout  the  interview  strongly  implied  that  this  group  is  largely  perceived  to  be  private 
non-accredited  sources  —  in  other  words  non-elite  voices.  Frankel  described  the  emergence 
of  audience  involvement  as  a  response  to  the  abandoning  of  traditional  forms  of  news 
consumption  that  has  resulted  in  a  lack  of  audience  loyalty  and  forced  news  organisations  to 
find  new  ways  to  engage  with  audiences.  Specifically,  this  means  an  awareness  of  the  shift 
from  a  one-to-many  news  distribution  model  as  seen  in  broadcasting,  to  a  news  environment 
where  outlets  need  to  actively  seek  out  new  audiences  through  engagement  on  social  media 
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platforms.  This  suggests  that  audience  engagement  through  social  media  is  not  only 
understood  as  using  new  technological  platforms  to  distribute  news  products  but  also  as 
building  new  relationships  with  news  audiences,  entailing  their  involvement  and  reciprocal 
communication.  
 
I  think  the  way  to  look  at  it  is  to  say  that  people’s  approach  to  information  has  shifted, 
in  that  there  isn’t  this  kind  of  complete  loyalty  to  one  medium.  If  you  were  to  go  back 
20  or  30  years  people  were  very  loyal  television  users  or  radio  consumers,  or  the 
paper  industry  was  in  ruder  health  in  those  days.  And  I  think  that’s  changed  or  being 
challenged  [...]  especially  amongst  our  younger  audience,  there  is  no  longer  that 
loyalty  [...]  to  one  form  of  news  distribution  and  increasingly  people  have  seen  [...] 
the  smartphone’s  growing  predominance  both  as  a  phone  and  as  a  computer,  if  you 
like,  as  a  portal  to  the  outside  world,  become  less  committed  to  the  consumption  of 
news  in  a  traditional;  and  linear  way.  And  we’ve  had  to  think  of  a  whole  host  of 
different  ways  of  reaching  and  engaging  them.  One  of  those  is  through  social  media 
and  so  social  media  is  a  bigger  part  of  our  world  as  a  consequence.  (M.  Frankel, 
phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
  
According  to  Frankel,  the  ability  not  just  to  speak  to  audiences  through  social  media 
platforms  but  the  willingness  to  listen  and  be  influenced  by  them  is  what  it  takes  to  remain 
relevant  in  the  digital  news  environment.  Engagement  and  involvement  of  users  is  not  only 
planned  but  also  reactive.  Social  media-sourced  content  is  used  especially  to  show  audiences 
are  heard  and  responded  to.  Although  the  interaction  with  audiences  was  described  as 
reactive  at  times  in  order  to  show  willingness  to  engage  there  was  no  clear  definition  of  how 
users  might  be  able  to  prompt  a  reaction  and  engagement  from  the  news  organisation.  The 
selection  of  multimedia  material  or  other  social  media  content  was  broadly  based  on 
journalists’  and  editors’  own  prioritisation  of  what  they  deemed  interesting  or  newsworthy. 
This  is  not  to  say  that  non-authoritative  social  media  users  were  not  used  as  sources  since  the 
findings  of  the  case  studies  show  they  clearly  were.  Rather,  there  was  little  evidence  that 
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these  users  did  anything  to  actively  gain  the  attention  of  these  particular  news  organisations 
and  were  not  selected  because  they  approached  them.  Even  Letters  to  the  Editor  have  to  be 
directed  to  a  newspaper  before  they  can  be  selected  for  publication.  The  interview  with 
Frankel  showed  how  audience  engagement  and  participation  is  largely  directed  by  editors 
with  little  scope  for  users  to  get  the  attention  of  the  newsroom  and  actively  participate  in 
newswork.  Instead,  non-authoritative  voices  were  selected  because  their  content  fit  with  the 
agenda  of  the  journalist  selecting  them.  Asked  about  the  use  of  citizen  voices  that  had  no 
direct  experience  of  a  news  event  or  were  not  personally  affected,  Frankel  said  these  voices 
may  have  been  sought  out  for  a  number  of  reasons,  be  that  to  reflect  a  wider  global 
conversation  around  the  topic,  or  “that  they  had  very  interesting  things  in  their  own  right  to 
say.”  
It  could  be  to  reflect  the  conversation  that’s  wider.  It  could  be  just  to  ensure  that  there 
were  other  people  coming  to  the  story  that  we’re  recognising  that  it  wasn’t  just  a 
narrow  constituency  that  we’ve  reflected  or  were  talking  to.  It  could  be  that  they  had 
very  interesting  things  in  their  own  right  to  say  that  we  haven’t  found  another  way  of 
bringing  to  light  or  we  felt  that  was  the  best  way  of  illustrating  that  perspective  on  the 
story  exactly  through  their  voice.  You  know,  it  could  be  a  number  of  reasons.  (M. 
Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
There  was  a  strong  gatekeeping  element  in  how  BBC  journalists  maintained  their  complete 
control  over  what  was  deemed  worthy  of  participation.  Ultimately,  what  was  considered 
interesting  remained  the  decision  of  the  journalist  who  chose  these  messages  to  amplify. 
However,  there  was  also  an  understanding  that  audience  participation  was  necessary  as  a  way 
to  engage  and  maintain  audiences.  Therefore,  in  the  case  study  of  the  Greek  debt  crisis,  it 
may  have  made  more  sense  for  journalists  to  seek  out  voices  from  demographics  that  were 
indeed  BBC  audiences  than  those  that  were  not.  Greek  citizens  affected  by  the  day-to-day 
reality  of  the  debt  crisis  were  more  likely  to  be  seeking  out  their  own  national  news  media 
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rather  than  the  BBC  to  learn  about  the  latest  developments.  The  BBC  was  not  speaking  to 
Greek  news  audiences  but  rather  English-speaking  audiences  around  the  world.  From  the 
point  of  view  of  community  management,  speaking  to  these  users  would  serve  the  goal  of 
audience  building  better.  Therefore  collaborative  newsgathering  did  not  necessarily  serve  to 
help  relay  the  experiences  of  ordinary  Greek  people,  but  to  reproduce  the  views  of  social 
media  users  elsewhere  shaped  by  the  global  news  flow.  This  type  of  audience  involvement 
may  in  fact  contribute  reinforcing  the  views  of  international  audiences  that  were  likely 
shaped  by  news  coverage  of  the  global  news  media  such  as  the  BBC. 
 
The  symbiotic  partnership  between  community  managers  and  those  carrying  out  collaborative 
newsgathering  also  creates  a  type  of  ‘produsage’.  The  joint  newswork  feeds  into  what 
Hermida  (2010)  defined  ambient  journalism  or  Papacharissi  (2010)  called  affective  news 
streams.  Those  involved  in  collaborative  newsgathering  adopt,  transform  and  interpret 
material  filtered  out  from  these  news  streams,  before  community  managers  redistribute  the 
‘prodused’  news  products  to  news  audiences.  As  such,  the  newsrooms  insert  themselves  into 
the  news  stream  through  the  distribution  of  their  networked  newswork  on  social  media  (or 
their  journalists’  activity  on  these  platforms)  with  the  goal  to  form  and  influence  the 
conversations.  Based  on  the  findings  in  the  analysis  of  the  Greek  financial  crisis  and  the 
refugee  crisis,  interactive  newsgathering  and  redistribution  of  this  content  usually  entailed  an 
aim  to  shape  news  streams  for  the  audiences  that  interact  with  them  both  at  the  BBC  and 
France  24.  The  only  news  texts  that  deviated  from  this  approach  were  the  webcasts  by  The 
Stream,  where  a  large  number  of  users  engaging  with  the  news  topic  were  incorporated  in  the 
coverage  and  had  the  power  to  shape  the  discourse  of  the  news  topic.  The  case  studies 
showed  that  almost  all  users  who  took  part  in  the  discussion  on  the  topics  featured  were 
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reflected  in  some  way  throughout  the  programme,  suggesting  a  very  low  threshold  in  who 
could  enter  the  mainstream  news  flow  with  their  content.   The  format  of  the  programme 38
fostered  a  discussion  between  different  users  that  was  hosted  but  remained  largely  unedited 
by  The  Stream.  It  did  not  interject  in  the  news  stream  on  Twitter  with  its  own  staff’s 
expertise,  but  rather  used  it  as  a  way  to  engage  and  recreate  another  similar  news  stream  in  its 
webcast.  The  participating  audience  in  the  webcast  did  so  knowingly  and  deliberately.  Many 
responded  to  calls  for  comment  by  producers  and  journalists  on  Twitter  and  engaged  in  a 
conversation  with  them.  This  means  they  were  in  fact  a  clearly  defined  Al  Jazeera  audience 
that  set  out  to  be  included  in  the  discussion.  They  were  not  reported  on  but  had  the  ability  to 
shape  the  news  texts  deliberately.  Of  course,  this  too  can  be  understood  as  a  form  of 
community  management  and  audience  building.  The  audience  involved  was  also  mainly 
global,  although,  as  described  in  the  Greek  case  study,  there  was  a  hierarchy  of  power  and 
authoritativeness  in  Al  Jazeera’s  coverage  that  elevated  Greek  sources  over  others.   But  there 
was  a  commitment  to  empowering  Greek  voices  to  tell  and  frame  their  experiences  to  a 
global  audience,  and  it  was  not  primarily  a  way  to  reflect  audiences  of  The  Stream  back  to 
themselves.  
 
The  Stream  is  one  Al  Jazeera  product  that  reflects  the  organisation’s  approach  to  social 
media,  while  AJPlus  is  another  and  produces  content  that  is  often  the  product  of  collaborative 
newsgathering  as  well  but  that  is  also  designed  to  be  distributed  on  social  media.  Its  news 
content  is  published  exclusively  on  social  media.  While  it  often  draws  on  content  on  social 
media,  its  journalists  have  greater  input  in  selecting  and  framing  it,  and  there  are  no 
38  This  was  determined  in  the  analysis  of  the  data  by  looking  at  all  the  responses  received  by  The 
Stream  to  their  call  for  comments  and  participation  on  Twitter. 
262 
invitations  for  participation.  The  resulting  news  product  is  therefore  also  shaped  by  the 
gatekeeping  practices  of  the  journalists,  albeit  with  a  particular  slant  characteristic  of  Al 
Jazeera.  
 
So,  just  to  backtrack  a  little,  so  Al  Jazeera  is  the  voice  of  the  voiceless  is  a  very  Al 
Jazeera  ethos. 
[...] 
We  are  a  newsroom  but  we’re  not  a  very  traditional  newsroom  in  the  sense  that  we 
don’t  have  a  newsdesk,  a  planner.  We’re  a  small  editorial  team  who  actually  create.  
[...] 
So  we’re  in  this  unique  position  that  we  have  really  great  reach  but  we’re  also  very 
limited  in  the  number  of  stories  we  can  do  a  day.  We  never  push  more  than  like  10  a 
day.  And  that’s  combining,  you  know,  the  different  formats.  (E.  El-Katatney, 
conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
 
Unlike  with  The  Stream,  there  is  very  little  community  engagement  on  the  AJPlus  accounts 
across  social  media  platforms.  However,  the  engagement  that  does  exist  was  mostly 
consistent  with  the  community-management  approach  seen  on  the  BBC  and  France  24 
accounts,  and  that  is  largely  limited  to  publishing  news  texts.  So,  while  The  Stream  is  focused 
on  building  communities  around  its  brand  to  foster  conversation,  AJPlus  is  primarily 
producing  content  and  distributing  it  straight  through  social  media.  It  presumably  also  aims  to 
foster  conversation  but  that  conversation  is  mainly  between  audiences  around  the  content  it 
produces.  So,  it  too,  acts  more  as  an  ‘influencer’,  inserting  itself  into  the  news  stream  with  its 
own  ‘prodused’  and  branded  content  than  encouraging  participation  through  social  networks. 
However,  the  angle  is  arguably  a  different  one,  taking  major  news  events  to  a  more  local, 
human-interest  level. 
 
So  we  have  a  lot  more  room  to  think  more  creatively  and  think  a  lot  beyond  what’s  on 
Reuters  and  what’s  on  AP,  right?  Cos  that’s  what  a  lot  of  traditional  media  does,  right? 
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They  just  pull  from  the  wires  because  that’s  right  there.  We’re  not  trying  to  compete 
with  that  and  we’re  not  trying  to  be  the  place  where  you  come  to  us  for  the  news.  
[...] 
I’m  tracking  a  lot  of  different  other  more  local,  especially  different  regions.  (E. 
El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
 
AJPlus  also  differs  from  BBC  and  France  24,  as  it  does  not  have  its  own  proprietary  platform. 
Therefore,  the  way  that  content  is  distributed  is  firstly  through  its  own  social  media  accounts, 
and  then  relying  on  shares  and  retweets  by  other  users  to  help  spread  it.  The  difference 
between  publishing  to  a  website,  and  using  social  media  as  one  of  several  means  of 
distribution,  such  as  search  engines  or  news  aggregators,  is  that  the  content  has  to  be  tailored 
to  social  media  in  order  to  give  it  the  furthest  possible  reach.  It  has  to  resonate  with  different 
audiences,  tapping  into  existing  communities  around  the  topic  discussed.  While  this  is  also  an 
aim  by  news  texts  linked  to  on  social  media  by  the  other  two  news  outlets,  it  is  not  the  sole, 
or  even  primary  concern  in  producing  news  content.  AJPlus  journalists  are  likely  more 
embedded  with  social  media  communities  and  even  if  they  do  not  stand  out  as  individual 
actors  in  these  communities  they  are  lurking  and  listening,  taking  the  pulse  of  what  interests 
and  resonates  with  these  communities,  in  order  to  then  contribute  and  shape  the 
conversations.  
 
In  the  talk  of  audience  involvement  and  participation  lies  the  promise  of  ordinary  voices  of 
private  citizens  being  heard  and  represented.  It  resembles  the  practice  of  collecting  and 
recording  vox  pops,  especially  when  the  material  that  is  published  through  social  media  is 
framed  as  reflecting  an  aspect  of  the  public  discourse  around  a  specific  topic.  Vox  pops  are 
the  inclusion  of  “interviews  with  the  ordinary  man  or  woman  on  the  street”  (Beckers  2017a, 
p.  101)  and  are  often  reflective  of  individuals'  opinions  on  certain  topics.  Vox  pops  usually 
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involve  individuals  who  do  not  have  a  representative  function  and  have  no  expertise  on  the 
news  topic  (Kleemans,  Shaap  &  Hermans  2015).  They  are  most  often  represented  in 
audio-visual  news  texts  and  are  deemed  a  means  by  which  to  encourage  public  involvement 
but  are  also  viewed  as  the  least  valuable  content  by  journalists  (Beckers,  2017b).  However, 
the  amount  of  vox-pops  in  traditional  news  reporting  –  including  through  social  media 
content  —  has  increased  significantly  over  the  past  25  years,  while  the  use  of  “citizens  as 
agents  or  active  contributors  of  relevant  content”  has  not,  according  to  research  conducted  in 
the  Netherlands  (Kleemans,  Shaap  &  Hermans  2015,  p.  14).  Twitter,  especially,  has  been  used 
to  gather  vox-pops  published  by  citizens  themselves  (Beckers,  2017a). 
 
Agents  and  affected  citizens  were  less  prominent;  in  particular,  the  prominence  of 
affected  citizens  has  declined  over  the  years.  This  implies  that  journalists  do  not  give 
citizens  a  substantive  active  voice  in  public  debate  but  that  citizens  are  largely  and 
increasingly  used  as  mere  illustrations.  (Kleemans,  Shaap  and  Hermans  2015,  p.  14) 
 
The  case  studies  too  showed  a  substantial  use  of  citizen  sources  for  vox  pops,  which  were 
oftentimes  shown  in  order  to  reflect  a  discussion  that  was  framed  as  public  opinion.  The  use 
of  citizen  sources  as  active  contributors  in  the  news  production  process  was  far  more  limited. 
However,  this  reality  shown  in  the  case  studies  mostly  did  not  reflect  the  interviews  that 
focused  predominantly  on  social  media  newsgathering  as  the  a  means  for  accessing 
eyewitness  material  and  fostering  non-journalist’s  active  participation  in  the  newswork. 
However,  limited  vox  pops  may  be  in  transferring  power  to  non-elites  in  news  it  does  still 
possess  value  as  a  means  for  the  public  to  access  the  news  flow.  Finding  out  what  individuals 
feel  and  think  about  news  events  is  an  important  way  to  represent  the  opinions  of  those  other 
than  the  elite.  Yet,  in  a  globalised  news  environment  the  values  in  vox  pops  might  be  more 
difficult  to  pinpoint.  How  valuable  is  it  to  represent  opinions  by  individuals  unaffected  by  a 
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news  event  and  who  are  forming  their  opinions  primarily  on  the  news  coverage  of  global 
news  media?  One  may  argue  that  this  effectively  undermines  the  opinions  of  affected 
citizens,  essentially  levelling  non-elite  voices  regardless  of  their  circumstance.  Therefore,  the 
quality  of  the  vox  pops  is  important  in  producing  meaningful  coverage  of  the  discourse  that  is 
taking  place.  Vox  pops  of  citizens  directly  affected  by  a  news  event  could  be  rightfully 
considered  empowering  to  ordinary  citizens,  as  it  may  raise  ideas,  opinions  or  concerns 
which  the  news  media  then  need  to  address  in  their  news  texts.  However,  research  has  shown 
that  journalists’  attitude  towards  vox  pops  is  mainly  negative  (Beckers,  2017b),  which 
suggests  that  many  journalists  might  not  take  great  care  in  the  voices  they  choose  to 
incorporate  in  their  news  coverage  as  they  consider  them  of  inferior  value  to  other  types  of 
sources.  On  the  other  hand,  “[j]ournalists  who  perceive  vox  pops  as  a  good  public  opinion 
tool  and  consider  vox  pops  as  increasing  audience  involvement  are  more  positive  about  them. 
Surprisingly,  journalists  who  use  vox  pops  are  not  per  se  more  positive  about  them.” 
(Beckers,  2017b,  p.  109)  It  is  fair  to  assume  that  those  who  are  working  for  The  Stream  or 
AJPlus  are  overall  more  positive  in  their  attitude  towards  reflecting  the  opinions  expressed  by 
social  media  users,  since  holding  a  microphone  into  online  communities  forms  a  core  part  of 
their  jobs  as  journalists.  Also,  public  involvement  plays  a  significant  role  in  the  successful 
dissemination  of  their  news  content  once  it  is  shared  on  social  media.  Therefore,  these 
journalists  are  likely  to  pride  themselves  on  producing  a  meaningful  insight  into  what  the 
opinions  of  citizens  affected  by  a  news  event  are.  On  the  other  hand,  journalists  who  do  not 
consider  this  to  be  the  core  part  of  their  job,  may  be  less  inclined  to  invest  as  much  energy 
into  reflecting  the  public  discourses  taking  place  on  social  media.  With  the  exception  of  the 
Aleppo  case  study,  Al  Jazeera’s  use  of  social  media  was  particularly  focused  on  its  AJPlus 
and  The  Stream  news  products,  while  social  media  played  a  much  more  limited  role  across 
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the  Al  Jazeera  English  online  platform.  With  specific  news  products  that  were  very  strategic 
and  deliberate  about  the  use  of  social  media,  the  outlet’s  editorial  approach  was  a  very  clearly 
defined  one.  The  BBC  and  France  24,  on  the  other  hand,  took  a  much  more  ad  hoc  approach 
to  social  media  content  in  the  Greek  debt  crisis  coverage,  and  to  a  lesser  extent  the  migrant 
crisis.  The  content  was  largely  mixed  in  with  the  regular  traditional  reporting  styles. 
 
Agenda-setting 
 
A  theme  that  cropped  up  in  all  three  interviews  was  the  perceived  power  relationship  between 
social  media  and  mainstream  media  and  the  ability  for  social  media  users  to  become 
agenda-setters  in  news  coverage.  Agenda  setting  was  addressed  in  questions  about  how 
non-journalists  carrying  out  newswork  on  social  media  can  get  the  attention  of  editors  and 
journalists  on  issues  of  importance  to  them.  It  was  explored  both  in  terms  of  journalists’ 
proactive  and  reactive  approaches  taken  towards  the  social  media  users  and  communities.  In 
other  words,  what  steps  do  news  organisations  take  to  seek  out  involvement  from  news 
audiences  in  setting  the  news  agenda? 
 
Pain’s  response  suggests  a  mostly  reactive  approach  to  the  information  shared  on  social 
media,  which  becomes  of  interest  to  news  organisations  due  to  its  potential  to  be  of  major 
interest  to  France  24’s  news  audiences. 
 
We  monitor  all  the  social  media  to  see,  what  can  I  get  out,  also  what’s  gonna  be  the 
next  hot  news.  That’s  what  everybody  does.  (J.  Pain,  phone  interview,  July  5,  2016)  
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Social  media  is  seen  as  a  ‘beat’  to  be  covered  by  journalists  mainly  because  it  harbours  the 
potential  to  produce  content  that  can  attract  a  lot  of  interest  from  audiences.  Moreover 
though,  social  media  is  seen  as  an  environment  that  sets  its  own  news  agenda,  and  which  is 
implicitly  considered  of  huge  importance  to  news  organisations.  Through  their  participation 
on  social  media,  users  have  the  ability  to  set  and  frame  what  is  newsworthy  and  should  be,  at 
least  in  part,  leading  the  news  agenda  of  news  organisations  such  as  France  24.  Social  media 
is  therefore  understood  as  having  its  own  news  ecosystem  that  news  organisations  seek  to 
exploit  for  sourcing  news  for  their  own  coverage.  An  added  value  to  gathering  this  news 
content  is  that  journalists  know  that  an  audience  already  exists  for  this  material.  The  material 
that  is  being  sourced  is  usually  already  generating  discussion,  so  enhancing  and  repackaging 
it  before  redistributing  the  ‘added  value’  newswork  on  social  media  platforms  is  likely  to 
drive  audiences  to  the  news  organisation.  So  social  media  is  monitored  for  news  that  is  first 
broken  on  social  media  rather  than  by  news  outlets  through  their  conventional  distribution 
channels.  France  24  then  responds  by  covering  this  news,  integrating  it  into  the  global  news 
flow.  In  that  sense,  “what  everybody  does”  is  a  description  of  Chadwick’s  hybrid  media 
model,  wherein  journalists  develop  an  interdependence  with  non-journalists,  giving  the  latter 
greater  power  to  determine  the  news  agenda.  It  also  echoes  Papacharissi’s  affective  news 
streams,  which  argues  news  is  being  created  in  a  collaborative  effort  on  social  media, 
continually  mutating  and  being  redefined  by  its  contributors.  News  production  becomes  a 
contested  process,  involving  both  journalists  and  non-journalists,  that  does  not  result  in  a 
final  product.  Instead  it  is  constantly  evolving.  However,  as  already  argued  earlier,  there  are 
influencers  in  this  process,  who  are  characterised  by  their  greater  power  to  impose  a 
particular  news  agenda  or  frame  than  others  –  France  24,  with  its  many  followers  on  all  the 
major  social  media  platforms  being  one.  Therefore,  while  Pain  looks  to  social  media  for 
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news,  the  selection  of  newsworthy  content  by  journalists  themselves  puts  them  in  the  position 
to  also  shape  what  the  “next  hot  news”  will  be.  Therefore,  gatekeeping  is  still  under  the 
control  of  journalists,  who  ultimately  make  the  decision  about  what  content  to  extract  and 
amplify,  and  how.  
 
In  the  first  two  case  studies,  the  type  of  content  described  by  Pain  was  not  the  main 
component  of  the  social  media-sourced  material  found  in  the  texts  for  either  France  24,  or  the 
BBC.  While  France  24  Observers  does  focus  especially  on  eyewitness  material,  it  represents 
only  a  very  small  part  of  all  the  social  media-sourced  material  used  in  the  news  coverage. 
Overall,  the  news  agenda  had  been  strongly  defined  by  professional  journalists  and  accredited 
sources,  while  non-journalist  private  citizens  had  the  least  source  power.  Only  the  Aleppo 
case  study  was  characterised  by  extensive  reliance  on  unaccredited  and  non-journalist 
sources,  and  saw  these  gain  significant  agenda-setting  power.  This  only  supports  the 
argument  that  news  organisations  hold  significant  influence  in  defining  the  terms  of  any 
collaboration  with  social  media  users,  and  that  their  decision  to  embrace  some  content  over 
others  plays  a  role  in  defining  what  is  ‘news’.  Control  is  only  relinquished  in  exceptional 
circumstances.  With  the  agenda  still  often  dictated  by  news  organisations,  audiences  fill  in 
the  gaps.  For  instance,  eyewitness  material  was  mentioned  by  Frankel  and  Pain  as  playing  a 
pivotal  role  in  how  social  media  is  used  in  collaborative  newsgathering  in  a  breaking  news 
situation.  Very  often,  information  about  a  breaking  news  event  will  first  emerge  on  social 
media,  with  eyewitnesses  sharing  accounts  and  images.  However,  what  constitutes  a  breaking 
news  event  is  already  defined  by  existing  routines,  and  amateur  content  takes  the  place  of  the 
eyewitness  account.  Eyewitnesses  can  be  approached  remotely  without  requiring  a  reporter  to 
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be  at  the  scene,  and  their  testimony  is  backed  up  with  videos  or  images  captured  on  their 
phone.  
 
[I]f  we’re  looking  at  a  story  where  we  are  keen  to  find  eyewitness  testimony  on  such 
as  a  breaking  or  developing  story,  then  UGC  would  be  very  central  to  that.  Because 
obviously  we  need  to  get  to  people  who  are  right  there  and  have  pictures  and  video 
and  can  talk  to  us  about  what  is  going  on,  so  there  is  definitely  a  social  newsgathering 
component.  (M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
 
Social  media-sourced  images  takes  on  the  role  of  the  eyewitness,  and  offers  evidence  of  what 
took  place.  It  does  not  necessarily  set  the  news  agenda  in  its  own  right  though.  For  example,  a 
bomb  attack  in  central  Paris  would  be  deemed  newsworthy  with  or  without  eyewitness 
material  and  produce  high  volumes  of  news  coverage.  The  eyewitness  material  only  adds 
colour  to  what  would  certainly  have  been  high  up  on  the  news  agenda,  not  because  there  are 
images  of  the  event  but  because  the  event  happened  at  all.  The  production  of  eyewitness 
material  has  been  described  as  acts  of  citizen  journalists  by  several  authors  (Allen  2013; 
Gillmor  2004)  where  ordinary  people  are  empowered  to  take  part  in  the  production  of  news. 
Recalling  the  events  of  9/11,  Gillmor  writes,  “[N]ews  was  being  produced  by  regular  people 
who  had  something  to  say  and  show,  and  not  solely  by  the  “official”  news  organizations  that 
had  traditionally  decided  how  the  first  draft  of  history  would  look.  This  time,  the  first  draft  of 
history  was  being  written,  in  part,  by  the  former  audience.”  Yet,  the  argument  that  the  ability 
to  produce  eyewitness  material  is  necessarily  empowering  has  been  contested  if  this  content 
only  provides  the  raw  material  for  news  organisations  to  incorporate  in  their  journalism.  This 
hinges  on  how  we  define  journalism  and  if  we  understand  it  as  selecting,  ordering  and  editing 
information  into  a  final  news  product  to  give  meaning  to  events.  Therefore,  “[a]  real  question 
we  need  to  ask  is  not  what  is  journalism,  but  where  does  the  journalistic  process  begin?” 
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(Burum  2016,  p.  13).  Burum  distinguishes  between  user-generated  content,  the  raw  content 
recorded  by  eyewitnesses,  and  user-generated  stories  which  are  texts  fit  for  broadcast  and  that 
are  produced  by  ordinary  citizens  (Burum  2012).  Only  the  latter,  he  argues,  can  be  considered 
citizen  journalism  and  offers  “editorial  empowerment  at  the  source”  (Burum  2016,  p.  14). 
User-generated  content  alone,  on  the  other  hand,  is  only  a  building  block  used  in  the 
construction  of  news  by  professional  journalists.  In  the  case  of  breaking  news  events,  as 
mentioned  by  Frankel,  the  audience  involvement  only  extends  as  far  as  it  fits  with  the 
professional  routines  and  values  of  news  production.  In  essence,  technology  has  enabled 
journalists  not  to  be  required  at  the  scene  of  an  event  in  order  to  report  about  it  as 
eyewitnesses  are  presenting  themselves  on  social  media,  not  only  with  accounts  but  with 
actual  images  to  back  them  up.  In  these  cases  the  value  of  eyewitness  material  to  the  news 
coverage  is  judged  by  the  same  standards  that  journalists  would  apply  to  any  other  piece  of 
information  or  content  to  build  their  news  coverage,  which  in  major  breaking  news  events  is 
low.  In  these  cases,  the  threshold  for  gaining  entry  into  the  global  news  flow  is  dictated  by 
simply  having  been  a  witness  who  recorded  content  of  sufficient  quality.  
 
Well,  when  in  terms  of  breaking  news  the  only  quality  is  to  be  there  at  the  right  time. 
So  if  you’re  at  the  right  time  somewhere  and  you  post  a  video  that’s  interesting  then 
even  if  it’s  badly  filmed  or,  you  know,  the  only  thing  we  have  to  do  is  to  check  that 
it’s  true  and  then  that’s  it.  (J.  Pain,  phone  interview,  July  5,  2016)  
 
 
Private  citizens  are  generally  most  likely  to  be  represented  in  news  coverage  in  unexpected 
news  events  (Reich  2015),  and  this  professional  practice  could  be  easily  adapted  and 
enhanced  through  the  widespread  use  of  mobile  phone  technology.  In  fact,  it  eased  the  burden 
to  expend  resources  on  having  journalists  and  entire  TV  crews  at  a  scene  when  eyewitnesses 
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could  easily  provide  the  raw  content  directly  to  newsrooms.  This  may  well  have  made  them 
more  valuable  to  journalists  as  sources  but  it  has  not  fundamentally  tilted  the  power 
relationship  between  news  media  and  private  citizens  in  their  favour.  This  is  not  to  say  that 
eyewitness  material  cannot  make  an  impact  on  the  news  agenda.  In  many  cases 
user-generated  content  has  recorded  human  rights  abuses  or  other  important  issues  that  have 
provoked  civic  or  political  action.  However,  the  requirements  for  entering  the  mainstream 
news  flow  are  stricter  and  more  difficult  to  meet  as  news  organisations  have  to  take  a 
proactive  approach  in  seeking  out  this  content  as  it  does  not  fall  into  a  predetermined  news 
agenda. 
 
But  equally,  if  it’s  a  story  where  we  know  there  is  an  audience  focus  because  it 
involves,  you  know,  not  so  much  something  that  is  breaking  or  developing  but 
something  that  people  have  direct  experience  of,  so  it  could  be  a  study  that  has  found, 
you  know,  that  people  believe  or  think  or  feel  particular  things  and  we’re  looking  for 
case  studies  or  people  who  have  experienced  those  things  or  have  been  affected  by 
those  issues,  then  again  you’re  talking  about  UGC  because  you  are  looking  for 
members  of  the  public  who  have  direct  experience  of  those...  of  that  particular  case. 
So,  it’s  largely  dependant  on  what  you’re  looking  for  really.  Some  of  it  is  the  kind  of 
thing  that  you  can  look  for  in  advance  because  you  might  be  working  on  a  feature  that 
would  involve  a  member  of  the  public  because  you’d  be  that  input  into  your  feature. 
(M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
Outside  of  breaking  news  events,  Frankel  describes  situations  where  the  BBC  might 
proactively  seek  out  the  input  from  users  who  are  private  citizens.  The  scenario  he  describes 
is  again  one  where  the  editorial  decision  on  a  particular  topic  was  made  solely  in  the 
newsroom  and  users  are  sought  out  to  fit  with  the  BBC’s  own  news  agenda.  Journalists  are 
decision  makers  in  what  is  important  to  audiences  and  subsequently  contact  users  who  may 
have  experience  on  this  particular  issue  for  an  opinion.  Journalism  practices  have  long 
involved  this  type  of  interaction  with  private  citizens  on  issues  tabled  by  the  professional 
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news  media,  while  technology  has  enabled  journalists  to  find  such  voices  more  easily.  In  this 
instance  also,  social  media  serves  as  a  tool  to  carry  out  the  same  established  practices  rather 
than  foster  new  ones.  These  do  not  intrinsically  challenge  the  power-relationship  between 
news  media  and  audiences,  where  the  two  interact.  It  may  be  argued  that  it  has  enabled  a 
wider  spectrum  of  voices  to  be  heard  as  journalists  are  able  to  find  sources  that  would  have 
been  outside  their  reach  or  off  their  radar  in  the  past,  providing  a  more  diverse  discussion  of 
news  topics.  However,  the  type  of  interaction  in  the  proactive  scenario  described  by  Frankel 
has  remained  essentially  the  same. 
 
For  contributors  to  feature  in  our  journalism,  they  have  to:  a)  have  something  that  is 
worth  talking  about  because  it’s  newsworthy,  and  secondly,  they  need  to  be  reliable 
and  trustworthy  and  genuinely  there  and  aware  of  what’s  going  on.  You  know,  there’s 
a  lot  of  fakery  out  there.  There’s  a  lot  of  rumour,  there’s  a  lot  of  people  who  claim  to 
know  things  or  be  in  places,  or  have  taken  footage.  So  those  are  the  key  things  that  we 
would  need  to  establish  before  we  would  go  even  near  approaching  them  or  using 
their  contribution.  (M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
Exploring  what  might  be  the  reason  that  users’  content  is  able  to  enter  the  mainstream  news 
flow,  Frankel  again  mentions  newsworthiness,  personal  experience  and  trustworthiness  (or 
authenticity)  as  the  main  factors.  What  constitutes  newsworthiness  appears  as  a  fixed  value 
determined  solely  by  the  journalist.  The  power  to  define  news  values  remains  in  the 
professional  realm.  However,  the  second  criteria  suggests  the  BBC  will  relinquish  a  degree  of 
control  over  the  practice  of  reporting  to  users  that  meet  its  set  of  values  and  expectations. 
Once  these  criteria  have  been  satisfied,  users  can  shape  the  news  product  through  their 
content.  This  is  particularly  evident  in  the  Aleppo  case  study,  where  media  activists  (who 
were  known  and  trusted  to  be  in  close  geographical  proximity  to  the  events  or  connected  to 
those  who  were)  were  able  to  feature  highly  in  the  coverage.  Journalistic  values  such  as 
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impartiality,  or  even  balance  were  not  necessarily  mentioned  in  this  context.  They  were 
discussed  in  depth  in  relation  to  the  Syrian  Observatory  of  Human  Rights  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  the  White  Helmets  but  not  applied  to  other  sources  in  opposition-held  territory.  Rather, 
their  role  was  was  seen  solely  as  that  of  an  eyewitness  stepping  in  for  the  absent  journalist. 
As  the  Aleppo  case  study  showed,  where  there  is  an  almost  categorical  absence  of  journalists, 
this  position  can  be  a  very  powerful  one.  Without  any  requirement  to  adopt  any  of  the  other 
journalistic  values,  activism  can  become  a  feature  in  the  journalism  produced  –  though  steps 
were  taken  to  undermine  the  role  that  these  motivations  played  in  the  BBC  news  texts  on  the 
battle  in  Aleppo.  This  creates  an  interaction  between  news  organisations  and  users  that  places 
control  over  the  news  agenda  (what  constitutes  ‘newsworthiness’)  and  the  users  deemed 
relevant  and  suitable  for  networked  journalism  with  the  news  organisation.  Meanwhile,  the 
actual  newswork  done  by  such  users  is  scrutinised  only  according  to  a  narrow  set  of 
journalistic  practices.  Namely,  the  ability  to  confirm  beyond  reasonable  doubt  that  a  piece  of 
content  shows  what  it  claims  to.  On  the  flip  side  this  can  lead  to  decontextualising  content 
and  the  omission  of  pertinent  information  to  provide  a  balanced  or  impartial  representation  of 
events. 
 
In  the  interview  with  the  AJPlus  editor,  online  communities  played  a  significant  role  in 
determining  what  content  may  enter  their  newswork.  The  collaborative  newswork  was  mainly 
focused  on  areas  that  were  inaccessible  to  journalists  and  highlighted  the  benefits  of 
accessing  communities  that  were  otherwise  difficult  to  reach.  El-Katatney  stated  the  intent  of 
seeking  out  news  content  that  was  not  on  the  news  agenda  of  elite  professional  outlets.  
 
Our  stories  aren’t  necessarily  tied  to  places,  where  journalists  can  access.  We’re  still 
very  reactive. 
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[…] 
The  social  media  element  and  UGC  works  best  in  stories  that  the  media  isn’t 
covering.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
 
Part  of  this  is  tapping  into  online  communities  that  discuss  and  share  information  of  interest 
to  them.  She  described  collaborative  newsgathering  in  terms  of  taking  the  lead  from  these 
communities  on  what  is  newsworthy.  This  may  sound  similar  to  the  sentiment  by  the  France 
24  editor,  who  describes  social  media  as  a  tool  to  find  the  “next  hot  news”,  but  there  are 
differences.  According  to  the  interviewee,  AJPlus  seeks  out  communities  and  their 
conversations  in  order  to  report  on  them,  which  suggests  seeking  out  a  news  discourse  on 
particular  topics  by  interested  and  involved  users.  The  news  coverage  is  explained  in  terms  of 
reflecting  this  discourse  rather  than  shaping  the  discourse.  
 
Ultimately,  the  power  to  decide  which  communities’  conversations  to  reflect  remains  with  the 
journalists,  giving  them  significant  gatekeeping  power  in  the  interaction.  However, 
El-Katatney’s  interview  suggests  there  is  a  strong  commitment  to  represent  a  news  discourse 
created  by  online  communities,  hence  giving  them  power  to  define  it.  This  was  consistent 
with  the  overall  finding  in  the  case  studies  that  showed  Al  Jazeera  was  using  social  media 
predominantly  to  report  on  the  conversations  between  unaccredited  sources,  deliberately 
seeking  out  sources  who  had  the  least  source  power  but  who  also  often  showed  personal 
involvement  and  knowledge  of  the  news  event.  In  the  Aleppo  case  study,  this  went  as  far  as 
fully  absorbing  social  media  content  into  Al  Jazeera’s  news  coverage  without  any  clear 
distinction  between  the  two,  as  well  as  embedding  its  own  journalists  with  those  producing 
this  content. 
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As  journalists  there  is  no  way,  even  if  we  were,  you  know,  the  most  powerful  media 
organisation  in  the  world,  there  is  no  way  you  can  have  access  to  document 
everything  that’s  happening  everywhere.  And  if  you  have  a  system  that’s  set  to,  you 
know,  your  workflow  is  set  to  how  to  receive  this  content,  verify  this  content  and 
utilise  this  content,  then  that  means  you’ve  just  accessed  a  huge  network,  that’s  so 
much  bigger  and  can  amplify  more  than  you  can  do.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call 
interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
El-Katatney  expressed  a  similar  use  for  social  networks  as  a  distribution  platform  with  a 
ready-made  audience.  The  aim  is  not  to  only  gather  content  but  also  to  distribute  it  again  to 
users  who  are  already  having  a  conversation  around  the  particular  topic  and  pieces  of  content 
that  the  news  outlet  is  reporting  on.  In  accessing  a  community  where  newsworthy  content  is 
shared,  gathering  this  content  and  reporting  on  it,  Al  Jazeera  is  taking  advantage  of  a 
ready-made  audience.  Once  news  texts  that  involve  these  communities  are  distributed  they 
can  receive  significant  amplification  as  its  members  help  distribute  the  texts  to  their  own 
networks.  In  order  to  do  this  effectively,  it  reflects  the  conversation  that  is  already  taking 
place,  bringing  together  the  different  pieces  of  a  scattered  discourse  taking  place  across  social 
media  platforms.  
 
The  one  minute  news  reports  here  are  very  different  from  the  one  minute  news  reports 
I  did  when  I  worked  on  TV,  you  know.  They  just  look  very  very  different.  And  the 
audience  doesn’t  just  want  to  know  what  happened,  they  want  to  know  what  the 
people  there  felt  like.  They  want  the  more  emotional  connection,  they  want  the  more 
human  interest  kind  of  aspect  on  it.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview, 
December  14,  2016) 
 
The  focus  on  the  human  interest  story,  the  eyewitness,  and  the  emotional  connection,  shows 
there  is  an  aim  to  break  down  the  barrier  that  exists  between  news  media  and  the  ordinary 
private  citizen.  It  is  not  about  finding  accredited  sources  on  breaking  news  events,  or  guiding 
the  social  media  content  through  journalist  sources,  but  to  access  the  plethora  of  other  voices 
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that  audiences  can  connect  with  on  a  more  personal  level.The  focus  is  on  content  that  does 
not  comprise  the  normal  news  flow,  but  hones  in  on  a  parallel  new  environment  that  is 
created  on  social  media  platforms.  Examples  that  were  given  by  the  El  Katatney  still  point  to 
the  selection  of  news  content  being  directed  by  the  news  agenda  set  by  the  Al  Jazeera,  and  the 
overall  agenda  of  the  global  mainstream  news  media,  which  is  also  symptomatic  of  the 
hybridisation  of  the  news  environment,  whereby  audiences  do  largely  discuss  topics  and 
issues  already  raised  by  professional  news  media  that  remain  a  powerful  player  in  shaping 
public  discourse. 
 
The  social  media  users  sourced  for  coverage  are  chosen  because  they  have  specific  attributes, 
and,  where  a  news  event  is  set  in  a  particular  location,  because  they  have  first-hand 
knowledge  of  it.  Therefore,  the  use  of  social  media  sources  is  not  to  engage  the  Al  Jazeera 
audience  per  se  in  the  way  that  the  the  BBC  may  have  been  selecting  a  stereotypical  BBC 
audience  in  their  coverage,  but  to  tap  into  the  communities  that  are  affected  by  the  event. 
Rather,  they  may  consider  their  audience  as  fluid  and  changing  depending  on  what  is  being 
covered.  For  example,  Greek  audiences  may  typically  not  seek  out  coverage  by  Al  Jazeera  on 
the  events  in  their  country,  but  through  assessing  and  reporting  on  the  conversations  taking 
place  in  Greek  communities,  Al  Jazeera  may  not  only  have  relayed  this  discourse  to  its  loyal 
audience  base  but  gained,  at  least  temporarily,  new  audiences.  While  Frankel  spoke  of 
building  audience  loyalty  through  reciprocal  engagement  with  users,  which  will  ensure  brand 
awareness  and  encourage  users  to  return  to  the  BBC  for  its  coverage,  the  interview  with 
El-Katatney  suggested  finding  audiences  that  already  exist  for  a  specific  news  event  and 
holding  a  microphone  into  their  virtual  forum.  The  two  news  outlets  share  the  same  intent, 
which  is  to  build  audiences.  The  one  positions  itself  as  delivering  the  news  to  whoever  is 
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likely  to  be  their  core  audience,  both  through  social  media  and  its  own  digital  platforms, 
while  taking  note  of  the  feedback  that  it  receives.  The  other  establishes  new  audiences,  even 
if  only  temporarily,  by  embedding  itself  in  specific  online  conversations. 
 
No  one  is  coming  to  AJPlus  to  see  what  happened  in  that  train  crash  in  New  York. 
They’ll  come  like  three  hours  later  to  see  our  story  which  includes  life  of  the  victims 
and  talks  to  you  and  gives  you  some  social  media  reactions  and  someone  who’s  an 
eyewitness.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
Nevertheless,  the  AJPlus  interview  also  shows,  that  social  media  is  used  to  fuel  the  existing 
news  agenda  with  further  content,  creating  conversation  and  even  an  exchange  between  users 
and  journalists.  But  this  takes  place  within  the  context  of  a  news  agenda  not  set  by  social 
media  users.  What  is  valuable  is  their  reaction  to  the  global  news  flow  and  their  ability  to 
‘produse’  content  that  can  be  absorbed  into  it.  Therefore,  the  framework  within  which  social 
media  users  contribute  is  controlled  by  an  agenda  that  is  not  set  by  them.  They  act  largely  as 
sources  rather  than  collaborators,  although  their  power  as  sources  may  have  increased 
through  their  engagement  on  social  media  platforms.  
 
Platforms 
 
As  the  case  studies  showed,  there  were  different  approaches  to  how  different  social  media 
platforms  –  namely  Twitter  and  Facebook  –  were  used  in  sourcing  content  and  the  type  of 
content  they  typically  contributed  to  the  news  texts.  The  micro-blogging  site  was  used  by 
BBC  and  France  24  mostly  to  gather  elite  sources.  Nevertheless,  social  media  is  often  treated 
as  a  homogenous  environment  that  enables  audiences  (ie.  ordinary  citizen  users)  to  enter  the 
global  news  flow  (Allan  2013).  Asked  which  voices  he  thought  had  gained  most  from  social 
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media  engagement  in  terms  of  accessing  the  global  news  flow,  Frankel  acknowledged  the 
different  user  groups  that  dominated  on  different  platforms  and  the  discrepancies  between 
what  platforms  journalists  mostly  commonly  used  and  those  most  frequently  used  by  ordinary 
private  citizens.  
 
[W]e  talk  about  social  media  as  if  it’s  one  thing  and  it’s  very  different.  For  most 
people,  say  in  journalism,  social  media  is  Twitter.  And  frankly  for  most  of  our 
audiences,  social  media  is  anything  but  Twitter.  So,  you  know,  Twitter  is  often  an  echo 
chamber  of  opinion  formers  trying  to  shout  their  latest,  you  know,  book,  policy  idea, 
thoughts,  concept,  whatever  it  is.  So  you’re  not  necessarily  talking  to  the  people  that 
you’re  wanting  to  reach  or  the  audiences  that  you’re  most  keen  on  impressing.  You’re 
certainly  talking  to  other  journalists  and  opinion  formers.  Whereas  Facebook  is  a 
much  broader  platform  in  that  sense.  (M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
Frankel’s  comments  that  journalists  are  most  likely  to  refer  to  Twitter  to  source  content, 
supported  the  conclusion  drawn  from  the  case  studies  that  identified  it  as  a  newsgathering 
platform  which  was  most  adaptable  to  established  routines,  and  therefore  most  likely  to  be 
used  by  professionals.  Broersma  and  Graham  (2012)  also  supported  this  with  their  research 
that  identified  Twitter  as  a  professional  network  for  journalists  to  stay  in  touch  with  their 
peers,  exchange  information  and  seek  contacts.  Meanwhile,  (Heinrich,  2012)  described  it  as  a 
type  of  personalised  newswire  for  journalists.  Together  with  the  ‘pack  mentality’  of 
journalists  (Boczkowski,  2010),  the  disproportionate  reliance  on  the  least  ‘social’  platform, 
creates  a  high  threshold  for  entry  into  the   global  news  flow  for  non-elite  users.  This  research 
clearly  showed  journalists  relied  particularly  on  the  micro-blogging  site,  while  non-elite 
users,  described  by  Frankel  as  audiences,  are  the  least  likely  to  participate  on  this  platform. 
This  suggests  that  journalists  actively  work  to  maintain  their  sphere  of  influence  and  control 
over  the  news  flow  in  a  way  that  allows  them  to  dominate.  Facebook,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
used  almost  exclusively  to  source  content  from  non-elite  users.  However,  it  was  used  to  a 
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much  lesser  extent  than  Twitter  despite  its  significantly  larger  user  base.  The  preference  for 
Twitter  is  more  likely  to  reproduce  the  opinions  and  information  put  forward  by  elite  users. 
So,  while  Twitter  as  been  driving  social  media  access  to  the  global  news  flow,  greater  access 
of  Facebook  users  might  result  in  a  different  demographic  participating  in  networked 
newswork.  Therefore,  audience  participation  in  the  news  environment  is  largely  kept  on 
social  media  platforms,  where  users  can  ‘produse’  but  not  have  significant  access  to 
professional  newswork.  So,  while  Frankel  argued  that  social  media  has  been  beneficial  in 
opening  up  the  news  environment  to  a  new  set  of  users,  who  were  previously  denied  access  to 
the  news  flow,  this  is  mostly  in  the  context  of  the  alternative  news  environment  that  exists  on 
solely  on  social  media.  The  impact  that  amateurs  can  have  on  news  audiences  with  their 
newswork  is  mostly  seen  to  be  taking  place  on  social  media  platforms,  which  is  not 
necessarily  synonymous  with  opening  up  a  gateway  into  the  professionally  produces  news 
media.  
 
Having  said  that  [social  media]  has  clearly  become  a  very  very  important  avenue  for  a 
lot  of  different  organisations  today  that  could  shift  perception  and  to  make  an  impact. 
It’s  a  much  quicker  way  to  reach  people  that  they  are  perhaps  unfamiliar  with  or  find 
hard  to  reach  in  other  ways.  And  done  and  used  effectively,  it  can  be  very  potent.  It 
can  be  really  really  powerful.  (M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
 
The  perceived  impact  of  social  media  on  communicating  with  large  audiences  by 
non-journalistic  sources  is  described  by  Frankel  in  a  general  sense  and  as  something  that 
happens  outside  the  professional  news  media.  While  he  sees  significant  power  given  to 
non-journalistic  users  through  harnessing  social  media  platforms  the  BBC  arguably  does  not 
see  its  role  as  facilitating  voices  on  social  media,  but  rather  as  working  in  tandem  with  this 
alternative  news  environment. 
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 Frankel  was  the  only  of  the  three  interviewees  that  brought  up  how  user  groups  differed 
across  platforms,  and  the  disparity  between  the  social  media  platforms  most  commonly  used 
by  journalists  and  those  used  by  ordinary  citizens.  El-Katatney  listed  out  the  types  of 
platforms  that  journalists  were  using  to  source  content  but  phrased  it  as  an  issue  of  tapping 
into  particular  communities.  She  also  mentioned  a  greater  variety  of  platforms  used  to  source 
content,  outside  of  Facebook  and  Twitter,  such  as  Instagram  and  closed  messaging  services 
such  as  Whatsapp  and  Snapchat. 
 
I  think  [it  is  valuable]  having  a  newsroom  that  is  very  diverse.  We  have  a  lot  of  young 
people  here,  who  don’t  even  know  Britney  Spears.  That’s  how  young  they  are.  That 
they’re  very  well  plugged  in.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview,  December 
14,  2016) 
 
The  case  studies  also  suggested  that  Al  Jazeera  was  primarily  focusing  on  tapping  into  very 
specific  types  of  communities.  They  did  not  use  Twitter  to  source  journalists’  communities  or 
even  opinion-makers,  which  explains  why  sourcing  practices  were  not  dependent  on 
platforms  at  Al  Jazeera.  Rather  they  sought  out  communities  that  did  not  stereotypically 
participate  in  the  newswork  of  professional  news  media  but  created  their  own  networks  in 
which  they  shared  information.  
 
Verification 
As  to  be  expected,  one  of  the  most  important  factors  dictating  if  social  media-sourced 
material  would  be  used  in  coverage  by  any  of  the  organisations  was  how  easily  its 
authenticity  could  be  verified  by  journalists.  All  three  interviewees  said  the  ability  to  ensure 
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the  authenticity  of  a  piece  of  content  was  paramount  before  considering  any  other 
characteristics.  Journalists  therefore  applied  their  practices  to  any  piece  of  content,  either 
qualifying  or  disqualifying  it  from  use  in  news  coverage.  How  these  practices  were  applied 
could  change  from  case  to  case,  and  decisions  were  explained  depending  on  the  context  of  the 
content.  However,  the  most  common  context  within  which  verification  was  mentioned  was  in 
breaking  news  events.  In  this  case,  the  users  providing  content  were  primarily  used  as  sources 
rather  than  as  participants  in  the  production  of  news  coverage.  Even  as  news  organisations  are 
seeking  to  integrate  this  content  into  their  coverage,  the  shape  the  interaction  takes  between 
the  content  producer  and  the  journalist  puts  the  journalist  in  a  position  of  power  over  that  of 
the  user.  Once  a  piece  of  content,  usually  eyewitness  material,  is  deemed  newsworthy,  the 
question  is  to  what  extent  the  user  providing  it  can  meet  the  criteria  set  by  journalists  to 
ensure  sufficient  proof  that  it  is  trustworthy.  In  a  breaking  news  scenario  this  would  first  of  all 
mean  proving  they  were  at  the  scene  and  did  indeed  record  the  material  themselves. 
Professional  journalists  explain  the  need  for  verification  in  accordance  with  their  own 
journalistic  routines  and  standards  as  their  duty  to  the  public.  By  extension,  verification  of 
social  media-sourced  material  is  to  safeguard  the  reputation  of  their  news  organisations. 
Failure  to  implement  it  sufficiently  is  seen  as  undermining  a  core  value  of  journalism  to 
represent  the  truth,  and  considered  detrimental  to  the  profession  in  the  eyes  of  the  public. 
Especially  in  breaking  news  scenarios  –  though  not  exclusively  –  it  is  understood  as  a  process 
to  ensure  accuracy  and  authenticity  that  is  usually  limited  to  providing  certainty  that  the 
material  originates  from  the  location  and  time  of  a  particular  news  event.  Other  issues  such  as 
the  motivation  and  framing  that  goes  into  the  production  of  content  is  usually  given  little 
importance  and  is  also  oftentimes  not  discussed  or  overtly  represented  in  news  texts  that 
make  use  of  eyewitness  material.  A  piece  of  content  will,  in  the  most  part,  be  framed  and 
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contextualised  within  the  news  text  where  it  is  typically  inserted  into  written  text  or  overlayed 
with  verbal  descriptions  by  journalists,  and  juxtaposed  with  other  images.  The  producer  of 
the  material  has  no  direct  role  in  this  process.  During  the  interview,  Pain  described 
verification  in  terms  of  breaking  news  event,  which  oftentimes  are  events  that  would  be 
considered  high  up  on  the  news  agenda  regardless  of  whether  eyewitness  material  is  available 
or  not. 
 
The  first  thing  is,  can  we  verify  the  images  the  guy  is  sending  us  or  the  images  we 
find  online?  That’s  the  first  thing,  especially  in  terms  of  breaking  news.  In  terms  of 
breaking  news,  I  don’t  know,  if  there  is  a  video  coming  out  after  the  bombing  of  the 
Brussels  airport  then  we  focus  on  the  images  we  can  confirm.  So  if  it’s  just  like  very 
short  and  the  guy  doesn’t  answer  our  messages  we  would  give  up.  But  if  the  person 
answers  and  we  can  ask  him  a  few  questions  and  talk  to  him  on  the  phone,  or  if  the 
video  is  long  enough  and  we  can  check  and  spot  things  that  it  was  really  shot  inside 
the  Brussels  airport  then  we  would  use  it.  (J.  Pain,  phone  interview,  July  5,  2016)  
 
In  this  instance,  rather  than  eyewitness  material  representing  a  type  of  audience  participation 
in  news  reporting,  it  is  simply  a  relatively  new  format  in  which  private  citizen  sources 
provide  additional  material  for  news  texts.  With  mobile  phones  ubiquitous  in  many  areas  of 
the  world,  sources  are  able  to  provide  content  to  reporters  beyond  the  verbal  eyewitness 
account  that  is  often  a  feature  in  unexpected  news  events.  The  tasks  of  the  journalist  – 
compiling,  framing  and  editing  reports  –  have  mostly  not  been  shifted  to  users.  Especially  not 
non-elite  ones.  As  discussed,  the  only  case  study  where  users  took  on  such  tasks  was  in  the 
news  coverage  of  the  battle  for  Aleppo,  fuelled  by  the  absence  of  journalists  on  the  ground. 
 
However,  in  most  cases,  social  media  users  posting  newsworthy  content  are  unsuspecting 
news  sources  competing  for  the  attention  of  journalists  and  editors,  who  select  and 
appropriate  the  eyewitness  material  according  to  their  own  criteria.  This  changes  little  about 
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the  power  relationship  between  citizen  sources  and  journalists.  The  same  routines  remain 
largely  intact.  Nonetheless,  this  is  not  to  say  that  eyewitness  material  cannot  have  a  dramatic 
impact  on  the  news  agenda  at  times.  Content  that  commands  a  lot  of  interest  in  the  alternative 
news  environment  of  social  media  platforms  is  something  journalists  do  want  to  harness  for 
their  own  news  products  and  capitalise  on.  The  fast-paced  and  highly  competitive  news  cycle 
means  journalists  are  keen  to  find  sources  that  can  supply  content  which  reaches  large 
audiences.  This  was  also  shown  in  the  France  24  interview,  where  Pain  said  finding  the  “next 
hot  news”  was  the  main  reason  journalists  monitor  social  media  platforms.  Through  the 
increase  in  the  value  of  the  material  that  sources  can  provide  to  journalists  they  are 
potentially  gaining  some  power  in  putting  their  accounts  across.  But  this  power  is  limited 
through  the  format  that  high-value  content  takes;  a  dramatic  video  of  an  incident  is  far  more 
likely  to  attract  interest  from  journalists  and  deemed  “hot  news”  than  a  verbal  statement  or 
argument.  Equally,  a  visual  piece  of  content  is  more  easily  inserted  into  news  coverage 
created  by  professional  journalists. 
 
You  know,  there’s  a  lot  of  fakery  out  there.  There’s  a  lot  of  rumour.  There’s  a  lot  of 
people  who  claim  to  know  things  or  be  in  places,  or  have  taken  footage.  So  those  are 
the  key  things  that  we  would  need  to  establish  before  we  would  go  even  near 
approaching  them  or  using  their  contribution.  (M.  Frankel,  phone  interview,  July  29, 
2016) 
 
Frankel  also  described  the  primary  role  of  the  journalist  in  sourcing  eyewitness  material  as 
guarding  against  the  spread  of  misinformation.  Again,  this  is  understood  first  and  foremost  as 
ensuring  that  the  user  disseminating  any  newsworthy  material  is  also  its  producer,  or  has  first 
hand  experience  of  the  event  or  topic  he  is  sharing  information  about.  However,  this  basic 
requirement  means  that  users  are  thought  of  as  eyewitness  sources  not  as  ‘collaborators’  or 
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‘citizen  journalists’.  It  is  not  required  of  journalists  to  be  present  at  the  time  a  news  event 
takes  place  in  order  to  report  on  it.  Although  one  of  the  tasks  ascribed  to  journalists  is  to  bear 
witness’,  this  is  not  necessarily  meant  in  a  literal  and  immediate  sense.  A  journalist  is  not 
required  to  be  an  eyewitness,  especially  in  unscheduled  news  events  where  being  in  the  right 
place  at  the  right  time  is  a  matter  of  chance.  Journalists  very  often  arrive  late  and  do  not  have 
any  first-hand  knowledge  of  the  specific  incidents  they  are  sent  to  cover.  The  work  of 
journalists  is  the  reconstruction  of  what  took  place  through  a  professional  set  of  routines  and 
processes  that  are  deemed  trustworthy.  Usually  this  involves  seeking  out  and  speaking  to 
eyewitnesses,  and  representing  statements  by  authoritative  and  official  sources  on  the  events. 
Applied  to  social  media,  the  so-called  audience  participation  offered  through  social  media 
newsgathering  in  breaking  news  scenarios  is  mainly  limited  to  journalists  sourcing 
eyewitnesses  remotely  without  needing  to  attend  the  scene  to  find  them.  While  the  eyewitness 
material  that  these  sources  provide  may  unveil  news  events  and  incidents  that  would  not  have 
gained  any  exposure  in  the  past  as  journalists  were  not  aware  of  them,  or  unable  to  package 
into  a  marketable  news  product  due  to  a  lack  of  content  to  illustrate  the  information,  it  has  not 
challenged  the  relationship  between  journalists  and  sources  in  news  production.  Non-elite 
citizen  users  have  gained  power  in  their  interaction  with  professional  journalists  primarily 
through  their  value  as  sources  only  in  as  far  as  this  corresponds  with  professional  routines.  Of 
course,  professional  journalism  and  the  voice  of  the  public  are  not  anathema  to  each  other, 
and  can  and  do  interlink.  So  citizen  sources  have  undeniably  been  able  to  enter  the  global 
news  flow  where  previously  they  might  not  have  been  able  to  and  influence  the  news  agenda 
thanks  to  technology.  This  at  times  has  benefitted  both  sides  with  journalists  able  to  get  high 
value  content  and  scoops,  and  members  of  the  public  able  to  get  the  attention  of  news  media.  
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Where  the  event  is  not  a  breaking  news  scenario  other  factors  begin  to  be  considered  in  the 
use  of  eyewitness  material.  Contrasting  two  piece  of  content  –  one  of  an  alleged  soldier  from 
Mosul  returning  home  and  another  of  starving  children  in  the  Syrian  town  of  Madaya  – 
El-Katatney  described  the  process  behind  how  some  content  was  chosen  over  others  at 
AJPlus.  
 
[A]  good  example  from  a  couple  of  weeks  ago.  It  was  a  soldier  in  Iraq  from  Mosul. 
He  reunited  with  his  mother.  Right?  So  it’s  a  soldier  and  he  runs  up  to  his  mother.  “I 
haven’t  seen  you  in  three  years.”  Eventually  we  decided  not  to  run  with  that  story 
because  it’s  almost  impossible  to  verify.  Like,  I  can’t,  I  don’t  even  know…  the 
footage  comes  from  a  source  that  I  can  in  no  way  verify.  How  am  I  going  to  verify 
someone  in  Iraq?  How  am  I  gonna  know  when  this  happened?  This  could’ve  been  the 
liberation  in  2004.  It’s  not  that  it  could  be  staged.  I  assume  it’s  true  but  the  facts  of  the 
story  itself  are  almost  impossible  for  me  to  know  where  he  is.  And  there  is  no  other 
source.  This  is  a  one  person  source.  It’s  not  like  there  are  several  stories  of  people 
reuniting  with  their  families.  [...]  I  don’t  know  what  their  agenda  is,  who  put  out  the 
video.  All  those  things.  That’s  the  kind  of  video  that  you  wouldn’t  run  with.  Unless 
there  is  some  way  to  give  that  story  context  or  to  verify  it  somewhere  else.  And  it’s 
not  a  Madaya  story,  right?  The  Madaya  story,  even  if  it  came  from  one  source,  that’s  a 
supremely  important  story  of  children  starving  in  Madaya,  Syria.  But  even  though  it 
came  from  one  doctor  in  Madaya,  I  verified  it.  The  Sans  [inaudible]  Medical  Society 
here  in  US  were  sending  them  money  but  still  the  very  core  of  that  story  was  one 
person.  But  that  was  fine  for  that  story  because  it  was  an  important  newsworthy  story 
that  the  information  coming  out  of  that  region  was  that  they  were  starving.  [...]  The 
facts  added  up.  So  that  was  fine  to  run  with  it  because  it  was  such  an  important  story 
to  tell.  The  other  one,  the  soldier  from  Iraq.  it  was  a  nice  story  but  it’s  not  a  story  you 
would,  you  know,  you  would  run  with  because  it  might,  you  know,  it  doesn’t  add  a  lot 
to  the  story  and  it’s  not  supremely  along  the  lines  of  what  AJPlus  were  trying  to  do, 
like  the  issue  of  Syria.  One  that  we  were  trying  to  raise  awareness  of.  (E.  El-Katatney, 
conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
The  comparison  reveals  a  number  of  factors  that  determine  whether  a  piece  of  content  is 
used.  In  non-breaking  news  events  journalists  continue  to  consider  verification  in  terms  of 
corroborating  information  based  on  multiple  sources.  This  is  the  ‘two-source  rule’  typically 
used  by  journalists  according  to  which  at  least  two  sources  need  to  confirm  a  piece  of 
information  independently  of  each  in  order  for  it  to  be  considered  for  news  reports  (Sullivan, 
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2017).  Alone,  the  fact  that  users  are  considered  in  this  context,  shows  that  journalists  think  of 
them  as  sources  in  the  conventional  sense.  Where  the  location  and  date  cannot  be  confirmed 
from  the  content  itself,  it  may  be  discarded  for  not  being  trustworthy.  Finally,  according  to  the 
interviewee,  journalists  could  not  establish  the  motivations  of  the  content  producer  as  they 
had  no  way  of  finding  out  who  they  were  and  did  not  have  their  own  reporters  on  the  ground. 
The  contrast  with  eyewitness  material  of  starving  children  in  Madaya  is  particularly 
interesting  as  the  footage  also  possessed  no  distinguishing  features  that  confirmed  location 
and  date,  little  was  known  about  the  content  producer  and  their  motivations  and  there  were  no 
journalists  on  the  ground.  Assuming  that  neither  of  the  videos  were  staged,  the  factors 
determining  the  use  of  one  over  the  other,  was  the  newsworthiness  of  the  video  from  Syria  in 
terms  of  the  dramatic  effect  of  starving  children  to  highlight  the  plight  of  civilians  living  in 
Madaya,  as  opposed  to  footage  of  a  soldier  returning  home  in  the  battle  for  Mosul.  The  latter 
suggested  advances  by  the  Iraqi  army  in  retaking  Mosul  from  the  jihadist  group  Islamic  State. 
Particular  efforts  were  made  to  verify  the  video  from  Madaya,  that  was  considered 
“supremely  important”.  A  single  piece  of  footage  showing  an  instance  of  such  human 
suffering,  could  be  deemed  of  paramount  importance  even  in  the  absence  of  other  such 
images,  as  it  was  newsworthy  in  its  own  right.  It  was  also  considered  to  be  keeping  with  the 
editorial  agenda  of  AJPlus,  as  the  interviewee  points  out,  while  the  footage  from  Iraq  was  not. 
Audience  participation  was  controlled  by  the  editorial  agenda  of  the  news  organisation  on  the 
one  hand,  the  ‘newsworthiness’  –  as  defined  by  the  news  organisation  –  of  the  content,  and 
also  rationalised  through  professional  routines  determining  verification  practices. 
 
Guidelines 
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Interviewees  were  asked  about  whether  guidelines  were  useful  and  should  be  in  place  for 
interactive  newsgathering.  The  question  addressed  how  professional  norms  may  be 
formalised  by  the  news  organisations  in  news  sourcing  on  social  media  platforms,  and 
attempted  to  probe  what  is  deemed  an  ethical  approach  to  audience  participation.  Both  the 
AJPlus  and  BBC  interviewees  believed  that  guidelines  were  necessary  and  described  what 
they  entailed  at  their  respective  news  organisations,  while  the  France  24  interviewee  believed 
that  journalists  should  be  free  from  any  guidelines  that  could  be  too  prescriptive  and  therefore 
hamper  them  in  their  profession.  On  the  one  hand,  this  is  somewhat  unsurprising  as  both  the 
BBC  and  AJPlus  are  founded  in  the  Anglo-Saxon  media  tradition,  which  attempts  to  instil  a 
strong  separation  between  the  journalist  as  a  subjective  individual  and  the  work  they  produce 
through  a  raft  of  routines.  As  discussed,  this  separation  between  ‘objective’  truth  and  the 
subjective  opinion  is  not  as  prevalent  in  the  Mediterranean  media  model,  therefore  efforts  to 
prescribe  a  correct  way  of  reporting  to  journalists  is  somewhat  anathema  to  the  media 
tradition  that  France  24  is  founded  in.  On  the  other,  however,  the  BBC  and  Al  Jazeera  showed 
considerable  differences  in  their  approach  to  collaborative  newsgathering,  which  indicates 
that  guidelines  were  primarily  there  to  sanction  the  practice  within  the  profession  rather  than 
vocalise  a  normative  ideology  around  participation  in  newswork.  The  guidelines  outlined  by 
the  BBC  and  AJPlus  interviewees  were  mainly  focused  on  general  awareness  of  how  to 
interact  with  potential  sources  safely  and  responsibly,  so  as  to  protect  them,  and  ensuring 
content  is  verified  as  accurate  and  truthful.  The  focus  in  guidelines  was  on  methods  that 
journalists  should  apply.  Again,  this  fits  with  the  overall  approach  to  social  media  users 
primarily  as  sources  rather  than  collaborators  or  participants.  The  interviewees  focused 
largely  on  how  professional  practices  and  ethics  should  be  adapted  to  social  media  rather  than 
rethinking  what  shape  audience  participation  in  mainstream  news  reporting  may  take  through 
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the  interaction  on  social  media  platforms.  Therefore,  the  purpose  of  the  guidelines  was  to 
integrate  collaborative  newsgathering  into  the  profession  and  provide  a  sanctioned  set  of  rules 
around  it  that  distinguished  journalists  from  non-journalists. 
 
Oh  no,  there  should  definitely  be  guidelines.  There  should  be  guidelines  if  someone  is 
inside  an  attack  of,  you  know,  if  there  are  people  in  a  school  shooting.  And  you  don’t 
message  them  with  your  phone.  Or  in  the  Pulse  nightclub  and  you’re  like,  “did  you 
take  this  photo?  Can  you  give  it  to  me?”  Like  we’ve  had  several  training  of  things  you 
wouldn’t  even  think  of.  If  someone  is  in  a  situation  of  danger  and  you  tweet  at  them  it 
will  make  sounds.  Like  it  will  ping  your  phone.  You’re  putting  them  in  danger.  Or 
someone,  like,  “my  friend’s  just  died.”  Like  the  Oakland  fire  last  week  here.  That’s  a 
good  example  of  where  we  were  sourcing.  And  people  whose  friend’s  just  died.  How 
do  you  talk  to  these  people?  There’s  a  lot  of  training  of  how  do  you  actually  reach  out. 
You  see  so  many  of  these,  like,  “Hey,  I’m  a  journalist  for  blah  blah,  can  I  use  your 
photo  in  all  perpetuity?”  There  is  just  a  lot  of  worry  about  how  you  phrase  and  how 
you  reach  out  to  sources.  In  how  to  even  just  broadly  verify  someone  before  you,  like, 
verify  who  they  are,  what  their  bio  is,  looking  them  up  on  other  platforms,  their  name. 
There  are  a  lot  of  ways  to  verify  that  you  should  be  trained  in  and  that  there  should  be 
guidelines  in  because  there  are  a  lot  of  ways  to  cut  corners  and  get  quicker  to  knowing 
if  this  is  a  piece  of  content  that  you  should  start  looking  into  before  you  even  start. 
You  know,  just  a  lot  of  simple  tools  that  all  journalists  should  know.  We  have  our  own 
guidelines.  (E.  El-Katatney,  conference  call  interview,  December  14,  2016) 
 
The  two  factors  that  warrant  guidelines  according  to  El-Katatney  was  attempting  to  ensure 
users’  physical  and  emotional  safety  when  interacting  with  journalists  at  her  news 
organisation.  Ethical  sourcing  of  content  meant  ensuring  that  sources  are  treated  respectfully, 
with  their  well-being  in  mind.  Protecting  sources  –  a  responsibility  that  is  deemed  very 
important  in  professional  journalism  –  is  extended  to  social  media.  This  is  understood  in 
terms  of  duty  of  care  on  the  one  hand,  and  in  terms  of  copyright  on  the  other.  It  is  commonly 
cited  by  journalists  as  an  important  component  of  ethical  interactive  newsgathering  (Posetti  et 
al.,  2014;  Storyful,  2015;  WAN-IFRA,  2014).  Duty  of  care  entails  recognition  that  sources 
are  typically  not  trained  journalists  and  unpaid  when  they  provide  content  to  news 
organisations.  Professional  journalists  therefore  have  a  responsibility  to  ensure  that  they  are 
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not  taking  advantage  of  sources  in  a  way  that  might  endanger  them  only  to  gain  access  to 
material  that  is  of  value  to  news  coverage.  Oftentimes,  however,  this  means  sources  are 
patently  in  dangerous  situations  that  journalists  have  no  access  to.  The  Syrian  conflict,  for 
example,  was  deemed  too  dangerous  for  journalists,  who,  therefore,  relied  on  amateurs  to 
provide  information  and  multimedia  material.  A  byproduct  of  the  duty  of  care  argument  is 
that  professional  journalists  ensure  a  degree  of  neutrality  and  removal  in  their  interaction  with 
users.  Information  is  shared  without  journalists’  intervention,  and  professionals  continue  in 
their  role  as  disinterested  observers.  This  upholds  another  important  tenet  of  professional 
journalism  and  reinforces  the  chasm  between  amateurs  and  professionals.  This  same  notion 
of  duty  of  care  is  rarely  problematised  when  dealing  with  young  freelance  journalists,  who 
often  put  themselves  in  dangerous  situations  without  the  benefit  of  protection  from  a  news 
organisation  as  a  way  to  break  into  their  chosen  profession.  In  part,  the  argument  of  duty  of 
care  is  what  separates  professionals  from  civilians  and  cements  the  responsibilities,  role  and 
hierarchy  in  interactions.  On  the  other  hand,  the  issue  of  copyright  acknowledges  users  as 
publishers.  They  are  treated  as  news  producers  in  their  own  right  and  the  ethical  way  in 
which  to  show  this  is  through  giving  onscreen  credit  to  them.  While  this  might  be  seen  as 
outsourcing  responsibility  for  the  content  itself  to  the  person  who  produced  it,  it  also  acts  as  a 
quality  seal  for  the  news  organisation,  indicating  that  efforts  were  made  to  verify  the 
authenticity  of  social  media-sourced  material  by  tracing  it  back  to  the  original  owner.  By 
absorbing  the  copyright  of  users  into  ethical  conduct  in  interactive  newsgathering,  users  are 
in  one  way  treated  like  journalists  with  bylines  and  the  potential  offer  –  though  usually  not  – 
of  compensation,  but  it  also  offers  transparency  in  the  work  of  the  professionals,  indicates 
verification,  and  finally  separates  the  news  organisation  from  the  content  that  suggests  a 
degree  of  unaccountability. 
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El-Katatney  considered  guidelines  as  helpful  in  implementing  work  processes  that  would 
speed  up  newsgathering  and  verification,  and  could  work  in  tandem  with  the  training  of 
journalists.  Therefore,  guidelines  were  considered  in  terms  of  solidifying  how  social  media 
was  integrated  into  routines  on  a  purely  operational  level  but  not  as  a  way  to  fundamentally 
integrate  audience  participation  and  rethink  the  relationship  between  audiences  and  the 
professional  news  media.  Despite  the  view  that  social  media  has  profoundly  changed  the 
relationship  between  professional  news  media  and  audiences,  the  way  that  it  was  formally 
integrated  into  professional  practices  was  framed  in  very  conventional  terms,  where  the 
journalist  carries  out  gatekeeping  according  to  familiar  norms.  While  the  view  that  social 
media  has  allowed  audiences  to  have  a  different  role  in  the  news  environment  as  active 
participants  rather  than  passive  consumers  was  shared  by  the  interviewees  the  discussion  of 
guidelines  made  it  clear  that  on  a  day-to-day  basis  there  was  little  effort  made  to  formally 
integrate  this.  Nevertheless,  AJPlus  did  use  interactive  newsgathering  in  a  way  that  took 
greater  notice  of  non-elite  users,  which  may  be  ascribed  to  the  culture  of  the  news 
organisation.  So,  whether  interactive  newsgathering  empowered  audiences  and  provided 
access  to  the  global  news  flow  was  more  a  matter  of  the  culture  cultivated  by  journalists  than 
formally  linked  to  social  media  but  rather  implemented  with  its  help. 
 
 
So,  for  example,  we  have  guidelines  we  take  quite  seriously,  in  terms  of  how  we 
approach  members  of  the  public,  the  extent  to  which  we  involve  them  in  our  stories  in 
the  first  instance,  rights,  obligations,  copyright  and  so  forth,  the  issues  around  their 
own  safety  and  how  we  credit  them  and  how  we  signpost  to  our  audiences  that  the 
material  has  not  been  filmed  or  recorded  by  a  BBC  journalist.  So  you  know  we  have 
things  that  we  abide  by,  you  know,  our  own  editorial  standards  and  guidelines.  But  in 
terms  of  how  it’s  used  beyond  that  largely  depends  on  the  circumstances.  (M.  Frankel, 
phone  interview,  July  29,  2016) 
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The  BBC  interviewee  outlined  guidelines  not  only  regarding  duty  of  care,  copyright  and 
crediting  of  sources,  but  also  on  the  extent  to  which  sources  are  involved  in  the  reporting.  “To 
what  extent  can  audience  involvement  be  integrated  into  professional  norms  and  processes 
without  undermining  them?”  is  the  question  that  the  guidelines  seek  to  confront.  The  focus  in 
the  guidelines  is  largely  on  the  interaction  between  professional  journalist  and  their  news 
organisation  on  the  one  side  and  the  user  on  the  other.  It  considers  how  journalists  speak  to 
sources  and  provides  a  set  of  rules  and  obligations  in  the  exchange  of  content.  Frankel  was 
the  only  one  of  the  three  interviewees  that  mentioned  guidelines  about  the  extent  to  which 
users  are  involved  in  the  news  reporting,  suggesting  that  there  is  a  formalised  demarcation 
between  the  task  of  the  journalist  and  that  of  the  user,  which  may  be  case-dependent.  The 
ethical  code  and  guidelines  are  mainly  about  setting  boundaries  in  the  interaction  on  both 
sides,  and  a  dividing  line  between  journalists,  who  must  implement  these  rules,  and  the  user, 
who  is  mainly  brought  into  the  newswork  in  a  structured  way  through  them.  For  example,  the 
involvement  of  users  was  phrased  as  limiting  access  rather  than  opening  access.  There  is  no 
mention  of  editorial  considerations  in  the  use  of  eyewitness  material,  which  are  dictated  by 
circumstance  and  are  therefore  left  at  the  discretion  of  the  journalist.  This  cements  the 
relationship  between  users  and  journalists,  where  the  latter  adopts  a  set  of  obligations  and 
practices  that  then  allow  them  to  integrate  content  into  their  coverage  according  to  their  own 
needs  and  preferences. 
 
Pain  from  France  24  was  the  only  interviewee  who  rejected  the  idea  of  guidelines  for  the  use 
of  social  media-sourced  material,  rather  suggesting  training  as  a  method  to  foster  work 
processes  around  interactive  newsgathering.  This  was  because  the  existing  routines  and 
professional  code  for  journalists  was  deemed  transferable  to  interactive  newsgathering  and 
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did  not  require  further  enunciating.  Rather,  journalists  had  to  be  trained  in  how  these  could  be 
applied.  Guidelines  were  not  considered  a  useful  or  efficient  way  to  help  journalists  as  they 
were  either  too  specific  or  not  specific  enough.  Interactive  newsgathering  was  considered  a 
tool  that  journalists  had  to  learn  to  use  effectively,  which  could  be  best  served  through 
training.  However,  the  course  of  the  interview  also  saw  the  interviewee  speak  more  about  the 
relationship  between  journalists  and  users,  and  the  way  that  social  media  could  challenge 
existinging  hierarchies  in  source  power.  This  led  the  interviewee  to  consider  the  question  of 
guidelines  in  terms  of  potentially  challenging  gatekeeping,  which  he  argued  would  be  mainly 
brought  about  through  training.  In  the  main,  though,  the  issues  that  would  be  addressed  in 
training  overlapped  with  those  listed  out  in  the  guidelines  at  the  other  two  news  organisations. 
But  the  fact  that  each  case  was  specific  and  may  warrant  a  different  course  of  action  was  the 
reason  that  the  interviewee  believed  guidelines  were  ineffective. 
 
Pain:  Personally,  I’m  not  a  huge  fan  of  guidelines.  I  think  in  our  profession  we  have 
to  adapt  all  the  time  and  guidelines  for  me,  it  makes  you  dumb.  […]  For  me  training  is 
more  important.  So  yes,  I  think  we  should  do  a  lot  of  training  with  journalists  and 
teaching  them  and  showing  them  how  to  use  UGC.  Especially,  you’re  right,  not  to  use 
a  comment  from  an  Australian  guy  on  the  Greek  crisis  but  explaining  to  him  how  you 
can  use  voices  from  Greece,  meaning  maybe  you  use  a  translator  or  use  Google 
Translate  if  you  don't.  And  how  to  contact  them,  how  to  get  more  from  them  and 
where  to  find  that  comment  and  I  think  it’s  more  a  question  of  training  than 
guidelines.  Because  guidelines,  you’re  going  to  put  up  guidelines  and  then  it’s  gonna 
be  either  too  general  and  not  really  useful  for  journalists  or  it’s  going  to  be  very 
specific  and  then  you  have  to  adapt  it  every  week. 
 
Interviewer:  Maybe  guidelines  was  the  wrong  word  but  you  know  how  you  have 
certain  news  values,  or  you  have,  you  know  most  journalists  are  aware  of  them, 
whether  they’re  overtly  aware  of  them  or  whether  they’re  kind  of  aware  of  them  is 
another  thing,  but  you  know  in  kind  of  like  practices.  There  is  a  certain  idea  of  you 
should  be  maybe  impartial,  what  you’re  doing  should  have  relevance  and  that  kind  of 
thing.  And  maybe  how  that’s  sort  of  adapted  to  social  media. 
 
Pain:  That’s  for  me  being  too  vague.  You  know  your  own  news  reporting  should  be 
impartial.  Every  journalist  on  earth  will  tell  you  that.  It  doesn’t  mean  anything 
because  then  what  is  impartiality  and  applied  to  every  case  what  does  it  mean 
concretely,  and  that’s  what’s  important.  As  I  told  you,  I  think,  it’s  going  to  be  too 
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vague  or  too  specific  and  it  would  be  very  challenging  to  find  something  that  is  in 
between.  It’s  also  training.  “Ok,  let’s  work  on  the  Greek  crisis  today  with  a  group  of 
twenty  journalists  and  let’s  see  what’s  out  there  and  then,  well,  you  explain.”  [...]  You 
could  use  [guidelines]  during  the  training  and  then  you  need  to  work  on  it  and  get 
used  to  it.  [...]  I  think  in  the  long  run  it  would  be  fantastic  if  every  journalist  would 
have  this  capacity  of  working  with  UGC  and  social  media  and  I  hope  we’ll  get  there 
but  so  far  there  is  still  specific  working  with  it  and  you  develop  this  capacity  by 
actually  doing  it.  It  can’t  be  just  theoretical.  (J.  Pain,  phone  interview,  July  5,  2016)  
 
Summary 
Collaborative  newsgathering  with  non-journalists  and  non-elites  is  frequently  understood   as 
“audience  participation”  by  the  interviewees.  As  the  BBC  interview  revealed,  understanding 
this  type  of  collaborative  newswork  as  necessarily  aimed  at  involving  subjects  directly 
involved  or  affected  by  a  news  event  is  a  misnomer.  Yet,  the  France  24  interview  suggested 
that  some  editors  may  hold  this  as  an  ideal  to  strive  for,  though  it  is  not  necessarily  seen  in 
practice  (perhaps  through  lack  of  adequate  training).  Nevertheless,  collaborative  newswork 
can  be  viewed  as  a  means  to  maintaining  audiences  and  building  brand  loyalty  by  conveying 
a  sense  of  empowerment  through  participation.  Participation  is  therefore  not  primarily  about 
the  quality  of  the  collaboration  and  its  outcome,  but  the  appeal  to  audiences.  This  is  done  in 
different  ways  by  the  organisations,  depending  on  who  they  are  targeting  and  how  they 
understand  their  own  role  as  news  producers.  Arguably  AJPlus  better  understands  the 
structures  and  fluidity  of  audiences  on  social  media  than  the  more  hierarchical  structure  of  the 
BBC.  AJPlus’  approach  to  collaborative  newswork  is  equally  driven  by  the  impetus  to  reach 
large  audiences  but  may  be  better  characterised  by  the  term  ‘community  participation’.  I  posit 
that  ‘audience  participation’  deals  with  members  of  audiences  as  mainly  disconnected 
individuals  that  have  not  fully  left  behind  the  era  of  mass  media.  News  organisations  may 
engage  individuals  but  it  takes  place  only  as  a  one-to-one  interaction  between  the  user  and  the 
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news  organisation.  Community  participation  on  the  other  hand  acknowledges  the 
interconnectedness  of  potential  audience  members  and  the  capacity  for  those  deemed 
connected,  knowledgeable  and  authoritative  inside  particular  networks  to  widely  distribute 
news  content  that  passes  their  muster.  Audiences  are  fluid  and  Al  Jazeera  appropriates  this 
fluidity,  recognising  that  there  are  influential  groups  around  specific  topics  that  can  help 
amplify  AJPlus  news  content  that  resonates  with  them.  The  objective  is  not  primarily  to  build 
an  audience  around  AJPlus,  but  to  insert  themselves  into  ‘ready-made’  audiences.  The  power 
deferred  to  non-elites  are  substantially  different  with  the  second  approach  that  requires  a 
deeper  integration  of  non-accredited  sources  in  the  newswork.  The  community,  which  is 
usually  knowledgeable  on  the  subject  matter,  has  to  recognise  its  role  and  voice  in  the 
newswork.  By  El  Katatney’s  own  admission,  AJPlus   favours  undercovered  topics,  where 
online  communities  can  fill  a  gap  and  more  easily  achieve  a  status  of  authority  thanks  to  a 
lack  of  alternative  sources.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  agenda-setting  power  is  harder  to  achieve  on 
topics  that  are  widely  and  frequently  covered  and  a  range  of  accredited  sources  cater  for  the 
routines  and  practices  that  journalists  are  most  at  ease  with. 
 
The  most  popular  use  of  social  media-sourced  material  is  in  breaking  news  scenarios. 
Technology  has  enhanced  the  variety  and  quality  of  news  content  available  but  changed  little 
in  terms  of  source  power.  Long-established  norms  and  news  values  determine  what 
constitutes  newsworthiness.  Editors  found  it  difficult  to  define  how  users  can  gain  their 
attention  despite  perceiving  collaboration  in  newswork  as  important  —  for  audience  building 
or  otherwise.  Fulfilling  the  requirements  of  professional  values  and  practices  such  as 
authenticity  was  brought  up  as  a  way  to  ensure  content  was  not  disregarded  outright.  Yet 
ways  to  influence  the  editorial  agenda  was  not  defined  or  even  considered  an  important 
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aspect  of  collaborative  newswork.  This  suggests  limited  scope  for  journalists  to  critically 
engage  with  professional  practices  where  collaboration  is  concerned.  The  interviews  suggest 
that  interactivity  between  journalists  and  users  is  tightly  managed  and  formalised,  with  users 
usually  treated  less  as  participants  or  collaborators  and  more  as  sources.  Source  power  may 
have  been  affected  but  gatekeeping  practices  continue  to  mirror  those  used  in  the  past. 
Participation  in  a  more  collaborative  and  egalitarian  way  is  mostly  seen  taking  place  outside 
of  the  mainstream  news  flow,  in  the  alternative  news  environment  created  on  social  media 
platforms.  When  journalists  are  speaking  of  audience  participation  in  news  reporting,  it  is 
shown  to  be  a  controlled  and  formalised  interaction  that  enables  sourcing  of  content  from 
afar.  Perhaps,  as  news  organisations  compete  in  the  alternative  news  environment  on  social 
media  platforms,  the  true  audience  participation  is  in  how  news  products  are  distributed  and 
contextualised  by  users. 
 
All  of  the  interviewees  considered  the  question  of  guidelines  in  a  solely  practical  sense  that 
would  help  journalists  apply  routines,  processes  and  ethics,  and  that  would  in  turn 
professionalise  interactive  newsgathering  for  them.  All  three  interviewees  were  also  broadly 
in  agreement  about  the  type  of  practices  that  needed  formalising  and  the  methods  that  were 
being  applied  –  be  it  through  guidelines  or  training  –  showing  that  journalists  are  coming 
together  to  establish  their  role  collectively  in  managing  audience  participation.  This  role  is 
defined  primarily  by  existing  routines  although  emphasis  on  practices  and  values  slightly 
varied. 
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9.  Conclusion 
 
At  the  outset,  this  research  aimed  to  examine  how  journalists  and  news  editors  manage  the 
collaborative  newswork  with  non-journalists  through  social  media  and  the  challenges  this 
posed  to  them.  It  soon  became  apparent  that  journalists’  diminishing  role  as  exclusive 
providers  of  news  has  created  a  seismic  disruption  to  the  industry,  one  that  the  professional 
community  is  mobilising  to  counteract.  The  mass  entry  of  non-journalists  to  major 
information  distribution  platforms  and  the  manifestation  of  two-way  mass  communication 
has  seen  journalists  attempt  to  assert  not  just  their  relevance  but  also  their  authority.  The  loss 
of  exclusivity  both  in  news  production  and  in  control  over  the  means  of  news  dissemination 
has  undoubtedly  thrown  the  profession  and  its  institutions  into  crisis.  Not  least,  the  Internet 
has  left  the  entire  business  model  on  which  journalism  is  built  in  disarray,  with  a  devastating 
effect  on  the  industry’s  profitability.  However,  in  this  muddle  of  information  exchange  and 
collaboration,  created  by  the  Internet  and  turbo-charged  by  social  media,  legacy  news  media 
remain  influential  in  shaping  news  discourse .  This  is  true  not  only  due  to  their  economies  of 39
scale  in  newswork,  which  place  them  at  an  advantage  over  other  news  producers,  or  their 
reach  through  various  mediums  that  extend  beyond  digital  media,  such  as  broadcast  and  print. 
It  is  also  true  because  in  an  otherwise  fragmenting  news  environment  they  are  the  closest  we 
have  to  an  overarching  public  sphere.  Although  their  privileged  position  as  news  providers 
has  become  contested,  mainstream  news  media  is  still  largely  accepted  as  providing  the 
‘townhall’  for  public  discourse.  This  is  demonstrably  the  case  as  media  exposure  remains 
sought  after  by  power  elites  and  activists  alike.  I  agree  with  Browne  (2018)  that  while  the 
39  Normative  approaches  and  professional  practices  in  newswork  are  also  often  internalised  by  citizen 
journalism,  especially  where  structures  mirror  those  in  professional  organisations.  (Lindner,  2017) 
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promise  of  the  Habermasian  public  sphere  remains  unfulfilled  (and  is  perhaps  unachievable), 
it  presents  an  ideal  to  strive  for.  There  is  I  believe,  the  need  for  a  place  where  voices  meet, 
though  I  do  not  maintain  that  they  must  reach  a  common  way  of  seeing.  An  agonistic  model 
of  democracy  (Mouffe,  2005)  does  not  place  the  same  expectation  on  the  media  to  build 
consensus.  Opposing  viewpoints  may  never  be  reconciled,  nor  is  that  the  aim.  In  this  model, 
democracy  needs  to  find  ways  to  accommodate  irreconcilable  view  points,  or  risk  becoming 
hegemony  by  consensus.  If  mainstream  journalism’s  perception  of  what  democracy  should 
achieve  is  limited  by  the  striving  for  consensus,  the  value  of  plurality  is  necessarily  put  into 
question  –  not  only  the  plurality  of  voices  but  the  plurality  of  approaches  to  covering  those 
voices.  Nevertheless,  as  a  space,  mainstream  news  media  remain  the  institutions  we  have  to 
try  and  tangibly  manifest  this  aim  in  the  real  world  and  are  therefore  worth  preserving. 
 
The  new  news  discourse  that  emerged  from  the  networked  nature  of  news  production  is 
attempting  to  bridge  the  divide  between  professionalism  and  amateurism  in  newswork  by 
absorbing  collaboration  into  journalistic  norms  (Hujanen  2016).  But  it  also  does  so  by 
reasserting  professional  authority.  In  fact,  I  argue  that  this  news  discourse  is  perhaps  above  all 
concerned  with  boundary  work.  The  findings  of  my  research  suggest  that  collaborative 
newswork  often  takes  place  between  journalists  in  the  western  news  organisations  studied 
here.  Where  it  does  not,  non-elite  contributors  are  not  necessarily  sought  out  for  the  value  of 
their  newswork  but  the  value  of  them  (and  people  like  them)  as  audience.  Even  where 
non-journalists  are  sourced  specifically  for  their  newswork,  it  is  often  explicitly  framed 
within  the  logic  of  professional  routines  to  legitimate  their  contributions.  In  order  to  validate 
the  amateur’s  newswork,  this  framing  has  to  be  done  by  professional  journalists  creating  a 
very  clear  hierarchy  that  places  journalists  at  the  top.  The  stamp  of  approval  that  has  to  be 
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given  by  professionals  not  only  creates  a  hierarchy  between  them  and  those  they  collaborate 
with  but  makes  the  journalist  indispensable  in  the  process.  At  the  same  time  that 
collaboration  has  become  a  journalistic  convention,  professional  norms  and  routines  have 
been  adapted  and  used  to  define  legitimate  collaboration  that  is  sanctioned  by  the 
professional  community.  
 
Nevertheless,  the  case  studies  have  shown  a  significant  divergence  between  the  three  news 
organisations  in  how  they  approach  networked  journalism.  The  BBC  used  social  media 
content  extensively  to  promote  their  own  reporters  as  well  as  other  elite  journalists,  while 
France  24  used  it  primarily  to  source  professional  journalists  from  other  news  organisations 
and  expert  sources.  The  expectation  laid  out  in  the  methodology  that  France  24  would  present 
more  fringe  sources  was  not  borne  out  significantly  in  the  research.  The  migrant  crisis 
included  some  extreme  right  voices  emerging,  while  the  BBC  presented  no  such  voices. 
However,  original  messages  among  citizen  sources  were  very  limited  across  France  24  texts. 
The  Media  Watch  programme  during  the  Greek  case  study  involved  high  levels  of  opining 
and  commentary,  but  overall  France  24  did  not  substantially  differ  from  that  seen  at  the  other 
news  organisations.   Meanwhile  Al  Jazeera  most  consistently  used  social  media  to  source 
non-journalist  and  non-elite  sources.  This  suggests  fragmentation  among  news  media  in  how 
to  tackle  collaboration.  The  approaches  appear  to  be  influenced  by  media  models  and 
cultures.  One  might  argue  this  indicates  diversity  across  the  news  landscape,  but  on  the  other 
side  it  also  suggests  a  lack  of  shared  vision  with  regard  to  what  collaborative  newswork 
should  look  like  in  practice.  While  in  interviews  they  each  claimed  collaborative 
newsgathering  as  an  important  journalistic  practice  for  themselves,  it  was  the  mere  adoption 
of  collaboration  as  convention  that  appeared  common  denominator  among  the  professional 
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community.  Consensus  on  how,  or  to  what  end,  collaboration  takes  place  seemed  mostly 
absent.  The  interviews  and  case  studies  showed  that  collaborative  newsgathering  has  been 
integrated  into  journalistic  norms  (i.e.  the  watchdog  role,  facilitating  public  discourse  through 
diversity  and  inclusivity,  objectivity,  etc)  as  well  as  professional  routines.  But  how  each 
organisation  approached  this  integration  into  norms  and  practices  (ie.  who  they  collaborated 
with  and  how  this  was  framed)  appears  to  be  shaped  largely  by  how  they  understand  their 
role  as  journalists,  which  is  influenced  by  the  respective  media  traditions  and  cultures.  Yet, 
the  focus  did  not  only  differ  between  news  organisations  but  showed  a  degree  of  change 
across  case  studies  which  also  indicated  weak  internal  coherence  in  each  organisation’s 
approach.  Collaboration  could  be  borne  out  of  necessity  in  some  cases,  and  not  in  others,  and 
this  influenced  its  nature  –  as  the  case  study  on  the  Syrian  conflict  showed.  This  chimes  with 
the  assertion  that  normative  approaches  to  journalism  are  extremely  difficult  to  ring  fence  and 
are  subject  to  rapid  changes,  which  calls  the  idea  of  a  claim  to  professionalism  itself  into 
question.  Lewis  (2015)  calls  for   a  more  interdisciplinary  approach  to  explore  boundary  work, 
acknowledging  the  rhetoric,  practice  and  the  objects  around  and  through  which  boundaries 
are  drawn.  Such  a  holistic  view  of  boundary  work  creates  space  to  analyse  the  different 
mechanisms  and  approaches  to  boundary  work  from  different  angles  and  creates  a  richer 
picture  of  how  the  profession  asserts  exclusivity  as  journalists  and  imposes  authority  even  as 
digital  news  practices  are  integrated. 
 
For  example,  while  the  polemic  around  collaborative  newsgathering  in  a  professional  context 
was  strong  from  each  news  organisation  during  the  interviews,  the  adoption  of  Twitter  as  the 
main  platform  where  collaboration  was  performed  favoured  specific  dynamics  in  this 
interaction.  Journalists  claimed  to  endow  social  media-sourced  content  with  journalistic  value 
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by  stamping  their  own  processes  on  it.  There  were  numerous  examples  of  user-generated 
content  used  to  underscore  the  professional  nature  of  journalism.  It  was  used  to  promote 
professional  journalists  as,  for  example,  seen  in  the  BBC  and  France  24  coverage  of  the 
Greek  referendum;  to  highlight  deviant  practices  such  as  in  the  coverage  of  the  actions  of  the 
Hungarian  camerawoman  in  the  case  study  of  the  migrant  crisis;  to  legitimise  non-journalistic 
material  through  journalistic  norms  as  seen  extensively  in  the  Aleppo  case  study  across  all 
three  news  organisations;  to  act  as  public  forum  for  discussion  with  The  Stream  hosting 
citizen  discussions;  and  also  to  broaden  the  number  of  news  sources  for  newswork  –  the 
reports  on  Palestinian  pen  seller,  the  huge  pool  of  journalists  in  Brussels  sharing  each  other’s 
insights  during  the  negotiations  on  the  Greek  loan,  and  the  majority  of  sources  from  Aleppo 
itself,  to  name  just  a  few.  All  in  all,  this  suggests  that  professionals  understand  their  role  to 
have  a  very  strong  gatekeeping  component,  which  is  expressed  in  the  way  they  collaborate 
and  how  they  legitimise  or  delegitimise  their  sources.  Non-journalists,  especially  non-elite 
ones,  have  little  opportunity  to  define  networked  journalism.  Arguably  a  more  empowered 
position  was  only  granted  to  non-elites  in  the  formats  that  Al  Jazeera  used.  This  is  likely  to 
have  been  the  case  as  they  were  quite  structured  and  formulaic  in  their  collaboration  through 
The  Stream  and  AJPlus,  which  carved  out  a  distinct  space  for  non-elites.  
 
The  research  defined  three  research  questions  in  the  methodology.  Each  case  study  and  the 
interviews  attempted  to  deal  with  these  questions.  Therefore,  I  want  to  largely  avoid  repeating 
these  case-specific  conclusions  here,  but  rather  produce  a  more  removed  perspective.  It  is 
difficult  to  address  the  questions  separately  as  they  inevitably  overlap  in  places.  Although  I 
have  attempted  to  deal  with  them  individually  as  far  as  possible.  The  conclusion  seems  more 
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coherent  when  bringing  the  questions  together  as  an  overall  analysis  of  gatekeeping  in 
networked  journalism. 
 
RQ1:  Is  social  media  sourcing  affecting  the  power  relationships  between  primary  and 
secondary  definers? 
 
RQ2:  How  do  professional  journalists  create  and  articulate  professional  boundaries  in  the 
participation  by  non-authoritative  citizen  voices/audiences? 
 
RQ3:  What  mechanisms  do  professional  journalists  use  to  maintain  their  gatekeeping  role? 
 
One  of  the  most  striking  findings  of  this  research  is  the  blurring  between  primary  and 
secondary  definers.  Secondary  definers,  meaning  journalists,  appear  to  act  like  traditional 
primary  definers,  assuming  roles  of  authority  and  expertise  in  analysis  and  commentary. 
Professionals  could  achieve  a  degree  of  celebrity  among  peers.  For  example,  the  Greek 
referendum  case  study  showed  that  the  ‘right  kind’  of  journalist  could  have  significant  clout 
in  gaining  access  to  Western  elite  mainstream  news  media.  This  journalist  was  usually  part  of 
the  professional  elite  themselves.  So  journalists  did  not  necessarily  go  to  power  elites  for 
information  but  sourced  information  from  their  peers,  both  bolstering  each  other’s  reputation 
through  promotion  of  each  other’s  newswork,  and  fostering  an  interpretive  community . 40
There  are  obvious  reasons  for  this  in  terms  of  journalistic  conventions,  as  professionals  are 
40  To  put  the  findings  in  the  Greek  referendum  case  study  in  context,  political  reporting  has  long  been 
characterised  by  ‘pack  journalism’  (McNair,  2012)  and  the  data  suggests  that  journalists  appropriate 
social  media  to  continue  this  practice  virtually. 
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keen  to  appear  removed  from  power  elites  and  as  gatekeepers  to  their  spin.  Of  course,  power 
elites  also  continued  to  act  as  primary  definers  for  journalists,  but  the  networked  journalism 
that  resulted  cannot  be  easily  put  down  to  the  sole  (or  even  primary)  framing  and 
agenda-setting  of  these  sources.  It  could  be  argued  that  journalists  closed  ranks  to  safeguard 
their  value  of  autonomy  and  relied  on  each  other  as  individually  autonomous  journalists  to 
build  what  they  might  understand  as  an  autonomous  community.  Social  media  has  not  only 
revolutionised  the  communication  flow  between  audiences  and  news  organisations,  but  also 
the  communication  flow  between  media  professionals,  and  this  is  being  used  by  them  to 
assert  influence  and  authority.  The  resulting  journalist  community  is  clearly  also  perceived  as 
hostile,  or  at  least  unaccommodating,  by  outsiders  –  politicians  from  less  influential  European 
Union  countries  used  Twitter  extensively  to  speak  to  the  public  about  the  Greek  loan 
negotiations  –  and  this  is  obvious  in  how  their  gatekeeping  is  side-stepped  with  the  help  of 
social  media.  While  some  newsmakers,  who  presumably  feel  supported  by  the  journalist  elite, 
choose  to  primarily  speak  through  the  news  media,  others  do  not.  Yanis  Varoufakis’ 
resignation  is  a  case  in  point.  Aware  of  the  framing  power  of  journalists  (and  his  own  ability 
to  circumvent  it),  Varoufakis  chose  to  publish  his  own  resignation  as  Greek  finance  minister 
to  a  mass  audience  rather  than  speak  to  and  through  international  news  media.  Most  notably, 
he  did  so  in  English.  In  the  Greek  case  study,  ‘sense-making’  and  analysis  was  carried  out 
extensively  by  BBC  journalists  and  some  other  journalists,  while  France  24  relied  heavily  on 
accredited  expert  sources  –  traditional  primary  definers  –  but  also  journalists.  Hall  et  al. 
(1978)  may  have  once  welcomed  journalists  assuming  greater  power  in  the  relationship  with 
power  elites.  Writing  in  the  1970s,  he  might  have  seen  journalists’  role  as  stand-in  citizens 
being  given  greater  autonomy  and  importance.  However,  the  persisting  marginalisation  of 
non-elite  voices  in  sourcing,  interaction,  and  collaboration  through  a  medium  that  lends  itself 
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to  greater  inclusion,  means  the  journalistic  community  is  revealed  to  be  mainly  concerned 
with  its  struggle  for  its  own  elitist  position.  Certainly,  social  media  has  not  been  the  leveller  it 
once  promised  to  be  in  mass  news  media  and  inclusion  of  non-elites,  especially  by  political 
correspondents,  is  not  a  priority  (Molyneux  and  Mourão,  2019;  Nuernbergk,  2016).  With  the 
exception  of  journalists’  increased  visibility  through  the  support  of  their  community,  sourcing 
practices  have  not  changed  substantially.  I  would  argue  that  especially  at  a  time  where  the 
concept  of  professionalism  has  come  under  intense  scrutiny,  journalists  have  an  interest  in 
maintaining  the  status  quo,  emphasising  their  supposed  authority  and  falling  back  on  their 
reliance  on  power  elites,  rather  than  opening  up  to  more  diverse  collaborative  newswork.  In 
the  Greek  case  study,  both  BBC  and  France  24  fell  back  on  their  reliance  on  power  elites, 
even  in  their  social  media  sources.  The  texts  from  the  refugee  crisis  showed  a  more  varied 
picture,  where  the  BBC  relied  heavily  on  their  own  and  other  journalists,  while  France  24 
limited  the  level  of  social  media-sources  overall.  Since  power  elites  already  have  privileged 
access  to  the  news  media,  they  continued  to  be  heavily  represented  regardless. 
 
In  the  case  studies  I  highlighted  the  reliance  on  primarily  English-speaking  sources,  which, 
given  the  news  stories,  were  arguably  not  always  the  most  informative  or  representative  of 
voices.  For  example,  by  relying  on  only  English-speaking  sources  in  the  coverage  of  the 
Greek  debt  crisis,  these  testimonies  may  not  have  provided  a  particularly  authentic  view  of 
what  ordinary  Greeks  thought  or  communicated  to  one  another  in  their  social  networks.  It 
arguably  highlights  how  these  sources  were  attempting  to  speak  to  a  global  community.  The 
news  organisations’  use  of  them  perhaps  illustrates  how  journalists,  broadly  speaking,  choose 
those  who  are  accessible  to  them,  which  suggests  that  collaboration  can  be  focused  on  the 
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discourse  of  contemporary  newswork  than  the  qualitative  impact  that  participation  can  have 
in  broadening  newswork.  
 
While  plurality  and  inclusiveness  is  certainly  a  journalistic  norm,  it  can  be  argued  that  in  a 
news  environment  where  newswork  is  no  longer  necessarily  controlled  by  journalists, 
non-elites  pose  a  greater  threat  to  professionalism  than  elites.  Journalists’  continued  relevance 
in  news  production  with  regards  to  power  elites  is  self-evident,  as  they  fall  back  on  engrained 
ideological  justifications  for  their  profession  as  gatekeepers  against  power  elites  and  political 
spin  –  encapsulated  in  the  well-worn  expression  of  ‘holding  power  to  account’.  In  other 
words,  power  elites  are  not  challenging  professional  journalism’s  raison  d’etre.  However, 
amateurs  engaged  in  newswork  are.  Ordinary  people,  such  as  eyewitnesses,  recording  news 
events  and  publishing  their  material  online,  do  so  too.  The  notion  that  journalists’  work  must 
provide  the  basis  of  an  informed  citizenry  has  arguably  become  much  harder  to  defend  when 
ordinary  people  themselves  can  and  do  carry  out  some  of  this  work.  Even  routines  of 
fact-checking  and  verification,  both  of  which  are  usually  invoked  with  regard  to  eyewitness 
material,  do  not  require  a  journalist  per  se.  ‘Fact-checking’  projects  such  as  snopes.com  and 
factcheck.org  have  mushroomed  and  so-called  fact-checkers  do  not  necessarily  think  of 
themselves  as  journalists.  What  was  always  considered  a  self-evident  journalistic  practice, 
primarily  carried  out  by  the  journalist  and  then  their  sub-editors,  has  been  revamped  as  a  new 
occupation  of  sorts  to  tackle  what  has  been  dubbed  ‘fake  news’,  ‘misinformation’,  or 
‘information  disorder’.  Ironically,  dealing  with  misinformation  has  even  become  a 
semi-academic  pursuit  in  recent  years  despite  journalism’s  aim  to  claim  the  area  of 
verification  for  themselves,  while  public  bodies  and  political  entities  are  also  trying  to  enter 
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this  field  (Poynter  2018).  Beyond  doubt,  fact-checking  is  used  in  boundary  work  in 
journalism,  but  even  there  it  is  contested  as  an  exclusive  domain  of  journalism.  
 
The  objectivity  norm  is  also  difficult  to  use  as  a  defence  when  there  is  no  overt  bias,  though 
objectivity  is  often  the  go-to  norm  when  dealing  with  any  activism.  Boundary  work  to 
distinguish  professional  newswork  from  that  by  non-elite  actors  can  be  tricky  because  there  is 
just  no  one-size-fits-all  approach,  and  acts  of  journalism  are  carried  out  by  non-journalists 
(Allan  2013).  As  non-elite  sources  can  be  the  trickiest  for  journalists  to  distinguish 
themselves  from,  boundary  work  can  be  as  basic  as  distinguishing  between  those  who  have 
authority  and  those  who  do  not  through  inclusion  and  exclusion  from  newswork  –  meaning 
that  non-elite  sources  that  encroach  on  the  newswork  of  journalists  too  much  are  sidelined 
where  there  is  not  an  overwhelming  need  to  include  them.  As  the  case  studies  showed,  Al 
Jazeera  did  the  most  to  deviate  from  this  hierarchy,  showing  that  they  understood  part  of  the 
purpose  of  their  professionalism  as  providing  a  broad  forum.  However,  this  was  always 
clearly  signposted,  with  a  division  between  straight  up  news  reporting,  which  (except  in  the 
Aleppo  case  study)  comprised  little  social  media  content,  and  news  content  that  was 
especially  tailored  to  social  media.  This  is  significant  because  there  was  still  boundary  work 
that  was  communicated  through  the  different  news  products.  AJPlus  and  The  Stream  news 
products  were  far  more  likely  to  comprise  social  media-sourced  content,  as  opposed  to 
coverage  on  the  main  website  aljazeera.net.  In  addition,  the  news  products  that  were  focused 
on  social  media  content  were  couched  in  the  idea  of  inclusivity  and  facilitating  public  debate, 
which  are  themselves  journalistic  norms.  The  convention  of  collaboration  the  way  Hujanen 
(2016)  described  it  was  perhaps  most  closely  represented  there,  with  the  journalist  managing 
the  chaos  of  citizen  debate. 
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 There  are  exceptional  circumstances  where  access  might  be  impossible,  such  as  seen  in  the 
Aleppo  case  study.  There,  the  public  audience  was  exposed  to  high  levels  of  legitimising  of 
non-journalists  through  journalistic  boundary  work,  even  though  they  may  not  have  been  in 
keeping  with  journalistic  norms  and  practices  with  regard  to  independence,  impartiality  and 
even  autonomy.  However,  the  defence  of  professionalism  was  asserted  in  tandem  with  the 
reliance  on  non-journalists’  newswork.  It  is  likely  that  by  doing  so,  news  organisations 
undermined  their  exclusivity  as  news  providers  through  a  short-term  trade-off  for  the  benefit 
of  keeping  production  costs  down  and  their  own  correspondents  safe.  The  aggressive  pursuit 
of  journalists,  not  only  by  the  Syrian  regime  but  also  by  opposition  fighters,  must  be 
understood  as  a  battle  for  controlling  the  news  narrative.  And  this  was  a  battle  that  was 
decidedly  won  by  the  opposition  to  President  Bashar  al-Assad  across  the  three  news 
organisations  –  though  to  different  extents  across  the  news  outlets.  These  sources  were  able  to 
become  primary  definers  of  the  Syrian  conflict  in  much  of  the  coverage,  but  were  also 
secondary  definers  through  their  activity  as  news  producers  in  their  localities.  In  fact,  part  of 
the  legitimising  of  their  newswork  by  professional  journalists  was  in  promoting  them  as 
taking  on  journalistic  practices,  therefore  partly  integrating  them  into  the  journalistic 
community. 
 
The  way  the  three  news  organisations  managed  participation  by  non-elites  was  perhaps  the 
most  diverse  out  of  all  the  source  groups,  ranging  from  near  exclusion  to  appearing  to  embed 
newswork  with  particular  communities.  The  BBC  appeared  to  be  mainly  concerned  with 
reaffirming  the  power  relationship  between  journalists  and  non-elite  voices.  Non-elite  and 
audience  participation  in  newswork  was  condensed  into  the  same  thing,  which  meant  that 
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BBC  news  editors  were  primarily  interested  in  involving  their  global  audience  in  order  to 
foster  brand  loyalty.  There  was  a  sense  that  audience  participation  was  integrated  because  it 
made  business  sense.  In  the  case  studies,  collaborative  newswork  with  non-elites  was  often 
mainly  about  engaging  the  BBC  audience  and  not  necessarily  about  exploring  new  voices  to 
produce  more  multifaceted  coverage  of  the  news  event.  Collaboration  with  non-elites  in 
newswork  was  very  low  except  for  the  Aleppo  coverage,  where  a  high  level  of  legitimating 
was  carried  out  by  the  BBC.  Al  Jazeera’s  reasoning  for  how  it  managed  participation  by 
non-elites  was  also  partly  built  around  audience  reach,  but  rather  than  claiming  a  particular 
audience  for  itself,  it  tried  to  harness  the  existing  audience  for  a  particular  news  topic.  It 
recognised  the  fluidity  in  news  consumption,  and  the  ‘influencers’  and  communities  at  the 
centre  of  particular  news  content  on  social  media.  To  capitalise  on  the  audiences  built  around 
these  communities,  more  parity  between  journalists  and  amateurs  was  needed.  France  24  on 
the  other  hand  used  non-elite  sources  often  to  simply  source  the  content  of  other  mainstream 
news  media,  so  that  the  original  input  of  these  sources  was  virtually  non-existent.  The  outlet 
was  perhaps  the  most  consistent  in  excluding  non-elite  sources  from  newswork,  and  even  in 
the  Aleppo  case  study  took  the  most  removed  approach  to  such  sources.  While  France  24 
Observers  gave  non-elites  a  much  more  prominent  role  in  collaborative  newswork,  it  was  not 
found  to  have  had  any  relevance  to  the  case  studies.  Its  own  news  agenda  existed  in  parallel 
to  the  mainstream  news  agenda.  This  perhaps  also  limited  how  explicit  the  newswork  needed 
to  be  in  terms  of  showing  boundary  work,  as  collaboration  with  non-elite  users  did  not  bleed 
into  the  main  news  output.  It  was  presented  as  a  specialised  form  of  newswork  that  was 
physically  removed  from  the  bulk  of  the  journalism  produced  at  France  24.  At  least  in  these 
case  studies  it  was  not  a  driver  in  agenda-setting  routines,  with  no  integration  into  the 
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mainstream  news  cycle.  The  relevant  and  topical  newswork  of  the  day  remained  firmly  in  the 
hands  of  journalists. 
 
It  is  probably  no  coincidence  that  Twitter  has  emerged  as  the  social  media  platform  of  choice 
for  most  journalists.  The  professional  networked  community  can  be  perhaps  one  of  the  most 
powerful  gatekeeping  tools  available  to  journalists,  while  at  the  same  time  appearing  to  be  in 
the  thick  of  the  collaborative  newswork.  Out  of  all  the  platforms  available  for  networked 
journalism,  it  was  the  one  that  was  relied  on  the  most,  and  this  is  no  coincidence.  Many 
prolific  journalist  tweeters  cultivate  their  ‘following’  to  ‘follower’  ratio.  The  number  of  users 
they  follow  –  often  in  the  low  thousands  and  sometimes  in  the  hundreds  –  are  those  that  they 
deem  important  enough  to  listen  to.  For  them,  Twitter  provides  two-way  communication  but 
they  hold  a  megaphone  and  have  highly  selective  hearing.  Social  media  (usually  Twitter)  for 
journalists  is  largely  not  a  place  to  listen  and  watch  but  a  place  to  speak  and  be  heard.  The 
microblog  as  a  platform  for  news  and  opinion  makers  to  put  information  out  was  also  pointed 
out  by  BBC  Editor  Mark  Frankel,  only  underlining  how  journalists’  are  most  comfortable  in  a 
space  that  replicates  the  sourcing  practices  they  are  used  to.  English  writer  and  producer 
Charlie  Brooker  once  likened  Twitter  to  a  video  game,  summing  it  up:  ‘It’s  a  massive  online, 
multiplayer  RPG  in  which  you  choose  an  avatar  and  you  act  out  a  persona  loosely  based  on 
your  own  in  order  to  gain  followers”  (Channel  4  News  2013).  The  observation  is  perhaps  a 
little  tongue-in-cheek  –  in  keeping  with  Brooker’s  own  public  persona  –  but  there  is  truth  to 
it.  Twitter  is  a  tool  by  which  most  journalists  chase  audiences  based  on  their  image  and 
strategic  networks  of  collaboration.  When  collaboration  happens  it  is  usually  expected  to 
happen  with  the  ‘right’  people.  Anyone  outside  of  this  might  provide  a  ‘scoop’  but  is  not 
brought  into  the  collaborative  relationship  beyond  that.  I  would  add  that  if  you  were  to  view 
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Twitter  as  a  game,  it  is  not  just  each  man  for  himself  –  on  the  contrary,  tied  into  it  is  a 
necessary  element  of  community  building  which  can  benefit  the  community  overall.  The 
professional  networked  community  can  be  perhaps  one  of  the  most  powerful  gatekeeping 
tools  available  to  journalists.  Carlson  (2018)  has  written  about  journalism’s  objectivity  norm 
as  a  commitment  to  remaining  external  to  the  political  process  in  order  to  occupy  the 
“symbolic  communicative  center  of  democratic  society”  and  has  called  on  journalists  to 
advocate  the  social  value  of  this  norm.  I  am  inclined  to  agree,  but  believe  that  such 
externality  should  also  require  journalists  to  exist  outside  the  echo  chambers  of  their  own 
networks.  I  would  argue  that  in  networked  journalism  among  the  professional  elite,  the  idea 
of  externality  has  been  often  abandoned.  Indeed,  the  use  of  the  concept  of  filter  bubbles  to 
berate  audiences  and  defend  professional  journalism  is,  arguably,  illogical  –  given   the  blind 
spot  that  consists  around  the  filter  bubble  of  networked  journalists  themselves.  It  can  be 
argued  that  the  social  media  echo  chambers  created  and  inhabited  by  journalists  exist 
primarily  to  reinforce  their  professional  authority,  but  given  the  loss  of  control  over 
newswork  as  a  whole,  the  question  is  whether  they  are  largely  self-affirming  (even 
self-deceiving)  about  the  state  and  status  of  the  profession.  The  more  the  journalist  elite 
fosters  its  own  community,  the  less  it  is  able  to  connect  with  the  wider  public.  Given  that  the 
role  of  stand-in  citizen  has  become  somewhat  obsolete  for  journalists,  they  need  to  reimagine 
their  role  in  different  terms.  Instead  of  chasing  the  self-perception  of  acting  as  stand-in 
citizen,  perhaps  it  is  time  to  foster  a  new  role  as  link  between  citizens  and  journalism’s 
institutions.  
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